A
«
THE ROYAL NAVY
A HISTORY
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT
»
9 "y- / ^/
•^^V.'fwc^.^^ 3it^
- .^;^i/ a^ffftfi^i'm*- ^^*m^fi
A History
From the Earliest Times to the Present
By
Wm. Laird Clowes
Fello-M of Kings College, London ; Gold Medallist U.S. Naval Institute ;
Hon. Member of the R. U.S. Institution
Assisted by
Sir Clements Markham, K.C.B., F.R.S.
Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N.
Mr. H. W. Wilson
Col. Theodore Roosevelt, late Assist. Sec. U.S. Navy
Mr. L. Carr Laughton
etc.
T\venty=five Photogravures
and
Hundreds of Full Page and other
Illustrations
Maps, Charts
In Five Volumes
Vol. III.
LONDON
Sam I 'SON Low, Marston and Company
LI. MIT ED
^t. Sun-tan's! ?|ou5f, dTcttcr Hanc, i£.C
1898
LONDON :
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFOKD STREET ASP CHAniSG CliOSS.
INTEODUCTION TO VOLUME III.
L
Some of the causes which contributed to delay the appearance of
the second vohime of this History of the Eoyal Navy, have con-
tributed to delay the appearance of this, the third. The progress,
of the work has, as before, been hampered by my ill-health and
my enforced residence in the high Alps during the greater part,
of the year. A certain amount of delay, moreover, has resulted
indirectly from the recent war between the United States and
Spain. Captain A. T. Mahan, whose critical narrative of the
major operations of the War of the American Revolution fills,
about a third of the present volume, was employed in the service
of his country^ at Washington during the late conflict, and was.
thus prevented for a time from devoting his attention to other
matters. So much of the delay as has been caused by his pre-
occupation will, I am sure, be readily forgiven, seeing that he
has now been able to revise proofs, etc., which must otherwise
have been sent to press without his final imprimatuy. This book
has much to say concerning the beginnings and the early exploits
of the United States' Navy, which, in the days of Hull and
Decatur, proved itself to be as capable and chivalrous an
opponent as Great Britain ever had to meet upon the seas, and
which since, — and not only in the days of Tatnall, — has shown
itself as true and loyal a friend to Britain and her Navy, in peace-
time, as it was gallant a foe in war. I cannot, therefore, refrain
from expressing here a sentiment which, in the course of the late
short but brilliant struggle, must have welled up often in the
^ I should meution that my other American collaborator, Mr. Theodore Eoosevelt,
resigned his appointment as Assistant Secretary of the U. S. Navy, in order to take an
active part in the war, and, having obtained a commission as Lieut.-Colonel of the now
famous " Rough Eiders," fought with very distinguished bravery before Santiago^
de Cuba. He has since been elected Governor of the State of New York.
vi IXTnODUCTION TO VOLUME HI.
heart of inaiiy a Briton. We triumph wherever the race wins
fresh glories ; and we feel proud in the thought that the victory
has heen gained by men speaking our speech, bearing our names,
sharing our blood, and insj)ired by the traditions bequeathed equally
to both nations by Howard, Drake, Hawkins, Blake, Boscawen and
Hawke. Not to us has it fallen in these recent years to illustrate
those traditions, and to add to them fresh epics. Yet, since our
brothers of the Kew World have shown themselves at Manilla and
Santiago the same men that they were at Mobile and New Orleans,
we are surely justified in hoping that we, should the hour for action
come again, shall be able to prove that our branch of the old stock
retains, in a similar manner, the old grit and the old sea virtues.
Although, as I have said, the progress of the work continues to
be somewhat delayed by my personal disabilities, I am not conscious
that the book suffers in any other way in consequence of my ill-
health. Thanks to my numerous and indefatigable helpers and
correspondents, I am not, in spite of my necessary absence from
home, obhged to forego reference to any documents, state papers, or
books which ought to be consulted. Happily, too, most of the
materials for my part of the work were collected, and, to some
extent, set m order, ere I became a prisoner here ; and although, of
course, I still very often have to appeal for further particulars to the
public libraries, the Kecord Office, i^rivate muniment rooms, and
other storehouses of fact, there is, I find, remarkably little supple-
mentary research of this kind which cannot be carried out for me
by my assistants. It is a longer process, and a costlier, but not, I
hope, a less effective one.
I make this explanation because some friendly critics who have
been so good as to point out certain small errors of omission or
commission in ilie previous volumes, have generously hinted their
•conviction that, were I not the invalid I unfortunately am, these
errors would not have appeared. If 1 really believed that my state
of health were nicompatible with the carrying out of the work in
hand, I should assuredly try to find someone else to take over my
duties and responsibihties. But the fact is that such errors as I
have had brought to my notice, — and fortunately they are neither
serious nor numerous, — are inevitable imperfections in any ))Ook of
this nature ; for, paradoxical though it be, I can safely assert that
in nothing is it so impossible to attain to absolute correctness and
finahty as in a critical record (jf historic facts. The difficulty
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME ILL vii
would beset me equally, were I sound instead of sick, and in London
instead of in Switzerland. There are conflicts of evidence which
appear irreconcilable ; there are original authorities which cannot
be laid hands upon, or which even the most studiously careful will
by chance overlook ; and there are many questions, the discussion of
which cannot be seriously attempted in a work to which limits have
been set. I am sure that some at least of the critics to whom I
have alluded, have made the mistake of supposing that it is because
of my condition and my position that I have ignored this witness'
testimony on a court-martial, have seemed to pay little or no heed
to the statements contained in that document, or have failed to
•enter upon such and such an interesting, but wide point of criticism.
I am obliged to say that such shortcomings as are to be found in
these volumes are due, for the most part, to very different causes.
Firstly, I am restrained by the space at my command from touching
upon many subjects with which I should otherwise like to deal at
length, and from entering upon long discussions as to the credibility
of evidence. The same consideration even obliges me to omit many
footnotes and references which I should otherwise gladly include.
Secondly, I am guided by the conviction that anyone who aspires
to complete a book so voluminous as this History, must perforce
proceed upon principles somewhat similar to those which Dr.
Johnson sketched in a very famous passage.
" Failures," he wrote, " however frequent, may admit of extenuation anil apology.
To have attempted much is always laudable, even wlieu the enterprise is above the
strength that undertakes it. To deliberate whenever I doubted, to enquire whenever I
was ignorant, would have protracted the undertaking without end, and perhaps without
improvement. I saw that one enquiry only gave occasion to another, that book referred
to book, that to search was not always to find, and to find was not always to be
informed ; and that thus to pursue perfection was, like the first inhabitants of Arcadia,
to chase the sun, which, when they had reached the hill where he seemed to rest, was
still beheld at the same distance from them."
If, to put matters in other words, one were determined, in an
undertaking of this kind, to be content with nothing short of absolute
completeness and finality, neither the initiator, nor, after his death,
any of his successors, would live long enough to finish the work.
I make bold to recommend this reflection to all my critics, and
especially to one of them, who, in his review of my second volume,
said, speaking of the account there given of the first Dutch War
(1652-54), that it was " premature." I do not doubt that it will be
possible, say a hundred years hence, to write a better and completer
viii INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME III.
liistoiy of that war than can be written now ; but to admit so niiich
is siirel)' not the same thing as to agree that a history, carefully
written now, and illustrated with scores of previously unpublished
facts, is written too soon. It is surely not " premature " to brush
away even a single published error or misconception concerning the
course of our naval history ; and, I think, I may safely say that this,
volume and those volumes which have preceded it, — although they,
too, possibly contain many errors on minor points, — give, upon the
whole, a much fairer and more accurate version of that history than
has been hitherto presented. One dares not hope for — much less
can one wait for, — absolute finality. But, by means of an under-
taking planned and carried out as this one is, in accordance with
the principles set forth in my General Preface, one may at least be
instrumental in enlarging general knowledge of a great subject, and
in rendering impossible the future acceptation of some of the gross.
and astonishing misstatements on naval matters which one finds in
almost every English history. I have no wish to say here anything
unkind about any of my brother men of letters : but I cannot
abstain from citing from one particular book a few misstatements of
the sort to which I allude, in order that it may be seen that the
present work is not " premature," and that there does exist alread}^
a real necessity for something of the kind. I speak of a book, dealing
with EngUsh history generally, and consisting of upwards of eleven
hundred large pages of small type. It bears the imprint of reputable
publishers ; and upon the title-page are the names of two distin-
guished university men, one of whom is described as a lecturer on
modern historj^ and the other as a late professor on history, in a
well-known English college. The second edition of this book, dated
1885, is responsible for the following extraordinary statements,
among others.
Of Admiral Edward Vernon (1), it is said tliat he was a "rear-
admiral at twenty-four," and that he " failed in his attempt to
seize Porto Bello, from an insufficiency of force." The truth is
that Vernon was made a vice-admiral in 1739, when he was fifty-
five, that ho had never before held flag-rank, and that, far from
failing at Puerto Bello, he brilliantly captured that place on
November 22nd, 1739, " with six ships only," as may be seen on
reference to pp. 54-57 of the present volume.
Surely there is some unconscious suppressio vert in the assertion
that, "foiled in his attempt to catch the Spanish treasure-ship,.
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II L ix
Anson sailed westward from America with the Centurion, his sole
remaining ship, and arrived at Spithead in June 1744." The story
of what really happened, and of how the Manilla galleon was taken,
will be found on p. 328 of this volume.
Episodes, localities, and individuals are curiously jumbled and
confused in the following passage : — " On the 1st of June, 1794, the
division of the Channel fleet commanded by Lord Howe attacked
and utterly defeated the French fleet off the Hyeres Islands. In
this action Hood played a conspicuous i)art, and in the following
August he was created Baron Bridport, in the Irish peerage." It is
true, of course, that a great battle was fought on " The Glorious
First of June," 1794 ; but it was fought, not off the Hyeres Islands,
which lie near Toulon, in the Mediterranean, but off Ushant, near
the mouth of the British Channel. The only important action
fought off Hyeres during the war of 1793-1802 was fought in July,
1795, by a British fleet under Admiral "William Hotham (1). That
force was not a division of the Channel fleet, nor were the French
utterly defeated on the occasion. Moreover, Lord Bridport was not
upon the scene.
Bodney is descri))ed as " the son of a naval officer of some
renown." Henry Eodney, his father, is usually supposed, neverthe-
less, to have been a country gentleman, living at Walton-on-Thames.
It is further said of Eodney that, while he was residing in France,
" offers were made by the French to tempt him to desert his
country ; but he rejected the overtures, and was rewarded in 1778
by being promoted to be an admiral." It is news that promotion in
the Navy has ever been a reward for a flag-officer's refusal to become
a traitor : yet, seeing that when Bodney was made an Admiral of
the White, on January 29th, 1782, he was still in France, and that,
according to the generally accepted stor}-, he owed his ability to
return to England to the fact that a French gentleman lent him the
necessary money, it is difficult to believe that the authorities at
Whitehall, if they had ever suspected him of treasonable proclivities,
could have felt sure, when they promoted him, that their suspicions
were baseless.
Of Sir Charles Napier it is said : "in 1829 he was employed off'
the coast of Portugal in the Galatea. He supported the Constitu-
tionalists ; defeated the fleet of Don Miguel, and settled Donna
Maria on the throne. Don Pedro was unbounded in his gratitude :
created him Viscount of Cape St. Vincent ; gave him all the
X ISTRODUCTION TO VOLUME III.
Portugiiese orders, and named bim admiral-in-chief." From this it
would certainly appear to the ordinary reader that, while com-
manding H.M.S. Galatea, Napier took an active part in the internal
atiairs of Portugal and defeated Don Miguel ; and that, in conse-
<iuence of his action, he was given command of Don Pedro's fleet.
Vet, in fact, Napier quitted the Galatea early in 188'2 ; succeeded
Sartorius in command of Don Pedro's fleet in 1833, and did not,
until he was already serving in that capacity, defeat Don Miguel.
1 might, if it were worth while, cite scores of other misstate-
ments, equally astonishing, from the book in question, and from
other recent works dealing with English history. Surely, when
.such misstatements are being circulated broadcast, it is not
•' premature " to put forw^ard a Naval History which, though it
may possibly contain errors on obscure points of fact or criticism,
and though it make no pretence to be absolutely complete and
linal, has been, at least, prepared with a vast amount of care,
which is the outcome of reference, — not, of course, to all existing
original authorities, but to many thousands of unpublished docu-
ments, private and public, and to many thousands of printed
histories, biographies, official paj)ers, Navy lists, pamphlets and
periodicals ; and which has involved research in, and, in some
cases, special journeys to, not merely many parts of England, but
also Prance, America, Spain, Holland, Kussia, Denmark and Italy.
For Chapters XXVI, XXVII, and XXX, of the present volume,
and for the appendix and some of the notes to Chapter XXXI, I am
directly responsible. Sir Clements Markham contributes Chapter
XXIX ; Captain Mahan, Chapter XXXI, and Mr. L. Carr Laughton,
Chapter XXVIII, and the appendix thereto.
Captain Mahan desires me to express here, on his ])ehalf, very
cordial thanks to Professor J. K. Laughton, R.N., who has kindly
assisted him in many ways in the preparation of Chapter XXXI, in
the present volume.^ With regard to that chapter, I ought to point
<»ut that the plan, on p. ;>75, of the naval attack on Fort Moultrie,
Charleston, in J77i), will bo found to ditfer, in some small and un-
important details, from Captain ^Nlahan's description of the disposi-
tions of the ships and of the guns in the works. Seeing, however,
that the plan in question is based uj)on a contemporary drawing
' "Ue kiiiiUy i)lace(l at my disposal numerous notes mailc by him at the Record
Oflicc. TLcKc liave been of ijreat, ami indeed of indisjjensable assistance in tlie
iiarnitivc."^ — Letter of Taptain Mahan to W. T;. ('.
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME JIT. XI
inade upon the spot by a British naval officer, and intended to
accompany and illustrate the dispatch of Commodore Sir Peter
Parker (1), I have deemed it to be of more than sufficient interest
to warrant its reproduction. For its inclusion, however, Captain
Mahan is not responsible. Among other supplementary illustrations
which I have ventured to add to his chapter, is the valuable note on
p. 396. It is but a brief note ; but it represents the results of many
days' labour ; and we should not have been able to obtain the
figures contained in it, had we not had the co-operation of Colonel
H. Hozier, Secretary of Lloyd's, who most kindly allowed some of
the clerks in his office to compile the table from the original
documents.
To Lord Vernon, for information concerning his distinguished
kinsman, Admiral Edward Vernon (1), and to Captain Thomas
Suckling, B.N. (retd.), I desire also to express special thanks.
I regret that, owing to the fact that more than one chapter
of the present volume has extended to greater length than was
originally intended, I have found it impossible to conclude the
history of the period 1762-1793 with Mr. H. W. Wilson's account
of the minor operations of the War of American Eevolution. That
account will form the first chapter of Vol. IV, which, since most
of it is already in type, will, I hope, be in a condition for publication
very early in the year 1899.
W. L. C.
Davos-am-Platz, Switzerland.
Nov. 1898.
ERRATA.
The reader is requested to correct the followiug errors, the presence of which was
not discovered until after the greater part of the volume had been sent to press.
P. 9, at end of the table, in the two lower lines, under Cables,
for Diameter of bower cables, read Circumference of bower cables.
P. 373, line 4: from hottom,
for Captain James Eeid, read Commander James lleid.
„ line 2 from hottom,
for Christopher, redd Tobias.
P. 380, line 5,
for Admiral Lord Howe, read Vice-Admiral Lord Howe.
P. 387, line 21,
for Caulfield, read Caulfeild.
P. 406, in tahle in note, under Vigilant,
for Com. Hugh Cloberry Christian, orad Com. Brabazon Christian
P. 471, line 18,
for Thomas Graves (1), read Thomas Graves (2).
P. 473, line 25,
for Caulfield, read Caulfeild.
„ line 26,
for Bonovier, read Bonavia.
P.' 474, line 2 from bottom,
for Caulfield, read Caulfeild.
P. 505, in 2nd col. of table,
for Capt. George Murray, read Cnpt. Hon. George Murray.
for Capt. Ptobert Sutton, read Capt. Robert Manners Sutton.
P. 538, line 14,
for Pilchard Hughes, Bart. (2), read Pilchard Hughes (3), Bart.
„ in first foot-note,
for Piichard Hughes, Bart. (1), read Eichard Hughes (2), Bart.
P. 546, in ord col. of note,
for Heros, read Heros.
P. 550, in line 8 of A.th col. of tahle,
for Lapalliere, read Lapelliere.
P. 554, line 35,
for Batacalo, read Batticaloa.
P. 557, line 12,
for Batacalo, read Batticaloa.
CONTENTS.
VOLUME III.
CHAPTER XXVI.
PAGE
Civil History of the Koyal Navy, 1714-17G2 .... 1
CHAPTER XXVII.
Military History of the Royal Navy, 1714-1762 :
Major Operations ••...... 24
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Military History of the Royal Navy, 1714-1762 :
Minor Operations . . . . . . . . 256
Appendix to Chapters XXVII. and XXVIII. :
Losses of the Belligerent Powers —
(a) Losses of H.M. Ships from 1714-1763 . . . 310
(h) Losses of the French Navy, 1744-48 and 1755-62 . 312
(c) Losses of the Spanish Navy, 1718-19, 1739-48,
AND 1762 314
CHAPTER XXIX.
Voyages and Discoveries, 1714-1762. ..... 316
CHAPTER XXX.
Civil History of the Royal Navy, 1763-1792 .... 325
XVI CONTENTS OF VOLUME HI.
CHAPTER XXXI.
PAGK
Military History of the Royal Xavy, 17G3-1792 :
Major Operations ........ 353
Appendix to Chapter XXXI. :
List of British Flag-Officers on the Active List, 1762-1793 5G5
IKDEX 569
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
VOLUME III.
r
FULL-PAGE PHOTOGRAVURES.
CxRORfiE, Lord Anson, Admikal op the Fleet
George Brydges, Lord Rodney, Admiral .
Captain James Cook, R.N.
Richard, Earl Hoave, Admiral op the Fleet
Sir Edward Hughes, K.B., Admiral .
. Frontinpiece
FnriiK/ paf/e 242
340
406
5.50
FULL-PAGE ILLUSTRATIONS.
H.M.S. "Grapton," pitted with a jury rudder, etc., for
HER VOYAGE TO ENGLAND, AFTER THE STORM OFF LOUIS-
BOURG, 1757. (JFVrtw Hrrvey's ' Naval HisT(n?v ') . Ftifimj jicuje 1G9
Attack on Fort Moultrie, 1776 . . . . . Far/c 375
Part op North America and the North Atlantic, and
the West Indies .......,, 377
New York Harbour, and Neighbourhood . . . „ 381
Martinique ........... 485
India and Ceylon . . . . . . . . ,, 544
ILLUSTRATIONS IN THE TEXT.
IThe illiistratiiiiis tliiiK marked (i) are taken f rum '.-1 Naval Expdaitur,' bii 'J!lH>iiiax liileii Blanekley :
TAiiiihi/i, 1T50.]
PAGE
1
6
6
8
13
iTop
The French " Invincible," 74
The Spanish " Glorioso," 74
The French "Terrible," 74
Hadley's Quadrant .
XVlll
ILLUSTRATIONS.
.t(
^ KoYAL Standard, of George II. .
COMMEMOKATIVE MeDAL OF MaTHEWS'S AcTION, 1744
►Sir John Xorris, Kt., Admiral of the Fleet .
George Bync;, Viscount Torrington, Admiral ok the Flei
Commemorative Medal of Byng's Victory, 1788
Admiral Nicholas Haddock
Admiral Ed»vard Vernon.
Attack on Puerto Bello, 1739
Admiral Sir Charles Knowles.
Commemorative Medal of Operations at Cakta<;i;na, 1741
The Neighbourhood of Toulon
Sir William Rowley, Admiral of the Fleet
Mathews's Action off Toulon, 1744 .
Admiral Thomas Mathews
Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Warren
Commemorative Medal of Anson's Victory, 174
Admiral Sir Charles Know'les.
Port Louis, Hispaniola .
Byng's Action, 1756, I., 2 p.m. .
Byng's Action, 1756, II., 2.30 p.m.
Byng's Action, 1756, III., 3 p.m.
Admiral the Hon. John Byng .
Vice- Admiral Charles Watson.
Captain Maurice Suckling, R.N.
Admiral Sir Charles- Saunders
Admiral Sir George Pocock
Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt
The Harbour of Louisbourg
Commemorative Medal of the Capture op Louisbourg, 1758
Commemorative Medal of the Battle of Quiberon, 1759
Sir Peter Parker, Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral Sir Richard King
' BiTTACLE, OR BlNN4CLE, 1750
^ VoYAL Block .
1 Ships' Fire-Engines, 1750
'Log, 1750
Hand Screw, or Jack, 1750
Signature of Richard, Earl Howe, Admiral of the Fleet
Commemorative Medal of Keppel's Action, 1778
Lake Cham plain ......
M.VNfEUVRES OF HoWE AND d'EsTAING .
Admiiiai, Augustus Viscount Keppel.
page
23
25
28
31
39
49
53
56
60
73
92
93
98
99
114
127
133
134
149
149
150
159
162
166
170
173
180
184
185
222
237
240
255
256
309
316
324
325
353
355
407
418
ILLUSTRATIONS. '
XIX
8 TO 9 A.M
NOON TO
Kkppel's Action off Ushant, 1778, I., 2.30 p.m.
Keppel's Action off Ushant, 1778, II., 6 p.m.
Admiral the Hon. Samuel Barrington
Northern Part of St. Lucia .
Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker (1)
Byron's Action off Grenada
Admiral Harriot Arbuthnot .
Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2)
Rodney and de Guichen, April 17th, 1780, I.,
Rodney and de Guichen, April 17th, 1780, II
Rodney and de Guichen, May 15th, 1780
Cornvvallis and de Tbrnay, June 20th, 1780
Admiral the Hon. Sir William Cornvvallis
Commemorative Medal of the Capture of St. Eustatius
Part of the Windward Islands
Arbuthnot and des Touches
Graves and de Grasse
Hood and de Grasse, January 25th, 1782, I.
Hood and de Grasse, January 25th, 1782, II.
Hood's Anchorage at St. Kitt's, 1782
Rodney and de Grasse, April 9th, 1782, I., 9.45 a.m
Rodney and de Grasse, April 9th, 1782, II., noon
Commemorative Medal of Rodney's Victory, 1782
Rodney and de Grasse, April 12th, 1782, A.
Rodney and de Grasse, April 12th, 1782, B.
Rodney and de Grasse, April 12tii, 1782, C.
Rodney' and de Grasse, April 12th, 1782, D.
SuFFREN and Johnstone, Porto Praya, 1781
Suffren and Hughes, February 17th, 1782
SUFFREN AND HUGHES, APRIL 12tH, 1782 .
SUFFRKN AND HUGHES, JULY 6tH, 1782
SUFFREN AND HuGHES, SEPTEMBER OKD, 1782
1 P.M.
PAGE
419
421
427
430
433
436
441
444
455
457
465
475
476
480
483
491
498
514
515
517
522
523
524
526
527
528
529
547
551
553
555
559
NAVAL HISTOEY.
CHAPTEE XXVI.
CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1714-1762.
Adiuinistration of the Navy — The Admiralty Board — The Sick and Wound-id Board —
The Admiralty Buildings— The Navy Office— The Navy Pay Office— First Lords
and Secretaries of the Admiralty, and Principal Officers of the Navy, 1714-1702 —
Naval Expenditure — Increase in various classes of ships — State of the fleet in 1714,
1727, 1752 and 1760 — The introduction of the true frigate — The dimensions of ships
— Complements — Small arms — Anchors — Cables — Method of computing tonnage
— Service ordnance — ^The armament of ships-— Some typical men-of-war — Cost of
men-of-war in 1719, 1733 and 174 L — Hadley's quadrant— Harrison's timekeeper
— Coppering — Sail-cloth — The Eddystone Light — Lighthouses — Lightships — The
King's Eegulations and Admiralty Instructions — Pilots — Smugglers — Vernon on
smugglers and their dangers — Piepression of piracy — -The Articles of War —
Greenwich Hospital — Tlie encoui-agement of seamen— Prize money — Bounties to
seamen — Pay and half-pay — Officers' servants — Promotion to flag-rank — Super-
annuation of Captains — The establishment of uniform for officers — The rough life
of the service — The character of officers — Immorality on the lower deck — Health
of the Navy.
mm
D
UEING the period 1714-1762 very littlo change
took place in the character of the machinery
whereby the Eoyal Navy was admiiiistered. That
machinery had attained a certain degree of perfection,
and was in fairly good working order. The Act of
William and Mary,^ which specified and defined the
functions of the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High
Admiral of England, continued to be the authority in virtue of which
the Admiralty Board acted; and the patent granted to her Admiralty
Board by Queen Anne was substantially reproduced from time to
time as fresh Boards succeeded one another. In the civil depart-
ment, the most important alteration was the appointment, in
1740, of a Sick and Wounded Board. The sick and hurt seamen
of the Navy had been looked after by a Commission in the reign
1 2 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2.
VOL. III. B
2 CIVIL HISTORY, 1714-1762. [1714-17G2.
of William III. ; but iu IGU'J the business had been transferred to
the Commissioners of the Eegister Office, and thence, in 1702, to
another separate Commission, which had lasted until 1713. There-
after, for some years, things remained unsettled ; but in 1740, in
consequence of the war with Spain, a Commission was specially
granted to three persons, who were entrusted not only with the care
of sick and wounded seamen, but also with the superintendence of
medical stores supplied for the use of the Navy, the management of
naval hospitals ashore and afloat, the examination and appointment
of naval surgeons, and the maintenance and exchange of prisoners
of war. From 1745 to 1749, this Board consisted of four instead
of three Commissioners ; from 1749 to 1755, of two only ; from
xVpril to November, 1755, of three, as at first ; and from 1755 to
1768, of four. Its offices were on Tower Hill.
The old Admiralty buildings at Wallingford House fell into decay
about the year 1722, when the office of the Commissioners was
temporarily transferred to a house in St. James's Square. The
older part of the present Admiralty buildings in Whitehall, was
completed and occupied in 1725, though not until 1760 was the
colonnade or screen built across the street-side of the court-yard to
mitigate the unpleasant effect produced by the attenuated propor-
tions of the columns on the western side of the square. The Navy
Office remained during the period at the corner of Seething Lane
and Crutched Friars ; and the Navy Pay Office was in Old Broad
Street.
The succession of the more important administrative officers was
as follows : —
FlEST LOED OP THE AdMIEALTY.
Oct. 14, 1714. Edward, Earl of Orford, Admiral.
Ap. 1(), 1717. James, Earl of Berkeley, Admiral.
Aug. 2, 1727. George, Viscount Torrington, Admiral.
June 21, 1788. Sir Charles Wager, Kt., Admiral.
Mar. J'.), 1742. Daniel, Earl of Winchelsea.
Dec. 1744. John, Duke of Bedford.
Feb. 20, 1748. John, Earl of Sandwich.
June 22, 1751. George, Lord Anson, Admiral.
Nov. 20, 175(5. Kichard, Earl Temple.
Ap. 1757. Daniel, Eaii of AVinchelsea.
June 30, 1757. George, Lord Anson, Admiral.
June ]0, 17(i2. George, Earl of Halifax.
Oct. 16, 1762. George Grenville.
1714-1762.] PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
3
Secretary of the Admiralty.
Josiah Burchett.
1742. Thomas Corbett.
1751. John Clevland (with,
John Milnes).
Treasurer oe the Navy.
John Aislabie.
1718. Eichard Hampden.
1720. Sir Geo. Byng, Kt., Adm.
1721. Hon. Henry Pattee Byng.
1725. William Corbett.
1734. Arthur Onslow.
Feb. 1742. Thomas Clutterbiick.
Dec. 1742. Sir Charles Wager, Kt.,
Admiral.
1743. Sir John Eushout, Bart.
1744. George Doddington.
1749. Hon. Henry Bilson Legge.
1754. George Grenville.
1755. George Doddinsiton.
1756. George Grenville.
A[)ril 1757. George Doddington.
June 1757. George Grenville.
1762. William Wildman, Vis-
count Barrington.
Controller oe the Navy.
Sir Charles Wager, Kt.,
Eear-Admiral.
April 1718. Thomas Swanton (1),
Captain, E.N.
Jan. 1722. James Miglielis, Vice- Ad-
miral.
Mar. 1734. Eichard Haddock (2),
Captain, E.N.
Mar. 22, 1749. Savage Mostyn, Captain,
E.N.
Feb. 1755. Edward Falkingham (1),
Captain, E.N.
Nov. 1755. Charles Saunders, Cap-
tain, E.N.
June 1756. Digby Dent (2), Captain,
E.N.
Dec. 1756. George Cockburne, Cap-
tain, E.N.
Surveyor of the Navy.
William Lee.
Mar. 1715. Jacob Ackworth.
June 1746. Joseph Allin.
/Thomas Slade.
Aug.
1755.
\ William Bateley
as assistant and deputy,
May
Sept.
April
Aug.
July
Jan.
Mar.
Clerk or the Acts.
Samuel Atkins.
1719. Tempest Holmes.
1726. Thomas Pearce.
1743. John Clevland.
1746. Eobert Osborne.
1747. Daniel Devert.
1761. Timothy Brett.
1761. Edward Mason.
Controller of the Treasurer's
Accounts.
Dennis Liddell.
Nov. 1717. Eichard Burton.
Aug. 17, 1727. Sir George Saunders, Kt.,
Captain and Eear-Adm.
Feb. 1735. George Purvis, Captain,
E.N.
Mar. 1740. John Philipson.
Dec. 1743. AVilliam Corbett.
Aug. 1753. Eichard Hall.
Mar. 1761. Timothy Brett.
Controller of the Victualling
Accounts.
Benjamin Timewell.
Nov. 1714. Eichard Burton.
Nov. 1717. John Fawler.
June 1744. Francis Gashry.
July 1747. Eobert Osborne.
Controller of the Storekeeper's
Accounts.
Thomas Jennings, Caji-
tain, E.N.
Nov. 1714. Charles Cornwall, Cap-
tain, E.N.
July 1716. Thomas Swanton (1),.
Captain, E.N.
April 1718. William Cleveland, Cap-
tain, E.N.
May 1732. Eobert Byng.
May 1739. John Philipson.
Mar. 1740, George Crowle.
Mar. 1752. Eichard Hall.
Aug. 1753. George Adams.
Mar. 1761. Hon. William Bateman,
Captain, E.N.
B 2
CIVIL BISTOBY, 1714-1762.
[1714-1762.
EXTKA Cum. MISSION lilts.
Isaac Townesend, Caiitaiii,
]!.X.
Lawreuce Wiiglit, Cap-
tain, K.N.
1714. John Fawler.
1717. Thomas Colbv.
1727. Sir George Saunders, Kt., ^.^,^_ j-j^_ Isaac Townesend, Captain,
Nov,
Dec.
Jan.
Captain, K.K
^lay 1721t. Sir Isaac Townesend, Kt.,
Captain, It.X.
May 17;'.l. Kobert Byng.
May 1732. Lord A'cre BeaiicltM k, Caji-
tain, li.N.
May 1738. George Crowle.
Mar. 1740. Francis Gashry.
April 6, 1743. James Compton, Captain,
R.N.
April G, 1743. Alexander Geddes, Cap-
tain, Pi.N.
Jan. 1744. James Oswald.
May 1746. Edward Falkingliam (1),
Captain, E.N.
July 1747. John lUissell.
Feb. 1755. Thomas Cooper, Captain,
It.X.
1755. Arthur Scott, Captain,
R.N.
1756. Digby Dent (2), Cap-
tain, R.N.
175(;. H(in. AVilliani Bateman,
Captain, ii.N.
June 1754. Arthur Scott, Captain,
R.N.
Nov. 1755. Thomas Cooper, Captain,
R.N.
Jan. 1761. Thomas Hanway, Qi\\>-
tain, R.N.
Portsmouth : —
Nov.
Mar.
^lay
Dec.
Jan.
Mar.
Mar.
R.N.
May 1729. Richard Hughes (1),
Ca])tain, R.N.
Feb. 1754. Richard Hughes (2),
Captain, R.N. (Bart.
1773).
I'li/moutJi : —
Nov. 1714. Sir William Jumper, Kt.,
Captain, R.N.
Mar. 1715. Thomas Swanton, Cap-
tain, R.N.
July 1716. Francis Dove, Captain,
R.N.
April 1726. Sir Nicholas Trevanion,
Kt., Captain, R.N.
Dec. y, 1737. Matthew Norris, Captain,
R.N.
Jan. 1739. Philip A'anbrugh, Cajitain,
R.N.
Oct. 1753. Frederick Rogers, Captain,
R.N. (Bart^ 1773).
DrjH/ord and Woohvich ^ : —
,__,. -r^- 1 1^ /-r.\ /-. • Henrv Greenhill.
l(o6. Digby Dent (2), Captain, ,, „,. _ , , „„ ' ,.., , ,,
f, -i,T / • \ ^'<iY 26,1(44. Ihomas \\ horwood, Cap-
R.N. (again). ' . • i> >t
-i-,-i T-i i\? tain, R.N.
1(()1. Edward Mason. '
1761. Sir Richard Temple.
1761. Sir John Bentley, Caji-
tain, R.N.
Jan. 1745. Edward Falkingham (1),
Captain, R.N.
May 1746. James Compton, Captain,
R.N.
Dec. 1747. William Davies, Captain,
n.N.
Gibraltar and Minorca : —
Dec. 1(1, 1742. Edward Falkingham (1),
Captain, R.N.
Mar. 1722. Thomas Kcmpthorne, June 29, 1744. Tin mias Tret'usis, Captain,
Captain, R.N. II.N.
July 17."'6. Thomas Mathews, Cap- Feb. 25, 1747. John Towry, Captain,
tain, R.N. R.N.
April 1742. Charles Brown, Captain, j June 22, 1756. Charles Colby, Captain,
K.X. R.N.
Commissioners at H.M. Dock-
yards, KTC.
C/iatham : —
Nov. 1714 James Littleton, Captain
and Rcar-Admiral.
' The business of these Yards was conducted by the Commissioners in London,
after the death of Captain Davics on February IGtli, 1759.
1714-1762.]
THE NAVY ESTIMATES.
The following statement of the sums annually voted by Parlia-
ment for the " extra " and for the " ordinary " expenses of the
Royal Navy, and of the number of seamen and ^larines authorised
for each year, is taken from Derrick's ' Memoirs'^ of the Else and
Progress of the Royal Navy.' ^ It should be explained that the
money voted under the head of " extra," was almost invariably
used for building or repairing ships, for providing furniture and
stores for such vessels, or for improving the Royal Dockyards ; but
that, occasionally, portions of the money were employed for the
replenishment of the supplies of hemp, timber, etc., when the
quantities in hand happened to be low, and for other special
services : —
Year.
E.Ktl-d.
Ordiuary.
No. of Seamen '
and Marines.!
Year.
Extra.
0 I'd i nary
No. of Seamen
and Marines.!
£
£
£
£
1715
237,277
233
471
/(a) 10,000
\{h) 16,000
1739
1740
222,689
199,704
12,000
35,000
1716
230,623
233
849
10,000
1741
184,691
40,000
1717
200,761
226
799
10,000
1742
188,756
40,000
1718
165,317
224
857
10,000
1743
188,558
40,000
1719
88,494
212
638
13,500
1744
192,834
40,000
1720
79,723
217
918
13,500
1745
200,479
40,000
1721
50,200
219
049
10,000
1746
198,048
40,000
1722
218
799
7,000 :
1747
196,259
40,000
1723
216
388
10,000
1748
208,827
40,000
1724
214
622
10,000
1749
285,878
17,000
1725
214
295
10,000
1750
197,896
293,625
10,000
1726
212
181
10,000
1751
140,257
290,302
8,000
1727
199
071
20,000
1752
100,000
277,718
10,000
1728
205
561
15,000
1753
280,206
10,000
1729
206
025
15,000
1754
100^000
278,747
10,000
1730
120^618
213
168
10,000
1755
100,000
280,288
12,000
1731
212
034
10,000
1756
200,000
219,021
50,000
1732
60,000
212
885
8,000 1
1757
200,000
223,939
55,000
1733
104,003
211
495
8,000
1758
200,000
224,421
60,000
1734
202
670
20,000
1759
200,000
238,491
60,000
1735
198
914
30,000
1760
200,000
232,629
70,000
1736
30^167
217
269
15,000
1761
200,000
258,624
70,000
1737
50 , 000
219
201
10,000
1762
200,000
272,226
70,000
1738
40,000
222
885
/(c) 10,000
\(cO 20,000
1 The cost of these was in addition to the sums specified in the "Extra" and " Ordiuary " columns,
(a) Numbei- to Midsummer. (6) Number from Midsummer to December 31st. (c) Number to April 10th.
{d) Number from April 10th to December 31st.
For several years after the death of Queen Anne, the number of
ships belonging to the Royal Navy showed no increase, but rather
a slight diminution. Nevertheless there was, even in those days,
an increase in the total tonnage. But, from the death of George I.
4to. London, 1806.
CIVIL BISTOIir, 1714-1762.
[1714-1762.
onwards, the Navy grew enormously There was no tendency to
add to the number of the first and second rates — vessels which
were only useful for special purposes, and which, as late as the
middle of the eighteenth century,^ it was customary to lay up
every winter. Of the ■ third, fifth, and sixth rates, and of the
sloops, on the other hand, increasingly greater numbers were built.
The third rates were the vessels which experience showed to be,
upon the whole, most serviceable for the line-of-battle. The fifth
and sixth rates were the ships with which the country found it
could best deal with the enemy's cruisers ; and the sloops were
iH!Sgi[5iffli
K?fp
^Jlffe^^
THE FKEN'CH Inviiicibh, 74.
Taken hij Vice- Admiral Anson. 1747
THE 81'ANISH (rioriosu, 74.
Taken bij the Russell, 80, 1747.
{From ihe drawiiKjs hij Chaniock.)
the natural foes of small privateers, and the natural agents for
the general policing of the seas. That the number of fourth rates
did not increase is attributable to the gradual discovery of the
fact that fifty and sixty-gun ships, while too small and light for
the line-of-battle, were too large and heavy for ordinary cruising
purposes. They continued to be built in small numbers, chiefly
because they were suitable craft for service in the colonies, and, as
flagships, on the less important stations, ii^. war, and almost every-
where in peace; and, because they continued to be l)Milt, they
occasionally foinid their way into tlic linc-ot'-battle. J^)Ut occupying,
' Vcninii'H corressiiondence with the Ailniiralty in 174") is lull dC rot'ereiices to the
danger of keeping tUrec-decker.s i\t s(m duriiiu; the wintci- iiKniths.
1714-1762.]
STRENGTH OF THE FLEET.
as they did, an intermediate position between the hne-of-battleships
and the regular cruisers, and belonging positively to neither, their
value was limited in both directions.
The " state" of the fleet at four different dates during the period
now under review is given below :-
Rates or Classes.
First-rates, 100 g:uns .
Second-rates, 84 to 90 guns .
Tliird-rates, (!4 to 80 guns .
Fourtli-rates, 50 ' to tJU guns.
Ships of the line, or of .50 guns ]
and upwards
Fifth-rates, 30 to 44 guns .
Sixth-rates, 10 = to 30 guns .
Sloops, 8 to 20 guns .
Bombs
Fireships
Busses
Storeships
Hospital ships
Yachts
Hoys, lighters, transports
Hulks ':
Ships under the line, or of)
less tlian 50 ffuns . . . I
Death of
Qiieeu Auue.
Aug. 12th, 17U.
No.
/
13
42
69
131
42
25
7
4
1
]
15
13
8
116
Burthen
Tons.
Death uf
George I.
June 10th, 1727.
No.
11,703 7
19,323 13
47,768! 40
51,379| 64
Burtheu
Tons.
130,173124
19,836
6,631
869
597
263
516
i,521
1,009
5,774'
27
27
13
2
3
i
1
12
14
9
37,046109
Total ships of all classes . i247 167,219 233
Peace.
Dec. 31st, 17i2.
No.
Burthen
To:is.
Death of
George II.
Oct. 25th, 17B0.
Nr.
12,945 5
20,125 13
47,9.58
50,754
47
67
131,782132
15,065
9,700
39
39
1,390: 34
417
1,057
"546
532
1,378
1,216
7,719
10
23
9
39,080,159
5
13
9,602
21,250
65,2771 74
69,155' 63
28,813' 54
19,129, 61
8,036| 65
1,104 14
678
i,195
2,037
8,648
3
2
3
12
33
12
69,640 257
Burthen
Tons.
9,958
22,82.5
109,494
67,901
165,284155 210,177
39,173
31,618
12,859
4,117
2,337
242
1,554
2,791
1,518
2,761
11,957
110,927
170,862 291 234,924*412 321,104
1 The 5u-gun ships were nut counted as of the line-of-battle after about 1756.
- l\[ost ships of under 20 guns were counted as sloops, i.e., Commanders' commands, after about 1750.
The Seven Years' War (1756-1762) saw the introduction to the
service of a class of vessel which, for nearly a hundred years after-
wards, was of the highest value. This was the regular frigate,
built to cruise at good speed, and carrying a reasonably heavy
armament on one deck. There had previously been no vessels
that thoroughly fulfilled this ideal. The forty-four, and even the
forty-gun ships of an earlier date were cramped two-deckers ; and
below them, until after 1745, there was nothing more formidable
than the wretched twenty-gun ship, carrying nine-pounders as her
heaviest weapons. Genuine frigates, mounting twenty-eight guns,
began to be built about 1748 ; but still no larger gun than the nine-
pounder found a place in them. The twelve-pounder thirty-two-
gun frigate appeared at about the same time, the earliest examples
8
CIVIL HISTORY, 1714-1762.
[1714-1702.
being the Adventure (1741), and Diana, Juno, Southampton, and
Vefital (1757). Then came the twelve-pounder thirty-six-gun frigates,
the best British fighting cruisers of the days before the accession of
George III. The first of these, the Pallas and the Brilliant, were
built under the superintendence of Sir Thomas Slade in 1757. Yet
even they were inferior to thirty-six-gun frigates which were in
possession of the French at about the same time. In a table
given hereafter, the student will find materials for comparing the
British Brilliant, 36, of 1757 with the French Aurore, which was
captured from her original owners in 1758, and added to the Eoyal
Navv as the Aurora, 8(5.
THE Terrible 74. taken from the erench, 1747.
(From a drawhio hij John Chaniock.)
The first half of the eighteenth century witnessed repeated
efforts to estabhsh unvarying standards of size, tonnage, and
armament for each of the classes of men-of-war then in most
general use. At least two of these efforts— those of 1719 and
of 1745 — met with considerable success ; and the rules tentatively
adopted in each of those years were for some time largely, though
not exclusively, adhered to in the construction of ships. But it was
pi-obably discovered that to aim at rigorous uniformity was to check
improvement ; and, after about the year 1755, all efforts in this
direction were wisely relinquished. Seeing, however, that many
vessels were built accordincr to these successive " establishments,"
1714-1762.]
ESTABLISHMENTS AND BATES.
it may not be deemed improper to give here some particulars of
them : —
■"■a
II-
P to ^
w
1719
1733
1741
1745
1 hree-deckers.
Two-deckers.
^0. of ffims
100
9?
and
90
24
80
74
20
64
60
53
44
Leugtb ou gundeck, ft. in. 174 0 '164 0 158
140 7 132 5 128
ton 1
Length of keel for
nage,"l ft. in ]
Breadth, extreme, ft. in. .
Depth in hold, ft. in. .
Burthen in ions
50 0
20 0
1869
47 2
18 10
1566 t
44
18
1350
Length on gundeck, ft. in. 174 0
Length of keel for ton-| , ,_ „
nage, ft. in M*" ^
Breadth, e.xtreme, ft. in. . i 50 0
Depth ill hold, ft. in. . . 20 6
Burthen in tuns . . . 1869
166
134
47
19
0 158
1127
142 4
Length on gundeck, ft. in. |175 0
Length of keel for ton
nage, ft. in. . . . ,
Breadib, extreme, ft. iu. ,
Depth in hold, ft. iu. .
Burthen iu tons
1623
45 i
18 '
1400
16S
137
50 0
21 0
0 161 0
0 130 10
I
48 0, 46 0
20 2 19 4
1892 ) 1679 1472
Length on gundeck, ft. iu,
Length of keel fur ton-
nage, ft. in
Breadth, e.xtreme. ft. iu. .
Depth in hold, ft. iu. . .
Burthen iu tons
178 0 170
} 144 64 138
Complement of men
/
1745
111 ^'
1(1 1-
1719
1745
flluskets, bayonets, cart-|
1 ridge-boxes ... .J
P;iirs of pistols ....
Pole-axes (boarding-axes)
Swords (cutlasses) with|
belts /
Hanil gr nades ....
(Weight of bower anchors,)
I cwts J
[/Weight of bower anchors,)
.-)1 u
21 6
2000
780
850
850
850
cwts.
200
50
50
200
200
81
4S
20
1730
680
750
750
750
0 165 0
4 134 101
6 47 0
6 20 0
1585
520
600
600
650
151 0
123 2
41 6
17 4
1128
151 0
122 0
43 5
17 9
1224 I
154 0
125 5
44 0
18 111
1291 !
144
117
0 134 0
7 109 8
39 0 36 0
16 5 15 2
' 9.J1 I 755
144
116
0 134 0
4 108 3
41 5' 38 6
16 11 15 9
1068 853
147
119
0 140 0
9 113 9
40
124 0,
101 8
33 2
14 0
594
124 0
100 3
35 8
14 6
, ,
lain
■•
42 0
1» 1
1123
126 0
102 6
40 0 36 0
17 2^ 15 5*
968 706
iico o;
1131 4!
45 0,
19 41
1414
150 Ol44 0 133 0
123 0| 117 8^108 10
37 6
42 8
l-i 6
1191
600
440
480
4s0
520
200
50
50
200
200
200
I
50 i
50 I
200
200 ,
470
180
50
50
200
l.>0
3B5
400
400
420
41 0
17 8
1052
280
300
300
350
16 0
814
250
250
280
106 0
87 9
I 28 4
I 9 2
374
106 0
85 8
30 6
9 5
429
112 0
91 6
32 0
11 0
498
113 0
93 4
32 0
I 11 0
I 508
190
160
130
140
140
liO
100
' * 1
40
30
40
35
140
120
100
100
67-5
73'5
61-5 .. 51-5
69-5 |69-5 58-7
46-5
53
39-5
49
31-5
80
20
50
80
100
21
/Diameter of bower cables,!
]l in i
/Diameter of bower cables,!
23
24
00
23
21
40-5
29-5
10
1 4
1 In 1719 Iha method of determiniug the length of keel for tonnage, and the rule fur computing tonnage, were
settled by the Lords of the Admiralty as follows : —
" Ou a straight line with the lower part of the rabbit of the keel ere:t a perpendicular or square line to the
upper edge of the wing trausum, at the afterpartof the plank ; and, at the stern, 10 the forepart of the plank at
5">s pjrt of the height of the wiug transom. The length between the said perpendiculars, addeJ to .^^^^ of the
extreme breadth (allowing fur the stern and stern post, wiihouf. the rabbit), from which subtract ./V"" of the
height of the whig transom for the rake abaft, and also ^""s of tue main breadth for the rake afore, leaves
the length of the keel for tonnage. Multiply this by thj breadth, and the product by half the breadth, and
divide by 94. The result gives tha tonnage."
A simpler and t!iore commonly-used method, both before and after the offtcial adoption of the above liighly-
conventional formula, was: to multiply the lengtli of the keel into the extreme breadth of the ship within-board,
taken along the midshiis beam, and to multiply the product by the depth of the hold from the plank joiuiug to the
keelson upwards to the main deck ; and to divide the last product by 94. The result gave the burthen iu t()ns.
See Derrick ; ' ]\Icms. of the Roy. Navy,' 301 ; Falconer, ' Diet, of the .Marine ' ; Willett, in ' Archaeologia,' ii. 154.
The last erroneously eaj's that the number to be divided by was 96.
The estabhshments of 1733 and 1741 were proposed, but never
10
CIVIL HISTORY, 1714-1762.
[1714-1762.
officially adopted. Many ships were nevertheless bnilt in accord-
ance with them.
The establishment of 1745 was generally adhered to for about
ten years. There was never afterwards any regular establishment
so far as dimensions were concerned.
The mode in which these and other vessels of the period were
armed can be seen at a glance on reference to the tables on the
following pages.
Although practically all the ships of the Navy were armed ac-
cording to a regular "establishment" as thus indicated, many vessels
were built upon lines which differed from any of the " establish-
ments " for dimensions and tonnage ; and it is therefore well to give
particulars of a few craft, both British built ships and prizes taken
from the enemy and added to the service, which may be regarded
either as typical specimens of the best home constructions of the
time, or as models, the capture of which drew the attention of
British constructors to points wherein foreign designers excelled
them. These will be found on page 12.
The estimated cost of building and equipping a ship of each of
the principal classes, and of storing her with eight months' boat-
swain's and carpenter's stores, according to the Navy Board Kegula-
tions, was, in 1710, 1733, and 1741 respectively: —
1719
1733
1741
Rate.
Guxs.
Cost of
Total
Cost
rea<iy
for f^ea.
Cost of
Total
O'St
ready
for .Sea.
Cost of
Total
Co.-t
ready
for Sea.
Hull, Rigging
Masts and and
Yards. .Stores.
Hull, Eigg'ng
A'asts and and
Yards. , Stores.
Hull,
Masts and
Yards.
Rigfliug
and
.Stores.
I
II
III
IV
y
VI
100
90
80
70
60
50
in
20
£ £
32,707 7,476
26,622 6,264
21,937 5,400
17,202 4,512
14,027 3,804
10,192 3,020
(;,355 2,:!5n
3,216 1,496
£
40,183
32,886
27,337
21,714
17,831
13,212
8,731
4,712
£
32,725
27,591
22,750
18,666
15,753
1 1 . 753
7,254
3,689
£
7,957
6,897
5,950
5,202
4,539
3,625
2,881
1,823
£
40,682
34,488
28,700
23,868
20,292
15,110
10,135
5,512
£
33,110
28,543
23,920
19,687
16,564
13,064
7 , 554
J 2S2
£
8,050
7,135
6,256
5,488
4,786
4,117
3,003
2,117
£
41,151
35,678
30,176
25,175
21,350
17,185
10,557
6,399
Many improvements wliicli increased the material efficiency of
the Koyal Navy were made in the period 1714-1762. One of these
was the invention of the reflecting quadrant, an invention usually
associated \\it1i tlio name of Doctor Hadley, and introduced Ity him
1714-17G2.]
GUNS.
11
Particulars
OF Service Gi
JNS (Establishment of 1'
■43).i
Nature. 2
Leu
frfli ^i'-.;,.K*^ (',.i:i.,.,.
Chaiiges.
Windage
Allow-
ance.
Proof.
Service.
Salut
ng-
Scaling.
Ft.
111.
Cut. 111.
Lb. oz.
Lb. oz.
Lb.
oz.
Lb. oz.
lu.
42-pouiider
10
0
G5 7-03
25 0
17 0
11
4
3 4
•35
32-poiuKler
!)
6
55 (J -43
21 8
14 0
9 ■
4
2 12
•33
24-pounder (a)
!l
fi
50 5-84
18 0
11 0
(
0
2 0
•30
(h)
!)
0
4G
9 y
18-pounder (a)
()
42 5-3
15 0
9 0
G
0
1 8
•27
(b)
()
3!'
■> ?
12-pounder (a)
(;
3() 4-G4
12 0
(J 0
4
12
1 0
•24
(b)
0
32
5 9
(c)
(i
31
, ,
? 5
9 -pounder (a)
!)
()
28-5 4-22
9 0
4 8
4
0
12
•22
(b)
«
()
27
> •>
(c)
H
0
2G
5 >
(d)
6
24
) '
(e)
7
0
23
? )
(i-pounder (a)
1)
0
24-5 3-G7
G 0
3 0
0
8
•19
(b)
H
6
90
) 9
(c)
K
0 21
9 >
(d)
(
(i
20
,
('-O
(
0
19
, ,
y ?
(/)
G
G
17
1 1
4-pouiider
.
3-22
4 0
2 0
2
0
G
•18
3-pounder
4
G 7 ' 2-91
3 0
1 8
1
8
4
•14
3-]X)uiider^ .
3
G
1-5 1-G9
s
4
4
1
1 I'rom Jlountaine, 'Practical Sea-(iunner's Companion,' 1747.
- The reference letters in this column refer to the similar letters emploj-ed iu the next table (Disposition of Guns).
3 These were swivels, usually mounted on the bulwarks, etc., and sometimes referred to as patereroes.
Disposition of the Guns in the various Classes of H. M. Ships, 1716, 1743, 1757.
Ci-ASSES OF Ships.
— *i
o
100
91
90
80
99
99
9'
74
70
64
99
60
58
50
ti^uns
(large class) .
(ordinary class)
(large class) .
(ordinary class)
(large class) .
(ordinary class)
(large class) .
(ordinary class)
(small class) .
(large class)
1716
1743
1757
1757
1716
1743
]757
1757
1716
1743
1757
1757
1757
1716
1757
1743
1757
1757
1716
1757
1757
1743
1757
Lov\er Deck.
Middle
Deck.
Upper Deck.
No. Prs.
Quarter
Deck.
Foi-
ecastle.
No.
Prs.
N
2
2
0. 1 Prs.
3 24
No.
Prs.
No.
4
Prs.
28|
28
28
42 or
32
28 12
12
6
6
42
42
B 24 (rt)
3 24
28 12 (rt)
28 12
12
12
6(c)
6
4
4
6(a)
6
28
32
3
[) 18
30 12
2
9
26
32
2
S 18
26 H
10
6
2
6
26
26
32
32
2
2
5 18(a)
J 18
26 12(/.)
26 12
10
10
6(a)
6
2
2
6(c)
6
26
32
2
3 18
24 9
4
6
26
32
2
3 ! 12
24 6
4
6
..
26
26
32
32
2
2
3 18 (6)
3 12
24 9(a)
24 6
4
4
Q(d)
6
..
••
28
32
.
30 24
12
9
4
9
28
32
28 18
14
9
4
9
26
24
26 12
14
6
4
6
28
32
28 18
12
9
2
9
26
26
32
24
26 18 (b)
26 12
10
10
9(d)
6
2
2
9(b)
6
26
24
. 26 12
8
6
2
6
24
24
. 26 9
8
6
2
6
26
24
26 12
6
6
2
6
24
24
26 9
8
6
2
6
24
22
24(a)
24
]
i
1
24 12 (a)
22 12
8
4
6{d)
6 ;
2
2
6(b)
6
12
CIVIL HISTORY, 1714-1762.
[1714-1762.
DisrosiTiox OF THE GuNS, ETC. — continued.
Lower Deck.
IMiilclle
Deck.
Upper Deck.
Quartei'
Deck.
Forecastle.
Classes of Shu's.
.as
I IV]
50
guns
(ordinary class) .
1716
,,
.1
1743
.,
1757
44
(lartri' class) .
1757
••
(urclinary class) .
1743
1757
4U
1716
36
1757
32
1757
30
1716
28
1757
24
1757
20
1716
9?
1743
91
1757
14
(ship-rigged) .
1757
12
,,
1757
10
,,
1757
8
,.
1757
No. I Prs. ; No. Prs. , No. ! Prs. No. Prs. No. Prs.
22
22
Tl
20
20
20
20
"s
2
le
24 (
If
I8(
It
11
<
oV
5 .
1
b) '.
i .
) .
e) :
22 9
22 12 (c)
22 9
22
20
20
20
26
26
20
24
20
20
20
20
14
12
10
8
9
9(c)
9
6
12
12
6
9
9(e)
6
9
9
6
4
4
i «(/) ■•
8
4
2
4
2
6 2
6
6(e) 2
(i(c)
6 2
t;
2
6
6
6
4
3
3
6
6
Typical Ships of War, 1714-1762.
LeuR
thof
.Shu-.
Dat. of
Launch
Beam. Depth.
Burthen
in Tous.
'A
Gua
Deck.
ft. iu.
Keel.
ft.
iu.
ft.
in. ft.
in.
Boyal Siivereign
100
1728
175
0
140
7
50
3*20
1
1883
h'oyal George .
100
1756
178
0
143
5*51
9*21
6
2047
Burlhur
90
1716
163
0
131
9 47
3 18
6
1565
Blenheim
90
1761
176
1
142
3 49
1 21
0
1827
Cormcall
80
1726
158
0
128
2
44
6 18
2
1350
Princess Amelia
80
1757
165
0
133
0
47
3 20
0
1579
Invincible .
74
*1747
171
3
139
0^9
3 21
3
1793
Terrible .
74
*1747
164
1
133
11 47
3 20
7*
1590
Mars
74
1759
165
6
134
4 46
3 19
9
1556
Priitcesa
70
*1740
165
1
130
3 49
8 22
3
1709
Mduiiiouth .
70
1742
151
0
123
2 48
5 17
9
1225
Dor>iet»hire .
70
1757
162
0
134
4g44
10 19
8
1436
Ciiptain .
64
1743
151
0
122
0 43
6 17
!»
1230
Bhjinoulh .
60
1722
144
7
118
0 .•!9
0 16
5
954
Bipon .
60
1758
155
5
128
0
42
7 18
7
1242
Conquistador .
60
*17t;2
155
9
128
6
43
3 19
3
1278
Oxford .
50
1727
134
6
109
10
36
3 15
2
767
Bomney .
50
1752
146
0
120
8J30
4*17
2
1046
Ludlow Castle .
44
1744
126
105
103
8 36
•^ 15
5*
725
Plicenix .
44
1759
140
9
116
10f37
lgl6
0
856
Brilliant
36
1757
128
4
106
2- 35
8 12
4
718
Aurora .
36
*1758
144
0
118
'.) 38
8^15
2
94(;
Juno
32
1757
127
10
107
Oi 34
3 11
10
667
Crescent .
32
♦175S
130
5
107
6^35
9 11
2
731
Coventry
28
1757
118
n
97
0*34
OS 10
6
599
Lolpltiii.
24
1751
113
0
93
4 32
1 11
0
511
Gibraltar .
20
175.;
107
8i
88
0 30
4 9
8
430
Snirpion
14
1746
91
>_>
74
1U26
4 12
0
276
I'^nrnace, b:iiiili.
M
1740
91
1]
73
llf
26
4 11
0
273
Terror, Inimlj .
S
1759
91
6
74
It
27
8 12
1
301
Princess Auifusta
yt.
,1710
73
8
57
7*
22
6J 9
6
155
lloynl Cliarioltf
y'-
1719
90
0
72
2.i
24
7 11
0
• Mj-i
A\here, and by whom Built.
Cliatham, J. Eosewcll.
AVodlwicli, J. Pownall.
Dcptford.
Wdohvich, J. Pownall.
Dcptford.
Woolwich, J. rowiiall.
*Takcn from Ihc French.
*Takcn from tlx' French.
AVoolwicli, .1. I'ownall.
*Taken from the Spaniards.
Dcptford.
Portsmouth, E. Allen.
"Woolwich, J. Holhmd.
Chatham.
Woolwicl), J. rownall.
*Takcn from tln'SiJuniards.
Portsmouth.
Woolwich, J. Harris.
Tliames.
Tliames. :\1. IJalson.
I'lymouth.
*'l'akcn from the Freiicii.
Thames, Alexander.
*Takcn from the Frencli.
Bcaulieu, H. Adams.
Woolwicli, Fcllowcs.
IJeuulieU. II. Adams.
I'xiiulien.
Thames.
llarwicli, Ikiriiard.
Dejitford, J. Allen.
Dejitford. .1. 11 -Hand.
1761.]
HARBISON'S TIMEKEEPEIi.
lo
about 1731. But after Hadley's death, there was found among his
papers a document in the handwriting of Sir Isaac Newton, con-
taining a drawing and description of an instrument somewhat
similar to Hadley's ; so that, apparently, the credit of the innova-
tion should be divided between these men of science, if not given
altogether to the elder of them.
The efforts which had been made under Queen Anne to induce
inventors to turn their attention to the perfection of methods for
discovering the longitude at sea, were continued ; and in 1758 a new
HADLEY S QUADRANT.
{From John Robertson's 'Elements of NavUnttion.' London, 1742.)
Act was passed in furtherance of the desired object. In 1761 the
Board of Longitude decided to give official trial to the timekeepers
of Mr. Harrison, a watchmaker who had produced a clock or
chronometer of unusual accuracy ; and at the instance of the Board,
the Admiralty placed the Deptford, 50, Captain Dudley Digges, at
Mr. Harrison's disposal for the purpose. The ship, with Harrison
on board, sailed from Portsmouth on November 18th ; and, both at
Madeira and at Jamaica, it was found that the timekeeper which
had been experimented with still showed the correct time. From
Jamaica, Harrison returned to England in the Merlin, 14, Captain
14 CIVIL HISTORY, 1714-1762. [1755.
Richard Carteret. On March -iBrd, 171J-i, the Merlin fell in with
the Essex, 64, Captain Alexander Schomberg, which had been off
Scilly on the preceding evening. Her reckoning agreed exactly with
that of the timekeeper; and on the 26th, when Harrison reached
Portsmouth, he found that his instrument, in spite of much shaking
owing to bad weather, had lost only 1 minute 54*5 seconds since it
had left England more than four months earlier. This result marked
a great advance upon anything that had been attained up to that time.
It was at about the same time that the experiment of coppering
ships' bottoms to preserve them against the worm was first officially
tried in the Navy. In 1761, the Alarm, 32, was so treated, but,
although the effect was found to be satisfactory, the general
introduction of the improvement was impeded for several years,
owing to the galvanic action which was set up between the copper
and the iron bolts of the vessel's hull, and to the evils which this
action wrought. The difficulty was ultimately got over by using
only copper fastenings in the under-water portion of ships'
hulls; yet it was not until 1783 that this measure of precaution
was ordered to be generally adopted, and, until then, copper
sheathing, while applied to specimens of every class of ships,
was very far from being universal in the service.
To encourage home manufactures, it was enacted in 1746 that
every ship built in Great Britain or in the American colonies should,
when first prepared for sea, be provided with a suit of sails made of
cloth woven in Great Britain, under penalty of i'50 ; and that every
sailmaker in Great Britain or the plantations should, upon failing
to place his name and address legibly and fully upon each new sail
made by him, be fined i'lO.
After the burning of Eudyard's w^ooden tower in 175,5, the
lessees of the Eddystone Light, by the advice of the Royal Society,
placed the work of constructing a new hghthouse in the hands of
John Smeaton, F.R.S., a distinguished engineer. Smeaton built
his tower entirely of stone, dovetailing every block into its neigh-
bours, and so making the column practically solid. Operations were
begun on August 5th, 1756 ; the first stone was formally laid on
June 12th, 1757, and the last on August 24th, 1759; and a light
from twenty-four candles, weighing five to two pounds,^ was shown
^ Smeaton invented a timepiece, wliich struck a single blow every half hour,
and so warned the keepers to snuff these candles. The original now belongs to the
Corporation of Trinity Tfonsc.
1731.] KING'S REGULATIONS AND ADMIRALTY INSTRUCTIONS. 15
from the rock on October 16th, 1759, and thenceforward every night
until 1810, when the candles gave place to oil lamps and reflectors.
Smeaton's tower, it is almost needless to add, remained effective
mitil, in 1879-81, owing to the base on which it stood having been
seriously shaken by the sea, a new tower, Douglass's, had to be
built on a neighbouring rock. Part of Smeaton's tower was there-
upon removed, and reconstructed on Plymouth Hoe.
Several other lighthouses which were in their day triumphs of
engineering, were erected during the first half of the eighteenth
century. One of the best known towers, that on the island of
Skerries, near Holyhead, dates from 1730. At about the same time,
also, lightships began to be placed round the coasts. The one first
moored in English waters was fitted out in 1731 by Mr. Eobert
Hamblin for the Nore Sand, at the mouth of the Thames ; the next,
in 1736, by Mr. Daniel Avery for the Dudgeon Shoal, Norfolk.
Until 1730, every commander-in-chief, with the sanction of the
Admiralty, issued his own code of instructions. In that year the
volume of material provided by the accumulations of lapsed codes
was in some measure digested ; many additional instructions were
set forth ; the principles of naval usage were crystallised ; and
in 1731 there appeared the first issue of ' The King's Regulations
and Admiralty Instructions.' This book has since been revised at
intervals, but it remains in substance very much what it was in
1731, and most of the important alterations that have been made in
it are merely such as have been necessary to bring it into conformity
with modern ideas and modern conditions.-^
In 1717, the rate of pilotage for pilots of Deal, Dover, and
Thanet, taking charge of ships in the Thames and Medway, was
fixed by Act of Parliament at ten shillings per foot of draught. The
Act w^as subsequently amended with a view to prevent these pilots,
who, of course, possessed exceptional opportunities for smuggling,
from engaging in that pursuit. The repression of smuggling, indeed,
was a burning question during the whole of the period now under
review, and especially in war time. The smuggler, besides being a
professional cheater of the revenue, was, of necessity, a man of lax
patriotism and easy conscience, and one whose success depended
upon his maintenance of good relations with both sides of the
^ 'The King's Eegulations and Admiralty Instructions' contain, as it were, the
civil code of tlie Navy. The penal code is supplied by the Naval Discipline Act.
See p. 17, infra.
16 CIVIL EISTORY, 1714-1762. [1745.
Channel. He was, consequently, ever available as a spy. The
frequency with which he impeded, and sometimes even confounded,
the operations of the Navy, appears in the correspondence of several
of the flag-officers of the time ; and there is very little doubt that
the many treacherous betrayals, which, in the reigns of the first two
Georges, prevented the secret carrying out of naval plans and
combinations, were, as often as not, attributed to grave Jacobite
and French sympathisers, when they were really the work of
persons owning no more serious political conviction than that he
who paid duty was a fool. There are several pregnant references
to this subject in the letters of Admiral Edward Vernon, who was
in command in the Downs at the time of the young Pretender's
descent in 1745. Advocating the more extensive recruiting of the
Navy from the seaport towns, he writes of men who " are now
thought to be principally employed in the ruin of their country by
the smuggling trade, and as daily spies to give the enemy intelligence
of our proceedings," and goes on to say : —
" I can't but thiuk it a seasonable time to suggest to their Lordships tliat tliere are
said to be in this town of Deal not less than two hundred able young men and seafaring
people who are known to have no visible way of getting a living but by the infamous
trade of smuggling, many keeping a horse and arms to be ready at all calls. At Dover,
it is conjectured, there may be four hundred : at Eamsgate and Folkestone, three
hundred each. And it is said that, within these three weeks, no less than nine cutters
at a time have gone off from Folkestone to Boulogne ; and it is conjectured that, from
the town of Folkestone only, a thousand pounds a week is run over to Boulogne in the
smuggling wa}\ And, about six or seven days past, a Dover cutter lauded goods in the
night vmder the Castle, that was carried off by a i)arty of sixty horse, and the cutter
supposed to have done it came into Dover pier next day ; and, though most believed it
was she, no one proceeded against them in any inquiry about it. This snuiggling has
converted those employed in it, first from honest, industriovis fisliermen, to lazy, drunken,
and profligate smugglers, and n()W to dangerous spies on all nur proceedings, for the
enemy's daily information." '
And again : —
" Captain Scott, in the Badger, is just returned from his cruise off the coast of
Sussex. On the 25th of last month he was informed of a cutter being going from
Fairleigh to Boulogne that night ; but she was gone over before he could get there.
On the 3rd of this month, he got sight of the French dogger privateer, and chased him,
and neared him as the other was edging down to get to leeward of him ; and, when he
got within shot of him, he exchanged some guns witli him; but the other, getting
afore the wind and hoisting her studding sails as the night was coming on, he soon lost
sight of him. He has the repute there of being a confederate with the smugglers, and a
convoy to them. I send you enclosed Captain Scott's day's work, when he seized two
of tlie smugglers' boats, in which you have the names of the two reputed notorious
' Letter of November loth, 1745. Letter Book in Author's Coll.
1749] THE ARTICLES OF WAR. 17
smugglers they belong to : which are George Harrison and Zebulon Morphet ; and a
copy of the Collector of Customs' certificate that they are reputed as such. And a
little before that, above a hundred horse had been upon the shore to carry off goods
brought by another cutter ; and, by all accounts, they carry on as great an intercourse
with the French now as they did in time of profound peace with them : by which they
are undoubtedly their daily spies to inform them of all our proceedings. I am informed
there are lawyers who say, as the laws now stand, such an intercourse with his
Majesty's enemies is now by our laws high treason ; and, if so, I should think we want
a speedy proclamation to inform these infamous wretches that it is high treason ; and
they shall be prosecuted as such ; for, surely, no nation but this would suffer itself to
be daily betrayed with impunity."
While smuggling and smugglers' treachery at home engaged the
attention of the authorities, piracy required, once more, their
energetic interference in the West Indies ; and on September 5th,
1717, a proclamation was issued, offering a pardon for piracies
committed before January 5th, 1717, to all such pirates as should
surrender themselves within a twelvemonth. After the expiration
of that period of grace, a reward would be paid to any of his
Majesty's officers, by sea or land, upon the legal conviction of a
pirate taken by him. The rewards promised were : for a captain
(master) £100 ; for any officer from a lieutenant down to a gunner,
£40 ; for any inferior officer, £30. Any private seaman or other man
who should deliver up a pirate captain (master) or "commodore,"
would, upon the offender's conviction, be entitled to £200.
In 1749, there was brought in " a Bill for amending, explaining,
and reducing into one Act of Parliament, the laws relating to the
Navy." One of the results of this Bill, had it been passed in its
original form, would have been to subject officers on half-pay to
martial law. The measure was, in consequence, strongly opposed
and petitioned against. The upshot was that the obnoxious clauses
were deleted. The Bill then passed ; all older laws for the govern-
ment of the Navy were repealed ; and, in place of them, the first
regular Articles of War ^ were established. In the same year, another
Act authorised the Admiralty for the first time to grant commissions
to flag-officers, or officers commanding-in-chief, to assemble courts-
martial in foreign parts.
The changes and alterations which more intimately affected the
1 This was the Consolidation Act of George II. 22. It was based upon the Act of
13 Car. II. c. 9. Being found to be too stringent, it was amended in 19 Geo. III.
In the amended form, it is the foundation of the existing Articles of War ; which, in
almost exactly their present guise, date from 1847. The proper name of the measure is
The Naval Discipline Act. It receives small alterations and amendments from time
to time.
VOL. III. C
18 CIVIL HISTORY, 1714:-1762. [1714-1762.
personnel of the Royal Navy between 1714 and 1762, were numerous.
The more important of those relating chiefly or exclusively to the
seamen may be first noted.
In 1735 an Act^ appropriated the forfeited Derwentwater estates
to the completion and support of Greenwich Hospital, and extended
the benefits of the Hospital so as to allow maimed merchant seamen
to participate more fully in them. A little later two naval Acts were
passed. One was for procuring a better supply of seamen to serve
in the Navy ; for permitting merchant vessels to be navigated by
foreign seamen in a proportion not exceeding three-fourths of the
crew ; and for giving the right of naturalisation to such foreigners,
after two years' service in British ships. The other was to prevent
the impressment of seamen aged fifty and upwards, or aged less
than eighteen ; of foreigners serving in merchant vessels ; of sea
apprentices of under three years' service ; and of all persons under-
going their first two years' service at sea.^ In 1749, Mr. Henry
Pelham brought in a Bill to revive the system of registering seamen ;
but, it being violently opposed, he withdrew it. In 1758, another
Bill, brought in by Mr. George Grenville, though opposed in the
Upper House, was ultimately carried. It provided in general for
the encouragement of na\Til seamen, and, in particular, for the
estabhshment of more regular and frequent payment of wages ; and
for enabling seamen to remit money for the support of their wives
and families by means of tickets payable in cash on demand by any
collector of customs or excise. An Act of 1747 authorised masters
of merchant vessels to detain from the wages of their seamen
sixpence a month, as a provision for the widows and children of
men drowned.
On April 3rd, 1744, a royal declaration assigned to the officers
and crews of men-of-war all property in prizes taken by them : and,
to the officers and crews of privateers and letters of marque, such a
proportion as might be conceded to them by the agreement of the
owners. It also provided that shares not claimed within three years
should go to Greenwich Hospital.
Bounties to seamen were several times offered. In 1734, the
rate was '20s. for an able-bodied seaman, and 15.s. for an able-bodied
landsman. In 1740, it was 42s. for an able-bodied, and 30s. for an
ordinary seaman. In 1742, it rose to 100s. for an able-bodied, and
60s. for an ordinary seaman ; and it was further ordered that the
1 8 Geo. II. c. 29. ^ 13 q^^^ jj^ p. 3.
1740.] OFFICERS' PAY. 19
widows of such bounty men as should be killed on service were to be
granted a sum equivalent to a year's pay of their late husbands. In
the same year, apparently to keep down rivalry, pay in the merchant
service was, for a time, restricted by Act of Parliament to a
maximum of 35s. a month.
'The pay of officers remained as it had been at the conclusion of
the period 1660-1714 ; but the position of officers of nearly every
rank was improved in various ways. Surgeons were, for the first
time, given half-pay in 1729 ; and, in 1749, an increased number,
both of surgeons and of masters, were granted half-pay. The
number then entitled to it was, in each case, fifty, of whom the first
thirty received 2s. 6fZ., and the remaining twenty, 2s. a day.
The number of domestics and servants allowed to officers had been
considerably reduced at the end of the seventeenth, but was again
increased in the first half of the eighteenth century ; and, in 1740, it
stood thus : — ^
50, of whom 16 only to be borne as servants on the books.
'^0, „ 12 „ „ „
20 10
-^*^j ?J -^^ >5 f) yt
4 per 100 of the complement.
Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral .
Vice- Admiral .
Bear- Admiral .
Captain
Lieutenant, Master, \
Second Master, Pur- i • i • i • oa t,
' , > 1, m ships havmg 60 men or above.
ser. Surgeon, Chap- 1
lain and Cook, each ^
Boatswain, Gunner, -i 2, in ships having 100 men or upwards, and 1 in ships
Carpenter, each . . j having between 100 and 60.
This generous allowance of servants permitted captains to take to
sea with them young gentlemen who aspired to the position of
officer ; and the better captains usually benefited the service by
having with them a large proportion of "servants" of that kind,
training under their own eyes. Yet, even captains who were heartily
devoted to the interests of their profession, took with them to sea, in
those days, many retainers of a class that would, nowadays, be
deemed very superfluous in a man-of-war. Tailors, barbers, footmen
and fiddlers, followed their patron. As late as 1785, Commodore
Edward Thompson, who, it is true, always had his quarter-deck
crowded with such young gentlemen as were destined, a few years
later, to shine in the front ranks of the service, had a painter on
his personal staff, and used to summon the poor artist on deck at
■* And so remained until April, 1794.
c 2
20 CIVIL HISTORY, 17U-1762. [1718.
strange hours to record impressions of sunrise effects or nocturnal
storms.
In 1718, it was, for the first time, formally ordered that captains
should, if duly qualified, be promoted by seniority to flag-rank, and
so onward to the rank of full admiral. But since, in those days,
the entire flag establishment consisted only of nine officers, viz., an
Admiral of the Fleet, an Admiral of the White, an Admiral of the
Blue, and Vice and Eear-Admirals of the Red, White and Blue
respectively, captains soon began to grow very old ere, in con-
sequence of deaths above them, they became eligible for advance-
ment. If, also, the order had been loyally carried out — which it
was not — and had not been followed by other modifications, it
would presently have resulted in a flag-list composed exclusively
of officers too aged to go afloat. The threatened evil w^as fended
off by the gradual increase of the flag-list in 1743 and subsequent
years, and by the provision, in 1747, of arrangements in virtue of
which senior captains, indisposed, or too infirm, to accept active
flag-rank, might be superannuated as rear-admirals, with pay at
the rate of 175. Q>d. a day. The first officers to be superannuated
under this scheme were captains of 1713, or, to put it otherwise,
captains of thirty-four years' service in that rank. Some of them
were septuagenarians.
The establishment of a regular uniform for certain officers of the
Eoyal Navy dates from 1748. Three years earlier, some officers
appear to have petitioned the Admiralty for the boon ; and, in 1746,
sundry captains, at Anson's wish, prepared tentative coats from
which a uniform pattern might be selected. But, though a captain
may have designed the uniforms which were finally adopted, King
George II. himself decided upon the colours of them. Having
noticed the Duchess of Bedford, wife of the First Lord, riding in
the Park in a habit of blue, faced with white, his Majesty chose
blue and white for the first uniform dress of his officers. The
innovation applied only to admirals, captains, commanders, lieu-
tenants, and midshipmen, and the wearing of the new uniform was
made compulsory, as regards these ranks, by an order dated April
14th, 1748. But there were difficulties in the way of obedience.
Patterns were not sent to foreign stations, nor were the regulations
sufficiently explicit to enable officers, by their aid only, to instruct
their tailors concerning what was required. It is therefore probable
that, for several years, the order was not fully carried out.
1748.] OFFICERS' UNIFORM. 21
Admiralty patterns of these uniforms were lodged at the Navy
Office and the Dockyards, but they have not been preserved. A few
coats, waistcoats, breeches and hats, for captains and lieutenants,
were, however, found at Plymouth, in 1846, and are now in the
Eoyal United Service Institution.
" The hats are three-cornered in shape ; one is trimmed with silver or tarnished gold
lace ; and both bear the silk cockade instituted by George I. Lace and frills being
then worn, there are no collars to the coats. They are made of thick blue cloth ; the
lappels, which button back, are blue ; but the cuffs of the captain's coats are white,
and the sleeves of all are purposely made short to allow the laced sleeves of the white
kerseymere waistcoats to show beyond. There are two kinds of buttons, one flat,
bearing a rose ; the other round and plain. Although we have not the patterns,
pictures of the dress of the admirals and midshipmen have come down to us, the
embroidery and lace on those of the flag officers being most elaborate." ^
Some written advice, given by Edward Thompson,^ in 1756, to a
relative who was about to enter the Navy, throws light upon the
condition of young gentlemen in the men-of-war of the time.
" Here," he says, " are no back doors through which you can make your escape,
nor any humane bosoms to alleviate your feelings ; at once you resign a good table for
no table, and a good bed for your length and breadth ; nay, it will be thought an
indulgence, too, to let you sleep where day ne'er enters, and where fresh air only comes
when forced." ..." Your light for day and night is a small candle, which is often
stuck at the side of your platter at meals, for want of a better convenience ; your
victuals are salt, and often bad ; and, if you vary the mode of dressing them, you must
cook yourself. I would recommend you always to have tea and sugar ; the rest you
must trust to, for you'll scarce find room for any more than your chest and hammock,
and the latter at times you must carry upon deck to defend you from small shot,
unless you keep one of the sailors in fee with a little brandy (which is a good friend
at sea, but always drink it mixed with water.") ..." Low company is the bane of
all young men ; but in a man-of-war you have the collected tilths of jails. Con-
demned criminals have the alternative of hanging, or entering on board. There's not
a vice committed on shore but is practised here. The scenes of horror and infamy on
board of a man-of-war are so many and so great that I think they must rather disgust
a mind than allure it. I do not mean, by this advice, to have you appear a dull
inactive being, that shudders amidst these horrors. No ; I would wish you to see them
in their own proper shapes, for, to be hated, they need to be seen." ..." You will
find some little outward appearance of religion — and Sunday prayers ! — but the con-
gregation is generally drove together by the boatswain (like sheep bj^ the shepherd),
who neither spares oaths nor blows." ^
^ ' The British Fleet,' 500. The first Admiral's uniform is well shown in the
portrait of Lord Anson, forming the title-page to this volume. This was painted
between 1748 and 1761.
^ Died Commodore on the West Coast of Africa, January 17th, 1786. He edited
some old writers ; wrote plays, stories, and songs ; and was a friend, and also
probably a benefactor, of Dr. Samuel Johnson.
^ ' Seaman's Letters,' i. 147.
22 CIVIL HISTORY, 1714-1762. [1756.
Concerning subordinate officers, and the abuse of power by
superiors, Thompson wrote : —
" The disagreeable circumstances and situations attending a subaltern officer m the
Navy are so many, and so hard, that, had not the first men in the service passed the
dirty road to preferment to' encourage the rest, they would renounce it to a man. It is
a most mistaken notion that a youth will not be a good officer unless he stoops to the
most menial offices ; to be bedded worse than hogs, and eat less delicacies. In short,
from having experienced such scenes of filth and infamy, such fatigues and hardships,
they are sufficient to disgust the stoutest and the bravest, for, alas! there is only a little
hope of promotion sprinkled in the cup to make a man swallow more than he digests
the rest of his life. The state of inferior officers in his Majesty's service is a state of
vassalage, and a lieutenant's preferment the greatest in it ; the change is at once from
a filthy maggot to a shining butterfly. Many methods might be introduced to make
the lower officers of more consequence on their duty, and their lives more agreeable to
themselves ; for that power of reducing them to sweep the decks, being lodged in the
breast of a captain, is often abused through passion or caprice ; besides, it is too
despotic an authority to exercise on a man who has the feelings of an Englishman.
" We are likewise to recollect that all commanders of men-of-war are not gentle-
men, nor men. of education. I know a great part are brave men, but a much greater,
seamen. I allow the maxim of learning to obey, before we command oursL4ves ; but
still there is no reason to be vulgar, for we are to consider these young people are the
active machines of duty, the wheels which give motion to the main body ; and it is
absolutely necessary to give them authority in their office to carry on the duties of the
ship: but rendering them low in the eyes of the people creates a contempt for
midshipmen in general, and turns that necessary respect due to them into contempt.
" I propose to warrant this body of officers, and make them answer to the Board of
Admiralty for their conduct. They should possess a third table in the ship, and have
the countenance of their sujieriors. This would enliven their servitude, and make
them of consequence on their duty." ^
But some improvement was already to be noticed, for Thompson
continues : —
" The last war, a chaw of tobacco, a rattan, and a rope of oaths were sufficient
qualifications to constitute a lieutenant ; but now, education and good manners are
the study of all ; and so far from effeminacy, that I am of opinion the present race
of oflicers will as much eclipse the veterans of 1692 as the polite the vulgar." ^
There was, however, as yet Httle improvement either in the code
of morals, or in the sanitary provisions on board his Majesty's ships.
There is evidence that, towards the end of the seventeenth century,
women were systematically carried to sea in the proportion of so
many per company of Marines ; and Thompson, writing in the
middle of the eighteenth, after describing the unsavoury persons
and dwellings of the negroes of Antigua, goes on : —
" But bad smells don't hurt the sailor's appetite, each man possessing a temporary
lady, whose pride is her constancy to the man she chooses; and in tliis particular they
' ' Seaman's Letters,' i. 140. ^ lb. 144.
1756.] SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE NAVY. 23
are strictly so. I have known 350 women sup and sleep on board ^ on a Sunday
evening, and return at daybreak to their different plantations." ^
As for sanitation, suffice it to say, by way of example, in addition
to the many cases which will be cited in the two following chapters,
that, in 1756, at the time of the outbreak of war with France, when
she had been on no long cruise, and had been exposed only to the
hardships of a few months of service in the Channel, the Stirling
Castle, 64, Captain Samuel Cornish, arrived at Portsmouth with four
hundred and eighty men, of whom two hundred and twenty-five
were the pressed refuse of gaols and scum of streets. She was full
of fever and other sickness, and, when the diseased had been sent
ashore, but one hundred and sixty men remained for duty. Less
than three months later, when, having filled up her complement in
England, she had proceeded to New York, Edward Thompson
wrote from her : "We have now one hundred and fifty-nine people
ill in fluxes, scurvies, and fevers." Two months afterwards, ashore
at English Harbour, Antigua, he added —
" I have been long declining with the white flux, and, for recovery, am stuffed into
a small room with twenty-six people ; but am now in better health. I officiate as
chapilain, and bury eight men in a morning. Fluxes and fevers are the reigning
distemper, and both I attribute to the water drunk by the seamen, which is taken out
of tanks or cisterns, built by Admiral Knowles. It is all rain water, and covered
close up, which, for want of air, breeds poisonous animalculje, and becomes foul and
putrid. The melancholy effects it produces might be in a great manner prevented by
boiling the water before it is issued, or ordering the people to do it. This would
destroy the vermin, and correct the putrefaction. I am convinced from long observa-
tion that most of the distempers in southern climates arise from the water drunk, as
ship sicknesses do from the bilge water ; which is evidently proved in leaky ships
being always healthful. I therefore recommend to all officers, naval and mercantile,
to let in salt water every day, and boil their fresh, for the good of themselves and
cargoes."
^ He speaks of H.M.S. Stirling Castle, 64, carrying 480 men.
^ ' Seaman's Letters,' ii. 24.
( 24 )
CHAPTER XXVII.
MiLiTAEY History of the Royal Navy, 1714-1762.
MAJOR OPERATIONS.
Accession of George I. — Trouble with Sweden — Norris to the Baltic— Co-operation
with Holland, Denmark, and Kussia — A Swedish conspiracy — Byng to the Baltic
in 1717 — The Quadruple Alliance — Irritation of Spain — Byng to the Mediterranean
in 1718 — Spanish operations in Sicily — The battle off Cape Passaro — The British
and Spanish accounts — Mahan's comments — War with Si)ain — Projected invasion
of England — Dispersal of the Spanish fleet — The Eoss-shire fiasco — Eeduction of
Sicily — Peace with Spain — Xorris in the Baltic in 1718 — Alliance with Sweden —
Norris in the Baltic in 1719, 1720, and 1721 — Peace between Eussia and Sweden
— The Treaty of Vienna — The Treaty of Hannover — Jennings to the coast of
Spain — Wager to the Baltic — Hosier to the West Indies — Sickness in the Heet —
Death of Hosier, Hopsonn, and St. Loe — Wager relieves Gibraltar — Norris in the
Baltic — Death of George I. — The Treaty of Seville — Difficulties in the New
World — Norris to Lisbon — Haddock to the Mediterranean — Spanish depredations
— Jenkins's ears — Eeprisals granted — War with Spain — Anson's expedition —
Edward Vernon — Vernon to the West Indies — Capture of Puerto Bello — Enthusiasm
in England — Co-operation between France and Spain — Vernon reinforced — France
holds her hand — Vernon at Chagres — Vernon again reinforced — Death of Cath-
cart — Beauclerk and de Boisgeroult — Unsuccessful cruises of Haddock, Balchen,
and Norris — Junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean —
Vernon's difficulties with Wentworth — Attack upon Cartagena — Early success
— Failure of the attempt — Attack on Santiago de Cuba — Abandonment of the
])lan — Criticism of the scheme — The commanders censured — Projected expedition
against Panama — Collapse of the venture — Eecall of Vernon and Wentworth —
Lestock joins Haddock in the Mediterranean — Lestock's character — Mathews
commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean — Friction between Mathews and Lestock
— Blockade of Toulon — Martin at Naples — Martin to Alassio— Ogle in the West
Indies — Eepulse of the attack on La Guayra — Eepulse at Puerto Cabello — France
supports Spain — Norris in the Channel — Escape of de Eoquefeuil — War with
France and Spain — The Dutch join Great Britain — Disposition of the fleets —
Navarro and de Court leave Toulon — Mathews's action oft" Toulon — Suspension
and trial of Lestock — Trials of captains — The court-martial and the Lord Chief
Justice — Trial of Mathews — Eowley in the Mediterranean — Gabaret escapes him —
Hardy blockaded— Balchen relieves him — Loss of the Victory — Barnet in the
East Indies — Davers at Jamaica — French intrigues in North America — Annapolis
summoned in vain — Schemes of the Pretender — He lands in Scotland — His escajDe
— Cai)ture of Louisbourg — Townsend to the West Indies — Aflairs in the Mediter-
ranean— French failures in North America — Lestock on the coast of France —
Peyton and La Bourdonnais— Fall of Madras — Duplicity of Dupleix — Lisle and
de Cxmflaus — Disgrace of Mitchell — Medley in the Mediterranean — French ex-
pedition to Cape Breton — Anson's action with de La Jonquiere — Hawke defeats
de L'Elenduere — Trial of Captain Fox — Exhaustion of France — Boscawen to the
1714.]
DIFFICULTIES IN THE NORTH.
25
East Indies — Failure at Pondicherry — Peace of Aix-la-Ohapelle — Surrender of
Madras — Knowles takes Port Louis— Attempt on Santiago de Cuba— Knowles's
victory off Havana — Trial of Knowles— Pocock takes a French convoy — Losses
during the war — Terms of the peace — French aggressions — Keppel to North
America— French designs on Canada — Boscawen to North America— Capture of
the Ahide and Lya — Threatened invasion — French expedition to Minorca —
Operations against Angria — Success of Holmes — Pieconnaissance of Brest — British
weakness in the Mediterranean — Byng ordered to Minorca — Byng's action with
de La Galissonniere — The dispatches — Byng superseded, tried, and executed —
Conclusions on his case — Fall of Minorca — Watson takes Calcutta — Fall of
Chandernagore — D'Ache to the East Indies — Forrest's action with de Kersaint —
Expedition to Louisbourg — Misfortunes of the fleet — The expedition abandoned —
Escape of du Revest — Expedition against Eochefort — Pocock's action off Cudda-
lore — Capitulation of Fort St. David — Pocock's action off Negapatam — With-
drawal of d'Ache — Kempenfelt relieves Madras — Siege and capture of Louisbourg
— Boscawen and du Chaffault — Marsh to West Africa — Kej^ii^el takes Goree —
Capture of the OrpMe and Foudroyani — Hawke at He d'Aix — Howe's expedition
to the French coast — Capture of Cherbourg — Disaster at St. Cas — Renewed French
preparations — Pocock again engages d'Ache — The Dutch at Chinsura- — Failure at
Martinique — Operations at Guadaloupe — The conquest of Canada — Saunders in
the St. Lawrence — Boscawen to the Mediterranean — Boscawen defeats de La Choe
— Rodney off Le Havre — Blockade of Brest — Hawke defeats de Conflans — •
Blockade of Pondicherry — Hurricane in the East Indies — Fall of Pondicherry —
Norbury's action in the West Indies — French attem23t against Quebec — Montreal
occupied — Elliot defeats Thurot — Boscawen and Hawke in Quiberon Bay —
Further operations in the East Indies — Keppel's expedition against Belleisle — The
Family Compact — War with Spain — Capture of Manila — Conquest of Martinique
— Conquest of Grenada and St. Lucia — Pocock reduces Havana — Misfortunes of
Pocock's fleet — De Terney at Newfoundland — Recapture of St. John's — The raid
on Buenos Ayres — Enforcement of the right of search — The Treaty of Fontaine-
bleau — Results of the Seven Years' War.
POPULAR MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF MATHEWS's ACTION OFF TOULON
FEBRUARY IItH, 1744, AND OF THE FRUSTKATION OF THE
THREATENED INVASION OF ENGLAND AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME.
{From an urUjinal kiiidlij lent by H.S.II. Captain Prime Louis
Battenberg, R.N.)
of
Although, at
the accession
of George I.,
Great Britain
was at peace
with all the
world, the re-
lations of the
country with
certain north-
ern powers
were far from
being satisfac-
tory ; and from
the first it was foreseen that difficulties were likely to arise, and
to call for the active employment of the Navy towards their solution.
26 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1716.
Sweden had not yet allied herself with Eussia, and was, in fact,
still at war with her and with Denmark ; and Swedish privateers
had seized many British ships which were alleged to contain arms,
ammunition, and stores, destined, in contravention of treaty, for
the service of the Tsar. Eemonstrances had been made by the
British minister at Stockholm, but they had produced no results.
The Dutch, who had similar causes of complaint against the
government of Charles XII., found it equally difficult to obtain
either redress or apology ; and it was therefore determined by Great
Britain and Holland to despatch a combined fleet to the Baltic in
1715 to intimidate the Swedes, and to convoy, and prevent further
undue interference with, the trade.
The British contingent, under Admiral Sir John Norris (B.) and
Bear- Admiral Sir Thomas Hardy (B.), was made up of twenty ships
of the line, besides a few small craft. It sailed from the Nore on
May 18th, and, reaching the Sound on June 10th, there joined the
Dutch contingent of twelve sail under Rear- Admiral Lucas de Veth.
The merchantmen were escorted to their ports, but nothing of
importance happened during the rest of the year. In 1716, Sir
John, unwilling to adopt strong measures against Sweden unless
he had the gravest reasons for doing so, sent an officer to Stockholm
to inquire whether or not the practice of seizing British and Dutch
ships was to be persisted in. A vague and ambiguous reply being
returned, it was determined by the allied commanders, in pursuance
of orders from home, to make a demonstration of an exceptional
nature. A Danish squadron lay at Copenhagen. There also lay a
Russian squadron under the Tsar Peter himself. After the necessary
negotiations had taken place, it was agreed that, while the Dutch,
then under Commodore Hendrik Grave, with five British men-of-
war, should convoy to their destinations such merchantmen as had
followed the fleets, the British, Russian, and Danish squadrons,
forming for the moment a single fleet, should proceed up the Baltic,
in order to let it be seen that, rather than permit any further
meddling with her trade, Great Britain would take active part
against Charles XII. The Tsar Peter became, for the nonce, com-
mander-in-chief ; Norris assumed command of the van, and Count
Gyldenlove,^ the Danish admiral, took the rear under his orders.
^ Ulrich Christian Gyklenlove, kimwii in England as Count Gueldenlew, was a
natural brother of King Frederick IV. of Denmark, and liad commanded the Danish
fleet at the time of Kooke's operations against Copenhagen in 1700.
1716.] TEE EANNOVERIAN ENTANGLEMENT. 27
The confederate fleet assembled in Kjoge Bay, and thence
proceeded to Bornhohn, where, learning that the Swedes had
retired to Karlskrona, unwilling to hazard an action, the Tsar gave
directions that the convoys might continue their voyages to their
various ports. He then, with his squadron, sailed to the coast of
Mecklenburg. Norris and Gyldenlove took measures for collecting
the homeward-bound trade, most of which joined them at Bornhohn
on November 9th, and with them entered the roadstead of Copen-
hagen on the day following. The remaining merchantmen, chiefly
Dutch, anchored there on the 12th. Sir John Norris left behind
him in the Baltic Captain William Cleveland, with seven ships, to
act, if necessary, in concert with the Danes ; and, with the rest of the
fleet, he returned to England. On his voyage he met with terrible
weather, and, although he succeeded in preserving his convoy, he
had the misfortune to lose the Auguste, 60, and the Garland, 24.^
The fleet arrived at the Nore on November 29th, 1716.
The ostensible reasons for this Baltic expedition have been given
above. It must be borne in mind, however, that the situation, as
between Great Britain and Sweden, was exacerbated by the fact
that George I., besides being King of Great Britain, was Elector of
Hannover. In his latter quality he had purchased from Denmark
territories which had been conquered from Sweden ; and, in order to
defend these, he had declared war against Sweden, and carried on
the conflict at a time when, in his quality of King of Great Britain,
he was at peace with Charles XII. The Swedish monarch did not
scruple to charge King George with having prostituted the honour
of the British flag in order to serve the interests of Hannover ; and,
although it may be that Charles, in his natural resentment, failed to
do exact justice to his opponent, it cannot be denied that the
personal union of the crowns of Great Britain and Hannover, if not
in 1715-16, at least on many subsequent occasions, led Great Britain
into ventures which, had her own interests only been consulted, she
would never have embarked upon.
The irritation of Sweden was increased by Norris's demonstration
in the Baltic ; and one of the results was that, soon afterwards,
^ So say all historians, but no authority can be found for one part of the statement.
The Auguste, Captain Eobert Jolinson, ran ashore, it is true, on November 10th,
her captain and most of her people being saved. The Garland, however, remained
in commission, under Captain Ellis Brand, until February 22nd, 1717 ; from which
fact it may be concluded that, if she went ashore, she did not at once become a total
loss. There seems, too, to have been no court-martial. MS. List in Author's Coll.
28
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762.
[1717.
certain Swedish diplomatists, including the minister in London,
associated themselves in plots, having for their object the further-
ance of the cause of the Pretender. The discovery of these intrigues
aroused the liveliest indignation throughout Great Britain ; and when
Parliament met in 1717, it was formally resolved by the House of
Commons to introduce a Bill to authorise the King to prohibit
commerce with Sweden " during such time as his Majesty shall
think it necessary for the safety and peace of his kingdom." On
SIR JOHN NORRIS, KT., ADMIRAL OK THE FLEET.
(Froxi the pic tire by Sir G. Encller. hi/ prnnisKiun of H. C. Nor r is. Esq.)
March '2nd, the Bill liuving in the meantime been passed, a
proclamation in accordance with its provisions was made public.
To properly enforce the prohibition, it was requisite to send another
fleet to the Baltic ; and on ^Nrarcli 30th, twenty-one ships of the line,
with frigates and fireships, sailed for Copenhagen under Admiral Sir
George Byng. A few days later, though in face of strong opposition,
the Government obtained a grant of a quarter of a million sterling to
enable the King " to concert such measures with foreign princes and
1718.] THE QUADS UPLE ALLIANCE. 29
states as may prevent any charge and apprehension from the designs
of Sweden for the future."
Byng agreed upon a plan of united action with Denmark, and
made various dispositions to ensure the carrying out of the objects
for which he had been sent to sea ; but his proceedings were, upon
the whole, uneventful, the Swedes not venturing outside their ports.
Beturning at the beginning of winter, he arrived in the mouth
of the Thames on November 15th. A note of such small services
as were performed by the cruisers of the fleet will be found in the
next chapter. In the meantime, thanks largely to the good ofi&ces
of France and Russia, the difficulties in the north were for the
moment smoothed over, although, for many j'ears afterwards, they
remained a source of much anxiety and expense to the Court of
St. James's.
" But this," says Campbell, " was not the only aflfair of consequence that employed
the thoughts of the administration. We were then in close confederacy with the
Emperor and France; and, in conjunction with these Powers, had undertaken to settle
the affairs of Europe on a better foundation than the Treaty of Utrecht left them.
With this view, the Triple Alliance was concluded on January 4th, 1717 ; and, that
not answering the end expected from it, we next entered, as will be shown, into the
famous Quadruple Alliance,^ which was intended to remedy all these defects, and to
fix the general tranquillity for ever. Yet, by unforeseen accidents to which human
policy will be always liable, this alliance proved the cause of an immediate war
between us and Spain, and, in its consequences, was the source of all the troubles that
disturbed Europe from the time of its conclusion ^ to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle."
The terms of the alliance were decided upon some months before
the treaty was actually signed. It was determined that Spain
should restore Sardinia to the Emperor, and that the King of Spain
should renounce his claim to succeed to the French crown, while the
Emperor was to renounce his claim to what had been guaranteed to
Philip V. under the Treaty of Utrecht, and Philip was to surrender
his claim to the Netherlands and to the Italian possessions of the
Emperor. In return for Sicily, the Emperor was to hand over
Sardinia to the King of Sicily, and was to recognise the right of
the House of Savoy to succeed to the crown of Spain in the event
of the failure of the heirs of Philip V. France and Great Britain
undertook to assist the Emperor to acquire Sicily ; and France and
the Empire undertook to maintain the Protestant succession in
Great Britain.^
^ Of Great Britain, France, Holland, and the Empire.
2 August, 1718.
^ Koch & SchoU, ' Hist, des Traites de Paix.'
30 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1718.
The arrangement was excessively displeasing to Spain ; and no
sooner had the House of Savoy transferred Sicily to the Emperor
than Spain, whose policy was then controlled by Cardinal Alberoni,
made preparations for attacking that island. Great Britain made
corresponding preparations for enforcing the provisions of the
still unsigned treaty, and, early in 1718, commissioned a large
number of ships. The Spanish minister in London remonstrated.
George I. rather bluntly replied that it was not his intention to
conceal the object of his armaments, and that he purposed to send
Sir George Byng to the Mediterranean with a powerful force " to
maintain the neutrality of Italy against those who should seek to
disturb it."
In March, 1718, Byng was accordingly appointed Commander-in-
Chief in the Mediterranean ; and on May 24th he received his written
instructions. They were not as explicit as might have been wished ;
but they appear to have been explained and supplemented in the
course of an interview which the Admiral, ere he left London, had
with Lords Sunderland and Stanhope, and Mr. Secretary Craggs.^
He was, upon his arrival upon his station, to inform the King of
Spain, the Viceroy of Naples, and the Governor of Milan, that he had
been sent to sea to promote all measures that might best contribute
to the arrangement of such differences as had arisen between the
two crowns, and to the prevention of any further violation of the
neutrality of Italy, which he was to see preserved. He was also
to enjoin both parties to abstain from acts of hostility, so that
negotiations for peace might be begun and concluded. But, should
the Spaniards persist, after all, in attacking the Emperor's territory
in Italy; or should they land in any part of Italy for that purpose; or
should they endeavour to make themselves masters of Italy (which
would be a step towards the invasion of the kingdom of Naples),
Byng was, to the best of his power, to hinder and obstruct them. If,
however, they were already landed, he was to try by amicable means
to induce them to abandon their project, and was to offer to help
them to withdraw their troops ; and, should all his friendly offices
prove ineffectual, he was to defend the territories attacked, by
keeping company with, or intercepting, Spanish ships and convoys,
and, if necessary, by openly opposing them.
Sir George Byng sailed from Spithead on June 15th, 1718, with
twenty ships of the line, two fireships, two bomb vessels, a store-
^ See a letter from Craggs in Campbell, iv. 3-18.
1718]
BYNG TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.
31
ship, a hospital-ship, and two tenders, and, passing Lisbon, sent the
Bupej-t in thither for intelHgence. Being off Cadiz on June 30th, he
despatched the Su-perbe with a letter to the British minister at
Madrid, desiring him to inform the King of Spain of the presence
of the British fleet, and of the instructions under which it was to
act. The Spanish reply, returned after some delay, was curtly to
the effect that Byng might execute his sovereign's orders. The
GEORGE BYNG, VISCOUNT TORRINGTON, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET.
(From T. Houbmkciis engraving after the portrait l)ij Sir G. Kneller.)
minister. Colonel Stanhope, continued, almost up to the very
outbreak of hostilities, to endeavour to induce Spain to give way ;
and in the meantime, foreseeing the probable futility of his efforts,
he did his best to warn British merchants in the Spanish ports to
take such measures as would protect their property against the
results of any sudden rupture.
Sir George, who had to contend with unfavourable winds, did
32 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17(;2. [1718.
not make Cape Spartel until July 8tli. He was there rejoined by
the Bupert and the Superhe, and learnt that Spain had been making
great preparations for war, and that a considerable Spanish fleet had
quitted Barcelona on June 18th for the eastward. Off Gibraltar,
the Admiral was joined by a small division of ships under Vice-
Admiral Charles Cornwall. The fleet subsequently watered at
Malaga, and thence proceeded to Port Mahon, where it landed
troops and took off the soldiers who had been in garrison there.
It sailed again on July 25th, upon receipt of news that the Spanish
fleet had been sighted on June 30th near Naples ; and on August 1st
it anchored in the Bay of Naples. Sir George had previously taken
care to apprise the imperial Viceroy, and the governor of Milan, of
his arrival in the Mediterranean.
The Spaniards had not been idle. They had landed the Marques
de Lede in Sicily ; and, except the citadel of Messina, the whole
island had quickly fallen to him with little or no resistance. The
citadel was held by Savoyards; and as Savoy, under the terms of the
understanding, was presently to surrender Sicily to the Emperor, it
could scarcely be expected that the fortress would hold out for long.
In these circumstances, the imperial Viceroy of Naples hurriedly
embarked two thousand German troops ^ on board the British ships,
and requested Sir George Byng to endeavour to throw them into
Messina citadel, and the neighbouring Fort Salvatore, The fleet
quitted Naples on August 6th, and on August 9th arrived off the
Faro of Messina.
The Spaniards were besieging the place which Byng desired to
relieve ; but Sir George does not seem to have known how near their
fleet was to him. Indeed, he had some reason to suppose that it
was endeavouring to avoid him. Instead, therefore, of moving
onwards to Messina and striking at once, he sent ashore the Captain
of the Fleet, George Saunders, with a letter to the Marques de Lede,
proposing a cessation for two months of the operations on shore, and
adding that, unless a truce were agreed to, he would use all his force
" to prevent further attempts to disturb" the dominions which his
master stood engaged to defend. De Lede replied that he had no
powers to treat, and that he intended to carry out his orders. Upon
receiving this answer, Sir George weighed, with a view to place his
fleet in front of Messina and to relieve the garrison of the citadel.
' Tliese troops, uiuler General Wetzel, were, before the battle oft' Cape Passaro, set
ashore at Reggio.
1718.] BATTLE OF CAPE PASSARO. 33
The stoiy of what followed is given in the formal relations which
will be presently printed.
"The eugagement wliich ensued can," says Mahan, "scarcely be called a battle
and, as is apt to happen in such affairs, when the parties are on the verge of war, but
war has not actually been declared, there is some doubt as to how far the attack was
morally justifiable on the part of the English. It seems pretty sure that Byng was
determined beforehand to seize or destroy the Spanish fleet, and tliat as a military man
he was justified by his orders. The Spanish officers had not made up their minds to
any line of conduct ; they were much inferior in numbers, and, as must always be the
case, Alberoni's hastily revived navy had not within the same period reached nearly
the efficiency of his army. The English approached threateningly near : one or more
Spanish ships opened fire : whereupon the Knglish, being to windward, stood down and
made an end of them. A few only escaped. . . ,"
The forces in face of one another were, as Captain Mahan
indicates, as unequal in numbers as in discipline. Over leaf is a
comparative statement of them. The ships of the British fleet are
arranged according to Sir George Byng's order of battle, in which
the Canterbury was to lead with the starboard, and the Bochester
with the larboard tacks on board. The exact order of the Spaniards
cannot be determined.
Sir George Byng, in his despatches,^ thus describes the events of
August 10th, and the following days : —
From ox board the Barfleur, off of Syracusa,
August 6th (O.S.).
" Early in the morning, on the thirtieth of July,^ as we were standing in for
Messina, we saw two scouts of the Spanish fleet in the Faro, very near us ; and, at the
same time, a felucca, coming oft' from the Calabrian shore, assured us they saw from
the hills the Spanish fleet lying by. Upon which the Admiral stood through the Faro
after the scouts, judging they would lead us to their fleet ; which they did ; for, before
noon, we had a fair sight of all their ships as they were drawing into line-of-battle.
" On our approach, they went from us large, but in their order of battle, their fleet
consisting of six and twenty men-of-war, great and small, two fireships, four bomb
vessels, seven galleys, and several ships with stores and provisions.
"The Admiral ordered the Kent, Superbe, Graf ton, and Or/brc?, being the best
sailers in the fleet, to make what sail they could to come up with the Spaniards ; and
that the ships which could get headmost, and nearest to them, should carry the lights
usually worn by the Admiral,^ that he might not lose sight of them in the night ;
while he made what sail he could, with the rest of the fleet, to keep up with them. It
being little wind, the Spanish galleys towed their heaviest sailers all night.
" The thirty-first,* in the morning, as soon as it was day, they finding us pretty
near up witli their fleet, the galleys and smaller ships, with the fireships, bomb vessels,
^ Sent home by his son, Pattee Byng. Gazette, No. 6(J73.
^ I.e. August 10th, N.S.
^ An Admiral commanding in chief carried three lights on the poop and one light
in the main-top.
* I.e. August 11th, N.S.
VOL. III. D
34
MAJOR OTERATJONS, 1714-17G2.
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1718.] BYNG'S DESPATCH. 35
and storeships, separated from the admiral and bigger ships, and stood in for the shore :
after whom the Admiral sent Captain Walton, in the Canterbury, with the Argi/le and
six ships moie. As those ships were coming up with them, one of the Spaniards ^ fired
a broadside at the Argyle. 'J'he Admiral, seeing those ships engaged with the Spanish,
which were making towards the shore, sent orders to Captain Walton to rendezvous,
after the action, at Syracusa (where the Viceroy for the King of Sicily was, with a
garrison). The like orders he despatched to the flags, and to as many ships as were
within his reach, that place being defended against the Spaniards, and being the most
proper port on that coast for the fleet to gather together again.
" We held on our chase after the Spanish admiral, with three of his rear-admirals,
and the biggest ships, which stayed by their flags till we came near them. The
captains of the Kent, Superbe, Grafton, and Or/ord, having orders to make what sail
they could to place themselves by the four headmost ships, were the first that came up
with them. The Spaniards began, by firing their stern-chase[rs] at them : but they,
having orders not to fire unless the Spanish ships repeated their firing, made no return
at first. But, the Spaniards firing again, the Or/ord attacked the Santa Rosa, which,
some time after, she took. The St. Charles ^ struck next Avithout much opposition,
and the Kent took possession of her. The Grafton attacked the Prince of Asturius,
formerly called the Cumberland,^ in which was Rear- Admiral Chacon : but, the Breda
and Captain coming up, she left that ship for them to take, which they soon did ; and
stretched ahead after another sixty-gun ship, which was on her starboard while she
was engaging the Prince of Asturias, and kept firing her stern-chase into the Grafton.
" About one o'clock, the Kent and Superbe engaged the Spanish admiral,* which,
with two ships more, fired on them, and made a running fight until about three; wheu
the Kent, bearing down upon her, and under her stern, gave her a broadside and went
away to leeward of her. Then the Superbe put for it, and laid the Spanish Admiral on
board, falling on her weather quarter : but the Spanish admiral shifting her helm and
avoiding her, the Superbe ranged up under her lee quarter ; on which she struck to her.
At the same time, the Barfleur being within shot of the said Spanish admiral astern,
inclining on her weather quarter, one of their rear-admirals,'' and another sixty-gun
ship, which were to windward of the Barfleur, bore down and gave her their broad-
sides, and then clap'd upon a wind, standing in for the land. The Admiral, in the
Barfleur, stood after them till it was almost night. But, it being little wind, and they
galing from her out of reach, he left pursuing them, and stood away to the fleet again ;
which he joined two hours after night. The Essex took the Juno ; the Montagu and
Rupert took the Volante. A'ice- Admiral Cornwall followed the Grafton to support
her ; but, it being very little wind and the night coming on, the Spaniard galed away
from the Grafton.
" Rear- Admiral Delavall, with the Royal Oak, chased two ships that went away
more leewardly tlian the rest, (one of them said to be Rear-Admiral Canunock ®) but
we, not having seen them since, know not the success. The ship which sufiered most,
with us, was the Grafton, the captain of which, though he had not the fortune to take
^ The San Isidoro, 46. ^ San Carlos.
- ^ The Cumberland, 80, Captain Richard Edwards (a), had been taken by the French
in 1707. See Vol. II. p. 513. In Spanish hands she carried a lighter armament than
she had been built for. *
* Real San Felipe. ^ Apparently the San Luis.
® George Cammock had been a post-captain in the Royal Navy until 1714, and had
repeatedly distinguished himself. Owing to his Jacobite leanings, he had been
dismissed the service, and had entered that of Spain. The Pretender afterwards
appointed him Admiral of the White. He is said to have died in banishment at
Ceuta. Charnock, iii. 221.
D 2
36 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [17 IS.
any particular ship, yet was engaged with several, behaved himself very much like an
utlicer and a seaman, and bid fair I'nr stripping the way of those four ships that he
pursueil; who escaped, not through his fault, but failure nf winil ; and his own sails
and rigging were inuch shattered."
"Fkom on hoard thk Barfieur, at sea,
August 7th (0.^.).
"Just now is returned one of the eight ships which the Admiral sent with Captain
Walton to pursue those of Spain that went in with the shore, with a letter ^ from that
Captain, dated the tifth instant, giving an account that he, with the said ships, had
taken oue Spanish rear-admiral of sixty guns, one man-of-war of four and fiftj', one of
forty,^ which gave the Argyle the first broadside, one of fovu- and twenty, one ship
laden with arms, and one bomb-vessel ; and had burnt one mau-of-war of four and
fifty guns, two of forty each, one of thirty, one fireship, one bomb-vessel, and one
settee.^ At the writing of this letter. Captain Walton Avas making into Syracusa.
The ship which brought this letter saw Hear- Admiral Delavall last night ; who had
taken the Isabela, a ship of sixty guns, with which he was standing in likewise for
Syracusa ; to which place we are now going ; and hope to get in there this night.
"When the Admiral has joined the ships absent from the fleet, and which we
judge are nnw in Syracusa with their prizes, he designs to send "\'ice- Admiral
Cornwall, in tlie Ar(jyh', with seven or eight ships more, to carry the ships taken to
Port Mahon, to be secured there till his Majesty's pleasure be known. He Avill also
put ashore, in Sicily, the Spanish admirals and commanding officers, with as many of
the common prisoners as will nut be necessary to help navigate the ships taken."
What may be regarded as ati official Spanish narrative of the
battle, and of the circumstances which led up to it, was compiled by
the Marques de Beretti-Landi, and published at the Hague. It is
interesting, as well as fair, to append the following translation of
part of it : —
"On August Dill, ill the iiKuning, the English tleet was disci ivered olf the tower of
Faro. Towards night it lay by, off Cape della Metelle, opposite the tower in question.
The Sjianish fleet was at the time in the Strait, but was without the detachment
commanded by IJear-Admiral Don B. de Guevara, and some ships and frigates which
had been sent to other places. As the intention nf the English Admiral in thus
approaching was unknown, t!ie S|),\nis]i Admiral dctcrniiuod to (piit the Strait, and to
' The letter here alluded to is the famous one which, erroneously, has so often been
cited as a model of modest brevity and sailor-like conciseness. As given by Campbell,
it runs: "Sir, we have taken and destroyed all the Spanish ships and vessels which
were upon the coast, the numl)er as per margin. I am, etc., (t. Wai.ton." Even
Mahan, following Cami)bell and Charnock, accepts this docked version of the letter as
genuine, and connnents upon its shortness; yet, as a n)atter of fact, the real letter is
one of some little length, and the above quotation forms oidy the first paragraj)h of it.
Walton's blunt brevity is as mythical as certain \\eIl-l<iio\\ n stmics whit'h are
associated with Fontenoy an<l Waterloo.
^ The Han Jsiduru, 40.
' Some of the vessels here said to have lieen liuint iiy Wahon were undouhtcdly in
reality fired by Mari to save them from capture. It comes, liowc\i'r, almost to the
name thing.
1718. J THE SPANISH STORY. 37
collect his forces off Cajse Spartiveuto, taking with him his vessels laden with stores,
his object being the better to prepare against the designs of the English, seeing that an
officer who had been sent by Sir George Byng to the Marques de Lede had not
returned. This ofticer had had orders to suggest to the Marques a suspension of
hostilities for two months; but tlie Marques had replied that he could do nothing
without directions from his Court. And although it was believed that a courier had
been despatched with the suggestion to Madrid, the Spaniards were unwilling to risk a
surprise from the English fleet, and a resort to svich tactics as might be prompted by
jterfidy.
" On the morning of the 10th, the English fleet advanced further into the Faro, and
was saluted by all the Spanish ships and vessels lying there. It is to be here noted
that although Admiral Byng had convoyed to Reggio some transports having on board
troops ^ of the Archduke, the officer who had been - sent to the Marques de Lede
declared that this was not for hostile purposes, but merely to secure from any insults
the transports which were under his protection.
" The Spanish fleet sent out two light frigates to reconnoitre the English fleet ; and
although these perceived that the English, whose designs were not understood, made
all possible sail to close with the Spaniards, whose Admiral was ignorant whether the
English came as friends or as enemies, yet the Spaniards, who were two leagues from
the strangers, decided to withdraw towards Cape Passaro under easy sail, in order that
there might be no pretence that they anticipated hostilities. Soon afterwards a calm
supervened, and thus the ships of both fleets fell among one another ; w^iereupon the
Spanish Admiral, witnessing the danger, caused his ships of the line to be towed away
from the English with a view to collecting them in one body. Yet he did not permit
the gallej's to commit any unfriendly act, such as they might have committed with
advantage while it remained calm. When the Marques de Mari was near the land and
was separated from his consorts in the rear and from the frigates and transports of his
division, the weather changed, so that he strove in vain to regain the main body of the
Spanish fleet. But the English, with dissimulation, held on their way, trimming their
sails so as to secure the wind, and to cut off the Marques de Mari's division. When
they had at length succeeded in this, they attacked him Avith six shijjs, forcing him to
separate from the rest of the fleet and to retire towards the shore. As long as it was
jiossible, the Marques defended himself against seven ships of the line, and, when he
was no longer able to resist, he saved his people by running his vessels aground.
Some of them were burnt under his own direction : others were taken by the enemy.
" The rest of the English fleet, consisting of seventeen sail of the line, fell upon the
Real San Felipe, Principe de Asturias, San Fernando, San Carlos, Saiita Isabela,
and Sun Pedro, and the frigates Sant'i Rosa, Perla, Juno, and Volante, Avhich
continued to make for Cape Passaro; and as, owing to their inferiority of force, they
drew off in line, the English attacked their rearmost ship with four or five vessels, and
cut her off. They did the same in succession with other ships, which, in spite of the
fact that they made all the sail they could, were unable to avoid being captured.
Thus, every Spanish vessel being separately fought by five, six, or seven of the enemy,
the English finally subdued the Re'd San Felipej^ Principe de Asturias, San Carlos,
Sarda Isabela, Santa Rosa, Volante, and Juno, though each offered a bloody and
determined resistance.
" While the Real San Felipe was engaged with the English, Eear-Admiral Don
Balthazar de Guevara returned from Malta with two ships of the line, and, heading for
the Real San Felipe, passed the English ships which were then alongside her, firing
upon each. He then attacked such of Admiral Byng's vessels as followed the Real
1 Under General Wetzel.
^ Admiral Castaueta subsequently died of his wounds at Port Mahon.
38 MAJOn OFEnATIOyS, 1714-1762. [1718.
Stu) Felipe. These, being very mucli damaged, drew (iff in ilie iiiglit, and, after the
action, remained fifty leagues at sea for three or fmir days, not only to repair the
Spanish sliips wiiicdi they had captured, and whicli were most severely mauled, but
also to make good their own damages. Admiral I'yng, therefore, could not enter
Syracuse until August 16th or ITth, and then only with much difficulty."^
After giving some account of the services of individual ships and
captains, the account continues : —
"Such is the story of the action off Abola, or the Gulf of I'Ariga, in the Malta
Channel, between the Spanish and English fleets. The English ships, thanks to ill
faith and superior strength, -were able to beat the Spanish vessels singly, one by one :
but it may be conceived, judging from the defence made by the latter, that, had they
acted in unison, the battle might have ended more advantageously for them.
" Immediately after the action, a captain of the English fleet, on behalf of Admiral
Byng, arrived to make a complimentary excuse to the Marques de Lede, and to assure
him that the Spaniards had lieen the aggressors, and that the battle ought not to be
considered to constitute a ru])ture, seeing that the English did not take it as doing so.
But it was replied that Sjjain, on the contrary, must hold it to constitute a formal
rupture ; and that the Spaniards would do the English all possible damage and ill, by
ordering the commencement of reprisals. In pursuance of this, several Spanish
vessels, and Don Guevara's division, have already seized certain English ships." ^
" It is difficult," comments Mahan, " to understand the importance attached by some
writers to Byng's action at this time in attackin.;: without regard to tlie line-of-battle.
He had before him a disorderly force, much inferior both in nund)ers and discipline.
His merit seems to lie rather in the readiness to assume a responsibility from which a
more scrupulous man might have shrunk ; but in this, and throughout the campaign,
he rendered good service to England, whose sea i)Owor was again strengthened by the
destruction not of an actual but a possilile rival; and his services were rewarded by a
peerage." ^
It will be well to conclude the history of the major operations of
the Spanish War ere turning to the work done in the meantime by
British fleets in the Baltic, where a state of unrest continued for
several years.
Sir George Byng, after having taken measures to enable the
imperial troops to attack the Spaniards in Sicily, and to gradually
make themselves masters of the island, proceeded to Malta, and
brought away some Sicilian galleys, which, under the Marchese de
Rivarole, had been blockaded there by Eear-Admiral Cammock. He
returned to Naples on November 2nd. In the interval, Eear-Admiral
Guevara, as related in the narrative of the Marques de Beretti-
Landi, entered Cadiz, and seized all the English ships there, while
' There are, of course, discrepancies between the Spanish and the British accounts
as here given; but, upon the whole, the two agree unusually well.
^ For the translation, I am indebted to Dr. Henry Lopes.
' Not, however, until September Uth, 1721, when he was made Barou Byng uf
Southill, and Yiscount Torrington.
1719.]
i^FANJSH HA IB OX SCOTLA^W.
3D
British merchants and their effects were laid hands upon in Malaga
and other ports of Spain. Reprisals followed immediately, yet war
was not formally declared until December 17th, 1718.
Spain, though weak, was exasperated and obdurate, and was
even more unwilling than at first to accept the terms dictated to her
by the Quadruple Alliance. She therefore collected a considerable
armament at Cadiz and Corunna, and boldly projected an invasion of
the west of England by troops to be led by James Butler, the
attainted Duke of Ormonde. A fleet, under Admiral of the Fleet
James, Earl of Berkeley,^ and Admiral Sir John Norris, was fitted
out, and cruised in the Channel in April ; and troops were con-
centrated, especially in the west country and in Ireland ; but, long
MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF BYNG S VICTORY Ob"F CAPE PASSAKO.
(From an orUjhud kindly lent bij H.S.H. Captain Frimr Loiii^ of Battenherg, B.N.)
ere these preparations had been completed, the Spanish expedition
had been dispersed by a violent and long-continued storm, and the
scheme had been rendered abortive. Three frigates and five trans-
ports, however, conveying, among others, the Earls of Marischal and
Seaforth, and the Marquis of Tullibardine, persisted in their design,
and, pushing on to the coast of Ross-shire, there landed about four
hundred men. These were joined by fifteen or sixteen hundred
Jacobite Scots ; but they had no success. Their depot at Donan
Castle was taken and destroyed by the Worcester, Enterprise, and
Flamhorough, and they themselves were soon afterwards defeated
^ So appointed on March 21st, 1719. He was then also Vice-Admiral of Great
Britain and First Lord of the Admiralty, and he hoisted his flag with no fewer than
three captains under him, viz., Vice-Admiral James Littleton (1st) ; Captain Francis
Hosier (2nd, or Captain of the Fleet) ; and the captain of the flagship.
40 MAJOli OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1719.
at Glenshiel, whereupon the Spanish anxiharies surrendered at
discretion.
Sir George Byng sailed from Port Mahon for Naples early
in the spring of 1719, and, thenceforward, co-operated wdth the
Imperialists in the complete reduction of Sicily. In August, when
that reduction was nearly accomplished, a dispute arose between the
Admiral and the allies as to the disposal of the Spanish ships that
still lay in the ports of the island. As a settlement of the question,
so far as it concerned the ships at Messina, Sir George proposed to
General Count de Merci, the Imperialist commander, that a battery
should be erected, and that the vessels should be destroyed at their
anchors. De Merci pleaded lack of orders ; but Byng, insisting that
no commander needed specific instructions to destroy the property
of an enemy, gained his point, in spite of the opposition of the
Savoyards ; and most of the ships were duly bombarded and burnt
or sunk. The citadel of Messina, and the remaining vessels, were
handed over to the Imperialists by capitulation on October 7th, 1710.
The Spanish troops in the island were not permitted to evacuate it,
and were kept, by the fleet on the one hand, and by the Imperialists
on the other, in much discomfort ; and this fact, combined w^th
the persuasive force of an expedition which was fitted out against
Vigo under Vice-Admiral Mighells and Viscount Cobham, and which
will be described in the next chapter, at length induced the King of
Spain to agree with the Quadruple AlUance. A cessation of arms
resulted in Februar}^ 1720; and, soon afterwards, both Sicily and
Sardinia were evacuated under the terms of a convention, the former
going to the Empire, and the latter to Savoy. ^ Thus the objects for
which Great Britain had entered into the war were attained. The
wisdom of British interference is a matter which it is unnecessary
here to discuss.
The difficulties with Sweden, suspended for the moment in 1717,
again became acute in 1718, and led to the dispatch of Admiral Sir
John Norris once more to the Baltic. He sailed from the mouth of
the Thames on April 28th, and from Solebay on May 1st, with a
squadron composed of ten sail of the line," a bomb ketch, and a
* Authorities for tlie War of the Quadruple AlUance : ' Accuuut of the Exped. of
tlie Brit. Fleet to Sicily'; ' Aunals of K. George IV.'; 'Historical Itegister'; 'Corps
Uuiv. Diplomatique,' viii. pt. I. ; Chandler's ' Debates,' v. aud vi. ; ' Merc. Hist, et L'ol.'
xliv. and xlv. ; ' Mem. pour servir k I'Hist. de I'Espagne,' iii. ; Letters of Earl
Stanhope, Alberoni, Beretti-Landi, etc. ; London Gazette.
"^ Cuinherland, 80, (flag). Captain William Faullnior: Burkinrihuii, 70, Captain
1720.] EXPEDITIONS TO THE BALTIC. 41
fireship, with Rear- Admiral Jaraes Mighells as second in command,
and with a number of merchantmen in convoy. Upon his arrival off
Copenhagen, he was joined by a Danish squadron, with which he
cruised to the northward ; but as the Swedes, upon his approach,
shut themselves up in their ports, no naval action resulted. Sweden
was, however, by no means intimidated by the action of the Allies.
She made peace with the Tsar ; and, having thus freed herself from
anxiety in one direction, turned with renewed energy to prosecute
the land war with Denmark, whose territories she invaded with
two considerable armies. In this campaign, although it was upon
the whole successful, Sweden suffered the loss of her brave but
quixotic king. Charles XII. was killed by a cannon ball at
the siege of Frederikshald on December 11th, 1718. Sir John
Norris, with the fleet, had returned to England in the month of
October.
After the death of Charles XII. and the accession of Queen
Ulrica Eleanora ^ the policy of Sweden changed. She entered upon
very friendly relations with Great Britain, and, on the other hand,
was attacked by her late ally and Great Britain's old friend, Peter
the Great. The Bussians ravaged the Swedish coasts until, a fresh
British fleet having been entrusted to the command of Sir John
Xorris in June, and having joined the Swedish fleet in September,
1719, the enemy was obliged to take refuge in the harbour of Reval.
A little later, the old quarrel between Sweden and Denmark was
settled by British mediation : ^ but when Norris, in order to avoid
being frozen up there, left the Baltic in November, Sweden and
Bussia remained unreconciled, in spite of the efforts which had been
made by Lord Carteret — afterwards Earl Granville — the British
minister at Stockholm, to pacify them.
In 1720 Russia's attitude continued as before, and Sir John
Norris went back to the Baltic to protect Sweden during the open
weather. He sailed on April 16th ; was joined in May by a Swedish
squadron under Admiral Baron Wachtmeister ; and, after cruising off
Tudor Trevor ; HamjJton Court, 70, Captain Robert Coleman ; Prince Frederick, 70,
Captain Covill Mayne ; Salisbury, 50, Captain John Cockburne (1); Defiance, 60,
Captain Joseph Soanes ; Winchester, 50, Captain James Campbell (1) ; Guernsey, 50,
Captain Charles Hardy (1) ; and Windsor, 60, Captain Francis Piercy. These were
afterwards joined by a few other vessels.
Whose consort, Friedrich of Hessen-Cassel, was presently chosen king, to the
great annoyance of Russia.
'^ Though the formal treaty of peace was not signed until the summer of 1720.
42 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1725.
Reval, returned to England in Xoveniber/ In 1721, Sir John was
employed in the same way, his mission being, however, not only to
protect Sweden, but also to lend moral support to the mediatory
efforts of the British minister at Stockholm. He sailed from the
Nore on April 13th with a fleet of twenty-one ships of the line, two
iireships, three bombs, and two tenders, and with Rear-Admiral
Francis Hosier (W.), and Rear- Admiral Edward Hopsonn (B.), in
command under him. His appearance in the Baltic undoubtedly
favoured the conclusion of peace between the belligerents : and on
September 10th hostilities between Sweden and Russia were
formally terminated by the Treaty of Nystadt. Sir John dropped
anchor at the Nore on October 20th. During these various ex-
peditions to the north he seldom had occasion to fire a gun in anger,
and his proceedings were throughout of an uneventful and un-
exciting character ; yet, thanks to his tact, patience, and diplomatic
ability, and to the recognised strength and efficiency of the forces
under him, he was able to exercise a very weighty influence upon
the councils of the northern powers, and to peaceably bring about
results which a less capable officer might have failed to secure even
by fighting for them.
From 1721 onwards, for four or five years, the Navy had no
great tasks assigned to it ; but the Treaty of Vienna, concluded on
April 20th, 1725, between Spain and Austria, introduced new
sources of trouble to Europe. By a secret article of that treaty,
marriages between the houses of Spain and Austria were arranged,
and both countries pledged themselves to assist the restoration of
the Stuarts, and to compel, if necessary by force, the retrocession of
Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain. To oppose these schemes. Great
Britain, France, and Prussia entered, on September 8rd, 1725, into
the Treaty of Hannover ; whereupon, Spain began to intrigue with
Russia ; and, as the Empress Catherine, the successor of Peter the
Great, was by no means amicably disposed towards Great Britain
and her allies, it became advisable, in 1720, not only to send a fleet
to the coast of Spain, but also to dispatch once more a strong force
to the Baltic. In addition to these fleets a squadron was got ready
for the West Indies.
The fleet destined to check the nnmcdiate designs of Spain was
entrusted to Admiral Sir John Jennings (W.), who was afterwards
' In a storm in tlie Nortli Sea, tlie Monrk, 50, Captain the Hon. George Clinton,
was driven ashore near Golston on Nov. 24tli, and lost ; but all her people were saved.
1726.] WAGER TO THE BALTIC. 43
joined by Eear- Admiral Edward Hopsonn (E.)- Sir John, with
nine ships of the line, sailed from St. Helen's on July 20th. The
appearance of the British so much disquieted the Spaniards that, for
the moment, they abandoned their hostile projects : and in October,
Jennings was able to return to England, leaving Hopsonn, with a
reduced squadron, as connnander-in-chief in the Mediterranean.
The Baltic fleet, under Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Wager (E.) and
Eear-Admiral Sir George Walton (B.), consisted of twenty ships of
the line, a twenty-gun ship, two fireships, and a hospital ship. It
quitted the Nore on April 17th, and, proceeding to Copenhagen and
Stockholm, obtained the co-operation of Denmark and the friendly
support of Sweden. A Danish squadron, under Eear-Admiral Bille,
joined Sir Charles in May, and, with him, proceeded to the Gulf of
Finland. The Eussians had, in and about Cronstadt, a considerable
force under the General-Admiral Apraxine, Vice-Admiral Thomas
Gordon,^ and a rear-admiral said to have been an Englishman : ^
but, although they were much inclined to issue forth and defy the
allies, Gordon succeeded in dissuading them from this suicidal
course ; and eventually the ships were laid up. AVager displayed
throughout great tact and diplomatic ability. In the autumn he,
like Jennings, returned to England, anchoring off the Gunfleet on
November 1st.
Vice-Admiral Francis Hosier ^ (B.) was given command of the
squadron for the West Indies. He sailed from Plymouth on
April 9th with seven men-of-war, and, after a tedious passage,
arrived off the Bastimentos, near Puerto Bello, on June 6th. He
was then or thereafter joined by several vessels which w^ere already
on the station, and by others from home. These brought up his
total force to a strength of sixteen ships. ■*
' Tlionias Gordon, a captain of 1705, severed his connection with the British Xavy
at the death of Queen Anne, and entered that of Eussia, in which he was at once given
tlag-ranl\. Other Jacobite naval officers, notably the gallant Kenneth, Lord Duffiis,
took the same service at about the .-anie time.
^ Some authorities specify him as Eear-Admiral Saunders, an ex-Master and
Commander in the British ]S[av}\
*' Francis Hosier. Commander, 1694. Captain, 1696. Distinguished himself as
captain of the Salisbury, 1707-1713. Eear-Admiral, 1720. Second in command in
the Baltic. Vice-Adnural, 1723. Died Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies,
August 23rd, 1727.
* 172., three third-rates, the Brida, Berwick, and Lenox; eight fourth-rates, the
Ripon, Leopard, Superbe, Nottingham, Dunhirlx, Dragon, Tiger, and Portland ; one
fifth-rate, the Diamond ; and three sixth-rates, the Grci/honnd, Winchelaca, and
Happij.
44 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1727.
The appearance of the British lieet in the West Indies gave great
uneasiness to the Spaniards ; and, as soon as it was reported, the
treasure-ships, which w^ere then ready to make their voyage to
Europe, were unloaded, and their cargo of pieces of eight and other
vahiables was placed on shore in security, part at Havana and part
elsewhere. The men-of-war which were to have convoyed the
treasure-ships were, moreover, laid up at Puerto Bello ; and it was
determined that, so long as a powerful British force remained in the
neighbourhood, no attempt should be made to dispatch the annual
flota to Spain ; although, of course, the non-arrival of the usual
supplies would inevitably put the mother country to immense
inconvenience.
The governor of Puerto Bello sent a civil message to the A^ice-
Admiral desiring to know the reason for the unexpected visit. The
real reason was that the galleons might be watched : but as there
lay in Puerto Bello at the time a South Sea Company's ship, the
Rojjal George, and as this vessel would probably have been detained
if Hosier had at once proclaimed the nature of his mission, the reply
returned was to the effect that the fleet had come to convoy the
Eoijal George. The governor thereupon took measures to facilitate
the early departure of that ship ; and, when she had joined the fleet,
he politely requested the Vice-Admiral, seeing that the ostensible
reason for the presence of the force had ceased to exist, to withdraw
from off the port. But Hosier then answered that, pending the
receipt of further orders, he purposed to remain where he was ; and,
that his intentions might no longer be in doubt, he stationed a ship
of the line within gun-shot of the castle, and suffered no vessel to
enter or leave the port without being strictly examined. He
maintained this blockade for six months, his ships in the mean-
while becoming daily more and more distressed by the ravages of
epidemic and other diseases ; and when, on December 14th, 1726, he
proceeded to Jamaica, his command was so completely enfeebled
that he had the greatest difiiculty in navigating it into harbour.
The Vice-Admiral refreshed his people and, to the best of his
ability, made up his weakened complements to their full strength ;
and in February, 1727, he stood over to Cartagena, where some
galleons then lay. Until August he cruised upon his station ; but
his instructions were of a nature which prevented him from being
of much use to his country. They authorised him to make reprisals
subject to certain restrictions, but not to make war ; and although
1727-2!).] MORTALITY IN THE WEST INDIES. 45
the Spaniards, after a time, began to seize the property of British
merchants and to detain and condemn British vessels. Hosier was
obHged to content himself with demanding a restitution which the
Spaniards refused, and which he was unable to compel. During
that period disease was even more rife throughout the fleet than it
had been in the previous year ; and, after thousands of ofilicers and
men had perished miserably, the misfortunes of the expedition
culminated on August 23rd, when Hosier himself died.^
His death has been attributed to anxiety and chagrin, but it
was, in fact, caused by fever. Nor is it astonishing that the fleet
was then little better than a floating charnel-house. The most
elementary prescriptions of sanitary science seem to have been
neglected, and there is perhaps no better illustration of the extra-
ordinary indifference to the simplest laws of health than the fact
that in that hot and pestilent climate the Vice-Admiral's body was
given a temporary burial-place in the ballast of his flagship, the
Breda, where it remained, a necessary source of danger to all on
board, until it was despatched to England, late in the year, on board
H.M. snow Happy, Commander Henry Fowkes. Hosier's death left
Captain Edward St. Loe,^ of the Superhe, 60, as senior officer on the
station.
St. Loe pursued the same policy as Hosier had followed, and pre-
vented the sailing of the galleons, until he was superseded by Vice-
Admiral Edward Hopsonn, who arrived at Jamaica on January '29th,
1728. Hopsonn died of fever on board his flagship the Leopard, 50,
on May 8th, leaving St. Loe once more senior officer. But by that
time the difficulties with Spain were in a fair way of adjustment.
It was still, however, necessary to keep a large force in the West
Indies ; and ere it was materially reduced, St. Loe also fell a
sacrifice to the climate and to the insanitary condition of the ships.
He died on April 22nd, 1729.'
It is doubtful whether any other British fleet has ever suffered
from disease so severely as that of Hosier suffered in 1726-27. Its
horrible experiences made a deep and lasting impression upon the
nation,* and it may be hoped that they have had the effect of
^ Hosier had been promoted on August lltli to be A'ice- Admiral of the White. Ai
the time of his death, a commission empowering the Governor of Jamaica to knight
him is said to have been on its way out. Charnock, iii. 139.
^ St. Loe fiew a broad pennant.
•' Having been promoted on March 4th, 1729, to be Kear-Admiral of the Bhie.
* See, for example, Glover's popular ballad, 'Admiral Hosier's Ghost.'
46 MAJUli OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [172
t-i .
impressing upon all later British admirals the supreme importance
of taking systematic and rigorous measures for preserving the health
of their men. During the two years immediately following Hosier's
first arrival off the Bastimentos, the fleet, the nominal complement
of which Jiever, rotighly speaking, exceeded 4750 persons,^ lost, in
addition to two flag offlcers and seven or eight captains, about fiftj^
lieutenants, and four thousand subordinate officers and men, by
various forms of sickness.
The attitude of Great Britain with regard to the galleons pro-
voked Spain to make great preparations for a siege of Gibraltar ;
and as that fortress was neither thoroughly armed nor properly
held, corresponding measures had to be taken for its protection.
A squadron of six men-of-war and two sloops" was fitted out at
Portsmouth towards the end of 17"26 ; seventeen companies of
troops and large quantities of provisions and ammunition were
embarked ; and on December 24th Vice-Admiral Sir Charles
Wager (E.) hoisted his flag in the Kent, 70, and took command.
He sailed on January 19th, 1727, and on February 2nd, having
picked up the Stirling Castle, 70, on his way out, arrived in
Gibraltar Bay, where he found Kear- Admiral Edward Hopsonn (R.),
who had remained upon the station during the winter.^ As the
Spaniards, fifteen thousand strong, were seen to be working hard,
troops, guns, and stores were landed ; but no actual hostilities took
place until after February 10th, when the enemy began a new
battery within half gunshot of some of the defences of the place.
Colonel Jasper Clayton, the Lieutenant-Governor, made a spirited
remonstrance ; but the Conde de las Torres, the Spanish commander-
in-chief, returned an unsatisfactory and truculent answer ; where-
upon fire was opened from the Mole Head, and from Prince's
• During much of the time the total complement was not more than 3300 officers
and men. If there had not been at Jamaica plenty of men whose ships happened
to be laid up there owing to the difficulty with Spain, the deficiencies could not
have been made good, and the fleet must litiTully have become an array of immobile
and impotent hulks.
^ Kent, 70, Lenox, 70, Ih'nrick, 70, Ituijal Oak, 70, I'ortlund, 50, Tigvr, 50,
Ilnwh, 6, and Cruiser, G. The Torhay, 80, and J'ooJc, fireship, 8, followed on
March 9th.
•'' Hopsonn had with him the liurfurd, 70, Yurk, 60, Winchestei; 50, Colchester, 50,
SwaUon', GO, Dursley (iallei/, 20, and Thunder, bomb, 4. A few days later the
Solebfty, bomb, fi, which had been cruising, joined. The Benvick and Lenox were
detached to the West Indies on February 13th, and the Portland and Tu/er on
April 21st. On the other hand, several fresh vessels arrived from England and
elsewhere at various times.
1727.] SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR. 47
and Willis's batteries ; and Sir Charles AVager, on the evening of
the 11th, sent the Tiger, 50, Dursley Galley, '20, and Solebay,
bomb, 6, to throw a flanking fire upon the Spanish lines from
the eastward.
From that day the Spaniards prosecuted the siege in earnest ;
but as they had nothing larger than boats and small settees afloat
in the Bay, they accomplished very little. Sir Charles, while
always leaving a few vessels to enfilade the Spanish attack, fre-
quently cruised in the Strait and off Cadiz ; and on those occasions
his vessels made prizes of several merchantmen. On March 11th,
moreover, the Boyal Oak, 70, being detached, took the new Spanish
man-of-war, Nuestra Senora del Bosario, 46, which was on her way
from Santander to Cadiz ; and, in the meantime, the small craft
employed by the enemy within the Bay were from time to time
nearly all seized. So matters went on, until, on June 16th, Sir
Charles Wager, having heard that the preliminaries of peace had
been agreed to, ordered a cessation of hostilities.^
"But," says Smollett, " when the siege was ou the point of being entirely riiised,
and the preliminaries ratified iu form, Spain started new difficulties and urged new
pretensions. The Spaniards insisted that a temporary suspension of arms did not
imply an actual raising of the siege of Gibraltar. . . . Upon this, hostilities began
between the ships of the two nations; and Sir Charles Wager continued to cruise on
the coasts of Spain, after the cessation of arms at Gibraltar. . . . However, after many
cavils and delays, the preliminary articles were at last signed at Madrid on February
24th,- above eight months after the death of King George the First, by the ministers
of the Emperor, England, Spain, France, and the States ; which opened the way to
the Congress." ^
Sir Charles Wager, with part of his fleet, reached Spithead on
April 9th, on his return from the Mediterranean. During his
absence there. Admiral Sir John Norris (B.), Rear- Admiral Salmon
Morrice (W.), and Eear- Admiral Eobert Hughes (1) (B.), with twelve
ships of the line and several smaller ones, made another demonstra-
tion in the Baltic, in order to induce the Empress of Russia to
refrain from attacking Sweden. The fleet reached Copenhagen
on May 12th, 1727, and its appearance in northern waters created
so powerful an impression that Russia, in spite of the fact that
she had already threatened Sweden in definite terms, laid up her
ships and abandoned her designs. Sir John returned without having
had occasion to fire a shot.
^ Sir Charles utilised the leisure which this cessation gave him by 2)roceeding to
Tangier, and renewing the peace wath Marocco.
(.
3
Begun at Soissons ou June l.stj 1728.
48 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1729.
The death of George I., which had occurred at Osnabriick on
June 11th, 1727, made no difference to the foreign poHcy of Great
Britain. George II., in his first message to Parhament, while
expressing a hope that peace would be re-established as a result
of the deliberations then in progress, pointed out that it was still
necessary to continue the preparations for war. Eleven ships had
already been commissioned in January ; and, as the sincerity of
Spain remained in some doubt, fifteen more were commissioned in
June, 1728. When Parliament re-assembled in January, 1729, the
Congress at Soissons had failed to devise terms of peace that were
satisfactory to all the numerous parties concerned, and the Spaniards
in the West Indies were more troublesome than ever to British
trade. But the manifest determination of the King to stand by
his allies ; his plainly-expressed intention to preserve his " undoubted
right to Gibraltar and the island of Minorca" ; ^ his assurance that
he would secure satisfaction for Spanish depredations in the West
Indies ; and his orders, issued on May 25th, for the commissioning
of twenty sail of the line and five frigates,- were not without
effect ; the result being that, by the Treaty of Seville, concluded
on November 9th, 1729, Great Britain, Spain, and France, who
were subsequently joined by Holland, became defensively allied.
Gibraltar was not mentioned in the treaty ; and the fact that
it was not mentioned was regarded as a tacit renunciation of the
claim of Spain to the Rock ; but, in some other respects, the
settlement was disadvantageous to Great Britain,^ and, upon
the whole, it was beneficial rather to France than to any other
country.
During the peace which followed, Admiral Sir Charles Wager,*
in 1781, assisted the Marques de Mari in convoying a large body of
Spanish troops to Leghorn, in order to place Don Carlos de Bourbon
in possession of Parma and Piacenza, to which, under the terms of
the treaty, the Prince had become entitled by the death of the
Duke of Parma. Yet, notwithstanding this friendly co-operation
between Great Britain and Spain in Europe, the relations between
' Answer of the King to the Commons, March 2.5th, 1729.
'■^ 'I'hese were j)reseiitly joined at Spithead by fourteen Duteli ships under \'ice-
Aduiiral van Soiumelsdijuk.
' It did not, for example, secure satisfaction for the Spanish depredations in the
West Indies.
* He had his \\a% in the Namur,'dO. Kear-Admiral Sir Jolin Bakhcu. Kt. ^_\V.),
in the Norfolk, HO, was second in command.
1735.]
PORTUGAL ASSISTED.
49
the representatives of the two countries in the New World became
ever more and more strained. And even in Europe very menacing
clouds arose when, in 1733, the death of Augustus II., Elector of
Saxony and King of Poland, brought about a hostile combination
of France, Spain, and Sardinia against the Empire. Great Britain,
as a necessary measure of precaution, commissioned no fewer than
ADMIRAL NICHOLAS HADDOCK.
(From Fahcr'K eiigmviiig <iftcr the paintimj hi/ T. Gih>:o)i,
rcpreHenUiKj Haddock ivlicti Rear- Ad mi ml of the Red, 178.').)
eighty-six^ ships of war early in 1734, recalled British sailors from
the service of foreign powers, and offered bounties to seamen.
In 1735, a dispute having broken out between Spain and Portugal,
the latter power solicited British aid against the Spaniards ; and,
in response, a large fleet, under Admiral Sir John Norris, with
Vice-Admiral Sir John Balchen (E.), and Eear-Admiral Nicholas
•• Bringing vip the total number in commission to one hundred and twenty.
VOL. III. E
50 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1738.
Haddock^ (W.), was dispatched to Lisbon, sailing from Spithead on
May 27th, and reaching the Tagus on June 9th. The demonstration
was made not only in the general interests of peace, but also in
the particular interests of the many British merchants w^hose welfare
was more or less dependent upon the safety of the then homecoming
Portuguese flota from Brazil ; and it was so efficacious that an actual
rupture between the two countries was prevented.
Yet Spain was not to be permanently intimidated. After France,
going behind the backs of her allies, had patched up, vastly to her
own benefit, her differences with the Empire by the treaty of
December 28th, 1735, Great Britain, awaking to the fact that she
had been neglecting her own peculiar business in order to be ready
to intervene on behalf of powders that deserved no such kindness at
her hands, once more turned her attention to the outrages which
had for years been committed upon her commerce by the Spaniards
in the West Indies. In 1737 she sent Kear-Admiral Nicholas
Haddock to the Mediterranean with a squadron, the appearance of
which was intended to lend weight to the demands which she then
felt it necessary to make. Spain haggled and temporised. In reply
to an address from the Commons, King George II., on March 6th,
1738, said : "I am fully sensible of the many and unwarrantable
depredations committed by the Spaniards,^ and you may be assured
I will make use of the most proper and effectual means that are in
my power to procure justice and satisfaction to my injured subjects,
and for the future security of their trade and navigation."
Still, however, Spain temporised. A paper presented to Parlia-
ment in 1738 showed that since the Treaty of Seville the loss
caused to British merchants by the operations of the Spaniards
had been upwards of £140,000, that fifty-two British vessels had
been taken and plundered by them, and that British seamen had
been very cruelly treated. This caused much excitement. Then
came the examination by the House of persons who had, or were
alleged to have, suffered at the hands of the Spaniards. Among
these persons was Richard Jenkins, sometime master of the Bebecca,
brig, of Glasgow. He declared that his craft had been boarded by
a guarda-costa, whose captain had wantonly cut off one of the
^ Nicholas Haddock. Born, 1686. Captain, 1707. liear-Adniiral, 17oi. \'ice-
Adiiiiral, 17-11. Admiral, 1744. Died, 1746.
^ Accounts of some of these, and furtlicr notes about Jenkins, will be found in the
next cliapter.
1739.] JENKINS'S EARS. 51
deponent's ears, and handed it to him with the insolent remark :
" Carry this home to the King, your master, whom, if he were
present, I would serve in like fashion." " The truth of the story,"
says Mr. Lecky, " is extremely doubtful." It has even been said
that Jenkins lost his ear at the pillory. Yet the indignation aroused
by the man's deposition was general ; and popular opinion grew
uncontrollable when it became known that, upon having been
asked by a member what were his feelings at the moment of
the outrage, Jenkins had replied: "I recommended my soul to
God, and my cause to my country."
Spain at length agreed to make some reparation, and to settle
outstanding differences. The convention to this effect was sub-
mitted to Parliament in 1739, and, after a most stormy debate,
approved of; yet, when the time came for it to be carried out,
fresh difficulties cropped up, and Spain, possibly because she had
gained by negotiation all the delay which she deemed necessary to
enable her to perfect her preparations, silently declined to play
her promised part. At about the same time, owing to the pre-
carious state of affairs, the British consuls at Malaga, Alicant,
and other Spanish ports, were compelled to advise British merchants
and vessels to depart thence with all haste.
Great Britain was to be satisfied only by the adoption of strong
measures ; and on July 10th, 1739, the King issued a proclamation
in which he set forth that the Spaniards had committed depredations,
and that they had promised and failed to make reparation ; and in
which he authorised general reprisals and letters of marque against
the ships, goods, and subjects of the King of Spain. Half-hearted
endeavours were made at the last moment to preserve peace ; but
Spain declared that she regarded the making of reprisals as a
hostile act ; France reminded the world that she was bound to
look upon the enemies of Spain as her own foes ; and Holland
averred that, if called upon to do so, she could not but observe
the spirit of her treaty of alliance with Great Britain.
The British minister presently withdrew from Madrid, and the
Spanish minister from London ; the British squadrons abroad were
reinforced ; ^ numerous ships were commissioned ; stringent measures
were adopted to procure the necessary number of seamen for the
^ Information as to the state of affairs was also sent to Commodore Charles Brown,
who was senior officer at Jamaica, and who at once began reprisals. For an account of
them, see next chapter.
E 2
52 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1739.
fleet; letters of marque were announced on July 'ilst as ready for
issue by the Admiralty ; and on October 23rd, 1739, war was
formally declared against Spain, which put forward her own
declaration on November 28th.
The power of Spain was then most vulnerable in the AVest
Indies and the Pacific. An expedition under Captain George Anson,
of whose proceedings an account will be found in Chapter XXIX.,
was prepared for the Pacific, but did not sail until the autumn of
1740. Dispatched primarily for warlike purposes, and originally
intended to co-operate with another force under Captain James
Cornwall, Anson's command, owing to various adventitious circum-
stances, gained for its leader an even more brilliant reputation as
a navigator than as a fighting officer ; and the history of it falls
naturally among the chronicles of the great British voyages. But an
expedition to the West Indies, which was entrusted to Vice-Admiral
Edward Vernon (1), (B.),^ was, from beginning to end, entirely a
fighting venture ; and as it was not without effect upon the issue
of the war, it may fitly be described here, although it led up to no
fleet action, and although it did not, to any appreciable extent,
directly strengthen the maritime position of Great Britain.
Edward Vernon was a blunt, well-intentioned, honest, and very
popular officer, whose chief service faults were that he could not
always control either his tongue or his pen, and that he w^as too
fond of vulgar applause. He had served in the West Indies for
several years after his first appointment as a post-captain, and
was generally believed to have an intimate acquaintance with the
whole of that station and with the weak points of the Spanish
position there. He had also been for a long time member of
Parliament for Ipswich and for Penryn ; and, in the course of one
of the debates upon the depredations of the Spaniards, he had taken
upon himself to declare in strong terms that the Spanish possessions
in the West Indies might be reduced with great ease, and that
Puerto Bello,' in particular, might be taken by a force of six
' Edward Vernon was born in 1084, and became a I'ost-Captaiii in 170(i, ami a
Vice-Admiral, without having ever been a llear-Admiral, nu .Inly Hrli, 17.''>0. Having
captured Puerto Bello, etc., in that and the next year, he led an attack upon Cartagena
in 1741. In 1745 he attained the rank of Admiral, but, in the following year, owing,
among other things, to his fondness for iiamplileteering, he was struck off the list of
flag-officers. See note on ]•. Ill, infra, lie died in 1757.
- Puerto Bello stands on tlie north side of the Isthmus of Darion, and is abnu
seventy miles from Panama. It has a considerable bay and good anchorage.
1739.]
VERNON TO THE WEST INDIES.
53
ships of the hue. He said, moreover, that he would gladly venture
his life and reputation upon the success of such an enterprise, if
only he were permitted to attempt it. Vernon was popular in the
country, and troublesome to the ministry ; and the Government,
anxious to be temporarily rid of him, and perhaps equally read}^
to take credit for his triumph or to rejoice over his disgrace,
promoted him, and gave him exactly the mission and force which
he had demanded.
ADMIRAL EDWARD VERXOX.
(From McArdcWn rn(iniri/iii n/ler the ijortrait hi/ T. GahidioroiigJi, R.A.)
Vernon sailed from Portsmouth on July 24th, 1739,^ with four
ships of seventy guns, three of sixty, one of fifty, and one of forty.
Of these, he presently detached three of the seventies, viz., the
Lenox, Captain Covill Mayne, Elizabeth, Captain Edward Falking-
ham (1), and Kent, Captain Thomas Durell (1), to cruise for a month
off Cape Ortegal, and to look out for some treasure-ships which were
daily expected in Spain. The vessels were to return afterwards to
' He (lid not, however, leave Plymouth until August 3rd.
54 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1739.
England. He also detached the Pearl, 50, Captain the Hon.
Edward Legge, to cruise for three months between Lisbon and
Oporto. With the rest of his force he crossed the Atlantic, reaching
Jamaica on October 23rd. ^ There he was joined by the senior
officer already on the station, Commodore Charles Brown, whose
broad pennant was in the Hampton Court, 70.
On the voyage out Vernon took every opportunity of disciplining
his men, and of exercising them both at the heavy guns and at small
arms ; and there is little doubt that, under his direction, his small
squadron rapidly became, for its size, the most efficient that Great
Britain had sent to sea for many years.
The intelligence received by the Vice-Admiral was to the effect
that the Spanish galleons were about to make rendezvous at
Cartagena, and to proceed thence to Puerto Bello, where they would
exchange their European goods for the. gold and silver which had
been sent for the purpose from Panama. The news that the bullion
was already at Puerto Bello determined Vernon to lose no time in
attacking that place. He obtained pilots, embarked two hundred
soldiers under Captain Newton, and, on November 5th, 1739, sailed
from Port Koyal.'- On the following day he issued the following
instructions to his captains : —
"Upon making the land at Puerto Bello, and having a fair wind to favour them,
and daylight foi* the attempt, to have their ships clear in all respects for immediate
service ; and, on the proper signal, to form themselves into a line of battle, as directed ;
and, being formed, to follow in the same order of battle to the attack, in the manner
hereafter directed. And as the north shore of the harbour of Puerto Bello is
represented to the Admiral to be a bold steep shore, on which, at the first entrance,
stands the Castillo de Ferro, or Iron Castle, Commodore Brown, and the shi]is that
follow him, are directed to pass the said fort, within less tlian a cable's length distant,
giving the enemy as they pass as warm a tire as possible, both from great guns and
musketry. Then Commodore Brown is to steer away for the Gloria Castle, and anchor
as near as he possibly can to the easternmost part of it, for battering down all the
defences of it, but so as to leave room fur Captain Majnie, in the Worcester, to anchor
astern of him against the westermost bastion, and to do the same there ; ami to follow
such orders as the Commodore may think proper to give him for attacking the said
castle. Captain Herbert, in the Nonoich, after giving his fire at the Iron Castle, is to
push on for the castle of San Jeronimo, lying to the eastward of the town, and to
anchor as neai- it as he possibly can, and batter it down; and Captain Trevor, in the
Strnfford, following the Admiral, to come to an anchor abreast of the eastermost
part of tlie Iron Castle, so as to leave room for Captain Waterhouse, in the Princess
Louisa, to anchor astern of him, for battering the westermost part of the (.'astle; and
^ Having called in the meantime at Antigua and St. Kitt's.
^ With the ships mentioned in the table infra, and the Sheerness, 20, Captain Miles
Stapleton. This vessel was presently detached to reconnoitre Cartagena.
1739.]
VERNON AT PUERTO BELLO.
55
continue there till the service is completed, and make themselves masters of it : the
youngest officers to follow the further orders of the elder in the further prosecution of
the attack : and, if the weather be favourable for it on their going in, each ship,
besides having her long-boat towing astern, to have her barge alongside to tow the
long-boats away with such part of the soldiers as can conveniently go in them, and to
come under the Admiral's stern, for his directing a descent with them, where he shall
find it most proper to order it. From the men's inexperience in service, it will be
necessary to be as cautious as possible to prevent hurry and confusion, and a fruitless
waste of jjowder and shot. The captains are to give the strictest orders to their
respective officers to take the greatest care that no gun is fired but what they, or those
they particularly appoint, first see levelled, and direct the firing of ; and that they shall
strictly prohibit all their men from hallooing and making irregular noise that will only
serve to throw them into confusion, till such time as the service is performed and when
they have nothing to do but glory in the victor}^. Such of the ships as have mortars
and cohorns on board are ordered to use them in the attack."
Line of Battle at the Attack on Puerto Bello, Xovember 21st, 17?>0.
Ships.
Guns.
Men.
Commanders.
Hampton Court .
70
495
j Commodore Charles Brown.
(Captain Digby Dent, (2>.
Norivich
50
300
„ Richard Herbert.
Worcester
GO
400
„ Perry Mayne.
Burford
70
500
J Vice- Admiral Edward Vernon, (B.).
\Captain Thomas Watson (1).
Strafford ....
60
400
„ Thomas Trevor.
Princess Louisa .
60
400
„ Thomas Waterhouse.
The squadron sighted Puerto Bello in the night of November 20th,
and chased into harbour some small vessels, v^hich apprised the
enemy of Vernon's presence on the coast. That he might not be
driven to leeward, the Vice-Admiral anchored about six leagues from
the shore. Early on the 21st he weighed, and, the wind being
easterly,^ he plied to windward in line of battle ahead. At about
2 P.M., the Hampton Court, being close to the Iron Castle, began the
attack, and was well seconded by the Norwich and Worcester. The
fire of the enemy, vigorous at first, gradually lessened. Seeing this,
Vernon, who was rapidly approaching, signalled for the manned
boats to go under his stern, and then ordered them to land beneath
the walls of the castle. In the meantime, the Burford, which had
come abreast of the castle, had received and returned a very heavy
fire. The men in her tops forced the enemy to abandon his lower
battery, whereupon the landing-party made an assault, and, by
climbing into the embrasures upon one another's shoulders, the men
entered, and quickly carried the work, most of the defenders of
This prevented the attack from being carried out in the prescribed manner.
56
MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2.
[1739.
which fled to the town, though a few shut themselves up in the
keep, whence they presently shouted appeals for quarter.
By that time night had come on. Owing to the wind, Commo-
dore Brown and his division had been unable to get up the bay and
attack the castles of Gloria and San Jeroniino, and his ships, having
fallen to leeward, were obliged to anchor, ready to proceed at
daybreak should the wind permit. The Burford and Strafford,
^/T £/;»"'• yj
.i i. ■'
■^^.s ^ -y
Attack on TcKiiTo Bkli.o, Novk.muku 21st., 1731).
(From a phni hi/ Coiu. Jamrx lii'ntonc kindUj hut hi/ Lanl Vrr/ioii.)
C. Worcester.
D. Norwich.
E. Burford.
F. Hamilton Court.
G. Straffwcl.
H. PriuccKx Liiiiiaii.
I. Two tendei's.
A'. Two Spanish ptiarda-costas.
M. Three trading sloops.
O. Boats on their wav to land soldiers.
which were just within reacli of the heaviest guns in Gloria, were
fired at all night, but received little damage beyond the wounding of
the former's fore topmast. The fire was returned with effect from
the lower deck of the lUtrford. Early in the morning of tlie '22nd,
the Vice-Admiral went on board ih.e Haiitptoii Court, and, after he
had consulted with his officers, directed steps to be taken for warping
ills ships up the harbour (lining tlic night, in order to be able to
1739.] VERNON ON THE SPANISH MAIN. 57
attack Gloria and San Jeronimo on the following day. But these
measures proved to be unnecessary. The Spanish governor, Don
Francisco Martinez de Eetez, hoisted a white flag, and sent out a
boat w^ith a flag of truce to convey to Vernon the terms on which
the place would be surrendered. These terms were deemed in-
admissible by the Vice-Admiral, who drew up others which he was
prepared to grant. He allowed the governor only a few hours in
which to make up his mind ; yet, well within the specified time, the
terms were accepted. Captain Newton, with two hundred soldiers,
was sent to take possession of the town and castles ; and detachments
of seamen boarded the vessels in port. The crews of these had, it
appeared, landed during the previous night, and committed various
outrages. The garrison was allowed to march out with the honours
of war, and to carry off two cannon with ten charges of powder for
each. The inhabitants were permitted either to remove or to remain,
and were promised security for their goods and effects. The ships ^
were surrendered absolutely, though their crews were permitted to
retire with their personal effects. And, contingent upon the due
performaiice of all the stipulations, the town, the clergy and the
churches were guaranteed protection and immunity in their privi-
leges and properties. -
Public money to the amount of ten thousand dollars was found
in the place, and at once distributed by Vernon among his men.
There were also taken forty pieces of brass cannon, ten brass field-
pieces, four brass mortars, and eighteen brass patereroes, besides
iron guns, which were destroyed, but not carried off. The fortifica-
tions were then demolished — a work which needed the expenditure
of one hundred and twenty-two barrels of captured Spanish powder,
and which occupied three weeks. ^
On November 27th, the Diamond, 40, Captain Charles Knowles,
and on November '29th, the Windsor, 60, Captain George Berkeley,
and the Anglesey, 40, Captain Henry Eeddish, joined the flag from
the Leeward Islands ; and on December 6th, the Sheer ness, 20,
^ One of them, a snow, was commissioned as the Triumph, sloop, bj' Commander
James Eentone, who was sent home with Vernon's dispatches. Another prize was
renamed the Astrma, 12.
^ The loss on the Britisli side during the attack was ahnost incredibly small, the
Burford and Worcester having each three killed and live wounded, and the Haiiq)to7i
Court having one man mortally wounded.
^ In the service Captain the Hon. Edward Boscawen assisted as a volunteer. His
ship, the ShorehaiH, 20, was at the time unfit for sea.
58 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1739.
Captain Miles Stapleton, which had been detached to reconnoitre
Cartagena, returned. While the Vice-Admiral still lay at Puerto
Bello, he sent to Panama a demand for the release of certain servants
of the South Sea Company, who were confined in that city ; and,
although Vernon, being on the wrong side of the isthmus, was
scarcely in a position to have backed up his demand by force, the
governor, who seems to have been greatly impressed by the easy
capture of Puerto Bello, saw fit to comply. The Vice-Admiral
sailed on December 13th for Jamaica.
The news of the success was hailed with great joy in England,
and Vernon was voted the thanks of both Houses, and the freedom
of the City of London in a gold box. Commander James Rentone,
the bearer of the intelligence, was presented with two hundred
guineas, and made a post-captain. The Ministry realised that it
could do nothing more popular than follow up the blow already
struck, and it at once arranged to send to Jamaica, if possible in the
early autumn, a strong military force composed of two regiments of
infantry, and six newly-raised regiments of Marines — the whole
under Major-General Lord Cathcart — to be employed by Vice-
Admiral Vernon in the prosecution of further designs against the
Spaniards in the West Indies and Central America. It was also
decided to endeavour to recruit in the North American Colonies a
corps of three thousand men, to be commanded by Colonel Spottis-
wood,^ and to be sent to Jamaica to strengthen the hands of Lord
Cathcart upon his arrival.
In the interval, the Spaniards, thoroughly alarmed for the
security of their empire in the New World, sent to the West Indies
a strong squadron,^ with troops and stores, under Admiral Don
Rodrigo de Torres. They also prevailed upon France to proclaim
not only that she was in strict alliance with Spain, but also that she
could not suffer Great Britain to make new settlements or conquests
in the West Indies ; and this proclamation was succeeded by the
dispatch across the Atlantic of three French squadrons. One, of
four ships of the line, under the Chevalier de Nesmond, left Brest on
July 28th. A second, of eighteen sail, under the Marquis d'Antin,
quitted the same port towards the end of August, and, soon after its
departure, suffered so severely in a storm, that two or three of its
' 'I'liis oflicer unfortunately died in Virginia ere the troops whicli lie had collected
could be embarked.
^ This sailed from Spain on July lOtli, 1710.
1740.] VERNON AT CARTAGENA. 59
best vessels had to return. The third, of fifteen sail, under the
Marquis de La Eoche-Allard, weighed from Toulon on August '25th.
When he had passed the Strait of Gibraltar, the Marquis opened
his orders, and, in pursuance of them, sent back to port four
of his largest ships. Proceeding with the rest, he made a junc-
tion with the other squadrons at Martinique in September and
October.
But the force there assembled was formidable chiefly on paper.
The vessels were not in good condition, and they were both ill-
manned and ill-found. Many of them had been much damaged by
bad weather ere they arrived ; and when they essayed to move in
company from Martinique to Hispaniola, they fell in with another
storm which caused serious losses, and reduced them to a condition
of impotence.
That they had been sent out to co-operate with Spain is
certain. But before they had an opportunity of co-operating,
reinforcements had reached Vernon ; and the situation in Europe
had been changed by the death of the Emperor Charles VI., on
October 20th, and by the accession of the Elector of Bavaria as
Charles VII. France then decided to hold her hand, to recall her
squadrons,^ and to postpone her definite rupture with Great Britain.
It is not necessary, therefore, to further follow the movements of the
French. As for the Spanish squadron under Don Rodrigo de
Torres, it reached San Juan de Puerto Kico in a sorely-damaged
condition in September, and there slowly refitted. In course of time
it went on to Cartagena, threw additional troops into the town, and,
leaving a detachment under Don Bias de Leso in the roadstead,
proceeded to Havana.
Vernon's squadron, on its voyage from Puerto Bello to Jamaica,
was dispersed and shattered by a storm. All the vessels, neverthe-
less, reached Port Royal by February 6th, 1740, except the Triumph,
sloop, which had foundered off Sambala Keys, but the officers and
men of which had been saved. The GreemvicJi, 50, Captain Charles
Wyndham, with four bombs, some fireships, and several other
craft, was found in harbour. The Vice-Admiral did all that lay in
his power to speedily refit his command, but, finding that the
Biirford would take some time to prepare for sea, he transferred his
flag from her to the Strafford, 60, and sailed on February 25th with
the greater part of his force, leaving the rest of it, under Commodore
^ Except a few sliips left at Hispaniola under the C'onite de Roquefeuil.
60
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1740.
Charles Brown, for the protection of Jamaica. His determination
was to bombard Cartagena.
On March 1st, the Vice-Admiral sighted the land near Santa
"Martha, and, having detached the Greenicich, 50, to ply to windward
of that place, to intercept any vessel that might be bound thither, he
bore away ; and, on the evening of the 3rd,^ anchored in nine fathoms
off Playa Grande, in the open bay before Cartagena. On the 4th
VICE-ADMIKAL SIK CUAKLKS KXOWLES.
(From Faber's mezzotint after the portrait hij T. Hudson.)
and 5th he reconnoitred the place, and made his dispositions ; and on
the 6th he ordered in the bombs Alderney, 8, Commander James
Scott, Terrible, 8, Commander Edward Allen, and Cumherland, 8,
Commander Thomas Brodrick,- with the tenders Pompeij and
Goodly, and other craft to assist them, to bombard the town. This
' < >n wliicli da}' he liiul bt'cii joined by tlie Juiliuoiith, 50, (!aiitaiii ^^'illia^l
Dougla.s.
^ This officer, who died a Vice-Admiral in 17G!I, in later life spelt his name
Brnderick ; but it was, properly, Brodriek.
1740.] VERNON AT C HAG RES. 61
they did until 9 a.m. on the 7th, receiving no damage whatsoever,
and probably doing little, although they terribly frightened the
inhabitants. It is difficult to understand why Vernon made this
demonstration, for he knew well that the force which he had with
him was insufficient to take the city. It has been suggested that
his action was intended as a reply to an insulting letter which he
had received from Don Bias de Leso, and this is certainly a plausible
explanation, for the quick-tempered Vice-Admiral was ever fully
as eager to resent a slight offered to himself as he was to resent
one offered to his country. It does not, however, appear that the
bombardment of Cartagena assisted, in the slightest degree, the
general policy which Vernon had been sent westward to carry out.
From Cartagena he coasted along the Gulf of Darien, exchanging
shots with Bocca Chica as he passed, and making observations
concerning the defences of the various towns. He detached the
Windsor, 60, Captain George Berkeley, and the Greenwich, 50,
Captain Charles Wyndham, to cruise off Cartagena with the object
of looking out for the galleons and of intercepting three Spanish
ships of war which, he had heard, were about to attempt to join
Don Bias de Leso there. Vernon then proceeded to Puerto Bello
to refit and water his squadron. He was rejoined on March 13th
by the Diamond, 40, Captain Charles Knowles,^ an officer in whom
he appears to have reposed exceptional confidence. Knowles was
ordered to go on board the Success, fireship, 10, Commander Daniel
Hore,"-^ and, accompanied by one of the tenders, to move round to
the mouth of the River Chagres, there to reconnoitre and to make
soundings with a view to reporting on the manner in which the
fort of San Lorenzo and the town of Chagres might best be
attacked. Measures were also taken to blockade the estuary. The
Vice-Admiral obtained much information and assistance froin an
English pirate or buccaneer named Lowther, who, in consequence,
received the King's pardon and permission to return home.
On March '22nd the Strafford,^ the Norivich, the three bomb
ketches, and the small craft, put to sea from Puerto Bello, instruc-
tions being left for the other vessels to follow as soon as possible.
^ Cliarles Knowles. Born, 1702. Captain, 17."!7. Rear-Adminil, 1747. Coui-
mander-in-Chief at Jamaica, 174.S. Captured Port Louis, Hispaniola. Defeated
Reggio off Havana, October 1st, 1748. Vice-Admiral, 1755. Admiral, 1758. Baronet,
1765, and Rear-Admiral of Great Britain. Served lUissia, 1770-1774. Died, 1777.
^ Or Hoare.
^ In which the Yice-Admiral still flew his fia2;.
62 MAJOR OFEBATIONS, ] 714-1762. [1740.
The Strafford met with a slight accident on the passage, and was
detained for a few hours, but the Norivich, by order, proceeded with
the remaining craft, and by 3 p.m. Captain Richard Herbert, with
the assistance of Captain Knowles, had not only placed his bombs
in position, but had. begun to bombard Fort San Lorenzo. The
Diamond also opened fire in the evening ; and, during the night, the
Strafford, Princess Louisa, and Falmouth, arrived and took up their
stations.^ The ships maintained a leisurely fire from their heavier
guns until March 24th, when the governor of the place, Don Juan
Carlos Gutierrez de Zavallos, surrendered. Captain Knowles took
possession in the course of the afternoon.
A large amount of booty, including cocoa, Jesuit's bark, and
wool, valued at £70,000, besides plate, etc., was captured. Two
guarda-costas, found in the river, were destroyed ; all the brass
guns and patereroes " in the defences were embarked in the
squadron ; and, after the works had been demolished, Vernon
quitted the river on March 30th. He was rejoined on the 31st
by the Windsor and Greenwich from before Cartagena, and on
April 2nd by his old flagship, the Burford, from Jamaica. After
making" dispositions, which proved to be vain, for intercepting the
new Spanish viceroy of Santa Fe, who was on his way out from
Ferrol, the Vice-Admiral returned to Jamaica, sending Captain
Knowles home with dispatches.
A little later, Vernon, advised from Lisbon of the Spanish
preparations for sending out the squadron under Don Eodrigo
de Torres, and of the actual departure from Cadiz of a squadron,
the supposed destination of which was the "West Indies, put to sea
again, hoping to fall in with the enemy; but, having encountered
bad weather, and having failed to get any news of his foe, he
returned to Port Eoyal on June 21st. During the summer his
cruisers were active, but he was himself detained in port by lack
of supplies. On September 5th, however, a number of store-ships,
convoyed by the Defiance, 60, Captain John Trevor, and the Tilhurij,
60, reached him, and on October 3rd he was able to put to sea once
more. On the 19th he fell in with eight transports, convoyed by the
' The ships engaged in the attack on Chagres were the Strafford, 60, Frmcesti
Louisa, 60, Falmouth, 50, Norivich, 50, Diamond, 40, Ald'.rnct/, Terrible, and
Cumberland, bombs, and Pompey and Ooodhj, tenders. The commanders of all these
have already been named. In addition, there were the fireships, Success, 10, Com-
mander Daniel Hore, and Eleanor, 10, Ccmnnander Sir l^obert Henley, Bart.
^ There were eleven brass guns and as many patereroes.
1740.] OGLE JOINS VERNON. 63
Wolf, sloop, 10, Commander William Dandridge, and laden with
troops from North America/ These he escorted to Jamaica. Soon
afterwards he heard of the arrival at Cartagena of Don Kodrigo de
Torres, and at Martinique of the Marquis d'Antin ; and not having
force sufficient to justify him in risking an encounter at sea with his
known enemies, even if they were not assisted by his suspected ones,
he remained at Port Royal, anxiously awaiting news of the promised
reinforcements from England.
These reinforcements, which included the transports carrying
Lord Cathcart's army, were to have been under the orders of
Vice-Admiral Sir John Balchen. But Balchen's division of men-
of-war consisted only of one 3rd-rate, five 4th-rates, and one
6th-rate ; and when, after the armament had actually put to sea
and had been driven back to port by contrary weather in August,
the Ministry learnt what powerful squadrons Spain and France had
dispatched across the Atlantic, it was decided to make new arrange-
ments. Balchen's orders were cancelled, and a very much larger
and entirely different squadron, under Sir Chaloner Ogle (1), was
appointed to escort the troops. The change of plan necessarily
involved much delay, and it was not until October 26th that the
fleet at length sailed.
It cleared the Channel ; but on October 31st, when it was about
seventy leagues to the westward of the Start, ^ it met with a heavy
gale, in which the Biickingliam, 70, Captain Cornelius Mitchell,
Prince of Orange, 70, Captain Henry Osborn, and Superbe, 60,
Captain the Hon. William Hervey, were so badly damaged that the
first had to be sent back to Spithead, and the others had to proceed to
Lisbon under convoy of the Cumherland, 80, Captain James Stewart.
In spite of these deductions the fleet still consisted of upwards of
twenty 3rd and 4th-rates, besides several frigates, fire-ships, bombs,
etc., under Bear- Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1), Kt. (B.), and
Commodore Eichard Lestock (2), together with transports carrying
about 9000 troops, ^ under Major-General Lord Cathcart, and
Brigadier-Generals Thomas Wentworth, John Guise, and William
Blakeney. It anchored on December 19th, 1740, in Prince Rupert's
^ These troops had taken part in the fruitless attack on St. Augustine, Florida, some
account of which will be found in the next chapter.
2 In lat. 17° 54' W.
^ I.e. the 15th and 24th regiments of foot, six regiments of Marines under Colonels
Fleming, Robinson, Lowther, Wynyard, Douglas and Moreton, and some artillery and
miscellaneous detachments.
64 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-17G2. [1740.
Bay, Dominica ; and, on the following da}^ it had to lament the
loss, by dysentery, of the militaiy commander-in-chief.^
Sir Chaloner weighed again for St. Kitt's, his general rendez-
vous, on December 27th, and thence steered for Jamaica. On the
passage thither, being off the western end of Hispaniola, he sighted
four large vessels, and signalled to the Prince Frederick, 70, Captain
Lord Aubrey Beauclerk, Orforcl, 70, Captain Lord Augustus Fitzroy,
Lion, 60, Captain Charles Cotterell, Weijnioutli, 60, Captain Charles
Knowles, and two more ships of the line, to proceed in chase. At
4 P.M. the strangers - hoisted French colours ; but as they did not
shorten sail, it was 10 r.M. ere the headmost British ship, the Prince
Frederick, got up with them. She hailed them, first in English and
then in French, and then, having failed to get an answer, fired into
one of the ships, which promptly returned a broadside. The Orford
next got into action ; and she and the Prince Frederick engaged the
chase for about an hour and a half before the remaining ships could
approach within gunshot. The IVeymoutJi was the third to overhaul
the strangers ; and, upon her arrival on the scene. Captain Knowles
boarded the Prince Frederick, and expressed his conviction that the
enemy was French. Lord Aubrey Beauclerk thereupon made the
signal to desist ; yet, as the enemy continued firing, the engagement
was renewed for about half an hour. At daybreak Lord Aubrey sent
an officer on board the senior ship of the chase, and at length it was
satisfactorily established that the strangers were indeed French, and
not, as Lord Aubrey had at first believed, Spaniards sailing under
French colours. The Prince Frederick lost four killed and nine
wounded ; the Orford, seven killed and fourteen wounded ; and the
Weymouth, two killed ; and all three vessels were much damaged
aloft.
The French, who bitterly complained of the manner in which
they had been treated, suffered much more severely. They declared
that, upon being hailed, they had at once replied ; and modern
French writers seriously contend that the true cause of the action
was the refusal of their senior officer to send a boat to Lord
Aubrey, when he called for one. It is possible, seeing how un-
favourable to Great Britain was the attitude of France at the time,
' Lord Ciithcart Wiis succeeded in the cnniiiianil l)y General AVentwurtli, a far less
cxi)erieuced and competent ollicer.
^ .(4 7-c?en <, fi4, Captain d'Epinai de Boisgeroult; 7l/e?'c?(>r, 54, Captain des Herbiers
de I'Etenduere ; Didinant, oO, Captain de I'oisins; and PinfaHe, 4(1, Captain
<VEstournel. Tiiu'rin, iv. 'J42. These vessels t'urnied part of d'Antin's squadron.
17iO.] BALCHEN'S CRUISE. 65
that neither Ogle nor Lord Aubrey was prepared to exercise much
forbearance with the French, and that the action was the result of
provocation and irritation on both sides. The squadrons, however,
parted with mutual apologies ; and Lord Aubrey proceeded to rejoin
Sir Chaloner Ogle, who arrived at Jamaica on January 9th, 1741,
and there placed himself under the orders of Vice- Admiral Vernon.
It is necessary to return for a time from the West Indies, and to
look at the course of events elsewhere.
The outbreak of war had found Rear- Admiral Nicholas Haddock
(R.) commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. Under him was
Rear- Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) (B.). At first. Haddock blockaded
the Spaniards in Cadiz, but he was soon drawn off by the foulness
of his ships and by the requirements of Minorca, which, it was
supposed, might be attacked from other Spanish ports ; and while
he and Ogle were at Port Mahon, such Spanish ships ^ as had been
lying at Cadiz slipped out, under Don Roderigo de Torres, and sailed
to Ferrol. Not long afterwards, when it appeared that Minorca was
in no danger, and that the Spaniards in the Mediterranean were
weaker than had at first been believed. Ogle, with a strong division,
was sent home by Haddock. He arrived in England on July 7th,
1740, and, as had been shown, went out later in the year ^ to
reinforce Vice-Admiral Vernon. No event of importance occurred
in the Mediterranean during the rest of 1740.
Nearer home, much was designed but little was effected. On
April 9th, Vice-Admiral John Balchen (R.) was dispatched from
Plymouth to intercept a Spanish treasure fleet which, escorted by
a squadron under Admiral Pizarro, was on its way home from
America. Balchen cruised in the very track which Pizarro had
intended to take ; but the Spaniards, learning of the British
Admiral's station and design, sent out a fast dispatch vessel which,
warning Pizarro, caused him to make for Santander by way of the
Lizard and Ushant, instead of for Cadiz by way of Madeira, as he
had originally purposed. He consequently took his convoy safely
into port. To defeat Balchen, Spain in the meantime fitted out and
sent to sea a superior force under Admiral Pintado, who, however,
failed to find his enemy, and, upon his return, was disgraced.
Balchen, against whose conduct no objections were ever alleged,
^ These were they which subsequently proceeded to the West Indies, as lias been
already related.
^ He first, however, cruised for a short time under Sir John ISTorris. See infra.
VOL. III. F
66 MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1741.
went back to port, having done little but capture the Princesa, 10}
Later in the year he commanded a squadron in the Channel.
The large concentration of Spanish force at Ferrol, and the
knowledge that Spain cherished plans for aiding the Pretender in
a descent upon Great- Britain or Ireland, led to the assemblage of a
large fleet ^ at Spithead. It was entrusted to Admiral-of-the-Fleet
Sir John Norris, and, under him, to Admiral Philip Cavendish (B.),
and Kear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) (B.). Sir John, who hoisted
his flag first in the Vicfori/, 100, and afterwards— the Victory having
been disabled by collision with the Lioii,^ (JO — in the Boi/nc, 80, had
secret instructions ; but what they were is, even now, not certainly
known. It is supposed by some that he had orders to attack Ferrol,
but this is upon the whole unlikely. It is more probable that his
force was designed mei'ely to convoy outward-bound merchantmen
until clear of the Channel, and to be ready for any special service
that might appear desirable. The Admiral of the Fleet took to
sea with him as a volunteer Prince AVilliam Augustus, Duke of
Cumberland,* second son of George II. The fleet sailed from
St. Helen's on July 10th, but was three times driven back into port
by contrary weather : and on August 28th, Sir John, being then in
Torbay, hauled down liis flag and departed for London with the
young Duke.
In 1741 the proceedings of the fleets in home waters were equally
uninteresting. In July, and again in October, the Admiral of the
Fleet and Admiral Philip Cavendish put to sea with a considerable
force and cruised off the north coast of Spain ; but, beyond picking
up a few small prizes, the connnniid did nothing. It returned to
Spithead on November ()th.
In the Mediterranean, Vice-Admii'al Haddock, who was from
time to time reinforced from England, endeavoured to prevent the
junction of a Spanish squadron which lay in Cadiz with tlie French
fleet which lay in Toulon, and tcj intercept the transport of Spanish
troops from Barcelona to Italy. But he failed in botli objects.
While Haddock was refitting at Gibi-altar. tlie I'ouloii fleet, under
' l'i)r iui accmmt of liei- caiilmc, .sw noxt cliaiitcr.
■■^ Made up of one shi[i of 1(")0 unns, ci^lit slii]is of SO, fivr <>( 70, suvcii of (10, ami
one of 50, besides smaller craft.
* The Vidor >/ c&rrieA away her head and bowsprit: tlie J.iaii lost licr tcHcinast,
and twenty-eight men who were thrown overboard by tlie shock.
* 'I'he victor of Culloden, then in his twentieth yeai-. 'i'lns short cruise seems to
have decided him to adopt a military instead uf a naval career.
1741.] HADDOCK MISSES NAVARRO. 67
M. La Bruyere cle Court, weighed and steered towards the Strait ;
and Don Jose Navarro, from Cadiz, issued forth to meet and join
hands with it. Haddock suffered Navarro to pass by him,^ and only
went in chase when it was too late to prevent the accomphshment
of the junction. His advanced frigates sighted the ahies off Cape
de Gata on December 7th, 1741, and the British and Spanish fleets
were distantly visible one from the other on the following morning ;
but at that time the junction was actually being effected. The
A^'ice-Admiral called a council of war which, in view of the fact that
French neutrality could not be depended upon,'- judged it inadvisable
to continue the pursuit. Soon afterwards the French and Spanish
fleets proceeded to Barcelona and embarked 15,000 men, who were
thence transported to Orbetello, in Tuscany, there to act against the
alhes of Great Britain. The ill-success both of Norris and of
Haddock was doubtless due rather to the nature of the instructions
given to these officers by the Ministry than to any fault on the
part of either. Popular indignation rose high, especially when it
became known that the passage of Spanish reinforcements to Italy
had not been prevented : and the general discontent on this subject
contributed much to the fall of Sir Eobert Walpole's administration.
In the West Indies, as has been said. Sir Chaloner Ogle joined
Vice-Admiral Vernon at Jamaica on January 9th, 1741. A fleet
such as had never before been assembled in the waters of the
New World was now at the disposal of the British commander,
who, unlike his fellow-admirals in Europe, had very full powers to
act as he might deem best for the advantage of the service.
"Better," says Beatson, "had it been for Great Britain if his
powers had been more limited ; for, had he been directed to proceed
immediately against the Havana, there can be no doubt but he
would have succeeded in reducing that place before the hurricane
months set in. His instructions pointed strongly at this as the
most proper place to commence his operations : and letters from the
most able and well informed of his friends^ in England strongly
enforced this idea."
1 Haddock, who had left cruisers to watch Cadiz, seems to have been very ill-seivod
l)y his scouts.
^ The Franco-Spanish fleet outnumbered the British by nearly two to one.
^ " ' Take and hold,' is the cry. This points plainly to Cuba, and if the people of
England Avere to give you instructions, I may venture to say, ninety-nine in a hundred
would be for attacking that island." Pulteney to Vernon, August 17, 1740, in ' Letters
to an Honest Sailor.'
F 2
68 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1741.
It would seeiu that, up to the day of Ogle's arrival, Vernon had
formed no distinct plans for the future. He had been looking
forward to talking over everything with Lord Cathcart, in whom
he had reason for placing the highest confidence. But Cathcart
died, and Wentworth, who took his place, was an officer of very
inferior ability, for whom Vernon, from the first, entertained dislike
and distrust. Wentworth, it is fair to add, did not deserve this.
He appears to have been sensible, if not very able ; and he was
certainly anxious to do for his country the best that lay in his
power.
As the result of a council of war held on January 10th, ^ it was
determined to proceed with the whole force to windward to observe
the motions of the French at Port Louis in Hispaniola. Vernon
formed his large fleet into three divisions, one under himself, one
under Ogle, and one under Commodore Kichard Lestock. Part of
the force got out of harbour on January 22nd, but the whole did not
make an offing until January 29th. On February 8th it was off
Cape Tiburon, the western point of Hispaniola. There the Vice-
Admiral was rejoined by the Wolf, 10, Commander AVilliam
Dandridge. She had been sent ahead to gain intelligence, and
she reported that there were in Port Louis nineteen large ships, one
of which had a flag at the main, and another a broad pennant flying ;
but, when the fleet arrived off the place on the 12th, it was found
that Dandridge had been mistaken,- and that there were in port only
some unrigged merchantmen and a large frigate. Three days later
Vernon obtained permission from the governor of Port Louis to
wood and water the fleet, and learnt that the Marquis d'Antin
had returned to Europe. At another council of war it was
decided, mainly in deference to Vernon's representations, to attack
Cartagena. The fleet, therefore, weighed on January 25th, the
Weymouth, 00, Captain Charles Knowles, Experiment, 20, Captain
James Rentone, and a sloop, being sent ahead to sound the coast
and to find a safe anchorage for the huge flotilla, which consisted,
with the transports, of a hundred and twenty-four sail.
Vernon dropped anchor in the Bay of Playa Grande'' on
March 4th, and at once made such a disposition of his small craft
' Tliere were present, in addition to Vernon and Ogle, Governor Trelawnev of
• lamaiea, and Generals Wentworth and Guise.
^ He was misled by a haze wliidi iirevaile<l wlien lie made Ids leronnaissance.
^ It is to the windward of Cartagena, between it and Point Canoa.
1741.] CARTAGENA. 09
as to suggest that he intended them to cover a disembarkation of
the army. This had the desired effect. It drew a large part of the
enemy's troops down to the shore in that neighbourhood, and
induced them to begin throwing up intrenchments there.
But no actual attack was made until March 9th, and in the
meantime the Spanish garrison of four thousand men, besides
negroes and Indians, and the naval force under Don Bias de Leso,
perfected its preparations for defence.
The following description of Cartagena, as it then was, is mainly
from Beatson : — ^
The city is in a great measure surrounded by water. It is divided into two
unequal parts, the city of Cartagena, and its suburb, called Xiruani. The walls of the
former are washed by the waves of the Bay of Mexico ; but, on account of some rocks,
and perpetual surf, there is no approaching it on that side. The water on the outside
of the harbour is seldom smooth, so that landing is at most times difficult. The only
entrance to the harbour is ujDwards of two leagues to the westward of the city, between
two narrow peninsulas, the one called Tierra Bomba, the other called the Baradera.
This entry is called Boca Chica, or the Little Mouth, and is so narrow that only one
ship can enter at a time. It was defended, on the Tierra Bomba side, by a fort called
San Luis, a regular square, with four bastions, mounted with eighty-two pieces of
cannon and three mortars ; but the counterscarp and glaces were not completed. To
this were added Fort San Felipe, mounted with seven guns, and Fort Santiago, of
fifteen guns, and a small fort of four guns called Battery de Chamba. These served as
outworks to Fort San Luis. On the other side of the harbour's mouth lies a fascine
battery,^ called the Baradera ; and, in a small bay at the back of that, another battery
of four guns. And, facing the entrance of the harbour, on a small, flat island, stood
Fort San Jose, of twenty-one guns. From this fort to Fort San Luis, a strong boom,
made of logs and cables, was laid across, fastened with three large anchors at each end ;
and just behind the boom were moored four ships of the line. Beyond this passage lies
the great lake or outer harbour of Cartagena, several leagues in circumference, and
land-locked on all sides. About mid-way to the town, it grows narrower ; and, within
less than a league of it, two points project into the lake from the inner harbour. On
the northmost of these was a strong fort called Castillo Grande, being a regular square
with four bastions, defended to the land by a wet ditch and glacis proper. The face of
the curtain, towards the sea, was covered by a ravelin, and a double line of heavy
cannon. The number of guns in this fort was fifty-nine, though there were embrasures
for sixty-one. On the opposite jwint was a horseshoe battery of twelve guns, called
Fort Mancinilla. In the middle, between these two forts, is a large shoal with only a
lew feet of water on it. On each side of this were sunk large ships. At the end of the
inner harbour stands the city of Cartagena, on two flat sandy keys or islands, well
fortifled to the land, and with lakes and morasses running round it. On the fortifica-
tion of the city are mounted one hundred and sixty guns, and on those of the suburbs,
one hundred and forty. South of the city, about a (piarter of a mile from the Xiuiani
gate, stands Fort San Lazar, on an eminence about fifty or sixty feet high. It is
composed of a square of fifty feet, having three demi-lmstions, and two guns in each
^ ' jSTav. and Mil. Mems.' iii. 2-i.
^ It was for fifteen 24-pounders ; but these seem not to have been mounted until
after operations had been begun.
70 MAJOn OPEBATIONS, 1714-1762. [1741.
face, one in each flank, and three in cacli curtain. It completely commands the town ;
but there is a hill about four liundred yards from it whieli overlooks and commands it
entirely.
Early in the morning of March 9th, Sir Chaloner Ogle, who had
shifted his flag from the Bussell, 80, to the Jersey, (50, Captain Peter
Lawrence, and who had General Wentworth with him, moved with
his division,^ towards the mouth of the harbour. He was presently
followed by Vice-Admiral Vernon and his division,- convoying the
transports full of troops. The third division,^ under Commodore
Lestock, was left at anchor, so as to distract the attention of the
enemy.
The Princess Amelia, 80, was specially told off to attack Battery
de Chamba, and the Norfolk, 80, Bussell, 80, and Shrewshurij, 80,
were similarly told off to batter forts Santiago and San Felipe. As
the division of Ogle approached, Chamba opened fire, but was soon
silenced by the Princess Amelia, Captain John Hemmington. At
about noon the Norfolk, Captain Thomas Graves (1), Russell, Captain
Harry Norris, and the Shrewshurij, Captain Isaac Townsend,
anchored in their assigned positions and fired so vigorously that
both the forts opposed to them were rendered untenable within an
hour. They were then taken possession of by landing parties.
Generals AVentworth and Guise, and Colonel Wolfe also landed soon
afterwards, and on that day and the 10th, most of the troops were
put ashore. These initial successes were gained at little cost. Only
six men were killed on board the Norfolk and llussell, and although
the Shrewshurij had her cable shot away and fell into a position
where she lay for seven hours under a most infernal fire from two or
three hundred guns she had but twenty killed and forty wounded.
She received, however, two hundred and forty shot in her hull, and
of these sixteen were between wind and water.
The following days were employed in landing guns and stores ; in
forming a camp in a somewhat ill-chosen position, before Fort San
' Friiircn^ Amelia, 80, Wiiuhor, 60, York, GO, Norfolk, 80, IlusseU, 80, Shrews-
bury, 80, liipon, 60, Lichfield, 50, Jemey, 60, Tilbury, (iO, Experiment, 20, Sheer-
ncss, 20, Vesuvius, fireship, Ttrriblc, bomb, Phaeton, fireship, and Goodly, tender.
^ Or/ord, 70, Princess Louisa, 60, Worcester, 60, Chichester, 80, Princess Caroline
(Hag), 80, Tnrhay, 80, Strafford, 60, Weymouth, 60, Deptford, 60, Burford, 70,
Squirrel, 20, Shoreham, 20, Eleanor, 10, Seahorse, 20, tlie fireships Strombolo, Success,
Vulcan and Cumberland, the tender Pompey, and a brig.
' Defiance, 60, Dunkirk, 60, Lion, 60, Prince Frederick, 70, Boyne, 80, Hampton
Court, 70, Falmouth, r)0, Montuyu, 60, Suffolh, 70, Astrcea, 12, Wul), 10, the iireships
uEtna and Firebrand, and tlie Viryin Qiiccn, tender.
1741.] ATTACK ON CARTAGENA. 71
Luis ; and in quarrels between AVentworth and Vernon, who was
dissatisfied with the manner in which the engineers did their work,
and who used unbecoming language to the military commander-in-
chief. As the camp was exposed to the tire of the Spanish fascine
battery on the Baradera side, an attack upon this was made on the
night of March 19th, when the boats of the fleet, under Captain
Thomas Watson (1), of the Princess Caroline, Captain Harry Norris,
of the Russell, and Captain Charles Colby, of the Boijne, landed a
party of five hundred seamen and soldiers commanded by Captains
the Hon. Edward Boscawen, of the Shoreham, AVilliam Laws, and
Thomas Cotes, ^ K.N. The party was put ashore about a mile to
leeward of the Baradera Battery, under the very muzzles of a
masked battery of five guns that had been thrown up on the beach ;
but, although a little confused at hrst by the hot fire which was
opened from this, the men promptly rushed it, and then, pushing on,
carried the Baradera Battery itself, and, suffering very little loss,
spiked the guns, and set the carriages, fascines, platforms, magazines
and guard -houses, on fire.
This well-managed exploit relieved the army before San Luis ;
but there was much sickness in the camp, the works did not progress
with the expected rapidity, and Vice-Admiral Vernon grew daily
more impatient and irritable. To add to his annoyance, the
Spaniards partially refitted the abandoned Baradera Battery, and
again began to fire upon the camp from it. They were driven out
by the Bipon, 60, Captain Thomas Jolly, which later prevented any
further attempts from being made to mount guns there. The main
British battery opened against Fort San Luis on the morning of the
21st ; and on that and the next day a furious fire was maintained on
both sides.
On the morning of March '23rd, a general attack upon all the
forts and batteries was begun. Commodore Lestock, with the
Boyne, 80, Captain Charles Colby, Princess Amelia, 80, Captain
John Hemmington, Prince Frederick, 70, Captain Lord Aubrey
Beauclerk, Hampton Court, 70, Captain Digby Dent (2), Suffolk,
70, Captain Thomas Davers, and Tilbury, 60, Captain Eobert Long,
engaged the Spanish forts, batteries and ships, "-^ there not being room
to bring more vessels to bear upon the enemy's defences. The
' The military officers were Captains James Murray aud Washington.
2 Galicia, 70, flag of Don Bhis de Leso ; San Carlos, 6G, Africa, GO, antl
San Felipe, 60.
72 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1741.
Boijne suffered so severely that she had to be called off at night ; the
Prince Frederick, which lost her captain/ and the Hampton Court,
very much shattered, had to be recalled on the following morning.
The other ships did excellent service, and were less injured ; yet it
was found expedient to withdraw even these on the 24th. During
this attack, the chief engineer was mortally wounded : on the other
hand, Fort San Luis was breached, and General AVentworth, who
went in person to view the effect of the bombardment, determined to
assault the place on the night of March 25th.
Vernon undertook to make a diversion on the Baradera side,
and, in the afternoon of the 25th, landed Captain Charles Knowles
and some seamen near the remains of the fascine battery. The
assault was then made with complete success, and with the loss of
but a single man. Owing to the fall of Fort San Luis, the Spaniards
had to scuttle or burn the Africa, San Carlos, and San Felipe, and
they were thrown into so much confusion that Captain Knowles,
taking advantage of it, apparently upon his own authority, pulled
across to Fort San Jose, on the island, and stormed it without the
sHghtest difficulty. Still unwilling to let shp what seemed to be so
splendid an opportunity for dealing serious blows, he, with Captain
Thomas Watson, forced a way within the boom, and boarded and
took the Galicia, 70." They also destroyed the boom, so that on the
morning of the 2Gth part of the British fleet entered the lake. A
few days later, it passed up to the narrow entrance leading to the
harbour proper,^ and, upon its approach, the enemy abandoned
Castillo Grande, sank two Hne-of -battleships* which had been moored
in the channel, and blew up Fort Mancinilla. Such was the general
situation on March 31st. ^
All would, doubtless, have continued to go well, but for the
unhappy dissensions between the Vice-Admiral and the General. The
siege had caused much disease, especially among the troops, which,
on March 25th, had lost about five hundred men, and had about one
thousand five litiiulred more sick on board the hospital-ships Princess
lioijal and Scarboroin///. The fleet was considerably less unhealthy ;
yet, while the fleet had plenty of water, and, very often, fresh meat
' Whose place was taken by Captain the Hon. Edward Boscawen.
^ She was towed out.
^ Called the Surgidero, or Anchorac^e.
* Confjuistadvr, GO, and JJratjun, (JO.
" On April 1st Vernon sent home a sanguine dispatch wliicli i cached the Duke of
Newcastle on May 17th, and caused general exultation.
1741.] ATTACK ON CARTAGENA. 73
and turtle, the army sometimes suffered from absolute want.
Vernon seems to have forgotten that troops and seamen alike served
a common sovereign and a common cause. He took no measures
for supplying water to the army ; he refused Wentworth's reasonable
request that two or three small craft should be told off to catch
turtle for the use of the sick ; and, speaking generally, his relations
with his military colleague were unaccommodating, boisterous, and
overbearing. Wentworth, in consequence, became disgusted, and,
rather than seek the co-operation of so bearish and dictatorial a man
as Vernon, he sometimes stood sullenly aloof, regardless of the
magnitude of the public interests involved.
On April 1st the Vice-Admiral moved his bomb-ketches, covered
MEDAL C0MMF;M0RATIVE OF THE DE.STKUCTION OF SOME OF THE DEFENCES OF
CARTAGENA BY VICE-ADMIUAL EDWARD VERNON, MARCH, 1741.
(From nn original kind!// lent hi/ H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battenbcnj, R.N.)
by the Experiment, '20, Captain James Kentone, and the Shoreham,
'20, Captain Thomas Brodrick,^ into the Surgidero ; and Commodore
Lestock, who had re-embarked the troops from Tierra Bomba, joined
Vernon off Castillo Grande. On the 2nd, three fireships took up
their station within the Surgidero in order to protect a projected
landing of troops at a place called La Quinta. On the 3rd, the
WeymoutJi, 60, Captain Charles Knowles, also passed the narrows ;
and, early on the morning of the 5th, General Blakeney, with about
one thousand five hundred men, was set ashore, and presently
pushed forward towards Fort San Lazar, the only remaining
outwork of Cartagena. Some resistance was encountered, but the
enemy eventually retired. On the 6th, more of the army dis-
' Wlio liad succeeded Captain the Hun. E. Boscawen.
74 MAJOn OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1741.
embarked, and, having joined Blakeney's brigade, encamped with it
on a plain about a mile from San Lazar.
On the 7th, a military comicil of war came to the conclusion that
Fort San Lazar ought not to be attempted until a battery should be
raised against it, and that the reduction of the work would be greatty
facilitated b}' the co-operation of the bomb-ketches and a ship of the
line with the army. Vernon, on being informed of this, testily
replied that he strongly disapproved of waiting for the erection of a
battery, and that, if a battery should be erected against so paltry a
fort, he felt sure that the enemy would not wait for it to be made
ready for action ; but, in his answer, he paid no attention to the
council's suggestion as to the co-operation of the ships ; nor could
Wentworth induce the Vice-Admiral to order his vessels to cover a
detachment of troops which had been posted with a view to cutting
off communication between Cartagena and the country at its back.
In short, it appears that Vernon believed that the army could do,
and ought to do, all that remained to be done, and that Wentworth,
with wiser intuition, knew that only by co-operation could the
desired results be attained. But sickness increased ashore, water
grew daily scarcer, and the Spanish defences became hourly more
formidable ; and, in an evil moment, at the pressing instance of
Vernon, and against the better judgment of some of the land officers,
the storming of San Lazar was ordered, and was attempted before
daybreak on April 9th. Things were mismanaged ; officers were
confused by lack of detailed instructions, and the assault was repulsed
with heavy loss.^
Operations were continued for two days longer ; but on the 11th
a council of land officers decided that, " without a considerable
reinforcement from the fleet, it would not be possible to go on with
the enterprise." Vernon still shut his ears to the suggestions of his
military colleagues; and when the council, having received from him
a very non-pertinent answer, reassembled, it desired that the Vice-
Admiral would make arrangements for re-embarking the forces and
stores, since it appeared, from his silence concerning the material
point, that no reinforcement was to be looked for. On the 14th,
after some further interchange of messages, a general council of war,
consisting of the sea as well as of the land officers, met on board the
flagship. The conference was stormy; and, in the course of it,
Vernon quitted his cabin in a passion. Alter his departure. Sir
' The loss was 17'.t killed ; 459 wounded, many mortally; and IG taken prisoners.
1741.] WITHDRAWAL FROM CARTAGENA. 75
Chaloner Ogle gave reasons for objecting to disembark the seamen
from the fleet ; and Vernon, who sat in his stern-walk within hearing,
interjected a remark to the effect that, if the men were set ashore,
some of them would infallibly desert to the enemy. The Vice-
Admiral then returned to his cabin, and the council unanimously
determined that the troops and guns should be re-embarked. In
pursuance of this decision, the guns, stores, and baggage were
reshipped on the 15th, and the troops, only 3569 of whom remained
fit for duty, on the 16th.
Vernon, who may, by that time, have begun to feel uneasy
concerning the effect which so signal a miscarriage would have upon
his reputation,^ made a last, but quite useless effort, against the
town. Having fitted up his prize, the Galicia, as a floating battery
of sixteen guns, and having fortified her with earth or sand, he
caused her to be warped in as near as possible to the town. During
the morning of the 16th, under the command of Captain Daniel
Hore, she fired into the place continuously for seven hours. She
was then so damaged that she was ordered to cut her cables and
drift out of gunshot, but she grounded on a shoal, and had to be
abandoned.^ She lost six killed and fifty-six wounded. But for
the happy chance that she grounded, she would probably have sunk
with all hands, for she had received twenty shot between wind and
water.
As soon as the works which had been already taken had been
dismantled and destroyed, the wretched remains of the expedition
sailed for Jamaica, where the fleet arrived on May 19th, and where
it found a welcome convoy from England awaiting it. Commodore
Lestock, with many of the heavier ships ^ and five frigates, was soon
afterwards sent home in charge of the trade. Vernon, chiefly in
consequence of his dislike to be further associated with Wentworth,
wished to go home also ; but the ministry, which adroitly flattered
him, persuaded him to remain.
' It is also suggested that Vernon desired to convince General Wentworth, by
actual experiment, that ships could not operate with success against the town. But, it'
so, the experiment was not a fair one. The Oalicia did not get near the walls because
.she approached them at the wrong point. Elsewhere there was deep water within
[listol-shot of the ramparts. Smollett, vii. 287.
^ She was subsequently burnt by the British.
^ Princess Caroline, 80, RtisseU, 80, Norfolk, 80, Shrewsbury, 80, Princess Amelia,
80, Torhay, 80, Chichester, 80, Hampton Court, 70, Burfoid, 70, Windsor, 60, and
Falmouth, 50. Vernon transferred his flag to the Boyne, 80.
76 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1711-1762. [1741.
The next attempt of the fleet in the "West Indies was against
Santiago de Cuba. The home Government would have preferred
to see Havana attacked, but the place was strong, and the squadron
of Don Eodrigo de Torres lay in the port. Governor Trelawney,
of Jamaica, urged an expedition, across the Isthmus of Darien,
against Panama, but gave way to the representations of Vernon,
Ogle, Wentworth, and Guise, all of whom voted for Santiago de
Cuba as the town which, upon the whole, offered the brightest
prospects of success. On June '25th, therefore, Captain James
Rentone, in the Bipon, 60,^ was dispatched to reconnoitre the
harbour and its defences, and on June 30th the fleet - put to sea.
The Vice-Admiral left at Jamaica the Suffollx, 70, Strafford, 60,
Dunkirk, 60, Bristol, 50, Lichfield, 50, and Vulcan, 8, under
Captain Thomas Davers, to protect the island and its trade, and
ordered the York, 60, Augusta, 60, and Deptford, 60, which were
refitting at Port Eoyal, to be completed for sea, and to be sent after
him, as soon as possible.
A spacious harbour lying near the south-east end of Cuba, and
then known as AValthenham Bay,^ was selected as the general
rendezvous; and there the expedition dropped anchor on July 18th.
This harbour is about sixty-five miles to the eastward of Santiago,
which occupies the head of a much smaller bay, and which has
a well-defended narrow entrance, closed at that time by means of
a substantial boom. Santiago was supposed to be impregnable from
seaward, and the leaders of the fleet and army decided to attack it
overland from Cumberland Harbour. To facilitate this operation,
Vernon despatched some cruisers to watch twelve Spanish sail
of the line which lay at Havana, and which constituted a " potential "
fleet of decidedly dangerous strength. He also sent other vessels
to blockade Santiago ; and across the mouth of Cumberland Harbour
he stationed six of his largest ships, so that, should any enemy
approach, the transports within could not be reached without a
' Captain Thomas Jolly bad died in May. Lord Augustus Fitzroy, of the Orford,
70, liad also fallen a victim to the climate soon after the arrival of the fleet at Jamaica.
'^ Boyne, 80, flag of Vernon, Camberlatid, 80, flag of Ogle, Grafton, 70, Kent, 70,
Worcester, 60, Tilbury, 60, Moidayu, 60, Chester, 50, Tiger, 50, Shoreliam, 20, Experi-
ment, 20, Sheerness, 20, Alderney, bomb, Stromholo, Phaeton, and Vesuvius, fireships,
Bonetta and Triton, sloops, Princess Royal and Scarborough, hospital ships, and
Pompey, tender, besides about 40 transports carrying 3400 troops.
■'' Ke-nauicd Cumberland Harbour by Vernon. It is tlie bay between Punto de
Guantiinamo and Cainiaun ra.
1741.] THE FIASCO IN CUBA. 77
severe struggle. But in the meantime Went worth lost heart. He
landed, but he did not go far. The country before him was thickly
w^ooded ; his men had rapidly become sickly ; he found great
difficulty in dragging his guns along with him ; and, although
Vernon assured him that, if he pressed on, he should find ships
before Santiago ready to co-operate with him, the General declined
to advance any further. The Vice-Admiral in person went round
to Santiago with a view to seeing whether, after all, he could not
devise some method of capturing it from the sea ; but he was obliged
to agree that the venture offered no chances of success. The whole
scheme, therefore, was abandoned, the troops being re-embarked on
November 20th, and the fleet quitting Cumberland Harbour for
Jamaica on November '28th.
This abortive enterprise was as ill-conceived as it was pusillani-
mously attempted. It was the professed desire of the ministry in
England, and of the naval and military chiefs on the spot, to
conquer Cuba.^ Havana was then, as it is now, the capital and heart
of the island ; and Santiago was a comparatively insignificant place
of less strategic and commercial importance than to-day. Yet it was
determined to avoid Havana, and to attack Santiago, in spite of the
fact that at Havana lay the strong squadron of Don Eodrigo de
Torres. Sane strategy would have dictated firstly the annihilation
or neutralisation of that formidable "potential" fleet, and secondly
the dealing of a blow at the heart instead of at the extremities of the
island. That Don Bodrigo lay fast, and did not come out, affords no
justification of the British action. He might have elected to come
out ; and, had he done so, he might, with his superior force, have
crushed Vernon, who would have been hampered by the presence
of his transports and by the necessity of looking to their safety. As
for the pusillanimity with which the descent was attempted, it is
sufficient to say that Wentworth lay for about three months, almost
inactive, within three or four days' march of Santiago ; that there
was at no time any considerable body of Spanish troops between him
and that city ; that the landward defences of Santiago were known
to be contemptible ; and that the delay involved the sacrifice of
more men than would have perished in any active operations that
could have been necessary to secure the fall of the place.
^ Settlers were actually invited to cross from North America, and were promised
grants of land in the island. — Speech of Gov. Shirley at Boston, Sept. 23rd, 1741. The
re-naming of places by the British leaders was also significant.
78 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1702. [1741.
The Ministry censured both Vernon and Wentworth, j'et only
with mildness, and chiefly on account of the personal quarrels which
had been allowed to spring up between them. The Duke of
Newcastle, on October 31st, wrote to Vernon : —
" His Majesty has commanded me to acquaint you and General Wentworth that
he sees with great concern the heats and animosities that have arisen hetween his
officers by sea and land, contrary to his orders, whereby the service cannot but greatly
sufl'er ; and I am ordered to recommend to you in the strongest manner carefully to
avoid the like for the future, and that, in case of any difi'erence of opinion, all acrimony
and warmth of expression should be avoided."
After the collapse of the undertaking had become known in England,
neither Admiral nor General received from the Government any
much stronger blame than this. Yet one, if not both, should have
been recalled. It was obvious, even to their best friends,^ that they
could not work satisfactorily one with the other. Unhappily, they
were allowed to embark together upon further adventures.
The transports from Santiago reached Jamaica in safety, while
the fleet cruised for a time off Hispaniola in order to protect the
arrival of an expected convoy '^ from England. After a time, the
Vice-Admiral left part of his force, under Captain Cornelius Mitchell,
of the Kent, 70, to look for the convoy, and proceeded to Jamaica,
where a council of war was held on January 8th, 1742. The council
eventually decided to adopt a plan which had been submitted to it
by Lowther, the ex-buccaneer, who knew the country well. This
involved a landing at Puerto Bello, and a inarch across the isthmus
to Panama, with three thousand soldiers, five hundred negroes, and
four hundred friendly Mosquito Indians. But many delays occurred.
In the interval, Lowther, in the Triton, sloop, convoyed by
Captain Henry Dennis in the Experiment, went to the Mosquito
coast to procure information and to make arrangements with the
natives. The Triton was for this service disguised as a trader. As
for Vernon, who was terribly impatient at the slowness with which
the land forces were being got readj^ and who had learnt that
Spanish reinforcements were on their way to Cartagena, he occupied
some of his spare time in making a cruise off Cartagena, with the
' l'iiltene}''s amiable apjicals Id \'einuu tu ciintiol his temper were almost pathetic.
See esi)ecially Pulteney's letter of Nov. 17th, 1741, in ' Letters to an Honest Sailor.'
- The convoy, consisting of the Greenwich, 50, St. Albans, 50, and For, 20, with
transpijrts containing about two tiiousand troops, reached Jamaica on January ir)th,
without having sighted Mitchell's squadron.
1742.] FAILURES OF VERNON AND WENTWORTH. 79
object of suggesting to the enemy that he was contemplating a new
attack upon that place. Sir Chaloner Ogle, who had been left behind
at Jamaica to bring on the main body of the expeditionary forces,
was not able to sail until the middle of March, 1742. On the '25th
of that month, he rejoined the Vice-Admiral, and the fleet ^ then
made the best of its way to its destination.
The Experiment and Triton had been directed to make rendezvous
with the fleet off the Bastimentos Islands, in what is now called the
Gulf of San Bias. On March 26th, Vernon detached the Montagu,
Captain William Chambers, to look for those vessels, and to order
them, in case they should be fallen in with, to join a detachment
which was to land a body of troops at Nombre de Dios, at the
head of the gulf of San Bias." The fleet sighted land near the
Bastimentos on March 28th, but, seeing nothing of the Experiment
and Triton, passed on to Puerto Bello, and, entering the harbour
in line of battle, dropped anchor there before nightfall, without any
opposition on the part of the Spanish Governor, who fled with such
troops as he had.
Lowther's report, received when the fleet was at Puerto Bello, had
the effect of convincing General Wentworth that the design against
Panama was impracticable ; yet Wentworth was so lacking in tact
that, instead of communicating his decision directly to Vernon, he
mentioned it casually to Governor Trelawney, the result being that
Vernon's first intimation that the expedition was destined to be a
failure was conveyed to him in the form of a private request from
Trelawney for a passage back to Jamaica. Wentworth's views were
formally adopted at a council of war at which seven military officers
were present, and were ratified at a general council composed of
three military and two naval officers. Vernon and Ogle formed the
minority, and could do nothing but acquiesce, although the Vice-
Admiral was strongly of opinion that, seeing that Panama had in
earlier years been taken from across the isthmus by Sir Henry
Morgan with five hundred buccaneers, it might be taken again by
the much larger forces which were at the disposal of the British
^ Boyne, 80, flag of Vernon, Cumberland, 80, flag ol' Ogle, Kent, 70, Orford, 70>
lVorceste7\ 60, Defiance, 60, York, 60, Montagu, 60, St. Albans, 50, and Oreenivich, 50,
with three fireships, two hospital ships, and about forty transports. Governor
Trelawney, as a colonel, was with the troops.
^ This landing was never effected. The Experiment and Triton rejoined tlie fleet
at Puerto Bello.
80 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1742.
leaders in 174'2. The fleet, therefore, quitted Puerto Bello for
Jamaica on April 8rd, having effected nothing.^
Indeed, the only important advance made in the West Indies in
the course of the year w^as the annexation and settlement of Eoatan
Island, in the bay of Honduras, by an expedition - from Jamaica
convoyed l)y the Lichfield, 50, Captain James Cusack, and the
Bonetta, sloop, Commander William Lea. Nor is it astonishing
that so little was done. The Admiral and the General were on
worse terms than ever, and their quarrels were taken up by all
around them. Even Ogle and Trelawney fell out. So scandalous
a state of things was terminated, after it had endured far too long,
by the arrival at Jamaica on September 23rd of the Gibraltar, 20,
Captain Thorpe Fowke, with orders for both Vernon and Went-
worth to return to England. Vernon sailed in the Boyne, 80, on
October 18th, leaving Sir Chaloner Ogle in command of the station ;
and Wentworth, with the remnants of the army, departed soon
afterwards, under convoy of the Defiance, 60, Captain Daniel Hore,
and the Worcester, 60, Captain William Cleland,
In the Mediterranean, where there had been scarcely a large
enough naval force for the due protection of trade, and for the due
observation of the declared and the suspected enemies of Great
Britain, Vice-Admiral Nicholas Haddock had been joined, in
Eebruary, 1742, by a considerable reinforcement under Commodore
Richard Lestock (2), who, on March 13th following, was promoted
to be Rear-Admiral of the AVhite.^ According to Charnock, Lestock,
during this period, " exhibited some proofs of that impatient temper
and improper professional pride which, afterwards becoming infinitely
more apparent, cannot but be condemned even by those who are so
warmly attached to him as to insist that no part of his conduct was
ever injurious or prejudicial to the cause and interests of his native
country."'* Haddock, owing to ill-health, had to resign his
command and ic'Uini to England ; ^ and, pending the arrival in the
Mediterranean of his successor, Lestock officiated as commander-in-
€hief. Lestock acted with some energy against the enemy, whom
' Tlie ]»iitisli cruisers were, liiiwcver, very successful, as will be seen in the next
cliajiter.
'^ Which reached IJoatan un August 23rd.
^ He was further advanced to he Rear of the Red, ou August 9th, 1743, and A'ice
■<»f the White, on December Ttb, 174o.
* 'Biog. Nav.' iii. .'540.
'' Wliich he readied in the RvcbiivL-, 4U, uu ]\Iay 2Glh, 17 12.
1742.] LESTOCK'S CHARACTER. 81
he obliged to postpone an intended embarkation of troops ; but, on
the other hand, he again allowed his unfortunate temper to get the
better of him. In view of what happened at a later date, it is
desirable to reprint here from Charnock ^ an order and certain letters
which will explain not only Lestock's peremptory methods, but also
his interpretation, at that time, of some of the duties of subordinate
commanders when in face of the enemy.
Eear-Admiral Lestock to Commander James Hodsell, of the
Ann Gallty, fireship.
"Captain Hodsell: Go to the Lenox, Nass'iu, Royal Oak, Ro^nney, and Dragon.^
Tell them I am the centre from whence the line of battle is to be formed, and, if any
ship or ships cannot get into their stations, I am to find remedy for that ; bnt those
who can, and do not, get into their stations are blameable ; and a line of battle is not
to be trifled with nor misunderstood. Go with this yourself to the several captains,
from. Sir, j^our most humble servant, Richard Lestock. Neptune, at sea. April 14th,
1742. P.S. — An enemy in sight would not admit of this deliberation."
Captain Curtis Barnet, op the Dragon, to Rear-Admiral Lestock.
"I thought that all the ships of a fleet or squadron were to sail in their proper
divisions. I have heard and read of divisions getting late into the line, not in time
to have any part in the action ; but never knew till now that it was my duty to leave
the flag, or officer representing one, in whose division I am, without a particular order
or signal. I therefore kept my station in the division, not with a design to trifle with
the line of battle. I am, etc., C. Barnet."
Rear-Admiral Lestock to Captain Curtis Barnet.
" I have your letter of the 15th inst., in answer to mine I sent you and several
other captains by Captain Hodsell on the 14th inst., at the time the signal was out for
the line of battle abreast of each other. Your not getting int(_) line when j'ou could
have done it, gave me that occasion by the fireship.
" You say you thought that the ships of a fleet or squadron were to sail in their
proper divisions ; and you have heard and read of divisions getting late into the line,
not in time to have any part of the action ; but never till now knew that it was your
duty to leave the flag, or officer representing one, in whose division you are, without a
particular order or signal.
"Let us suppose that j^ou are in a division, and that a signal for the line of battle
is made ; and that the commanding ship of that division, by bad sailing, could not
get into the line, though all the rest of the squadron could have got into the line, but
did not. That division makes one-third of the squadron.
"Now: is it your duty to see two-thirds of the squadron sacrificed to the enenn^,
when you could, but did not, join in the battle ? An admiral, in such a case, would
either leave the bad sailing ship for one that could get into the action, or would send
^ ' Biog. Nav.' iv. 213 et seq. Charnock says : " Mr. Lestock appears in his
vehemence of rage to have been guilty of a few literarj^ omissions and mistakes, which
we have supplied and corrected." The present editor has adopted some of Charnock's
emendations and made othei's, chiefly with respect to punctuation.
^ The Dragon, GO, Captain Curtis Barnet.
VOL. III. G
82 MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1714-1762. [1742.
you such orders as should justify you at a court-martial for not coming into the action
when you could have done it. Captain Rowley,^ indeed, has not the power either to
shift his ship, or to stop you with him.
"Such an account would lell but ill to our country after the loss of a battle. But
I hope such a thing can never happen to an Englishman ; and the punishment inflicted
on a breach of the 12th article of the Statute of Charles the Second upon those who
Avithdraw, or keep back, or do not come into the fight and engage, would be what
must follow in such a case.
"So I Avill say no more of trifling nor misunderstanding of a line of battle ; as
these are, and must be, the consequences of a not trilling want of duty in the weighing
of circumstances in regard to battle : for that is the cause why lines are formed.^
" The 13th article of the Fighting Instructions^ leans that way also. So, having, I
think, answered your letter, I am, Sir, your most humble servant, Richard Lestock.
Neptune, at sea. April 16th, 1742."
Captain Curtis Baknet to Rkar-Admiral Lestock.
" Dragon, April 16th, 1T42.
" Sir, — As yon have given yourself the trouble to answer the letter I thought
necessary to write in excuse for my continuing in my station in the division of which
I am, when you made the signal for the line of battle abreast, and in it are pleased to
say : ' Is it your duty to see two-thirds of the squadron sacrificed to the enemy, when
you could, and did not, join in the battle?' I answer that I should readily concur
in punishing rigidly any man who could, and did not, join in the battle. But, as the
commanders of divisions will, I imagine, always expect that the captains, in their
respective divisions, should, in anything like the late case, take directions from them,
and, as we are to suppose every otTicer of that distinction neither wanting in zeal or
capacity, I can make no doubt that such orders would be immediately given as would
be most essential for his Majesty's service; and that a signal or order might be
expected for the ships to make sail into the line if the commander of the division
could not get up with his own ship, and did not think proper to remove into another.
Without such an order or a prui)er signal, I could not in my conscience condemn any
man for remaining with his division, or think that he fell under the 12th article of the
Statute of Charles the Second, or the 13th of the Fighting Instructions ; for a man in
his station cannot be said to withdraw, keep back, or not use his endeavours to engage
the enemy in the order the admiral has prescribed. In this manner I should judge,
were I to sit at a coiu't-martial on such an occasion ; but in this manner shall no
longer act, since you have been pleased to tell me Captain liowley has not the power
to shift his ship or stop me.
" I presume there are instances both of whole divisions going down to the enemy
too soon, and of coming in so late as to have no part in the action ; but I never heard
that the private captains who kept their stations in those divisions fell under the least
censure ; and, as I was neither called nor sent from the division by order or signal, I
had no apprehension of being blameable.
^ Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet, Sir William Rowley; then senior officer of
Barnet's division. Lestock meant that, as there was no flag-officer of the division,
there was no jiossible question as to what was Barnet's duty.
^ I.e., " After all, I will not speak of this as trilling, for it is far too liglit a word to
apply to so serious a subject."
* " As soon as the Admiral shall hoist a red flag on the flagstafl' at the fore-topmast
head, and fire a gun, every ship in the fleet is to use tlieir utmost endeavour to engage
the enemy, in the order the Admiral has prescribed unto them."
1742.] MATHEWS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 83
" With regard to what you are pleased to say of seeing the squadron sacrificed to
the enemy, that cannot happen while you, Sir, command it, who will never go down
to the enemy in an improper manner, with more sail than the principal ships of the
line can keep you company. ..."
Lestock had, undoubtedly, hoped to be continued as commander-
in-chief in the Mediterranean ; but Vice-Admiral Thomas Mathews
(E.) ^ was appointed to that post on March 25th, 1742, and, having
hoisted his flag in the Namur, 90, sailed on April 16th, '-^ and arrived
at Gibraltar on May 7th. Lestock was hurt, and he is said to have
foolishly showed his resentment by neglecting to obey instructions
to send a frigate to meet Mathews. For this supposed omission
Mathews publicly reprimanded Lestock as soon as the two flag-
officers met.^ From that moment the junior seems to have regarded
his senior with scarcely-disguised hostility.
Mathews was a good officer, as strict in obeying as he was in
enforcing discipline, and a jealous, yet not intemperate, believer in
the dignity of the great position to which he had been called by his
country. He was, moreover, a highly honourable man, of con-
spicuous gallantry. Lestock, on the other hand, was ever more
ready to enforce than to obey the laws of discipline. In his eyes,
his own person was fully as dignified as any rank or place with
which his country could invest him. " Unconciliating in his
manners, austere when in command, restless when in a subordinate
station, he had," says Charnock, "fewer friends than fell to the lot
of most men, and that number, which was gradually diminishing,
his behaviour never appeared of a nature to recruit." His courage
has not been questioned, but his abilities, which were considerable,
were contracted and neutralised by a petty meanness of spirit and
smallness of view that prevented him from ever commanding either
confidence or respect. That Mathews disliked Lestock cannot be
gainsaid.* Almost every naval officer of the day disliked Lestock.
^ Thomas Mathews ; born, IGTG ; captain, 1703 ; took the Bien Aime, 26, in 1707,
and the Glorieux, 44, in 1709 ; connnauded the Kent at Cape Passaro, in 1718 ;
Commissioner at Chatham, 1736 ; Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief in the
Mediterranean, 1742 ; Admiral, 1743 ; fought a spirited but partial action off Toulon,
1744 ; dismissed the service, 174G ; died, 1751.
^ In company with the Frincess Caroline, 80, Norfolk, 80, and Bedford, 70.
^ Lestock alleged that he had sent a frigate, which had failed to fall in with
Mathews. It is admitted that, in this instance, no matter what were the facts as to
the frigate, the Vice-Admiral behaved with somewhat unnecessary warmth.
* When he accepted his appointment, he stipulated that Lestock should be speedily
recalled, but the stipulation was afterwards either forgotten or misunderstood. — ,
Beatson, i. 153.
G 2
84 MAJOlt OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1742.
But Mathews was the last man in the world to allow his private
dislikes to interfere with his duty.
The Vice-Adniiral met the Eear- Admiral and part of the fleet at
Villa Franca on May 27th. He at once instituted a strict watching
blockade of Toulon, where a Spanish, as well as a French force, lay.
This blockade was maintained chiefly by the division of Lestock,
whose headquarters were off Hyeres, while Mathews himself
remained in reserve at Villa Franca, ready to sail upon the receipt
of news that the enemy was at sea. In June, five Spanish galleys,
which were to have escorted some Spanish troops to Italy, and
which were laden with ammunition and stores, ventured to quit the
shelter of Fort Ste. Marguerite, and crept round under the coast as
far as the Gulf of St. Tropez. Captain Harry Norris, of the
Kingston, 60, with a small detachment, blockaded them there, and
when, although they were in a neutral port, they fired on him, he
effected their destruction.^ Other Spanish vessels were destroyed at
Palamos, Mataro, and elsewhere.
In July, 1742, the Vice-Admiral, who had intelligence that the
King of Sicily had dispatched a body of troops to the assistance of
the Spaniards in Italy, ordered Commodore William Martin, with a
small squadron,^ to Naples, to endeavour to induce the King to
withdraw his forces, and to adhere to a declaration of neutrality.
Should the King refuse, Martin was to bombard the city. The
squadron arrived, and anchored in the Bay on August 19th ; and
Martin sent ashore Commander de I'Angle with an ultimatum, and
a demand for an answer in half-an-hour, unless, indeed, the King
could not be reached within that time. After very little delay, the
required assurance was given on the 20th, and the squadron there-
upon departed, to the great relief of the Neapolitans. The incident,
most creditably managed by Martin, would, perhaps, have had
comparatively little importance, had not the same prince who, in
1742, was King of Sicily, become, in 1759, King Carlos III. of
Spain. He then remembered against Great Britain the coercion
which had been employed against him by the Commodore, and,
towards the end of the Seven Years' War, and during the War of
■ ' For details of this, see next chapter.
2 Ipswich, 70, Commodore William ^Tartiii, Fanther, 50, Captain Solomon Gideon,
Oxford, 50, Captain Lord Harry Powlett, Feversham, 40, Cajitain Eichard Huglies (2),
Dursley Galley, 20, Commander Merrick de I'Angle; and the bombs. Carcass, 8,
Lieut. John Bowdler, Salamandn; 8, Lieut. John Phillipson, and Terrible, 8, Lieut,
the Hon. George Edgcundje ; besides four tenders.
1743.] ATTACK ON LA GUAYBA. 85
American Bevolution, never ceased to do all that lay in his power to
ruin the naval might which had thus humiliated him.
Commodore Martin rejoined the flag, and was soon afterwards
again detached to destroy certain storehouses and magazines at
Alassio, in the territory of the republic of Genoa. These, which
were known to be destined for the use of the Spaniards, were all set
on fire by a landing-party from the ships.
In 1743, the blockade of Toulon was continued, and Admiral
Mathews, as before, exerted himself to the utmost to hinder the
operations of the Spaniards in the Italian peninsula, and the trans-
mission thither of stores and reinforcements from Spain. But the
transactions on the station were not of sufficient importance to
deserve description in this chapter. They are, therefore, relegated
to the next.
One of the first actions of Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) ^ after he had, as
has been seen, been left as commander-in-chief in the West Indies,
upon Vernon's recall, was to organise an expedition against the
Spanish settlements at La Guayra and Puerto Cabello, on the coast
of Caracas, in what is now Venezuela. These were reported to be
almost defenceless, and to be at the mercy of the fleet. Ogle
entrusted the conduct of the expedition to Captain Charles Knowles,
in the Suffolk, 70, and gave him directions to proceed first to
Antigua, there to take under his orders such additional vessels as
could be spared, and to embark a certain number of troops.
Knowles carried out these instructions, and on February 12th, 1743,
sailed for La Guayra. After touching at St. Christopher, he arrived
off his port of destination on the 18th.
It is quite true that when Ogle first contemplated the descent
upon the coast of Caracas, La Guayra was almost defenceless.
Unfortunately, the Admiral suffered his projects to become known,
and the Spanish governor of the place, with great promptitude and
vigour, thereupon set himself to work to repair the fortifications, to
build new ones, to raise extra forces, and to obtain fresh supplies of
ammunition.^
When, consequently, on February 18th, the squadron began the
attack at about midday, a warm and formidable opposition was met
' Promoted to be Vice-Adiniral of tlie Ked on August 9th, and Vice-Admiral of the
White on December 7th, 174.3.
^ Some of this ammunition was obtained from the Dutcli Governor of Curacoa,
who, by handing it over, committed an unwarrantable breach of the Dutch under-
standing with Great Britain.
86
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1743.
with. There Avas a swell which prevented the vessels from
approaching within about a mile from the forts, and the landing of
the troops was found to be impracticable. Yet, although an attempt
to burn the shipping in harbour, by means of armed boats, failed as
a result of confusion of orders, and although the ships suffered badly,
it looked, at 4 o'clock p.m., as if the fire of the batteries was about
to be silenced. But at that hour, a chance shot cut the cable of the
B afford, which was anchored at the head of the British line. The
Burford drove on board the Norwich, and forced both her and the
Eltham out of station, the three vessels drifting almost helplessly to
leeward. This re-encouraged the enemy, and although, up to
nightfall, the attack was pluckil}^ continued, the British, after the
accident, had much the worse of the encounter, and were ultimately
obliged to draw off. La Guayra was severely damaged ; a magazine
was blown up by a shell from the Comet, and about seven hundred
Spaniards were killed and wounded. Yet, in spite of the gallantry
of the assailants, the day ended with their decisive repulse. The
composition of Knowles's squadron, and the damage and loss
sustained by each ship, are shown in the following table : —
Ships.
Vi
P
o
Suffolk.
70
Burford
70
Aorivich
50
Aduice .
50
Assistance
50
hiiham
40
Lively .
20
Scarborovq
h 20
Ott'-r .
14
Cometjhom
b 8
Commauders.
Capt. Charles Knowles .
„ Fiankliii Lushington
„ Tlioiuas Gregory (1)
„ Elliot Smith
„ Smith Callis
„ Eichard Watkins (acting)
„ Henry Stewart (acting)
Commander Lachlin Leslie .
„ John Gage .
„ Richard Tyrrell .
il
97
380
30
73
380
24
7
250
1
10
250
7
41
250
12
44
210
14
10
120
7
3
120
y
45
?
40
a
0
80
50
11
15
71
24
1 ."^hot in the iinli uuly are iutiuiletl.
Captain Lushington, of the Burford, a most excellent ofdcer, was
mortally wounded by a chain-shot, which carried off one of his legs
at the thigh. He died at Cura9oa on February 23rd, two hours
after he had been landed there. The Burford, Eltham, and
Assistance, were almost completely disabled ; the flagship had
fourteen guns dismounted ; ancl the squadron, as a whole, was, for
the moment, unserviceable. It, therefore, proceeded to Cura9oa
to refit.
1743.] REPULSE AT PUERTO CABELLO. 87
As soon as he had refitted, and had supplemented his rather
reduced forces by taking on board a few Dutch volunteers, Captain
Knowles, in pursuance of the Commander-in-Chief's design, turned
his attention to Puerto Cabello. He sailed on March 20th, but,
owing to a strong lee current, could not anchor in the neighbourhood
of his destination until April 15th.
Puerto Cabello was even better prepared to receive him than La
Guayra had been. There were in the place three hundred regular
troops, twelve hundred seamen belonging to the vessels in port, and
a large body of negroes and Indians. The Spaniards had hauled all
their smaller craft up to the head of the harbour out of gunshot, and
had moored a ship of sixty, and another of forty guns, in good
defensive positions, while they had placed a large vessel ready for
sinking in the mouth of the harbour. Newly-erected fascine
batteries flanked the entrance, and two more, one mounting twelve,
and the other seven guns, occupied a low point called Punta Brava.
These last, in the opinion of Knowles, were ill-placed, and might be
easily taken, and then employed against the fortress itself. He
therefore, after having held a council of war, ordered in the Lively
and EWiam, on the afternoon of the 16th, to cannonade the Punta
Brava works, and prepared a landing-party, consisting of Dalzell's
regiment, all the Marines of the squadron, and four hundred seamen,^
which, as soon as the batteries should be silenced, was to storm
them, while the Assistance lay anchored within pistol-shot of the
shore to cover a retreat, should one be necessary.
The Lively and Eltham effected their part of the work by about
sunset. All firing then ceased. As it grew dark the storming-party
landed, and began to march along the beach towards the batteries,
Knowles accompanying the advance in his galley. Just before
11 P.M. the foremost troop seized one of the batteries ; but, at that
moment, the Spaniards, being alarmed, began to fire from the other
works, and, to the mortification of the British leaders, so blind a
panic seized the men that they retired pell-mell in the most absolute
confusion, and did not regain their self-possession until they were
once more on board the ships.
After this disgraceful repulse, another council of war was held on
April 21st, and, in pursuance of the resolutions then come to, a
general attack from seaward w^as made upon the place on the
morning of the 24th. The Assistance, Burford, Suffolk, and
^ The whole being under Major Lucas, of Dalzell's Eegiment.
88 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [1743.
Norwich were told off to batter the main work, and the Scar-
borough, Livehj, and EWiam, to attack the fascine batteries at the
entrance of the harbour. Fire was opened at about 11 a.m., all the
ships taking up their stations ^ as well as they possibly could, except
the Norwich, which apparently hesitated to get into close action.
Seeing this, Knowles very promptly sent Captain Henry Stewart
(acting), of the Livehj, to supersede Captain Thomas Gregory, who
was put under arrest.^ Thenceforward, the engagement was hotly
maintained until the close of day, when the enemy's fire slackened,
and it became evident that his batteries had suffered severely. He
reopened fire, however, after dark, and so badly mauled the ships —
some of which had, by that time, expended nearly all their ammuni-
tion— that, soon after 9 p.m., Knowles made the signal to cut cables,
and drew off his shattered vessels.
The ships actually engaged in this disastrous affair were, saving
the Advice, Otter, and Comet, the same as had been engaged at La
Guayra, but some of them were differently commanded. Captain
Kichard Watkins had been promoted from the Eltham to the
Burford, vice Lushington, killed ; Captain PhiHp Durell (1) had suc-
ceeded Captain Watkins in the Eltham; and, after the supersession
of Captain Gregory, Commander John Gage, of the Otter, assumed
command of the Lively. The loss of the squadron was about two
hundred men killed and wounded. The ships refitted under shelter
of the Keys of Barbarat, and were there rejoined by the Advice,
which had been detached on scouting duty on March 23rd. On
April 28th it was determined that the force was no longer in a con-
dition to attempt anything more against the enemy ; and, after an
exchange of prisoners had been carried out, the ships belonging to
the Leeward Islands' station ^ returned thither, and the rest of the
squadron proceeded to Jamaica. Captain Knowles, in the autumn,
cruised off Martinique, and, soon afterwards, went home to
England.
Late in 1748, the excited condition of parties in England, and
' In this they were impeded by the sinking of the Spanish vessel in the harbour's
mouth.
^ He was Liter sent to England and court-niartiallcd at Spithead for misbeliaviour.
(C. M. Sept. 17th, 1743.) The court dismissed liim from the service; but, after distin-
guishing himself as a volunteer, he was restored to his rank as from Nov. 12th, 1745.
He ended his life in a duel.
* Where Commodore (later Vice- Admiral Sir) Peter Warren rommandcd, with his
broad pennant in the Superbe, GO.
1744.] HOSTILITY OF FRANCE. 89
the widespread dissatisfaction there at the manner in which the
interests of Great Britain had, according to the views of many, been
sacrificed to those of Hannover, encouraged France to take up an
active, instead of a merely benevolent attitude, with reference to the
cause of Spain/ France was further encouraged in the same
direction by the growing jealousy with which the Emperor, the
King of Prussia, and their allies, regarded the pretensions of Maria
Theresia, Queen of Hungary, and by the results of the secret
negotiations which were set on foot at Frankfurt-on-Main with the
object of checking the alleged ambitions of that very able princess.
France, therefore, concluded at Fontainebleau an offensive and
defensive family alliance with Spain, each party guaranteeing the
possessions and claims of the other, and agreeing that no peace
should be concluded until the restoration of Gibraltar by Great
Britain. France also despatched reinforcements to the aid of Philip
in Savoy ; directed M. La Bruyere de Court, Lieutenant-General of
the French squadron in Toulon, to co-operate with the Spanish
squadron which, under Don Jose Navarro, had so long lain blockaded
there by Admiral Mathews ; and, early in 1744, sent forth from
Brest Lieutenant-General de Roquefeuil, with nineteen men-of-war,^
to cruise in the Channel.
The objects of France were manifold. She desired, firstly, to
expel Great Britain from the Mediterranean, and then, by sending
her own Mediterranean fleet to join her squadrons in the Channel,
to annihilate British superiority in those waters as well : she hoped,
next, to oblige Great Britain to recall her troops from the Continent,
and to desist from supporting on shore the cause of Maria Theresia :
and, finally, she looked forward to fomenting revolution in England,
and to restoring to the throne the exiled family of Stuart, by means
of an invasion from Dunquerque.
The assumption by France of this actively hostile attitude had
the happy effect of partially calming the violence of party rage in
Great Britain. The command of the Channel Fleet ^ was given to
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Norris, with Vice-Admiral Sir
Charles Hardy (1) (B), and Rear-Admiral William Martin (B), as his
^ The Treaty of Worms, September 1743, leagued together Great Britain, Holland,
Austria, Saxony, and Sardinia. This was met, in October 1743, by the Treaty of
Frankfurt, which banded together France, Prussia, Hessen Cassel, and the Pfalz.
^ These were jn-esently joined by some from Eochefort.
^ This presently included twenty-five ships of 50 guns and upwards, and twenty-
four frigates and small craft.
90 MAJOll OFEBATIONS, 17U-1762. [1744.
immediate subordinates. Korris wished to go in search of M. de
Boqiiefeuil, but, it being feared that the latter might possibly pass
the British fleet at night, or in thick weather, and so get to
Dunquerque, where a French army was awaiting his escort, the
Commander-in-Chief was ordered to proceed with his whole strength
to the Downs. De Roquefeuil was sighted off the Eddy stone on
February 3rd, with, it would appear, sixteen ships of fifty guns and
upwards, and seven frigates and smaller craft. A little later,
believing Norris to have taken refuge in Portsmouth, he detached
five vessels, under M-. de Barrailh, to Dunquerque, and himself
anchored off Dungeness on February 24th.
De Barrailh seems to have passed Norris in the night. The
latter, learning of De Roquefeuil's presence to the westward,
weighed, and, although the wind w^as contrary, worked up towards
him. At that moment the position of the French was extremely
precarious. But, when he was not much more than six miles from
the enemy, Norris was obliged by the tide, which made strongly
against him, to anchor. De Eoquefeuil thereupon got all his anchors
apeak, and, as soon as the tide set in his favour, ordered his ships
to weigh, and make independently for Brest. Many of the captains
were too apprehensive to literally obey the command. Most of them
cut or slipped, in order to lose as little time as possible ; and, a
strong north-westerly gale springing" up, they went off at a great
rate. The gale increased to a storm, and a fog supervened. The
French reached Brest, ship by ship, in a more or less crippled
condition, and Norris, hopeless of being able to overtake them, and
having himself suffered considerably, returned to the Downs, and
thence despatched his three-decked ships to Spithead, where they
could lie in greater safety from the weather.^
In the meantime, the French flotilla before Dunquerque had
experienced the full effects of the storm ; and several transports with
troops and stores on board had foundered, or had been driven ashore.
When news arrived of the flight of de Boquefeuil, de Barrailh also
returned to Brest ; and, there being no longer any prospect of a
successful invasion of the United Kingdom, the rest of the French
troops were disembarked, and the Young Pretender, who had been
with them, returned to Paris. De Eoquefeuil died on board his
flagship, the Siq)erbe, 7G, on March 8th, and was succeeded in the
' Sir John Norris soon afterwards liaulod duivn liis flag for the last time. He was
succeeded in command of the Channel Fleet by Sir John Balclieu.
1744.] CO-OPERATION OF HOLLAND. 91
command by the Chef d'Escadre, later Yice-Admiral, Blouet de
Camilly, who was directed to guard the French coasts and to detach
de Barrailh to cruise off the Scilly Islands. In spite of the nature
of these events, war was not formally declared by France until
March 20th. ^ A counter-declaration was returned by Great Britain
on the 31st ^ of the same month.
The outbreak of formal hostilities enabled the British Government
to request Holland, under the stipulations of the treaty, to supply a
naval force to co-operate with the British fleets. The States-General
had already, in view of war, equipped some ships of forty-four guns
and upwards ; and they presently sent these and others, a few at
a time, to the Downs, under Lieutenant-Admiral Hendrik Grave,^ in
the Haarlem, 74, Vice-Admiral Willem 'T Hooft, in the Dordrecht,
54, Vice-Admiral Cornells Schrijver, in the Damiaten, 64, and
Rear-Admiral Jacob Keijnst, in the Leeuwenlwrst, 54. As the
names and force of the ships are wrongly given in all English
histories, they are here copied from De Jonge : — *
Haarlem, 72, Dordrecht, 54, DamiateJi, 64, Leeuwenliord, 54, Delft, 54, Assen-
delft, 54, Edam, 54, Beekvliet, 54, Oorcum, 4i, Oud Tijlingen, 44, Middelhurg, 44,
Gouderak, 44, Bnderode, 54,^ Tholen, 64,^ Zierikzee, 64,^ Goes, 64,'"^ Kasteel van
MedemUik, 54,^ Bamhorst, 54,^ Prins Friso, 54,^ Vriesland, 64.^
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (1) (R) was sent southward with
a squadron to escort the trade to Lisbon and some storeships to
Gibraltar; Admiral Sir John Balchen and Vice-Admiral William
Martin (B) cruised with a fleet in the Channel ; and Sir John
Balchen subsequently sailed with Martin and Vice-Admiral James
Stewart (B) ^ to release Hardy's convoy, which was reported to have
been blocked up in the Tagus by a French squadron. A small force,
under Commodore Curtis Barnet, was also despatched to the East
Indies ; and Vice-Admiral Thomas Davers proceeded to the West
Indies to relieve Sir Chaloner Ogle. The operations of these officers
will be followed later. First, however, some attention must be
^ By ordinance dated March 15th.
^ By proclamation dated March 29th.
^ Both Beatson, i. 184, and Hervey, iv. 257, for some unexplained reason, call this
officer " Admiral Baccarest, or Baccherest." The contingent was officially styled the
Auxiliary Squadron.
* ' Nederl Zeewezen,' iv. 182.
^ These did not join until late in the year.
^ Stewart, Hardy, and Martin were not promoted to the ranks here given until
June 23rd.
92
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1744.
paid to the work of the Navy in the Mediterranean, where the
earHest fleet action of the war was fought.
Admiral Thomas Mathews,^ being then at Turin,- was informed
on December 30th, 1743, that de Koquefeuil had sailed from Brest.
The intelligence was incorrect, but it induced liini to suspect that
co-operation betw^een the Brest and Toulon squadrons w^as intended.
He therefore sent orders to Minorca that all ships there were to put
to sea at once. A little later, he heard that M. La Bruyere de
Court and Don Jose Navarro purposed to quit Toulon together on
January 20th ; and, hastening to Villa Franca, he embarked to join
Vice-Admiral Lestock, off Hyeres. TTpon arriving there early in
January, 1744, lie lound hinisclf at the head of only twenty sail
of the line, four of which mounted but fifty guns apiece ; but on
the 11th he was reinforced by the Elizahetli, 70, Berwick, 70,
Princesa, 70, and Marlborough, 90 ; on February 3rd, by the
Somerset, 80, Warwick, 60, and Dragon, ()0 ; on February 10th, by
the Boyne, 80, and Chichester, 80, which had been sent out from
England ; and on the 11th, on the very eve of the battle, by the
Bojjal Oak, 70. In the interval, he kept himself admirably informed,
by means of his frigates, of the motions and designs of the enemy.
' He was promoted to be Aihuiral of tlie White by the Gazette of February 18th, 1744.
" Where he had been concerting measures with tlie Sardinian (invcriiinent fdr tlio
defence of the Italian ma'^ts.
1744.] MATHEWS AND THE ALLIES. 93
On February 9th, the combined fleet appeared under sail in the
outer road of Toulon, and there formed a line of battle. Mathews
had already unmoored and shortened in cable, and at 10 a.m. he
weighed, the wind being westerly. Half an hour afterwards, he
formed his line of battle ahead, and then plied to windward between
the islands and the mainland, as if inviting the enemy to bear down
on him. At night, having stationed cruisers to watch the foe, he
SIR WILLIAM ROWLEY, K.B., ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET.
anchored in Hyeres Bay. That evening, when Vice-Admiral
Lestock visited his chief on board the Namur, Mathews seems to
have received him coldly, and to have presently desired him to
return to his own ship.
At dawn on February 10th, the British weighed with a land
breeze ; and at 7 a.m., the wind being from E. or E.S.E.,^ Mathews
' At that time the alhes had, or appeared to have, a westerly wind.
94 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
signalled for his fleet to draw into line of battle ahead with the wind
large, and for Lestock's division to lead with the starboard tacks
on board. Both Vice-Admiral Lestock and Bear-Admiral William
Eiowley repeated the signal, but, as the wind was very light, and
there was a heavy swell from the westward, there was much
difficulty in getting out of the bay in anything like the prescribed
order ; and for some hours many of the ships had to tow with their
boats in order to keep clear of one another. The enemy was seen
at a distance of twelve or fifteen miles to the S.W. At 1 P.M.
Mathews again signalled for the line of battle ahead ; and at 2 p.m.
he hoisted a blue flag at the mizzen-topmast head, and fired a gun.-^
He brought to ; the junior flag-officers repeated the signal ; and the
whole fleet brought to with the larboard tacks on board. The wind
was then so light as to be almost imperceptible, and the swell drove
the ships nearer and nearer to the island of Porquerolles. But at
3 P.M., when there was a nearly easterly breeze, Mathews signalled
for the line of battle abreast,^ and then stretched with his division to
the south-west, Vice-Admiral Lestock stretching to the west, and
Rear-Admiral Rowley making all possible sail with a view to
extending the fleet and forming line of battle. Yet, towards evening,
most of the ships were still out of station ; Rowley's division was
scattered, and was far astern of Mathews's ; and neither Mathews's
nor Lestock's division was in hne. The allies, on the contrary, were
in admirable order, at a distance of between four and five miles,
M. de Court being in the centre, M. Gabaret in the van, and
Don Jose Navarro in the rear.
Soon after nightfall, Mathews signalled to bring to, the most
windwardly ships to do so first and to lie by with their larboard
tacks on board. The fleet accordingly brought to close to the allies,
and, during the night, lay well in sight of them, the wind varying
in the eastern quarter. The Essex, 70, and Winchelsea, 20, were
told off to watch the enemy, and to signal intelligence as to any
movement on his part ; but these ships do not appear to have
observed that, after the moon had set, the allies made sail, and thus
^ "When the fleet is sailing before tlie wind, <and the Admiral wuuld liave them
bring to with the starboard tacks on board, he will hoist a red flag at the flagstaff on
the mizzen-topmast head, and fire a gun ; if to bring to with the larboard tack, a blue
flag at the same place, and fire a gun ; and every ship is to answer with the same
signal." — 'Sailing Instruction,' ix.
^ Hoisting the Union and a pennant at the mizzeu-poak, and firing a gun. —
' Fighting Inst.' ii.
1744.] TEE BATTLE OFF TOULON. 05
increased their distance from the British, who, in the meantime, had
drifted between the enemy and Toulon, and lay with Cape Sicie
about twelve miles to the N.N.W. At dawn, at least nine miles
intervened between the headmost and the sternmost ships of
Mathews's command ; and the various divisions were not in close
order. Neither were the allies as well stationed as M. de Court
must have desired. Not more than six miles, however, represented
the extreme length of their line.
As soon as he realised how far he was from the Admiral, Lestock
on his own responsibility made sail; but when, at 6.30 a.m.,
Mathews ordered the fleet as a whole to do the like, Lestock was
still five miles astern. M. de Court had already signalled for the
line of battle upon a wind ; and the allies at that time, now with
their topsails and now with their foresails set, were stretching in
fairly good order to the southward. The British followed, ])ut, says
Beatson : —
"As the rear division was at so great a distance from the centre, and the van not so
close as it should have been, the Admiral, at 7.30 a.m., made the signal for Rear-
Admiral Rowley and his division to make more sail — which signal the Vice-Admiral
repeated ; and, soon after, the like signal Avas made for the Vice-Admiral and his
division. At 8 a.m. the Admiral made the signal for the fleet to draw into a line of
battle, one ship abreast of the otlier, with a large wind ; and, half an hour after, he
made the signal for the fleet to draw into a line of battle, one ship ahead of another.
These signals were repeated by the junior flags."
Yet it took some time to form the line ; and, in the meanwhile,
M. de Court seemed inclined to avoid a general action, and to
endeavour to draw the British towards the Strait. Mathews divined
his opponent's intention to be either to escape altogether, or to
proceed without fighting until, reinforced by the squadron from
Brest, he should be in a condition to go into battle with superior
forces in his favour. Mathews was, of course, unwilling to allow
either object to be attained ; and it was for that reason that, at
about 11.30 A.M., when, as has been hinted, the order of battle was
still very incompletely formed, the Admiral hoisted the signal to
engage.
The fleets which were about to be opposed one to another were
constituted as follows : — ^
^ 'I'he lists are taken, with slight alterations, from those in Beatson and 8chomberg,
and from the evidence in the courts-martial. It would appear, however, tiuxt some of
the Spanish ships practically formed part of the allied centre.
96
MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1744.
Ships.
c □
o ! -.
Commanders.
Stirling Castle .
W'aricick .
Ayassdu
Barfleur . . .
Princess Caroline
Benvick .
Chichester
Boyne.
Kingston .
Oxford, 50 .
Feversham, 40
Winche'sea, 20
Jhragon
Beit ford . .
Somerset .
Princesa .
Norfollc . .
Namur .
Marlltoroiigh.
/lorsetsliire .
Fssex .
Rupert
Boyal Oak .
Guernsey, 50
Salisburi/, 50
Dursley 'Galli'y,W
Anne Galley f-s^., 8
Sutherland h.s
70 480
60 400
70 480
90 765
80 600
70 480
80 600
80 600
60 400
. . 300
.. 250
.. Il25
Thomas Cooper.
Temple AVest.
James Lloyd.
|Reai--Adm. William Rowley,
■ (R.)
I MeiTiclv de I'Angle.
Heuiy 0.<l)c>rn.
Edward Ilawke.
William hilkes.
Rowland Hiogmore.
John Lovet.
]>ord Han-y Powlett.
John \Vat'kius (2).
William INIavsh.
18
:}'
/ Dunkirk .
Cambridge .
Torhay
Xeptnne .
Bai:seU
Buckingham .
Elizabeth . .
Bevenge .
A'onsuch, 50
Bfimney, 50
Diamond, 40
Mercury f.s.,
60 4011 Charles ^Vage^ Purvis.
80 600 Charles Drummond.
80 600 John Gascoigne.
on T-jn fVice-Adm. K. Lestock, (W.).
■"^ ^^" iGeorge Stepney.
80 600 Robert Long.
70 480 John 'i'owrj-.
70 4S0 .loseph Lingen.
70 4.S0 George Berkeley.
. . 30O • Edmund Strange.
. . 3l)0 \ Henry Godsalve.
. . 250 I James Hodsell.
45 ; M. Peadle, (Com.).
Note. — The Burford, 70, Captain Richard Watkins, and
several vessels not of the line, were absent from the fleet.
60
400
Charles Watson.
70
4M0
Hon. (ieorge Townshend.
80
600
(Jeorge Sclater.
74
550
Robert Rett.
80
600
Hon. John Forbes.
lAdm. Thomas Mathews,
90
780
(John Russel.
90
750
James Cornwall.
80
600
George Burrish.
70
480
Richard Norris.
60
400
.lohn Ambrose.
70
480
Edmund Williams.
300
Samuel Goruish.
300
Peter Osborn.
125
Giles Richard Yanbrugh.
45
— Mackie, (Com.).
100
(■Alexander Lord Colville,
I (Com.).
Ships.
Boree .
Toulouse . .
Due d' Orleans
Jispe'rance
Trident . .
Alcion
Aquilon .
Bote . . .
Atalante. 20
A fireship, 8
Furieux .
Smeux
Ferme .
Tigre . . .
Terrible .
Saint Esprit .
IHamant .
Solide .
Fleur, 20 .
Zephyr, 20.
A fireship, 8
A fireshi]), 8
Oriente .
America .
Neptuno .
Poder .
Constante.
Beal Felipe .
Hercules .
Alcidn- .
Brillante .
San Fernando
Sobiero
Jsabela
^olage, 20 .
A fireship, 8
o
60
64
74
50
74
74
50
64
Commanders.
650 M. de Damaquart
600
800
820
650
500
500
650 M. d'Albeit.
M. d'Orves.
M . Gabaret (Chef d'Esc).
i\L de Caylns.
M. de Vaudreuil.
600 i AL de Gravier.
650
800, M. de Desorqua't.
550 : M. de Sanrius-Murat.
850 Adm. de Court.
800
550 M. de Marrilart.
650 M. de Chiiteauneuf.
60
600
6n
600
60
600
60
600
70
750
114
1350
64
650
58
600
60 600
64 ' 650
60
80
600
900
Don M. de Vilena.
1 )on A. Petru'he.
Don H. Olivares.
Don R. Errutia.
Don. A. Eturiago.
fAdm. Don Jose Navarro.
(.Don N. Geraldine.i
I Ion C. Alvario.
Don J. Rentorin.
Don B. de la Barrida.
Coude de Vega Floriila.
Don J. B. t'astro.
Don I. Dutabil.
1 A French officer, Captain Lage de Cueilli, also
exercised some executive authority on board.
2 Some lists onut this vessel, and substitute for her the
Betiro, .'it.
Captain Mahan's account of this action ^ is far too brief to be
of much value to the student. AVhat he writes should, however,
be here quoted, since it describes in a few words the general
lines upon which the battle, such as it was, was fought. After
mentioning the issue of the allied fleets from the port of Toulon,
he continues : —
"The English fleet, whicli liad been cruising oif Hyeres in observation, chased, and
on the 11th its van and centre came up with the aUies ; but the rear division was then
several miles to windward and astern, quite out of supporting distance. The wind
was easterly, both fleets heading to the southward ; and the English had the weather-
' lull, of Sea Power,' 265.
1744.] THE BATTLE OFF TOULON. 97
gage. The numbers were nearly equal, the English having twenty-nine to the allied
twenty-seven ; ' but this advantage was reversed by the failure of the English rear to
join. The course of the Rear-Admiral has been generally attributed to ill-will towards
Mathews; for, a though he proved that in his separated position he made all sail to
join, he did not attack later on when he could, on the plea that the signal for the line
of battle was flying at the same time as the signal to engage ; meaning that he could
not leave the line to fight without disobeying the order to form line. This technical
excuse was, however, accepted by the subsequent court-martial. Under the actual
condition, Mathews, mortified and harassed by the inaction of his lieutenant, and
fearing that tlie enemy would escape if he delayed longer, made the signal to engage
when his own van was abreast the enemy's centre, and at once bore down himself
out of the line and attacked with his fiagship of ninety guns the largest ship in the
enemy's line, the Royal" Philip of one hundred and ten guns, carrying the flag of the
Spanish admiral. In doing this he was bravely supported by his next ahead and
astern. The moment of attack seems to have been judiciously chosen ; five Spanish
ships had straggled far to the rear, leaving their admiral with the support only of his
next ahead and astern, while three ^ other Spaniards continued on with the French.
The English van stood on, engaging the alhed centre, while the allied van was without
antagonists. Being thus disengaged, the latter was desirous of tacking to windward of
the head of the Englisli line, thus putting it between two fires, but was checked by
the intelligent action of the three leading English captains, who, disregarding the
signal to bear down, kept tlieir commanding position and stopped the enemy's attempts
to double. For this they were cashiered by the court-martial, but afterwards restored.
This circumspect but justifiable regard of signals was imitated without any justifica-
tion by all the English captains of the centre, save the Admiral's seconds already
mentioned, as well as by some of those in the van, who kept vq> a cannonade at long
range while their Commander-in-Chief was closely and even furiously engaged. The
one marked exception was < aptain Hawke, afterwards the distinguished admiral, who
imitated the example of his chief, and, after driving his first antagonist out of action,
quitted his place in the van, brought to close quarters a fine Spanish ship that had
kept at bay five other Englisli ships, and took her — the only prize made that day.
The commander of the English van, with his seconds, also behaved with spirit and
came to close action. It is unnecessary to describe the battle further. . . ."
After having, at 11.30 a.m., hoisted the signaP to engage,
Mathews stood on, but overhauled the enemy only very gradually.
At 1 P.M., the Namur was abreast of the Beal Felipe, and the
Barfleur, of the Terrible. Half-an-hour later, the Namur bore
down within pistol-shot of the Beal Felipe, and began to engage her
furiously, and the Barfleur presently did the same with the Terrible.
Lestock's division was still far astern, and to windward, and,
according to the evidence at the court-martial, could not have then
been up with the centre, unless Mathews had shortened sail and
waited for it.
^ This statement seems to be a little misleading. According to the lists already
given, the British had in line twenty-eight ships, and the allies the same number. But,
in addition, the British had five 50 and two 40-gun ships, for which the allies had no
equivalents. The guns in line on each side were : British, 2080 ; Allies, 1822.
2 Qy. " four."
* This was repeated by Eowley, but not by Lestock, who was at a great distance.
VOL. III. H
98
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2.
[1744.
The Nam It r was well supported by the Marlborough, which
attacked the Isahela,^ and by the Norfolk, which attacked the
Constante. The Princesa, Bedford, Dragon, and Kingston fired into
the Poder, and the Neptuno,'^ America, and Oriente, after exchanging
rather distant broadsides with the same British ships, passed on
with the rear of the JFrench part of the allied fleet. The remaining
Spanish ships were, at
first, considerably astern
of their station, but, as
the breeze freshened, they
came up, and, towards the
end of the action, assisted
the Beal Felipe. Lestock
made some effort to pre-
vent this, but the wind
was still very light with
him, and he was also im-
peded by the swell, so that,
although he had all sail
set, his efforts were vain.
The Barfleur^ got to
close quarters with the
Terrible, and was much
assisted by the Princess
Caroline * and the Ber-
wick. The Chicliester and
Boyne also threw in their
fire, but they were not
close enough to the enemy
to do much execution. As
for the leading ships of the van — the Stirling Castle, Warwick and
Nassau — they did not bear down to the enemy at all, although the
signal for them to do so was flying. They chose to disregard it,
and to keep their wind, in order, as was afterwards explained or
suggested, to prevent the French fi'oni doubling upon the head of
the British column.
' The Isabela, which lost nearly three liundred killed and wounded, had by that
time moved up to the position next astern of the Real Fdipe.
^ The Neptuno lost nearly two hundred killed and wounded.
^ The Burflcur had twenty-live killed, and twenty wounded.
' 'I'lju I'rincess Caroline had eight killed, and twenty wounded.
MATHEWS S ACTIOX OFF TOULON,
FEBKUAKY IITH, 1744.
British, black ; French, irhitf : Spanish, slunh'd.
[Mathews's flagship.the Namiir.is the centre one of tlie
three rearmost British ships that are closely engaged.
Hiiwke's ship, the Beririck, is the rearmost one of the
larger closely engaged group. She has already silenced
the Poder, which lies head to wind astern of hcv.]
1744.]
THE BATTLE OFF TOULON.
99
The hottest part of the action was, in the meantime, being
waged by the ships immediately about Mathews. The Norfolk ^
drove the Constante out of the Hne, a shattered wreck, but was
herself too much damaged to pursue her. The Namiir and Marl-
borough were, at one moment, so close to one another that Mathews,
to avoid being fallen on board of by his eager second, was obliged to
fill his sails, and draw a little ahead. The Namur was then scarcely
ADMIRAL THOMAS MATHEWS.
(From T. Fahi'r''> engmvltuj after the portrait by Arniilphi (1743).)
under control, owing to the rough handling which she had received,
and could give little help to the Marlborough, which, fought by her
captain, and afterwards by his nephew. Lieutenant Frederick
Cornwall, in the most magnificent manner, was very sorely
pressed. None of the vessels immediately astern of her volunteered
to assist her in the least, but, keeping their wind, fired fruitlessly at
an enemy who was beyond the reach of their shot ; and, in spite of
The Norfolk had nine killed, and thirteen wounded.
H 2
100 MAJOR OrEBATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
the fact that the Spaniards betrayed eveTj desire to meet them in
the most handsome manner, few British captains properly took up
the challenge. The most brilliant exception was Captain Edward
ilawke, of the Berivick, who, noticing how the Poder had vainly
endeavoured to draw on some of his reluctant colleagues, quitted his
station, and bore down upon her. His first broadside did her an
immense amount of damage, and, in twenty minutes, when she had
lost all her masts, she was glad to strike.
The Real Felipe ^ was disabled, but the Spanish ships of the rear
were crowding up to her assistance, and Lestock remained afar off,
so that it looked as if the British strength about the Spanish admiral
would not suffice to compel her to haul down her colours. In these
circumstances, Mathews ordered the Anne Galleij, fireship, to go
down and burn the Beal Felipe, and, seeing that the Marlborough'^
was in no condition to help herself, he further signalled for the boats
of the British centre to tow her out of the line.
The Anne Galletj was handled with great ability and gallantry.
As she bore down on the Heal Felipe she was received with a well-
directed fire from such guns as that crippled ship could bring to
bear, and with a more distant cannonade from the Spanish vessels
astern of the flagship. Commander Mackie, match in hand, stood
alone upon the deck of his little craft, ready to fire her at the proper
moment. Most of his crew were alongside in a boat, which was
waiting to take him on board. The rest, by his orders, had taken
shelter from the storm of shot that hurtled across the fireship. But
the Anne Galley, struck repeatedly between wind and water, was
already sinking. Moreover, a Spanish launch, crowded with men,
was approaching to board her, and tow her clear. Mackie felt that,
at all hazards, he must endeavour to destroy the launch, and, in
spite of the fact that his decks were littered with loose powder, that
his hatches and scuttles were open, and that his funnels^ were
uncapped, he fired his waist guns at the boat. This was fatal.
The blast from the guns set fire to the loose powder ; and, while the
Anne Galley was still too far from the Beal Felipe to seriously
damage her, she prematurely blew up, and then sank, carrying down
' The Real Felipe had about five hundred men killed and wounded.
^ The Mnrlhorougli lost Captain Cornwall, and forty-two men killed and one
hundred and twenty wounded.
^ Funnels : in a fireship, tubes leading fruni the deck to the main body of explosives
in the hold.
1744.] THE BATTLE OFF TOULON. 101
Commander Mackie, a lieutenant, a mate, a gmmer, and two
quartermasters.
In the meantime, M. de Court, who, owing to the confusion and
smoke, seems to have supposed that the Spaniards were much more
closely pressed than was actually the case, tacked to their assistance.
Bear- Admiral Eowley tacked too, and followed the allied centre.
Very soon afterwards, Mathews, to quote the words of Beatson —
" hauled down the signal to engage the enemy, and also the signal for the line of
battle ; making the signal to give over chase ; but, at half-past five o'clock, he made
the signal for the fleet to draw into a line < f battle ahead. There was then but little
wind, and so great a swell that the ships could only wear. The Admiral wore, and
formed the line of battle on the larboard tack. This last manoeuvre of the Admiral's
appears to have been made with a design to collect his fleet, draw them out of the
confusion they were in, and arrange them in a proper order for battle, which he had
every reason to think would be speed. ly renewed ; the French squadron being now at
hand, and in an extremely well-formed line. They crowded, however, to the assistance
of the Spaniards. The Poder, prize, being dismasted, and being vmable to follow the
British fleet when they wore, was retaken by the French squadron, she having on
board a lieutenant and twenty-three men belonging to the Berwick. The Dorsetshire,
Essex, Eupert, and Royal Oak, wearing at the tinie the Admiral did, brought them
nearer to the sternmost ships of the Spanish squadron, which had by this time joined
their admiral in a close line. In passing each other, being on contrary tacks, a short
action took place, in which the Namur, Dunkik, and Cnnhri'lge joined, but with
little execution on either side. Daylight was almost gone, and the British fleet passed
on, leaving the confederate fleet astern."
Owing to the condition of the Namur s ^ masts, Mathews, at
about 8 P.M., shifted his flag from her to the Bussell, and intimated
the fact of the change to Lestock and Rowley. On the morning of
the 12th, when the wind was E.N.E., the enemy was seen about
twelve miles to the S.W. At about 7 a.m., the Sonierset, which
had become separated from her consorts, in the night, fell in with,
and for half-an-hour engaged, the Herc/des, which had likewise
straggled from her friends ; but, the Hercules being assisted by some
French ships, the So?nerset had to draw off and rejoin her division.
At 9 A.M. Lestock ordered his squadron to chase to the S.W., and
crowded sail ahead of the fleet. At 11 p.m., Mathews signalled for
the fleet to draw into line of battle abreast, and then brought to on
the starboard tack in order to collect his command. In the after-
noon, the British fleet, in admirable order, was going down on the
enemy, which was retreating in some confusion before the wind, the
Spaniards being ahead of, and to leeward of the French, and the
^ The Namur had eight killed and twelve wounded. Among the latter was
Captain Russel, who lost his left ami, and who subsequently died at Port Mahou.
102 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
Beal Felipe still bearing Navarro's flag, although she was in tow of
another vessel. As for the Poder, she fell so far astern that the
enemy fired her to prevent her from again falling into British hands ;
and, in the course of the following night, she blew up. But, in the
meantime, Mathews, at about 5.30 p.m. on the 12th, had ordered his
fleet to bring to, there being no more than a light wind from the
N.E., and by 10 p.m. that night the enemy was out of sight.
On the 13th, Mathews again chased to the W. and W.S.W. ; but
at 9 A.M. he ordered the pursuit to be relinquished, his reasons, as
afterwards explained, being, that he saw no prospect of bringing the
allies to action ; that, if he had continued to follow them, he would
have been drawn towards the Strait's mouth, and would have left
Italy entirely unprotected ; and that, as his instructions were
stringent as to the protection of Italy, he was unwilling to risk
leaving the way clear for the transport thither of a large number of
troops which he had reason to Ijelieve had been collected for that
purpose in the ports of Spain. Yet it was unfortunate that the
Admiral did not persist. Had he pressed the chase, he must
inevitably either have picked up several of the crippled ships ^ of the
allies, or have obliged de Court and Navarro to accept action on
disadvantageous terms in order to cover their lame ducks.
After having relinquished the chase, Mathews tried to beat back
in the face of strong contrary winds, but failed ; so, first showing
himself in Rosas Bay, with a view to letting the Spaniards know
that he was observing their motions, he ran for Port Mahon. Upon
reaching that harbour, he suspended Vice-Admiral Lestock, and sent
him to England.
Both in France and Spain, as well as in Great Britain, there
was great disgust at the result of the battle off Toulon. In France,
Admiral de Court, in consequence of Navarro's representations, was
superseded. De Court in a letter to the Bishop of Eennes, who
was then Ambassador from France to the Court of Madrid, said,
" It was not I, my lord, who forced M. Navarro to fight against all
laws of war and prudence ; it was not I who separated his ships
from him and drove him into danger; but when he had taken so
much pains, after all I could do, to get himself beaten, it was I who
came to his assistance and gave him the opportunity to get away,
which otherwise he never could have had." De Court was at the
time an oflicer of nearly eighty years of age.
' Four, at least, and jirobably more, were seriously disabled aluft.
1745.] THE COURTS-MARTIAL. 103
In Great Britain, Lestock's unwillingness to sit quietly under
his suspension led to a succession of courts-martial. These were
preceded by an enquiry by the House of Commons, which began on
March 12th, 174.5, and lasted until the middle of April. The King
was then addressed to order a court-martial into the conduct of
Admiral Mathews, Vice-Adiniral Lestock, the captains of a number
of ships, which had been engaged in the battle off Toulon, and the
lieutenants of the Dorsetshire. In his reply his Majesty said,
"I am sensible how much depends on preserving an exact
discipline in the fleet, and of the necessity there is of bringing
to justice such as have failed in their duty on this important
occasion." In the meantime, Mathews, in pursuance of orders
from England, had resigned his command and returned home,
leaving the fleet under the orders of Vice- Admiral William Eowley.
The court-martial first assembled on board the London at
Chatham on September '2Srd, 1745, under the presidency of Sir
Chaloner Ogle (1), Kt., Admiral of the Blue. The officers brought
before it were the lieutenants of the Dorsetshire, who were charged
with having advised their Captain, Burrish, not to bear down upon
the enemy. They were all acquitted. On September 25th Burrish's
trial began, and sentence was delivered on October 9th. The court
declared, " That by reason of Captain Burrish lying inactive for
half-an-hour when he might have assisted the Marlborough , and
not being in line with the Admiral when he first brought to, he is
guilty of a part of the charge exhibited against him, as he did not
do his utmost to burn, sink, or destroy the enemy, nor give the
proper assistance to the Marlborough till after the message he
received from the Admiral : that he is guilty on the 12th and
1.3th Articles of the Fighting Instructions, and that therefore the
court adjudge him to be cashiered and forever rendered incapable
of being an officer in his Majesty's Navy." Captain Edmund
Williams, of the Boyal Oak, was next tried on four charges. The
court found that Captain Williams had failed in his duty by not
being in line with the Admiral, and by keeping to the windward of
the line during the greater part of the action, and not within proper
distance to engage with any effect during the most part of the time
he was engaged : but, in regard of his long service and his eyesight
being very defective and other favourable considerations, the court
was unanimously of the opinion that all this greatly weighed in
mitigation of the punishment due, and therefore only adjudged
]04 MAJOB OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1745.
him untit to be eiuployed any more at sea, but recommended him
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to be continued
on half-pay according to his seniority. This recommendation their
Lordships complied with.^
Captain John Ambrose, of the Bupert, was tried on October 18th.
In his case the court found that he had failed in his duty in not
engaging closer while he was engaged, when he had it in his power :
but in regard that both before and since the action he had borne
the character of a vigilant officer, and that his failure in action
seemed to have resulted from mistaken judgment, the court only
sentenced him to be cashiered during His Majesty's pleasure, and
mulcted of one year's pay for the use of the Chest at Chatham. He
was presently restored to his rank, and was in 1750 superannuated
as a rear-admiral, dying in 1771. Captain William Dilkes, of the
Chichester, had to answer the charge of not bearing down and
engaging the enemy closer when' he had it in his power so to do.
The 'court found the charge proven, and dismissed him from the
command of his ship, but he also was afterwards restored to his
rank, though relegated to the half-pay list.^ Captain Frogmore, of
the Boyne, who was to have been tried with these officers, had died
on November 8th, 1744, while still abroad.
At a rather earlier date, Captain Norris, of the Essex, who had
been accused by his own officers of bad behaviour during the battle,
had demanded and obtained a court-martial at Port Mahon, but, as
he had previously resigned his command and was on half-pay, the
court, after much debate, considered that it had no jurisdiction.
The account of the proceedings, and a strongly-w^orded protest from
the accusing officers, having been sent to England, the Admiralty
ordered Norris to come home to stand his trial ; but on his way he
seized the opportunity to abscond at Gibraltar, thus, it must be
feared, admitting his guilt. He died in deserved obscurity.
Vice-Admiral Lestock had brought charges of his own against
Captains Robert Pett, George Sclater,^ Temple West, Thomas
Cooper, and James Lloyd. In consequence of his complaints of
their misconduct, these five captains were tried in due course. The
first two were acquitted, the last three cashiered ; Init as the
offences of which the latter had been convicted did not reflect
^ Edinuud Williiinis, wlio was a captain of 17.'>4, subsequcnily became a super-
annuated rc;u-adiiiiral, and di< d in 1752.
^ Captain Dilkes died in 1750. ^ Or Slaughter.
1745.] LESTOCK ACQUITTED. 105
upon their professional honour or capacity, and as their case was
considered a hard one, the King at once restored them to their
former rank in the service. After an adjournment of the court,
the trial of Yice-Admiral Lestock himself began at Deptford on
board the Prince of Orange, and, Sir Chaloner Ogle being in ill-
health, Eear-Admiral Perry Mayne officiated as president. The
other fiag-officer in attendance was Bear-Admiral the Hon. John
Byng, who, a few j'ears later, was shot for his behaviour in the
action off Minorca. Lestock urged in his defence that he could
not have engaged without breaking the line, and that he was not
authorised to do this because, though the signal for engaging had
been made, that for the line-of-battle was still flying. He was
unanimously acquitted. The truth is, that he took shelter through-
out behind purely technical excuses, which availed him, although he
had acted in opposition to the spirit of his earlier coiTespondence
with Barnet, that a subordinate should go to the length of quitting
his station, even without orders, for the sake of joining and
supporting the main body of the fleet in action. In short, for
reasons of his own — and they are not hard to formulate — he chose
to forget his broad duty to his country, and his comrades in arms,
rather than depart from the narrow letter of his instructions.
During Lestock's trial a very remarkable occurrence happened.
On May 15th the president of the court was arrested by virtue of
a writ of capias, issued by Sir John Willes, Lord Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas, in consequence of a verdict which had been
obtained by Lieutenant George Frye, of the Marines, against
Sir Chaloner Ogle, Bear-Admiral Perry Mayne and others, for
false imprisonment and maltreatment in the West Indies, resulting
from an illegal sentence passed upon him by a court-martial.
The arrest of their president so incensed the members of the
court that, oblivious of the fact that the civil law must always
of necessity take precedence of the military, they passed resolutions
in which they spoke of the Lord Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas with violent disrespect. These resolutions they forwarded
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, who laid them before
the King. His Majesty was somewhat hastily advised to express
his displeasure at the insult which had been offered to the court-
martial ; but he, like the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralt}',
had little idea of the great authority vested in the Lord Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas, who, as soon as he heard of the
106 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
resolutions of the court-martial, promptly ordered each member
of it to be taken into custody. He was beginning to adopt further
measures to vindicate his office, when the episode was happily put
an end to by the submission of the offending officers.
The trial of Admiral Mathews began on June 16th, 1746, Rear-
Admiral Perry Mayne, as before, being president, and Rear-Admiral
the Hon. John Byng being of the court. Lestock exhibited fifteen
charges against his superior. Once more the advocates of a broader
interpretation of the instructions were defeated by the advocates
of the strict letter. It is perhaps well that in those days it was so,
for, for several years previously, naval discipline had been none too
good. Mathews, whose anxiety to do his best against the enemies
of his country cannot be denied, though his wisdom may be, heard
his fate on October 22nd, when the following sentence was passed
upon him : —
" The court having examined the Avitnesses produced, as well in support of the
charge as iu behalf of the prisoner, and having thoroughly considered their evidence,
do unanimously resolve that it appears thereby that Thomas Mathews Esq., by divers
breaches of duty, was a principal cause of the miscarriage of his Majesty's fleet in the
Mediterranean in the month of February 17-1:4:, and that he falls under the 14th Article
of an Act of the 13th of Charles II., for establishing articles and orders for the better
government of his Majesty's Navy, ships of war and forces by sea : and the court do
imaniiiiously think fit to adjudge the said Thomas Mathews to be cashiered and
rendered incapable of any emphiy in his Majesty's service."
There is no question that, from a purely legal point of view,
Mathews deserved his punishment, but it is equally undoubted that
Lestock's conduct throughout was really far more reprehensible
than that of the superior officer. Mathews blundered, but his
intentions were good. Lestock clung tightly to the dead letter of
his duty ; but his intentions were contemptible, for, in effect, he said
to himself, " My superior is making a mess of this affair. I will
stick fast to my instructions and let him, and even the fleet and
country, go to ruin before I will strike a blow to help him. I shall
then be safe, and he, whom I happen to regard as my private enemy,
will pay the penalty." ^
' Tiio minutes of these courts-martial are enoruiously voluuiinous, and llie
pamphlets called forth by the action off Toulon are extremely numerous. See
especially: 'A Partic. Account of the late Action . . . by an officer in the Fleet,' 8vo,
1744; 'Captain Gascoigne's Answer,' etc., 8vo, 1746; 'Admiral Mathews's IJemarks
on the Evidence,' etc. ; 'Defence made by J. Aiubrose,' etc., 8vo, 1745; 'Case of
Captain G. Burrish,' etc., 8vo, 1747; *A Narrative of the Proceedings of H.M. Fleet,'
etc., 8vo, 1745 ; ' Vice-Admiral L — st — k's Account,' etc., 1745 ; ' Vice-Admiral
Lestock's Recapitulation,' etc., 1745.
1744.] BALCHEN'S LAST SERVICE. 107
Mathews, after the fight off Toulon, had refitted at Port Mahon,
and had then detached Captain Eobert Long, with a small division,
to cruise off the Italian coast and to intercept supplies for the
Spanish army there. Mathews himself put to sea as soon as
possible, and on June 14th, 1744, drove ashore and destroyed a
number of French transports near Marseilles. In fact he and his
cruisers were very active until his return to England in September.
His successor, Vice- Admiral William Bowley, had many objects
which he was compelled to keep in view. He had to guard Italy
from the French and Spaniards, coming by way of the sea ; he had
to observe a French squadron from Brest, which lay at Cadiz ; he
had to watch a French fleet at Toulon ; he had to keep his eye on the
Spanish squadron at Cartagena ; above all, he had to protect British
trade. At that time Admiral de Torres was expected in Spain with
a valuable convoy of treasure ships from Havana ; and on the other
hand, as has been mentioned, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (1) had
gone southward with a convoy bound for Lisbon and Gibraltar.
The French and Spaniards, anxious to facilitate the safe arrival
of de Torres, and, if possible, to intercept Hardy, arranged that the
Toulon squadron should put to sea, and join with the Spanish at
Cartagena, and with the French at Cadiz. Admiral Gabaret,
therefore, left Toulon on September 20th with sixteen sail of the
line and four frigates. Eowley, who was then at Minorca, with
only a part of his forces, did not hear of this till October 7th. He
at once put to sea in chase ; and, as soon as he realised that the
enemy's plan involved an attempt upon a division of Hardy's convoy,
which had reached Gibraltar, Rowley made for Spain. Although
he ultimately found the merchantmen safely under the Eock, he
thereby managed to miss the enemy.
Hardy had sailed in April 1744, and, having sent his main convoy
into the Tagus, whence it was to proceed by divisions to points
further south, he returned, and re-anchored at St. Helen's on
May 20th. But scarcely had he quitted Lisbon when the transports
and store-ships, which he had left there, were blockaded in the
river by the French squadron, under M. de Eochambeau, from
Brest. As the stores were much needed by the Mediterranean fleet,
Admiral Sir John Balchen, with his flag in the Victory, and with
a considerable force, was detached from the Channel to relieve the
blockade. He sailed on July 28th, made several prizes, compelled
de Eochambeau to return to Cadiz, and then escorted to Gibraltar
108 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
that part of the convoy which was suhsequeiitly found there by
Rowley.
Balchen returned ; but on October 8rd his command was over-
taken by a violent storm and was dispersed. Several ships were
much damaged and were at times in great danger ; but all of them,
except the Victory, safely reached Plymouth on October 10th.
The Victory, which was at that time considered the finest ship in
the world, had become separated from her consorts on October 4th,
and was never again seen. It is supposed that she struck on the
ridge of rocks called the Caskets, near the island of Alderney, seeing
that on the night between the 4th and 5th of October the booming
of guns was heard, both by the people in charge of the Casket Light
and by the inhabitants of Alderney. The wind, however, was so
strong that no boat could venture in the direction whence the
sounds proceeded. The Victory's crew, including her Admiral,^ her
Captain, Samuel Faulknor,^ her officers, and about fifty young
gentlemen volunteers, amounted to upwards of one thousand souls,
all of whom perished. The loss of the ship was at that time
imputed to some defects in her construction, but it is probable that
this really had nothing to do with it, and that the disaster must
be attributed solely to the storm and thick weather which prevailed
at the time.
Owing to the situation of affairs with France, a small squadron
of four ships, under Commodore Curtis Barnet, sent at the request
of the directors of the East India Company to the East Indies, had
sailed on May 5th, 1744, from Spithead. In January following,
after having taken measures to intercept home-coming French ships
from China, and after having disguised his own vessel, the Deptford,
60, Captain John Phillipson, and the Preston, 50, Captain the Earl
of Northesk (1), Barnet was so fortunate as to take in the Strait of
Banca the French Indiamen Daupliin, Hercule, and Jason, each of
30 guns.
The Commodore had not long left England when the successful
return of Commodore Anson suggested to the British Ministry that
it might be easy to capture the next treasure-ships bound from
Acapulco to Manilla ; and a despatch to that effect was sent to
Barnet by the Licely, 20, Captain ]i^lliot Elliot. But the activity
' Sir .IdIiii Bulchen was then in his seventy-sixth year.
2 A captain of 1730, and a member of one of the most distinguished of British
naval families.
1744.] THE FRENCH IN NORTH AMERICA. 109
and threatening attitude of the French in India prevented the
scheme from being carried out ; and, after his squadron had taken
a few other French ships, Barnet went to Madras and confined
himself mainly to observing and harassing the enemy in the Bay
of Bengal.
Vice-Admiral Thomas Davers was sent with reinforcements to
Jamaica to relieve Sir Chaloner Ogle in 1744 ; but the French and
Spaniards were so strong on that station, and so many battleships
were carried home with him by Ogle, that Davers had to restrict
himself to the defensive. His cruisers, however, made several prizes
and the French failed in their only important enterprise, an attack
on Anguilla.
The war which broke out in 1744 was destined to have an
important influence on the fate of the British and French empires
in North America. At first the French there were very active, and
the British were extremely indifferent to their own interests. In
consequence of this, the French territories, which had been handed
over to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht, were neglected and
were badly affected to the new government. They were, indeed, full
of active French sympathisers. The natural outcome was a scheme,
hatched by the French, to take advantage of the dissatisfaction,
and to deprive Great Britain of part at least of her new possessions.
M. de Quenel, who was then- Governor of Cape Breton, fitted out
a small armament from Louisbourg and put it under the command
of Captain Duvivier. The native Indians gave, or at least promised
to give him some assistance. The armament made first for Canso,
where the French arrived on May 11th. They were joined by
two hundred Indians, and by many disaffected inhabitants. The
place was held by a company of the 40th Regiment, but, as it was
indefensible, it presently surrendered. The French demolished
such fortifications as existed, and set the place on fire. M. Duvivier,
who, in the meantime, had been reinforced by five hundred Indians,
proceeded with all his forces to Annapolis Royal. This important
position, like Canso, was in a very neglected state; but it was saved
by the activity and patriotism of the New Englanders.
Governor Shirley and the Assembly of Massachusetts, well
knowing the consequence of Nova Scotia to Great Britain, en-
couraged the raising in New England of a body of volunteers,
which, promptly dispatched to Annapolis, arrived before the French
made their appearance. When, therefore, M. Duvivier, who landed
110 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
on June •Jiul, summoned the town, he was informed that it would
be defended to the last extremity ; and, although he made some
preparations for an assault, the strength of the defenders so deeply
impressed him that he finally returned to Louisbourg without
attempting anything further.
This activity of the French suggested to the Governor and
Assembly of New England a project for the conquest of Louisbourg,
which was then the chief French base in North America. A re-
quest was made to the home Government to the effect that, as the
necessary naval forces could be sent more quickly from the West
Indies than from England, Commodore Peter Warren might be
detached from the former station to co-operate with a colonial
expedition. To this the Government agreed, and orders were issued
accordingly. The Assembly of Massachusetts raised .;i27,0()0 for the
service. Troops were collected and confided to the command of
Mr. William Pepperel, of Kittery, Maine ; and, though no fewer
than 8Ho{) volunteers were assembled and sufficient transports and
stores for their accommodation were provided, all was done with so
great secrecy that the enemy. seems to have suspected nothing. But
as this expedition did not sail till 1745, the history of its proceedings
must be for the present deferred.
While Great Britain was fully occupied with her foreign foes she
had to contend with not less dangerous enemies at home, for France
in 1745, at a time when the greater part of the British army was on
the Continent, engaged in supporting the schemes of the House of
Austria, suddenly transported the Young Pretender to Scotland.
France did not believe that Prince Charles Edward would be
successful, nor did she ever mean to assist him very actively ; but
she realised that he might cause a most useful diversion. With a
slender retinue the Prince embarked at 8t. Nazaire on board a small
vessel, the Dentelle, which was lent him by a Mr. Walsh, who was
a merchant of Nantes but was of Irish extraction. He had arms for
about '2000 men and al)out l'i2()00 in money, and he sailed on
July 7th. Wlien off Belle Isle he was joined by the Elisabeth, 64,
which had orders to escort Prince Charles Edward round Ireland to
the Hebrides. On July <)th. in lat. 47° 57' N., the httle expedition
was discovered by the Lion, 5H, Captain Piercy Brett (1), which
immediately gave chase. At 5 o'clock the Lion ran alongside and
poured a broadside into the Elizabeth at short range. The two vessels
continued warmly engaged until 10 o'clock, when the Lion had
1745.] FRANCE AND THE YOUNG PRETENDER. Ill
suffered so severely in her rigging that she was incapable of making
sail. The Elisahetli, on the contrary, had suffered chiefly in her
hull; and, although it is reported that several of her gun-ports were
knocked into one, she was able to get away. The smaller vessel at
the beginning of the action had endeavoured to assist her consort,
but had soon been beaten off by the Lion's stern-chasers; and,
when she saw that the Elisabeth had failed of success, she crowded
sail and made her escape. The Lioti, whose complement was 440
men, lost 55 killed and 107 wounded, of whom seven ultimately
died. The French lost 65 killed and 136 dangerously wounded.
Prince Charles pursued his voyage and reached the coast of
Lochaber at the end of July. The Young Pretender, on landing,
was dissuaded by his best friends from pursuing his adventure ; but
he persisted, and they then gave way and joined him. For a time
he had some success, but he was too fond of pleasure to act with the
necessary energy, and presently the British Government began to
recover from its first amazement. A regular plan of defence was
elaborated. Admiral Edward Vernon (1),^ with a squadron, was sent
^ It should here be ineutioned that Vernon's ultimate disgrace arose out of this
appointment of his to the command in the Downs. He had with him but very few
ships, and in a letter of November 16th, 1745, to the Earl of Sandwich, he said : " It
must liave made an odd appearance in the Eye of tlie World to have seen two Flag-
Officei-s lye so long in the Downs with but one forty-gun ship to form a line of battle
with." This paucity of command, combined with the fact that he had no commission
as a ('Ommander-in-Chief, was the origin of his discontent. He was also irritated by
the conduct of the Admiralty which, in the same letter, he stigmatises in rather strong
language. Things came to a head when, on December 1st, Vernon wrote to the
Admiralty: "I have read, with great surprise, the long paragraph in your letter
informing me their Lordships don't approve of my having ai^pointed a Gunner to the
Pooh when the necessity of the Service required it, and his Matie's Service must have
suffered for the want of it ; and acquainting me, it is their Lordships' directions I
should withdraw the Warrants that I gave to them for his Majesty's Service. I niust
say with concern, in answer to it, that I did not expect to have been treated in such a
contemptuous manner, and that 1 can hardly conceive it to bo their directions till I sec
it from luider their hands in an Order for mo to do it, and shall now entreat the favour
of their Lordships that, if they think it deserves an Order, they will please to direct it
to my Successor to put in Execution, as I must, in such case, intreat the favour of
their Lordships to procure me His Majesty's leave to quit a Command I have long
thought too contemptibly treated in regard to the rank I hold for His Majesty's honour
and service, and I should rather chuse to serve His Majesty in the capacity of a private
man in the Militia, than to permit the rank I hold in His Majesty's Service to be treated
with contempt, which I conceive to be neither for our Koyal Master's honour or Service.
A private Captain ovei- two ships on any foreign service exercises the power of filling up
all vacancies under him, and it is for his Matie's Service he should be empowered to do so.
When I attended the Piegency, I was spoke to as a person of confidence that was to have
had the Chiel' Command at home. Their Lordships' Orders of the 7tli August seem'd to
design me for such, tho' that was speedily altered by those of the 14th, and I always
U'J. MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714:-1702. [1745.
to the Downs to watch the motions of the French at Dunquerque
and Calais, and he from time to time detached squadrons under the
command of Commodores Thomas Smith and Charles Knowles,
who intercepted many small vessels destined for the rebels. At the
suspected there was something lurking under the avoiding to call me Commander-in-
Chief anywliere, but only Admiral of the White, tho', at the same time, Letters had
passed thro' my hands, directed to Vice- Admiral Martin (whom, by my tirst orders, I
was to take under my Command), stiling him Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's
Ships in the Soundings. But your letter, Sir, has now explained the whole to me."
The controversy led the Admiralty to quote what it believed to be a precedent for its
action, whereupon, in a letter of December 6th, Vernon wrote : " I am now come to the
last part of your letter in answer to mine of the first, and was pleased to tind you had
quoted the precedent of Sir John Ncrris's case in the year 1740. Sir John Norris
thought it right to appoint two officers on a vacancy that happened under his command,
and, 1 dare answer for him, would not have thought it right ; but, as he judged it for
his Majesty's Service, and that Ins predecessors had done it before him, and I don't
think anyone will say that Lord Orford, Sir George Eooke, Sir Clowdisley Shovell, Lord
Aylmer, Lord Berkeley, Lord Torrington, and Sir Charles "Wager, have not done the
same. Sir John Norris thought it so much a right in him, that, when a pirson was
sent down by the Board to supersede a warrant granted by him, he sent the person
back with his warrant, and he was not received while he commanded, but when the
service was over, and he returned to town, their Lordships superseded liim, so that his
acquiescence was necessity, not approbation. And I hope the haughty temper of the
noble Lord that presided at the Board at that time, will not be thought a fit precedent
to be followed by their Lordships." Again, on December 13th : " As to what I am so
politely acquainted with, that their Lordships have appointed a gunner to the Poole
after my having informed their Lordships that I had warranted the gunner of the
Sheerness to that ship, I must acquaint you in answer — it was what I little expected —
and that I am determined to follow the example of Sir John Norris, and not permit that
indignity to be put on me while I remain in command here, but when he arrives, shall
civilly send him back again. That officer that don't pique himself on supporting his
own honour, and the dignity of the commission he holds under his Majesty, may not
be the likeliest to defend the honour of his Prince and the Security of his Country
against the face of his enemies, and I will, therefore, iiever take the fatal step of
abandoning my own honour." And on December 14th : " A private Colonel in the
Army, who has no command but his regiment, shall be allowed to fill up most of the
vacancies for ensigns in his regiment, and the poor slighted admiral bearing his
Majesty's flag at main-topmast head, and in actual command, shall be denied the
filling up the low vacancy of a gunner ! " The only result of this condition of things
was Vernon's super.session, on December 26th. He was succeeded by Vice-Adm. Wm.
Martin (1). Immediately after his supersession, he engaged in controversial pamphlet-
eering, and, according to general belief, was responsible for two somewhat plain-spoken
pamphlets, respectively entitled, ' A Specimen of Naked Truth from a British Sailor,'
and 'Some Sensible Advice from a Common Sailor, to whom it might have Concerned,
for the Service of the Crown and Country.' He was summoned to the Admiralty to
deny the authorship of these productions, but as he did not choose to do so, he was
informed, on April 11th, 1746, that the King had been pleased to direct their Lordships
to strike his name from the list of flag-oflicers. Thus ended the service career of a
great and honourable officer, who owed his fall to his 2:)etulance and pugnacity. — Letter-
book in Author's Coll.; the pamphlets above mentioned; and 'Original Letters to an
Honest Sailor ' (published by Vernon after his dismissal from the service).
1745.] ESCAPE OF THE YOUNG PBETENDER. 113
Nore Captain the Hon. Edward Boscawen commanded : at Ply-
mouth, Captain Savage Mostyn. A further squadron cruised in the
Channel under Vice- Admiral William Martin (1) ; and Eear-Admiral
the Hon. John Byng went northward, and, by means of his cruisers,
greatly annoyed the rebels on the Scots coast.
The Young Pretender reached Derby, but then lost heart and
retreated to await reinforcements. In Scotland for a time he won
more successes, but the assured British command of the sea really
made his enterprise almost hopeless from the first ; for even his
private sympathisers in France could not aid him with supplies,
such vessels as they dispatched being almost invariably snapped up
by British cruisers. Yet individual loyalty, after the disaster at
Culloden, saved the Prince from capture, in spite of the fact that
the Government had set a price of .£30,000 upon his head. He
reached the Hebrides, and, after suffering great distresses, was taken
on board a French privateer, the Bellone, on September 20th, 1746.
This vessel had been sent on purpose from St. Malo by some of his
French friends. She reached Eoscoff, a small port in Brittany, on
September 29th, not, however, without having very narrowly
escaped capture by a British cruiser in the Channel. It is worth
mentioning that she was at least the third vessel which had been
sent to Scotland to rescue him. Two large French privateers, one
of 34 and the other of 32 guns, had anchored off the coast of
Lochaber in the previous April, with the object of picking up
fugitives from the rebel army. They had been there discovered by
Captain Thomas Noel of the Greyhound, 20 ; but, though he had
been joined by the Baltimore and Terror sloops, and had then
attacked them, they had succeeded in beating him off and in
carrying away several of the rebel chiefs.
The expedition against Louisbourg assembled at Boston, Massa-
chusetts, and the troops were there embarked, with all the necessary
stores, on board eighty transports. It was convoyed by eight
privateers of twenty guns, and ten small vessels ; and it sailed on
March 20th, 1745, arriving at Canso on April 4th. This was
immediately after it had become known in New England that
Commodore Warren had received orders to co-operate in the under-
taking. The expedition reached Canso before the Commodore,
and Mr. Pepperel wisely employed his time in exercising and
drilling his troops. Meanwhile Mr. John Rous, master of the
Shirley Galley, the largest of the privateers, proceeded off the
VOL. III. I
114
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17C2.
[1745.
harbour of Louisbourg to intercept supplies intended for the place.
That he did so was fortunate, for the French Government, hearing
of the projected attack, had hastily despatched the Benommee, 32,
one of its fastest frigates, commanded by the celebrated Kersaint, ^
with dispatches for Louisbourg. On April 18th, she sighted Eous's
blockading squadron, which very pluckily attacked her and forced
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR PETER WARREN, K.B.
{Front a lithograpU by Ridley i7i the 'Naval Chronicle! 1804.)
her to fly, greatly disabled. In her flight she encountered some
transports, which, escorted by a privateer, were on their way to join
Pepperel. These she attacked, Init the privateer defended them so
well that once more she made sail and got away. The Benommee
had finally to return to France without having effected her purpose.
Commodore Warren's squadron from the West Indies reached
' A biographical note concerning this gallant officer will be foimd on jip. 219, 220 of
tiie present volume.
1745.] CAPTURE OF LOUISBOURG. 115
Canso on April 2'2nd and 23rd, and consisted of His Majesty's ships
Superb, 60, Captain Thomas Somers, bearing the Commodore's broad
pennant ; Eltham, 40, Captain Phihp Dm'ell (1) ; Launceston, 40,
Captain Warwick Cahnady ; and Mermaid, 40, Captain James
Douglas (1). In the com'se of the subsequent operations, it was
joined by several other vessels. Warren lost no time in landing
and in conferring with Mr. Pepperel. Returning on board, he sailed
again, and effectually blockaded the harbour of Louisbourg. The
troops at Canso were re-embarked on April 29th, conveyed to Gabarus
Bay, near Louisbourg, and landed on the morning of the 30th. The
French garrison was discontented and mutinous, and its officers
were tyrannical and corrupt, so that M. de Chambon, the Governor,
feared to attack the invaders after they had inflicted one small check
upon him. Thus, the expedition had leisure to establish itself
ashore and to rapidly become disciplined and formidable. In the
meantime, the Benommee had returned to France with the news
of what was going on, whereupon the French Government hastily
despatched the Vigilante, 64, with stores for the threatened fortress.
She was, however, intercepted and captured by Warren's squadron
on May 19th. A general attack by land and sea upon Louisbourg
was imminent, when on June 28th the place surrendered. The
British lost during the operations only 101 killed, while the French
loss was 300.
With Louisbourg fell the whole of Cape Breton. The conquest
was of immense importance. It not only destroyed a nest of French
privateers, but it also relieved the British fishermen on the banks
of Newfoundland from much dangerous rivalry. Moreover, it had
a great moral effect upon the Indians throughout North America.
Those who had taken part in it were fittingly and liberally rewarded.
Warren was promoted to be Eear-Admiral of the Blue, Governor
Shirley, of Massachusetts, was made a colonel, and Mr. William
Pepperel, besides also being made a colonel, was created a baronet of
Great Britain. Nor were the sailors neglected. The Shirley Galley
was purchased by the Government, and added to the Navy as a
post ship ; and her late master, Mr. John Rous, was presented with
a post-captain's commission and aj)pointed to her. Finally, the
Colonists were reimbursed by Parliament for all the expenses which
they had incurred in connection with the expedition.
The despatch of Vice-Admiral Thomas Davers with reinforce-
ments to the West Indies has already been mentioned. Upon
I 2
116 MA JOE OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
the French Ministry hearing of it, it also sent thither a strong
reinforcement, under the Chevaher de Caylus, who arrived at
Martinique on March 28th, 1745. Xo sooner was the British
Ministry advised of its departure, than it ordered Vice-Admiral
William Kowley, then in command in the Mediterranean, to detach
to the West Indies a considerable division under Yice-Admiral
Isaac Townsend (2), who left Gibraltar on August 2nd, and arrived
off Martinique on October 3rd. He fell in, on October 31st, with a
squadron of ships of war and store ships, destined to further
reinforce the French ; and, chasing it, ultimately took or destroyed
upwards of thirty out of about forty sail.
In the Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral W^illiam Eowley blockaded
the Spaniards in Cartagena, while Eear-Admiral Henry Medley
watched the coasts of Italy and prevented supplies from reaching
the Spanish Army there. Commodore Henry 0 shorn observed the
French Brest squadron, which lay at Cadiz. When Genoa threw
in her lot with the House of Bourbon, Commodore Thomas Cooper
was detached to bombard the ports of that Republic, and he caused
several of them to suffer very severely. The difficulties of Genoa
induced the Corsicans to make an effort to throw off the Genoese
yoke and to seek British and Sardinian assistance ; whereupon
Commodore Cooper went to Corsica, and on November 17th, 1745,
anchored off Bastia. The place was bombarded until the 19th,
when the ships relinquished the attack, and withdrew, Cooper
despairing of the arrival of the promised Corsican assistance. But
his action was a little premature ; for one of the rebel chiefs, the
Marchese de Rivarole, had already arrived, and, just after the
disappearance of the British, threatened the town with such good
effect, that the Chevalier de Mari, the representative of Genoese
authority, finding the defences untenable in consequence of the
damage that had already been received by them from the British
squadron, carried off his garrison by sea. A little later Commodore
Cooper sent to Corsica Captain the Hon. George Townshend, who
discovered that the Genoese held only a few towns, and that the
island was in a fair way of falling into the hands of the patriots.
The success at Louisbourg directed attention to the importance
of British interests in North America, and in 1746 suggested fresh
undertakings in that quarter. An attack on Quebec was projected,
and it was proposed to utilise for the purpose the colonial troops,
which had done so well at Cape Breton in the previous year,
1746.] THE FRENCH IN NORTH AMERICA. 117
strengthening them of course by means of large detachments from
England. Preparations were made, and troops were assembled at
Portsmouth and even embarked ; but various causes detained the
fleet at Spithead until too late in the season, and the enterprise was,
for a time, abandoned. Eumours of the intentions of the Govern-
ment had, as was usual in those days, promptly reached the ears of
the French Ministry, which decided to retaliate for the threatened
British invasion of Canada by a descent upon Nova Scotia. In
pursuance of this determination a large force was sent across the
Atlantic under the Due d'Anville.
British public opinion had been much attracted by the Quebec
idea, and was greatly disgusted by the failure of the expedition to
sail. To pacify the people, it was hinted that the troops which
had been assembled were not to remain unemployed ; and, a
little later, as will be seen, they were directed upon the coast
of France.
The French fleet of eleven sail of the line and fifty-gun ships,
three frigates, three fireships and two bomb-vessels, under the Due
d'Anville, with transports and storeships containing 3500 troops,
sailed from Brest on June 22nd, 1746, and arrived off the coast of
Nova Scotia on September 10th. But on its passage it was much
damaged and weakened by a violent storm. Vice-Admiral Isaac
Townsend, who was then at Louisbourg, had with him an inferior
force, but had the advantage of assistance from New England, and
of a well fortified base. The sudden dea.th of d'Anville depressed the
spirits of the French expedition, and although the enemy did land, he
soon decided not to prosecute the object for which he had crossed the
Atlantic. D'Anville's successor, M. Tournel, a man of impetuous
temper, could not agree with the resolutions of the majority of his
officers ; and, considering that if he retreated he would be dis-
honoured, he solved his own difficulties by committing suicide, while
at the same time he complicated the confusion into which his un-
fortunate command had fallen. M. de La Jonquiere succeeded him ;
but by that time, owing to delay and neglect, the troops had been
almost exterminated by scurvy and by a small-pox epidemic. Some
succour was therefore sent to Quebec, and the rest of the expedition,
in a very bad case, returned to Europe. On the voyage several of
the vessels composing it were snapped up by British cruisers.
The troops which had been assembled at Portsmouth for the
undertaking against Quebec were, as has been said transported to
118 MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1714-1702. [1746.
the coast of France. Command of them had been given to Lieut. -
General the Hon. James St. Clair, chiefly for the reason that,
besides being an excellent officer, he had made a special study of
the military position in Canada. When the destination of the
expedition was altered, the command, perhaps unwisely, was not
changed. The fleet destined to convoy the army was entrusted to
Admiral Eichard Lestock (B.) The idea of the Government was
that a descent upon the coast of Brittany might induce the French,
who were very powerful in Flanders, to detach part of the army
which was operating there under Marshal Saxe. But the affair
was wretchedly managed. The General had no special knowledge ;
the troops were unprepared for the service ; and no maps of the
country to be attacked were provided. St. Clair asked for a map of
Brittany, and the Government sent him, by express, a map of
Gascony. Nor had the coast been properly reconnoitred. It was
little known to any of the British naval officers of the time, and
the charts of those days were very indifferent.
Lestock detached Commodore Thomas Cotes to look in at Port
Louis and neighbouring places, and to find some convenient spot
for landing near L orient. With the main body of the fleet he
himself sailed from St. Helen's on August 5th, but did not clear
the coast of England until September 14th, nor reach that of France
till September 19th, when Cotes rejoined him. A landing was in
time effected, and the troops began to advance upon Lorient ; but
the country was a close one, and greatly facilitated the guerilla
operations of the French. Lorient, nevertheless, appeared to be
disposed to treat ; and it would no doubt have surrendered to the
British commander if he had been inclined to deal leniently. Yet
as he would accept all or nothing, the place sturdily prepared to
defend itself. The siege was begun in a partial and ineffectual way ;
but so many necessary supplies were wanting that progress was
very slow, and, though the sailors from the fleet co-operated with
marvellous energy, the enterprise was at last concluded to be
impracticable and the troops were re-embarked, very sickly from
the consequences of exposure, on September 30th. At a council of
war the project of a landing in Quiberon Bay was discussed and
rejected, but on October 1st, Lestock received so favourable a report
from Captain Thomas Lake of the Exeter, of the anchorage there,
that he and General St. Clair decided, in spite of the resolutions of
the council of war, to proceed and there await reinforcements from
1746.] LA BOURDONNAIS TO INDIA. 119
England, meanwhile harassing the enemy whenever possible. The
fleet sailed, and some troops were landed and works erected ; but,
after • hesitation and paltering, the forces were re-embarked. Mean-
time the isles of Houat and Hoedic had been reduced and the
fortifications upon them destroyed. The troops were ultimately
sent under convoy to Ireland, and Lestock, with the bulk of the
fleet, returned to England. No glory was won, but the expedition
partially attained its original object, for orders were actually sent to
Marshal Saxe from Paris, directing him to despatch troops to
Brittany. These did not, however, reach him until he had so well
established his position in Flanders as to be well able to afford to
weaken himself.
At the time of the commencement of the active alliance between
the French and Spaniards, M. La Bourdonnais, governor of the Isle
of France, happened to be at Versailles. He was a most far-sighted
administrator and capable soldier, and, had his advice been followed,
the fate of India might have been very different from what it has
been. He advised his Government to send a strong squadron to the
Indian seas, so as to be ready for all eventualities. A squadron of
five sail of the line was accordingly collected, and command of it
was entrusted to La Bourdonnais himself. He was given great
powers over the officers of the French East India Company in
India ; and the Company became anxious concerning its rights and
privileges as soon as he had sailed. The directors persuaded the
French Ministry that hostilities in India were not likely, and that,
the representatives of the two countries there being exclusively
traders, it was unwise in the highest degree to provoke ill-will where
neutrality would, in all probability, be observed if no aggressive
measures were taken. The squadron was accordingly recalled ; but
La Bourdonnais himself proceeded, and, with the slender resources
he possessed, he assembled a motley squadron, which included only
one king's ship, the Achille, 70. With her and seven other vessels,
armed merchantmen, he sailed for the coast of Coromandel.
Commodore Curtis Barnet, who had gone to Madras in the
beginning of 1746, would have been a worthy opponent even for so
great a man as La Bourdonnais ; and he was preparing to take
active measures against the French, when, on April 29th, he died.
His successor. Commodore Edward Peyton, was apparently a less
energetic and capable officer. He was cruising between Fort St.
David and Negapatam when, on June 25th, he sighted the French
120
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1746.
squadron.^ M. La Bourdonnais, though conscious that his ships in
strength of armament and in discipHne were very inferior to the
British, decided to utihse the only superiority which he possessed,
the superiority in men, and to attempt to board. During the earher
part of the day there was httle breeze ; and Peyton, who probably
grasped the idea of the French admiral, kept as near the wind
as possible, so that the two fleets were unable to come to close
action. Not until four in the afternoon did they begin to engage ;
and even then the firing was maintained at such a distance that
little damage was done to either side. Peyton might have an-
nihilated his foe had he ventured sufficientl}^ close to take full
advantage of the stouter scantling of his ships, and of the heavier
guns which they carried. But he did not attack "svith dash ; and at
dusk the action ceased, the British having lost fourteen men killed
and forty-six wounded, and the enemy twentj^-seven killed and fifty-
three wounded. The British vessel which suffered chiefly was the
Medway's Prize. On the' other side, the Insulaire was so badly
mauled that, immediately after the action, La Bourdonnais had to
order her away to repair. Peyton's behaviour gave great umbrage
to the East India Company ; but no one ever brought any specific
charge against the commodore. Commodore Thomas Griffin (1)
afterwards superseded him, put him under arrest, and sent him
home ; but the matter went no further.
^ Squadbons of Commodore Peytox and M. La Bourdoxnais in
THE Action of Juke 25th, 1746.
Ships.
British.
Guns.
Commanders.
Medway
Preston .
Winchester .
Harwich
Medvjay's Prize
Lively .
60
50
50
50
40
1270
|Comniod. Edward Peytcm.
\Capt. Henry Kosewell.
„ George, Earl of Xorthesk.
„ Lord Thomas Bertie.
„ Philip Carteret (1).
„ Thomas Griffin (2), actg.
j „ Nathaniel Stephens,
i actii.
Frenxh.
Ships.
Ach ille
Due d^ Orleans
Bourhon .
Neptune .
Phenix .
St. Louis .
Lys . .
Lisulaire
Guns ' „„„,
P^IJf^ momited.
74
56
56
54
54
44
40
30
60
26
36
34
34
30
34
28
0(^0
iSome French accounts mention another armed vessel, the Renoimnee, 28, as having
been with La Bourdonnais, in addition to the ships named above. The British official
account also mentions a ninth ship, name unknown, mounting, however, 20 guns only.
All the French ships, however, except the AchiUe, were merely improvised men-of-war,
and were, in that respect, greatly inferior to the British.
1746.] PEYTON'S INEFFICIENCY. 121
The activity of La Bourdonnais was hampered by the jealousy
of M. Dupleix, Governor in India for the French East India
Company. Dissensions continually arose owing to the natural
complications of authority ; and the naval commander could obtain
scarcely any help from the civil one. La Bourdonnais, neverthe-
less, made shift to refit, and on July 24th sailed again from
Pondicherry and worked to the southward. On August 6th he
sighted the British squadron, which was returning from Trincomale,
where it had refitted. Peyton avoided action, and, after three days
of futile manoeuvres, made sail and disappeared. This conduct
encouraged La Bourdonnais to plan an attack upon Madras. He
was taken ill and had to remain at Pondidierry ; but his squadron
appeared before the place on August 15th ^ and bombarded it. The
guns, however, produced little effect upon the town ; nor did the
French sacceed in an attempt to capture the Princess Mary, East
Indiaman, which lay in the road.
One of the objects of the British squadron in the East Indies
was of course to be a protection to British settlements and British
trade ; yet it did not proceed to the succour of Madras. Peyton,
lying in Pulicat Eoad, thirty miles to the northward, heard, on
August 25th, of what had happened in the previous week ; but,
instead of going to the rescue of the threatened town, he went
to Bengal, his excuse being that the Medtvay's Prize was very leaky
and needed repairs. La Bourdonnais was thus induced to proceed.
On September 3rd his squadron disembarked troops, and on the
7th a bombardment of Madras by land and sea was begun. On
the 10th the place capitulated, upon the understanding that it
should subsequently be ransomed. On September 27th, while still
before Madras, La Bourdonnais was reinforced by three ships of
the line from Europe, the Centaure, 74, Mars, 56, and BriUant, 50.
His operations were still hampered by the interference of Dupleix ;
but, on October 1st, he was able to send off two of his vessels with
booty, etc., to Pondicherry. It was fortunate that he did so, for
otherwise he would probably have lost almost all his squadron. On
the night of October 2nd there was a great storm ; and, in the course
of it, the Due cVOrleans, Phenix, and Lys foundered, and about
twelve hundred men were lost with them. Two prizes, the Mermaid
and the Advice, shared the same fate, and the flagship, Achille, and
^ An account issued by the Hon. E. I. C. says that the eueuiy appeared at Madras
on Au2;ust 10th.
122 MAJOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1746.
two other vessels were dismasted. In fact, every craft in the road-
stead either sank or suffered most severely.
In regard to the promised ransom of the town, La Bourdonnais
behaved throughout like a man of honour ; but Dupleix seems
never to have intended that the conditions should be carried out ;
and when La Bourdonnais had gone to Mauritius, on his way home
to France, Dupleix, to the astonishment of many even of his own
officers, caused the treaty to be declared void. The arrival of
Commodore Thomas Griffin (1) from England soon afterwards, com-
pelled the French to desist from a projected attack on Fort St.
David, and to withdraw nearly all their forces to Pondicherry.
On the Leeward Islands' station, Vice-Admiral Isaac Townsend
commanded at the beginning of 1746 ; but very early in the year
he was ordered to proceed with the gi'eater part of his squadron
to Louisbourg. He sailed from St. Kitt's in January, and, on his
way, met with so violent a storm that all his ships except two,
the Princesa and Ipswich, were obliged to return, and those two,
terribly disabled, had to bear away for England. The Ipswich,
which reached Plymouth on April '22nd, was only saved by a
most brilliant display of seamanship, after her crew had suffered
great hardships.
When Vice-Admiral Townsend had refitted, he again sailed for
Louisbourg, leaving Commodore the Hon. Fitzroy Henry Lee in
command in the West Indies. Lee was ultimately superseded by
Commodore the Hon. Edward Legge. Both Lee and Legge w'ere
unfortunate in their attempts to intercept French convoys, several
of which, under the care of M. de Conflans, escaped them. On
one occasion, as will be seen, Conflans would have come off badly
but for the cowardice of Commodore Cornelius Mitchell. On
another occasion, he fell in with the British Leeward Islands'
convoy, escorted by the Severn, 50, Captain William Lisle, and
the WooUoich, 50, Captain Joseph Lingen. Lisle, who was the
senior officer, ordered the convoy to disperse and each vessel to
shift for herself. Conflans, in the Terrible, 74, with another ship
of the line, chased him, and after three hours' action, obliged the
Severn to strike ; but the Woolwich got away, and none of the
convoy were taken. Lisle's action was considered so creditable
that, after his exchange, he was at once given the command of
a larger ship, the Vigilant, 64.
At Jamaica, Vice-Admiral Davers commanded until his death ;
1740.] MITCHELVS INEFFICIENCY. 123
but, being very ill with gout, had to depute Captain Cornelius
Mitchell to go in search of M. de Conflans, who was expected with
a convoy of ninety merchantmen at Cape Francois. Mitchell had
four sail of the line, a frigate, and a sloop ^ ; Conflans had but four
vessels in all '" ; and Mitchell's superiority, though small, should,
perhaps, have sufficed. Mitchell sighted the convoy on August 3rd
off Cape St. Nicolas ; but, as promptly as possible, he ordered his
ships to close, and held a council of war. It was thereupon resolved
to wait till daylight before bearing down upon the enemy ; but, on
the following morning, Mitchell was so backward in bringing on
an engagement, in spite of the evident willingness of Conflans, that
at 4 P.M. the squadrons had not exchanged a shot. At that hour
everything was in his favour, and the breeze was fair ; but he
hauled to the wind and shortened sail. The enemy, after he had
recovered from his astonishment, gave chase ; and his • headmost
ship overhauled the Lenox, 64, at about 8 p.m., and fought her,
without result, for an hour and a half. Mitchell that night ordered
his ships to proceed without lights, and laid his course for Jamaica,
where, on October 16th, owing to the death of Vice-Admiral Davers,
the command devolved upon hnn. His behaviour having been
represented to the Admiralty, he was superseded, and was tried
at Jamaica by court-martial on January 28th following. The court
convicted him of cowardice and neglect of duty ; but less severe
than many of the naval courts of that period, sentenced him only
to be mulcted of five years' pay, adjudging him at the same time
to be incapable of again serving in the Navy.
In the Mediterranean during 1746 a large fleet, under Vice-
Admiral Henry Medley and Kear-Admiral the Hon. John Byng,
offered much assistance to the Austrians and their allies, and co-
operated with success with the army which, under General Browne,
crossed the Var on December 1st. A detachment of small vessels
under Captain Hugh Forbes, of the Phoenix, 20, and Commander
William Martin (2), of the Terrible, 6, lent valuable aid to the
troops. Medley also blockaded Antibes, assisted in the capture of
Ste. Marguerite, and lent help to the insurgents in Corsica.
The year 1747 was upon the whole very successful for Great
Strafford, 60, Capt. Cornelius Mitchell ; Lenox, 64, Capt. Peter Lawrence ;
Plymoutli, 60, Capt. Digby Dent (2) ; Worcester, 60, Ca^it. Thomas Andrews (2) ;
Milford, 44, Capt. Edward Eich ; and Brake, 14, Commander Edward Clark (1).
^ Terrible, 74; Neptune, 74; Alcion, 50; and Gloire, 40.
124 MAJOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1747.
Britain, although it witnessed some check to the cause of Britain's
aUies in the Mediterranean. The x\ustrians were obhged, hy
Marshal Belleisle, to recross the Var ; and the Genoese succeeded
in defeating the patriots in Corsica, and in driving them to the
interior of the island. On the other hand, Yice-Admiral Medley
not only maintained the blockade of Cartagena, but also intercepted
a French expedition from Toulon to Genoa. Medley died in Vado
Bay on August 5th, when Bear-Admiral the Hon. John Byng
succeeded to the command.
In the East Indies, Bear-Admiral Thomas Griffin kept M.
Dupleix on the defensive, and, at Madras, took and burnt the
Neptune, 34, which had been left there by M. La Bourdonnais.
At Jamaica, Captain Digby Dent (2) commanded until the aiTival of
Bear-Admiral Charles Knowles. On the Leeward Islands' station.
Commodore the Hon. Edward Legge commanded until his death
on September 9th, 1747, and was succeeded by Captain George
Pocock. On each of these stations the cruisers were successful as
well as active, but all the great naval transactions of the year
happened on the Atlantic coasts of Europe.
France fitted out two considerable squadrons ; one under the
Marquis de La Jonquiere, intended for the recovery of Cape Breton,
and the other under M. Grou de St. Georges, of the French East
India Company's service, for co-operation in the conquest of British
settlements on the coast of Coromandel. It was arranged that, in
order the more surely to escape the dangers presented by British
naval superiority in the home seas, the two squadrons should depart
from France together and proceed for some distance in compan5\
The projects of the French were known in England ; and a
squadron, under Vice-Admiral George Anson and Bear-Admiral Peter
Warren, was specially fitted out to checkmate them. The forces
which were ultimately opposed one to the other are set forth in the
note^ (p. 125). The French had with them a convoy, which brought
the total number of their sail up to thirty-eight. M. de St. Georges
left Groix in March, but, after suffering some losses from British
cruisers and from very bad weather, had to put into the road of
Isle d'Aix. La Jonquiere there joined him and the two finally sailed
on April 29th. Anson and Warren had left England on April 9th
and had proceeded off Cape Finisterre, where, on May 3rd, the Cape
bearing S.E., distant twenty-four leagues, they sighted the French.
La Jonquiere thereupon caused twelve of his best ships to shorten
1747.]
ANSON AND BE LA JONQUIERE.
125
sail aiid form a line of battle ahead, while the rest stretched to the
westward and crowded every possible stitch of canvas. Anson also
made signal for a line of battle, believing apparently that he was in
the presence of a more formidable squadron than was really before
him ; but, at Warren's instance, he substituted the signal for a
general chase. La Jonquiere was but ill-supported. Several of the
French East India ships, especially the Vigilant and Modeste, and
later the Thetis and Apollon, looked to nothing but the idea of saving
themselves. It is useless to examine the tactical details of an action
of this kind. Suffice to say, that, after a running fight lasting from
4 to 7 P.M., in which several of the French captains behaved with
great courage and others conducted themselves with equal cowardice,
all the ships which had remained in the French line struck. At
7 P.M. Anson brought to, and detached the Monmouth, Yarmouth
and Nottingham in pursuit of the convoy, which then bore W. by
S.W., distant about five leagues, and which had been followed and
observed during the action by the Falcon. These ships captured the
Vigilant, the Modeste and the Dartmouth, once a British privateer,
together with six of the convoy. Night saved the rest.
^ Action between Vice-Admiral Anson and M. de La Jonquieee,
May 3ed, 1747.
The account of the action, as well as the following list, is based upon the British and
French disjiatches, and especially upon the papers of La Jonquiere in the Archives
de la Marine, and upon the i-eport of La Galernerie.
British.
FUENCH.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
iVice- Admiral George
Diamante . . .
30
Capt. de Hocquart.
Prince George . .
90
i Anson.
PhiUbert 2 3 . .
30
„ Larr.
(Capt. John Bentley.
Vigilantes. . .
20
„ Vaimeulou.
jRear-Admiral Peter
'. Warren.
Chimene 3 . . .
36
?
Devon shire 'i . .
66
PMbis - (en fliite) .
52
„ Macarty.
leapt. Temple West.
Jason - . . . .
50
„ Beccart.
Namur ' .
74
,, Hon. Edward Bos -
cawen.
Si-rieux 2 . . .
64
(M. de La Jonquiere, Capt.
I d'Aubigny.
Monmouth .
64
,, Henry Harrison.
Invincible- .
74
Capt. Grou de St, Georges.
Prince Frederick .
64
„ Harry Norris.
Apollon -s . . .
30
,, Noel.
Tarmouih i . .
64
„ Piercy Brett (1).
Thetis ^3 . . .
22
,, jVIasson.
Princess Louisa .
«0
,, Charles Watson.
Modeste -3 . . .
18
,, Thiercelin.
Nottingham . .
60
,, Philip de Saumarez.
Gloirc-i ....
40
,, de Saliez.
Defiance i . . .
611
„ Thomas Grenville.
Pembroke I . . .
Windsor'^ . . .
«0
60
,, Thomas Fincher.
„ Thomas Hanuay.
Emeraude* . . .
40
f , , de la Jonquiere de
I TafTailel.
Centurion i . . .
50
,, Peter Denis.
Dartmouth -f . .
18
>
Falkland . . .
50
/ ,, Bloomfield Barra-
\ dell.
Bristol^ . . .
50
1 „ Hon. William
{ Montagti.
Ambuscade . . .
40
,, John Montagu.
falcon ....
10
fCommander Richard
I Gwynn.
Vulcan (fireship) .
8
fCommander William
I Pettigrew.
1 These ships only were engaged.
2 Taken.
3 These ships belonged to the French East India Company.
■< With the convoy but not in line of battle.
126 , MAJOR OPEEATIONS, 1714-1762. [1747.
The battle, considering its nature, was a costly one. The French
lost about 700 killed and wounded, and the British, 520. Among the
French officers killed was Captain de Saliez, and among those
wounded were La Jonquiere himself and d'Aubigny, his flag captain.
On the British side Captain Thomas Gren villa, of the Defiance,
was killed, and Captain Boscawen, of the Namur, wounded. The
victors found specie to the value of ii300,000 on board the prizes.
For this service Anson was created a peer, and "Warren, a K.B. All
the men-of-war taken, and also the East Indiaman Thetis, were
purchased into the Eoyal Navy. The name of the Serieux was
changed to Intrepid, and that of the Diamant to Isis.
The victory was valuable if not exactly brilliant. Commenting
upon it, and upon the other great action of the year, Captain Mahan
says :
" Two encounters between Englisli and French sc|uaflrons happened during the year
1717, completing the destruction of the French fighting navy. In both cases the
English were decidedly superior, and though there was given opportunity for some
brilliant fighting by particular ca^jfains, and for the display of heroic endurance on the
part of the French, greatly outnumbered, but resisting to the last, only one tactical
lesson is aflbrded. This lesson is that, when the enemy, either as the result of battle,
or from original inequality, is greatly inferior in force, obliged to fly without standing
on the order of his flying, the regard otherwise due to order must be, in a measure at
least, dismissed, and a general chase ordered." . ..." In both cases, the signal was
made for a general chase, and the action which resulted was a mCdee. There was no
opportunity for anything else; the one thing necessary was to overtake the running
enemy, and that could only certainly be done by letting the fastest or best-situated
ships get ahead, sure that the speed of the fastest pursuers is better than that of the
slowest of the jiursued, and that, therefore, either the latter must be abandoned, or the
whole force brought to bay."
It would appear that in 1747 the Admiralty had begun to be
better served by its intelligence officers than it had been earlier in
the war ; and it is not the least merit of the administration that, on
several important occasions, it was able to bring superior forces to
bear upon its enemies. Anson's success was one result of this fore-
knowledge ; the success of Captain Thomas Fox, to be noted in the
next chapter, was another ; that of Kear- Admiral Edward Hawke,
now to be recounted, was a third.
Information was received in England that France was collecting
in Basque Koad a huge convoy for the West Indies, and that a
squadron of men-of-war had sailed from Brest to pick it up and
escort it to its destination. Thereupon a squadron, under Hawke,
was despatched from Plymouth to intercept it. It left Plymouth
Sound on August Uth. The French left Isle d'Aix on October Gth ;
1747.]
HAWKE AND DE UETENDUERE.
127
and, on October 14tli at 7 a.m., were sighted in lat. 47° 49' N. and
long. 1 ° 2 ' W., off Finisterre. Hawke made signal to chase, but at
8 A.M., seeing the enemy's ships to be very numerous, many of them
being large, he, as a measure of prudence, formed a line of battle
COMMEMORATIVE MEDAL OF ANSON's VICTORY, 1747, AND OF HIS
CIRCUMNAVIGATION OF THE WORLD, 1740-44.
{From an original kindbj lent by H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battcnherg, R.N.)
ahead. ^ There were in fact no fewer than 252 merchantmen with
the French squadron. Commodore de I'Etenduere, who at first
mistook the British for part of his own convoy, no sooner discovered
his mistake than he ordered the merchantmen to make the best of
their way under the care of the Content, 64, and himself also formed
a line of battle ahead. These manoeuvres informed Hawke as to
^ Action between Eear-Admiral Hawke and M. de l'Etenduere,
October 1-4th, 17-47.
British.
{ FkENX'H.
Ships.
Guns
1
Commanders.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
iP
ear-Admiral Edward
(M.
des Herbiers de
Devonshire . . .
66
\
Hawke.
Tonnant. .
80
1 I'Etenduere, Clief
iCapt. John Moore (1).
j d'Escadre.
Kent
74
,, Thomas Fox.
Capt
. Duchaffault.
Edinhurgh . . .
70
„ Thomas Cotes.
Intrepide . .
74
,,
de Vaudreuil.
Yarmouth . . .
64
,, Charles Saunders.
Trideut i . . .
64
,,
d'.Vmblimont.
Monmouth .
64
,, Henry Harrison.
Terrible^ . .
74
^^
du Guay.
Princess Louisa .
60
„ Charles AVatsou.
Monarque i . .
74
It
de La Bodoyere.
Windsor. . . .
60
,, Thomas Hanway.
Severn i . .
56
»»
du Kouret.
Lion
to
,, Arthur Scott.
Fougueux i . .
64
lie Vignault.
Tilbury ....
6U
,, Robert Httrlaud( '2).
1 Neptune '
74
jj
de Fromeniieres.
Nottingham . .
60
„ Philip de Saumarez.
Defiance
00
„ John Bentley.
Castor- . . .
26
,,
d'Ossonville.
Eagle ....
60
f
,, George Brydges
Rodney.
j Content- . .
04
"
?
Gloucester . . .
50
„ Philip innell(i).
Portland . . .
50
„ Charles Stevens.
and
some
frigates.
. ■
L'akeu.
■■^ With the
convoy.
128 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1747.
the nature of the force before him, and induced him to haul down
the signal for the line and to again make that for a general chase,
following it half-an-hour later with the signal to engage. A running
fight resulted. The French behaved with great spirit but were over-
powered by sheer weight of numbers. They had in line but eight
ships and of these six were taken. Towards night the Intrepide and
Tonnant, finding that the day was lost, set all sail with a view
to escaping. Their intention was perceived by the Yarmouth,
Nottingham and Eagle, which, at the instance of Captain Saunders
of the Yarmouth, and on their own responsibility, followed. These
ships engaged the fugitives for an hour, in the course of which
Captain Saumarez ^ of the Nottingham fell. The two French ships,
though very badly damaged, succeeded in getting into Brest. At
dark Hawke brought his ships to ; and in the morning, at a council
of war, it was decided, in view of the mauled condition of the British
^juadron, not to pursue the convoy. The Weazel, sloop, w^as,
however, despatched to the AVest Indies, to apprise Commodore
Pocock of the approach of the French ; and thanks to this precaution,
many of their ships were ultimately taken. '■^
The French loss in the action was about 800 killed and wounded,
among the former being Captain de Fromentieres of the Neptune.
The British lost 154 killed, including Captain Saumarez, and 558
wounded. As nearly all the vessels captured had been dismasted,
it took some time to refit them ; but on October 31st, Hawke had
the satisfaction of carrying them and his squadron into Portsmouth.
A little later he was made a K.B. for his services. All the prizes,
except the Neptune, were purchased into the Eoyal Navy.
Hawke in his despatch had occasion to complain of Captain
Thomas Fox of the Kent, who, in the action, when ordered by
signal to make sail ahead after the Tonnant and to engage her, had
failed to obey. Captain Fox was consequently tried by court-martial
at Portsmouth on November 25th upon the charge that " he did not
come properly into the fight, nor do his utmost to distress and
damage the enemy, nor assist his Majesty's ships which did."
Fox's personal courage was not impeached ; and there is no doubt
' Philiii Saumarez, or de Saumarez. Born, 1710. Coinniauder, 1741. Captain,
1743. Killed, as above, October 14tli, 1747. He had served with Anson in his voyage
round the world, and had distinguished himself greatly, when already commanding
the NottimjTiam, by his capture of the Mars, 64, in 1746. A monument to him is in
Westminster Abbey.
^ See next chapter.
1747.] CRITICISM OF THE ACTION. 129
that his faihire to obey orders was chiefly due to the faulty system
of signals then in use. Both his first lieutenant and his master
mistook the signal for close action for one to proceed to the assist-
ance of the Admiral ; and he acted accordingly. The trial lasted
until December '22nd, when the court came to the conclusion that
" he had been guilty of backing his mizen-top-sail and leaving the
Tonnant, contrary to the 10th and 11th Articles of AVar." He was
acquitted of cowardice, but, because he had paid too much regard to
the advice of his officers, contrary to his own better judgment, he was
sentenced to be dismissed from the command of the Kent. Captain
Fox, whose post-captain's commission dated from August 6th, 1737,
and who always had been a good officer, was never again employed,
but was superannuated as a Eear-Admiral in 1749. He died
in 1763.
Criticising the battle. Captain Mahan ^ says :
" If . . . Hawke showed in his attack the judgment and dash which always
distinguished that remarkable officer, it may be claimed for Commodore I'Etenduere that
fortune, in assigning him the glorious disadvantage of numbers, gave liim also the
leading part in the drama, and that he failed nobly."
Troude, the French naval critic, remarks - of de I'Etenduere that :
" he defended his convoy as on shore a position is defended, when the aim is to save
an army corps, or to assure an evolution. He gave himself to be crushed. After an
action that lasted from midday to 8 p.m., the convoy was saved, thanks to the obstinacy
of the defence, and 250 ships were secured to their owners by the devotion of I'Eten-
duere, and of the captains under his orders. This devotion cannot be questioned, for
eij,ht ships liad but few chances of surviving an action with fourteen ; and not only did
tlie commander of the eight accept an action which he might possibly have avoided,
but also he knew how to inspire his lieutenants with trust in himself, for all suj^ported
the fight with honour, and yielded at last, showing the most indisputable proofs of their
fine and energetic defence."
" The whole affair," concludes Mahan, " as conducted on both sides, affords an
admirable study of how to follow up an advantage, original or secured, and of the
results that may be obtained by a gallant, even hopeless defence, for the furtherance of
a particular object."
The squadron of Anson and Warren, as well as that of Hawke,
cruised in the Channel and Bay after the actions above narrated,
and took numerous prizes ; but an account of such smaller engage-
ments as were fought in the course of the year may be reserved for
the next chapter.
The war had been very costly to France. The French Navy had
' ' Influence of Sea Power,' 272.
- ' Bats. Nav. de la France.'
VOL. III. K
130 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1748.
been almost crushed, and French maritime trade had been ahnost
ruined, though the armies of France had been successful on land.
But all the Powers engaged were to some extent weary of the
conflict ; and it was therefore felt, when a Congress met at Aix-la-
Chapelle to consider the terms of an arrangement, that there was
every prospect of the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. In the
meantime, Great Britain did not relinquish, nor even diminish, her
preparations to continue the struggle. In 1748, as in previous years,
all ships, as the}^ became ready for sea, were put into commission.
Squadrons were sent to cruise at various times in home waters,
under Vice-Admirals Sir Peter Warren and Sir Edward Hawke, and
Bear-Admiral William Chambers. Commodore the Hon. George
Townshend watched the coast of Flanders ; Vice- Admiral the Hon.
John Byng remained in the Mediterranean ; and in the West Indies
Bear-Admiral Charles Knowles and Commodore George Pocock, let
slip no opportunity of annoying the enemy.
Bear- Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen had been sent out in
1747, as Commander-in-Chief, to the East Indies, and had taken
with him reinforcements to the station. Before his arrival, Bear-
Admiral Thomas Griffin (1) had received three additional ships from
England, so that his squadron consisted of three 60's, three 50's,
three 40's, and one 20, and was considerably superior to the French
force in the same seas. But Mr. Griffin had been outwitted and
out-manoeuvred by the French commander-in-chief, M. Bouvet,
who, in spite of him, had thrown troops into Madras.
The French ministry was warned of Boscawen's departure from
England ; and M. Dupleix, being advised from home, took such
measures as he could to meet the Bear-Admiral, who had with him
six ships of the line or 50's, and four smaller craft, and who
convoyed eleven ships of the East India Company with 1500
soldiers on board. Boscawen reached the Cape of Good Hope in
March, 1748, and was there joined by six Dutch East Indiamen,
having on board 400 troops. On May 18th he sailed again, and on
June 23rd, after a troublesome voyage, sighted Mauritius, which he
had decided to make an attempt upon. The island had been
informed by Dupleix of its danger, and was to some extent prepared,
though it was but ill garrisoned. On the 25th, after having
reconnoitred the coast, Boscawen decided to abandon the project
and to proceed to Coromandel. Had he known how few troops were
in the island, ho would certainly have persisted, and would probably
1748.]
BOSOAWEN IN THE EAST INDIES.
131
have been successful ; for the works, though strong, could not be
properly manned.^
The Dutch convoy parted company at Mauritius, and proceeded
for Batavia ; and Boscawen, on June 27th, sailed for Fort St. David
(Cuddalore), where he arrived on July 29th. There he met Eear-
Admiral Griffin, who, in the meantime, had been promoted to be
Vice-Admiral, and who soon afterwards returned to England by way
of Trincomale with part of his command.
Besides the naval force, Boscawen had under him many
armed East Indiamen, and 3240 troops, including sepoys but not
including Marines. Indeed, he was m a position to dispose of
5220 men to act on shore ; and, in addition, 2000 native auxiliary
cavalry were placed at his service for the contemplated siege of
Pondicherry, whither Boscawen presently proceeded. Leaving
Captain Wilham Lisle in command of the squadron, he landed to
direct the operations on shore. Early in August the army closed
round the town, which was closely blockaded from seaward by
the Exeter, Chester, Pemhroke and Sivalloiv. An assault upon one
of the outlying works was repulsed with loss on August 12th, but the
siege was formally begun and some successes were gained. The
engineers upon whom Boscawen was obliged to depend were, how-
' Rear-Admihal the Hon. Edward Boscawen's Squaddon, which arrived
OFF Mauritius in June, 1748.
Ships.
Guns.
Namur .
74
Vigilant
()4
Deptford
(JO
Ptmhroke
GO
Ruby
50
Chester .
50
Deal Castle
24
Sn'allow
16
Basilisk (bomb)
8
Apollo (hosp
ital slii]))
20
The above,
proceeding, fouud on the Eas
Exeter .
60
York .
60
Harwich
.
50
Presto7i .
50
Lively .
.
20
Commauders.
I Rear- Admiral Hon. Edward Boscawen.
\Captain Samuel Marshall (1).
„ William Lisle.
„ Thomas Lake.
„ Thomas Fincher.
„ Joseph Knight.
„ Richard Spry.
John Lloyd (2).
Commander John Rowzier.
„ William Preston.
Lieutenant Robert Wilson.
Captain Tjord Harry I'owlett.
„ Timothy Nucella.
„ Philip Carteret (1).
„ William Adams (1).
„ Nathaniel Stephens, actg.
in addition to the other vessels, which, upon Boscawen's arrival, returned home or went
elsewhere.
K 2
132 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [1748.
ever, incompetent ; and little progress was made, though the Basilisk,
bomb, threw some shells into the place. In the operations Ensign
Clive, afterwards Lord Clive, gained his first military distinction.
As the siege threatened to be a protracted one, Boscawen ordered
Captain Lisle to begin a general bombardment from the ships of
the squadron ; but, owing to the shallows, these could not approach
near enough to do much damage. The business, however, cost the
life of Captain William Adams (1), then commanding the Harwich.
In the meantime the weather was bad, and the troops were sickly ;
and, as the neighbourhood of the town was liable to be completely
flooded at the beginning of the rainy season, the siege was raised
at the beginning of October, the sick being removed to the ships,
and the army retiring overland to Fort St. David. The expedition
cost the lives of 1065 British, and of only about 200 French. The
fiasco reflected no disgrace upon Boscawen, and was entirely due
to the incapacity of the engineers and some of the military leaders.
Nevertheless, it greatly lowered British prestige with the natives,
and led to some serious defections.
Boscawen learned in November of the cessation of hostilities
between Great Britain and France, but was ordered to remain on
his station until advised of the final conclusion of peace. Part of
the squadron went to Acheen, and part to Trincomale, to avoid the
monsoon, and the whole returned in January, 1749, to Fort St.
David, where it lay maintaining an observant attitude, while
M. BoLivet, with the French forces, lay at Madras, or as it was
then often called, Fort St. George, 120 miles to the northward.
But the British did not remain wholly idle, and in April ships
were detached to assist the East India Company in a war with the
King of Tanjore. While this service was being performed, a violent
hurricane wrecked the Femhrolce and Naynur. The former lost her
captain,^ and all hands except fourteen, 380 in all ; the latter lost
520 souls, though the admiral, captain, and a few officers, being on
shore, fortunately escaped. Two East Indiamen were also wrecked.
In August, in pursuance of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which
had been concluded on April 18th, 1748, Madras, in a dismantled
condition, was surrendered to the British.
In the West Indies, in February, 1748, Bear- Admiral Charles
Knowlcs, with a squadron and detachment of troops, left Port
^ This was on April ]3th. Captain 'riioinas FiucUer's post-commission dated from
December 6th, 174.').
1748.]
KNOWLES AT PORT LOUIS.
133
Eoyal to make an attack on Santiago de Cuba ; but, the winds
blowing persistently from the north, the ships could not make that
place. Knowles therefore determined to attack Port Louis, on
the south side of Hispaniola. The squadron ^ arrived there on
ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES KNOWLES, BART.
iFrom an engraving by Ridley.')
^ British Squadron at the Capture of Port Louis, Hispaniola, 1748.
Ships.
Cornwall.
Plymouth
Elizabeth .
Canterbury
Strafford .
Warivick .
Worcester
Oxford .
Weazel
Merlin
Guus.
80
60
70
60
60
60
60
50
6
6
Meu.
600
400
480
400
400
400
400
300
102
100
C'omiuanders.
(■Rear-Admiral Charles Kiiowlos (B.).
\Captain Eichard Chadwick.
Disby Dent (2).
„ Polycarpiis Taylor.
„ David Brodie.
„ James Kentone.
„ Thomas Innes.
„ Thomas Andrews {2).
Edmond Toll.
134
MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1714-17G2.
[1748.
March 8th, and was at once ordered by signal to cannonade the
fort, which mounted seventy-eight guns, and was garrisoned by
GOO men. A warm engagement resulted, and in the height of it
the enemy sent out a fireship, which was designed to fall on board
the CornicaU or the EUzaheth. She was towed oft' by the boats
of the fleet, and left to burn out and explode innocuously. The
British boats then boarded and brought away two other craft,
which had been prepared as
fireships. The action con-
tinuing, the Spanish fire after
a time languished, and the
liear- Admiral sent a suminons
to the governor, who, first
taking some time for reflection,
surrendered upon terms. The
place was then taken posses-
sion of. The squadron lost
only 70 killed and wounded,
but among these was Captain
Eentone,^ of the Strafford, and
Captain William Cust," of the
Boston, who, with the Eear-
Adiniral's permission, was
serving as a volunteer on board
the Elizahetli. The enemy
lost 160 killed and wounded.
With the place were captured
three ships, a snow, and three
privateer sloops. The fort was
burnt, it not being advisable
to retain it ; and, the conditions
of wind being at length more favourable, the Kear-Admiral decided
to prosecute his scheme against Santiago de Cuba.
The place had been much strengthened since the time of
Vernon's attack upon it ; and, as the appearance of the British had
been anticipated, all possible precautions had been taken. Knowles
arrived before the town on April 5th, and, the mode of procedure
having been determined. Captain Dent of the PJjjmoutli, as senior
EXPl
IM, - ■
K.-f
I.
M.Y
N MiJ'irt
,w<?nsrvw*«-
OPC/
KAl lOV.
W 7/Af ll'aru ».-*♦ f> O liMTUt
Y . /^^ ^i fojitjlfcfi a<u "or
Ah. Me ^g^tvn
■1^
• James Eentone ; comniauder, 17311; captain, 1710.
^ William Cust; comniauder, 174(); captain, 1717.
1748.]
ENOWLES'S ACTION OFE HAVANA.
135
captain, claimed and obtained the honour of leading in. He was
seconded by the flagship. When the Plymouth had approached
close to the harbour's mouth it was seen that the passage was
obstructed by a boom, backed by vessels held ready to be used as
fireships. The nearest forts were cannonaded and the fire was
returned ; but Dent, having taken the opinion of his officers, came
to the conclusion that it w^is impracticable to proceed, and so
reported to the Kear- Admiral, who thereupon drew off and went
back to Jamaica.
Dent's apparent hesitation on this occasion was taken exception
to by Knowles ; and, in consequence, the captain of the Plymoutli
was court-martialled on his return to England, but he was honour-
ably acquitted.
Later in the year Knowles was informed that the Spanish Plate
fleet was expected at Havana from Vera Cruz. He therefore
detached Captain Charles Holmes, in the Lenox, to convoy a great
body of trade, which had been collecting to sail for England ; and
himself went to cruise off the Tortuga Banks in search of the enemy.
The convoy under Holmes sailed from Jamaica on August 25th ;
and, being prevented from getting through the Windward Passage,
had to bear away for the Gulf of Florida. On September '29th it
sighted seven large ships, which were presently recognised to be
S]3anish men-of-war.^ Holmes signalled the convoy to disperse
and to look to its own safety, while he endeavoured to draw the
attention of the enemy to his own ship ; and, knowing where the
Eear-Admiral was cruising at the time, he succeeded, under press of
sail, in joining him on the following morning, when he reported what
had occurred. Knowles instantly went in quest of the Spaniards,
^ Orber of Battle of the Brfmsh and Spanish Squadrons in the
Action off Havana, Octouer 1st, 1748.
Bkitish. I
SrAXisH.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanilers.
Ships.
Guus.
Commanders.
rUburt/ ....
60
dipt. Charles Powlett.
Invencible . . .
74
Rear-Aduiiral Spinola.
IStraffurd . . .
60
,, David Brodie. i
Conquistador .
64
Don de San Justo.
1 Rear -Admiral Charles
Africa ....
74
Vice-Admiral Keggio.
Cornwall . . .
80
■; Kuowles.
IJragdn ....
64
Don (le La Fa/..
ICapt. Polycarpus Taylor.
Nueva Espaiia .
64
Don Barrella.
Lenox ....
10
,, Cliarles Holmes.
Heal Familia . .
64
Don Forrestal.
Warwick . . .
KU
„ Tliomas luues.
Canterburij. . .
6U
,, Edward Clark (1).
Galgai ....
36
Don Garrecocha.
Oxford 1 . . . .
5U
., Kdmoud Toll.
1 Not in the line.
136 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. ' [1748.
and sighted them early in the morning of October 1st between
Tortuga and Havana. The Spaniards at once formed a hne ; yet
the British, though they had the advantage of the wind, edged down
only very gradually, and it was 2 o'clock before either side fired.
The distance was then too great for much damage to be done, but
at about 2.30 p.m., the two squadrons being nearer, a brisk action
was begun. The Spaniards seem to have been in good order and
close together, but the Warwick and Canterbury were far astern
of station, so that for nearly two hours the British had but four
ships opposed to six of the Spanish. During this time the Cornwall
engaged the Africa at pistol range, and was so gallantly received
that in half an hour she was obliged to fall astern and quit the line,
having lost her main-topmast and received other damage to her
rigging. Soon afterwards the Conquistador, also much damaged
aloft, dropped astern of her consorts and fell nearly where the
Cornwall lay refitting. Knowles lost no time in attacking her, and
quickly killed her captain ; but that officer's successor fought the
ship bravely until she had thrice been set on fire by shells from
the eight cohorns,^ which the Cornwall, unlike most of her class,
carried. Not until then did he surrender. The Lenox had taken
the Corn wall's place and had warmly engaged the Africa ; but
other Spanish ships succoured their admiral, and Captain Holmes
was hard pressed for about an hour until he was relieved by the
Wanvick and Canterburi/. The action then became general and
fierce, and so continued until about 8 p.m., when the Spanish drew
off towards Havana, closely pursued. All, however, escaped except
the Conquistador. The Africa, owing to her damaged condition,
had to anchor before she reached port ; and, being discovered by
the British two days after the action, w^as burnt by the Spaniards
to save her from capture. The enemy lost 86 killed and 197
wounded ; the British had 59 killed and 120 wounded. But whilst
the Spaniards had several officers of rank included in each category
the British had none in either.
Knowles continued to look out for the i'late fieet, but in vain.
In the course of time he learnt from a prize that the preliminaries
of peace had been concluded and that hostilities were to cease,
whereupon he returned to Jamaica. When he went home to
England he complained of Holmes for having left the convoy,
' Coliorn, a small mortar, so named from its inventor, ^k'lino van Coehoorii, the
Dutch military engineer (born IHIl ; died 1704).
1748.] KNOWLES'S COUBT-MARTIAL. 137
oblivious of the fact that, had Hohnes not rejoined the flag, the
victory ofi^ Havana could not have been gained. Holmes was most
honourably acquitted. On the other hand, some of the captains
of the squadron complained of the conduct of the Eear-Admiral, who
was in consequence tried on board the Charlotte yacht, at Deptford, by
a court-martial which sat from the 11th to the 20th December, 1749.
It appeared that -while Eear-Admiral Knowles was standing for the
Spanish fleet he might, by a different disposition of his squadron,
have begun the attack simultaneously with six ships, and might
have begun it earher in the day. It appeared too, that, owing to
the method which he pursued, he had begun to attack with only
four ships. Upon these points the court condemned him ; and it
was also of the opinion that, in order properly to conduct and direct
the operations of his command, he ought to have shifted his flag
from the Cornwall to some other vessel, after the former had
been disabled. For the rest, the proceedings amply vindicated the
Eear-Admiral's personal courage. The sentence was thus worded :
" The court unanimously agree that Rear-Admiral Knowles falls under part of the
14tli Article of War, being guilty of negligence, and also under the 23rd Article. The
court therefore unanimously adjudge him to be reprimanded for not bringing up
the squadron in closer order than he did, and for not beginning the attack with so
great a force as he might have done ; and also for not shifting his flag, on the CornivalVs
being disabled."
On the Leeward Islands' Station, Commodore Pocock learned
by the arrival of the Weazel, sloop, despatched to him by Hawke,
of the approach of the large convoy, which had been under the
escort of M. de I'Etenduere ; and, although he had not time to
collect the whole of his squadron to intercept it, his ships, and the
privateers on the station, succeeded in capturing no fewer than
thirty-five sail of it.
In the Mediterranean, where Eear-Admiral the Hon. John Byng
commanded, the British fleet was too strong for the French and
Spanish to attempt at sea anything of importance before the
conclusion of the peace. The British hampered the passage of
reinforcements to the allied armies at Genoa, by arming a number of
small craft and entrusting them to lieutenants, who cruised with
great success inshore, and intercepted many transports. On the
peace being concluded, Byng returned to England with most of the
larger ships of his fleet.
In the home seas Eear-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke went on
138 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1749.
a cruise with a considerable squadron in the month of January ;
and, ere he returned to port, made several prizes, including the
Magnaninie, 74, an account of the capture of which will be found in
the next chapter. Rear-Admiral Sir Peter Warren, in April, also
went on a cruise ; but in May both he and Hawke were recalled to
England upon the settlement of the preliminaries of peace.
" In the course of the war," says Beatson,^ " the British captured
from the Spaniards 1249 ships, and from the French 2185, making
in all 3434. The Spaniards captured from the British 1360, and the
French 1878, making together 3238, being 196 fewer than what had
been taken by the British." Yet, in spite of this, the general balance
was in favour of Great Britain, for not only were several of the
Spanish prizes extraordinarily valuable, but also the British mer-
chant marine, on account of its superior strength, was far better
able than either the French or Spanish to suffer great losses without
being seriously crippled. The main gain to Great Britain by the
war was the reduction of the French navy to proportions which, for
the time, were no longer formidable. The peace itself benefited
her but little, for, in accordance with it, all conquests made by any
of the combatants were to be restored. On the other hand, the
point which had been the chief occasion of the war — the right of
British ships to navigate the American seas without being searched
— was not touched upon, and remained unsettled. The right to the
province of Nova Scotia, or Acadia, was to be left to be discussed by
commissioners appointed for the purpose. This last matter, never
having been properly arranged, was, as will soon be shown, pro-
ductive of another bloody and expensive war.
The first care of France after the conclusion of peace was to
reorganise and revive her navy. Great numbers of ships were laid
down at home ; and contracts were placed abroad, especially in
Sweden, for the construction of others. None of the ambitious
projects of King Louis were surrendered. He had merely accepted
peace in order the better to prepare for the realisation of his designs.
Nor did the French agents invariably take the trouble to obey the
spirit of the treaty. As early as 1749 the French Governor of
Martinique seized and fortified the neutral island of Tobago ; and
the place was not evacuated until grave international complications
threatened to arise out of the matter. Again, in 1751, the French
contemplated aggressions on the West African coast, and only
' ' X'lv. iiii.l :\Iilit. Moms.,' i. 4U.
1754.] OPERATIONS DURING THE PEACE. 139
desisted when Captain Matthew Buckle (1), of the Assistance, 50,
informed M. Perrier de Salvert, the French commodore, that if he
persisted in his designs of building a fort at Annamaboe, the British
would look upon it as a breach of the peace and would repel force by
force.
French aggression in other quarters was not always checked
with equal promptitude. M. de La Jonquiere, the French com-
mander-in-chief in North America, and M. de La Gahssonniere,
Governor of Canada, hatched between them a project for tampering
with the Indians of North America and for gradually driving British
settlers out of that continent ; and French officers occupied British
territory in Nova Scotia and built forts there. Remonstrances were
made, and in 1750 commissioners were appointed to adjust the
disputes ; but nothing came of their conferences. Still, while Great
Britain herself remained almost indifferent, the Colonists at last
took up the question. Virginia raised 400 men and i;10,000 for the
defence of its inland borders, and confided the command of its
troops to Major George Washington.^ The French Canadians,
however, in spite of the heroism of the Americans, captured them
and their commander on July 3rd. Thereupon the colonial
governors held a congress and agreed upon a common plan of
defence ; and the Ministry at home, shamed into action, sent troops
under General Braddock to the assistance of the Colonists. These
were convoyed to America in 1754 by two 50-gun ships - under
Commodore the Hon. Augustus Keppel. Such signs assured the
French that, if they persisted in their policy, an open rupture could
not but result ; and they therefore endeavoured to associate Spain
with them in the coming quarrel ; but their schemes were foiled by
the watchfulness of Sir Benjamin Keene, the British ambassador at
Madrid.
In India, where M. Dupleix still governed Pondicherry, the
French were as aggressive as elsewhere ; and, in consequence,
hostilities between the two East India Companies were almost
unceasing, so that the peace in that quarter was a merely nominal
one. Clive in this contest won great successes and opened up to
' This was the beginning of the great Washington's military career. See Walpole :
' Meins. of George II.,' i. 347 ; and ' Corresp.,' iii. 73.
^ Centurivn,Gi\.^i.t\\e Hon. Aug. Keppel; and Norwich, Capt. the Hon. Samuel
Barrington. In the latter, Adam Duncan, afterwards Lord Duncan, served as acting
lieutenant. — Keppel: 'Life of Keppel,' i. 201.
140 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [1755.
the British East India Company such a vision of future wealth and
glory as induced it to beg the Ministry at home to assist it in pre-
serving its rapidly growing superiority over its French rival. In
response the Government in 1754 despatched Rear-Admiral Charles
Watson with a force which, as ultimately constituted, consisted of
the Kent, 70, Cumberland, 66, Tiger, 60, Salishunj, 50, Bridge-
water, 24, and Kingfisher, 16. France at the same time sent out
a squadron of nearly equal strength ; but, before the ships arrived,
Dupleix had been recalled, and the French in India had adopted
a more peaceable policy, which might have led to permanent
harmony between the two Companies had not the outbreak of war
elsewhere precluded such a consummation.
The despatch of General Braddock to America led France to
throw off her mask and to assemble a large expedition at Brest and
Rochefort, destined for Canada. Great Britain in reply prepared
for war; and on March 11th, 1755, a proclamation was issued
offering bounties for seamen and able-bodied landsmen. On
March 14th thirty-five sail of the line and numerous small craft
were commissioned ; a hot press for men was instituted in each of
the chief ports, and fifty companies of Marines were ordered to be
raised.
The French expedition left Brest under the convoy of twenty-
five sail of the line, commanded by M. de Macnamara, who, after
seeing it fairly to sea, returned with nine sail, leaving the rest of the
command to M. Dubois de La Motte, who later detached four sail of
the line and two frigates to Louisbourg, and proceeded with the rest
of the fleet to Quebec. The British Ministry was only vaguely
informed as to these movements, and sent to North America Vice-
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen with but eleven sail of the line,
a frigate, and a sloop, convoying two regiments. He sailed from
Plymouth on April '27th, 1755, with instructions to protect the
British colonies and to attack the French squadron wheresoever he
should find it. An intimation of what instructions had been given
was, at the same time, coiniiumicated to the French ambassador,
who replied that the king liis master would consider the first gun
fired at sea in a hostile manner to be a declaration of war. When
it became known how greatly superior a French force had gone to
America, a reinforcement of six sail of the line and a frigate, under
Kear-Admiral Francis Holburue, was sent to Boscawen ; and the
necessary arrangements were so quickly made that Hollmnie sailed
1755.] CRUISE OF BOSCAWEN. 141
on May 11th and joined Boscawen off the Banks of Newfoundland
on June 21st.
The mihtary operations in North America of the force under
General Braddock need not be followed in detail. Suffice it to say
that an American expedition against Niagara Fort miscarried ; that
Colonel William Johnson, a colonial officer, on his way to occupy
Crown Point, defeated a considerable French force which had
attacked him ; and that Braddock himself, while leading an ex-
pedition against Fort Duquesne,^ was routed and killed. A com-
bined naval and mihtary expedition under Captain John Eous, E.N.,
and Lieut. -Colonel Monckton, against French forts in Nova Scotia,
took Fort Beau Sejour, which was renamed Fort Cumberland, and
several other works ; and was completely successful with but little
loss.
The fleets of Boscawen and Dubois de la Motte did not
meet, although four French line-of -battle ships, which had become
separated from their consorts, were chased by the British on
June 6th. For a time they escaped in a fog ; but on June 8th,
when the weather cleared, three of the French vessels were again
visible and a general chase was ordered. The Dunkirk, 60, Captain
the Hon. Eichard Howe, assisted by the Torbay, 74 (Boscawen's
flagship). Captain Charles Colby, after a brisk action took the
Alcide, Captain de Hocquart ; and the Defiance, 60, Captain Thomas
Andrews (2), and Fougiieux, 64, Captain Eichard Spry, took the Lijs,
which, though pierced for 64 guns, had only 22 mounted. The third
ship got away owing to the return of the fog.
When Boscawen discovered that the French had safely reached
Quebec, and that his own fleet was very sickly, he left Eear-Admiral
Holburne with a small squadron to blockade Louisbourg, and went
to Halifax to refresh his men. But the epidemic of putrid fever
could not be checked ; and, before Boscawen, with the main part of
his squadron, got home to England, the ships had lost 2000 people.
Captain Spry, with a few vessels, w^as left to winter at Halifax.
Boscawen and the rest of the fleet anchored at Spithead on
November 4th. It should be added that M. Dubois de la Motte
returned to France without adventure, and that the vessels which
he had sent into Louisbourg escaped and rejoined him at the time
when the British blockading squadron had been driven from its
station by bad weather.
' On the yite of what is now Pittsliurir.
142 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1756.
The capture of the Alcide and Lijs produced great excitement in
France, and fanned the flame of war in En_gland ; but although
hostihties thereupon began, formal war between Great Britain and
France was not declared until May 18th, 1756, upon the receipt in
London of the news of the French invasion of Minorca.
In the summer of 1755, Kear-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and
Eear-Admiral Temple West, with a strong squadron, put to sea in
hopes of intercepting the Comte du Guay, who was expected back
from the West Indies after having carried reinforcements to the
Leeward Islands. But the enemy avoided them, and re-entered
Brest without loss ; whereupon Hawke returned to Spithead. The
fleet soon afterwards sailed again under Vice-Admiral the Hon.
John Byng and Kear-Admiral Temple AVest, but re-anchored at
Spithead on November 21st. When Parliament met in November,
the addresses in reply to the speech from the throne were very
warlike, and France, which had previously believed that the great
body of Englishmen was averse to hostilities, made efforts to
negotiate : but too late.
Early in the new year, troops were assembled on the French
coast as if for an invasion of Great Britain ; and a fleet was collected
at Brest. The threat of invasion produced almost a panic in
England, and in February the Ministry increased the alarm by
issuing a foolish proclamation, ordering the proper officers, in case
the French should land, to cause all horses, oxen and other cattle,
which were fit for draft or burden and not actually used in the
interest and defence of the country, and all other cattle as far as was
practicable, and all provisions, to be driven or removed at least
twenty miles from the point at which such an attempt should be
made. The Government also unwisely detained at home a large
fleet, while it left America and the West Indies and the Mediter-
ranean very insufficiently guarded. It did not realise that Great
Britain is best protected from invasion by the activity and efficiency
of her Navy at sea. France took advantage of the alarm and con-
fusion to quietly embark at Toulon about 16,000 men, under the Due
de Kichelieu, and to send them to Minorca, convoyed by a strong
squadron under M. de La Galissonniere. The expedition landed at
Ciudadella on April lUtli.
Before proceeding to give an account of the operations of the
war, it may be well to say something of an expedition, which, under
liear-Admiral Charles Watson, rendered valuable service to commerce
1756.] OPERATIONS AGAINST ANGBIA. 143
by destroying the power of a most dangerous pirate in the East
Indies. This pirate, Tulagee Angria by name, was the representative
of a family which for about a hundred years had committed outrages
on the Mahratta coast, and had acquired both wealth and territory.
Angria was feared not only by the natives of India, but also by
European traders, and even by the East India Company; and he
had extended his authority from the small island stronghold of
Severndroog over a large stretch of coast, which included the town
and port of Geriah. In 1734 Angria had taken the East Indiaman,
Derby, richly laden, and later the Bestoration, 20, armed ship, and
the French Jupiter, 40. He had also ventured to attack Commodore
Wilham Lisle, who had two ships of the hne and several other
vessels in company; and he had wrought much damage to the
Dutch trade. He was by origin a Mahratta, but he had thrown off
his allegiance ; and the Mahrattas had long urged the East India
Company to assist in effecting his downfall. More than one attempt
had been made to destroy him, but in vain ; when, in 1755, an
agreement of the East India Company, the British Government and
the Mahrattas led to the fitting out against the pirate of a force,
which finally secured the desired object. Mr. James, Commodore
of the East India Company's ships in India, sailed in March with
the Company's ships Protector, Swallow, Viper, and Triumph, and
attacked and captured Severndroog, afterwards delivering it up to the
Mahrattas. He also took Bencote (Fort Victoria), the most northerly
port in Angria's dominions.
In November Eear-Admiral Watson reached Bombay, and further
operations were begun. James, with the Protector, Bevenge, and
Bombay, went to reconnoitre Geriah, Angria's chief stronghold ;
and, upon his return on December 31st, the Rear-Admiral sent His
Majesty's ships Bridgewater and Kingfisher, w^ith some of the
Company's armed vessels, to cruise off the port. James joined them
on January 27th, 1756, with the Protector, and Guardian ; and the
Rear-Admiral, with Eear-Admiral George Pocock as second in
command, and with Lieut. -Colonel CHve in command of the troops,
followed with his squadron, arriving on February 12th. In addition
to the King's and Company's ships, there was a contingent of Mahratta
craft, which, however, did httle or nothing. Angria, terrified at the
force arrayed against him, fled to the Mahrattas to try to make
terms, and left Geriah under the orders of one of his brothers-in-law.
His offers and promises induced the Mahrattas to withdraw their
144 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1756.
active co-operation, in return for an undertaking to put them in
possession of the place ; and the brother-in-law would have carried
out this aiTangement but that Watson refused to be satisfied with
anything short of the destruction of the pirate's stronghold.
In the afternoon of February 12th, the garrison having refused
to sun-ender, the squadron weighed and stood in in two divisions :
one to attack the fort and the other to attack Angria's fleet and
dockyard. A brisk cannonade resulted. The shipping was soon
burnt, and part of the town was set on fire. After about three
hours, the enemy's guns were nearly silenced, and the British guns
in consequence ceased also ; but, soon afterwards, firing was re-
commenced, and not until 6.30 p.m., the engagement having begun
at about 1.30 p.m., did the pirates cease to make further resistance.
Troops were then disembarked under Clive, ready to take possession ;
and during the night, lest the enemy might again take heart, the
bombs occasionally shelled the fort. In the morning Watson
summoned the garrison and was refused ; whereupon the bombard-
ment was again recommenced. At length a flag of truce was hung
out, and an offer of submission was made ; but, as it was not com-
plete and unconditional, fire was renewed. The governor then
surrendered unconditionally. On the morning of the 14th, Clive
marched into the place. Not more than twenty men were killed
and wounded on the British side in the affair. The victors found
in the fortress two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, six brass
mortars, and a large quantity of stores and ammunition, besides
about i,'100,000 sterling in rupees and ^630,000 worth of valuables.
Ten Englishmen and three Dutchmen, who had been enslaved by
Angria, were released. The pirate fleet which was burnt at Geriah
consisted of one ship, eight grabs or galleys, and a large number of
armed row-boats called gallivats. At the end of April Watson left
the coast of Malabar, and on May 14th arrived off Fort St. David.
In North America the Earl of Loudoun commanded the British
land forces, but, before he could take the field, the French had won
several successes and had made themselves masters of the British
armed vessels on Lake Ontario.
It has been mentioned that Commodore Spry had remained at
Nova Scotia after the return of Boscawen to England in 1755.
Commodore Charles Holmes, convoying some troops from Cork, was
sent out with a reinforcing squadron, and assumed command. With
the Grafton, Nottiiif/ha/n, Hornet and Jdnxuca he cruised ot't
1756,] THREATS OF INVASION. 145
Louisbourg in July, and nearly succeeded in cutting off a small
French force ; and on the following day he fought another French
force, which, however, also got away.
On the Leeward Islands' station Commodore Thomas Frankland
commanded ; and, although he fought no action, and rendered himself
very unpopular, his cruisers greatly annoyed the enemy. On the
Jamaica station, the squadron was under the orders of Kear-Admiral
the Hon. George Townshend ; but it was so small that he had to
remain almost entirely on the defensive. It, however, prevented the
French from carrying out an intended attack on Jamaica.
At home, the threat of invasion continued to cause popular
uneasiness, and in January, 1756, Vice-Admiral Henry Osborn
was sent to sea with a large squadron to convoy outward-bound
merchantmen, and, on his return, to reconnoitre Brest. He would
have been better employed in reinforcing the fleet in the Mediter-
ranean, for, although the enemy had sixteen ships of the line in
Brest and Eochefort, it was discovered that these could not be
ready before May ; and in the meanwhile. Great Britain had eight
ships of the line and twenty-three frigates quite ready, and thirty-
two ships of the line and five frigates nearly ready for sea in the
home ports.
Nor was the threat of invasion ever a serious one. The French
knew too well that the project at that time was hopeless. Upon the
return of Osborn, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke was sent with a
squadron to cruise off Brest, and was reinforced in April by additional
ships under Eear-Admiral Francis Holburne. But these precautions
were taken too late, for Vice-Admiral d'Aubigny had left Brest for
Martinique on January 30th, and M. de Beaussier had sailed on
February 19th for San Domingo. Yet Hawke, ere he came back
to England in May, made many valuable prizes. He left Holburne
to cruise before Brest ; and Holburne was presently joined by Vice-
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen, who assumed command of the
united fleet of eighteen ships of the line, six 50-gun ships and two
frigates.
This demonstration naturally induced the French squadron to
keep within its harbour; but some of Boscawen's vessels engaged
straggling French ships. The invasion scare still continuing, the
Vice-Admiral took effectual means to put an end to it. He sent
the Hunter, cutter. Lieutenant Cockburn, to reconnoitre Brest.
Mr. Cockburn ran close into the harbour's mouth, and then with
VOL, III. L
146 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1756.
five companions, got into a boat and rowed into the port in the
dark. He reported that he had found there only nine ships of war
of 50-giins or under and six large merchantmen. Boscawen and
Holbm-ne returned to England in November, leaving Eear-Admirals
Savage Mostyn and Harry Norris before Brest, chiefly to intercept
such of the enemy's ships as might be coming home from abroad.
The blockading force was afterwards entrusted to Vice-Admiral
Charles Knowles, who came back to port w^ith most of it in
December. His departure was somewhat premature, in that it
enabled M. de Kersaint to get out with a small force for the coast
of Africa, and M. de Beauffremont to escape with another small
force bound for the West Indies. It also allowed some small
cruising squadrons to proceed to sea in safety.
The British Ministry was very negligent in the matter of
Minorca. It is quite clear that as early as October, 1755, it had
received intelligence that the expedition preparing at Toulon was
destined for that island ; and that French reports to the same effect
reached it in November and December, as well as later.^ Yet it
took no proper measures for the defence of the place, the reason
apparently being that, at that time, it undervalued the importance of
the position. The mihtary command of the island was in the hands
of General WilHam Blakeney, an officer in his eighty-second year,
who was so infirm that when Port Mahon was besieged by the Due
de Eichelieu, he, though mentally very active, was obliged to spend
great part of his time in bed. The garrison also was very weak,
and most of the ofiicers belonging to it were on leave until some
time after the French expedition had sailed from Toulon. More-
over, the British squadron in the Mediterranean, including as it did
only three ships of the line and a few small craft, was a serious
danger rather than a source of strength.
Yet at length public opinion in England insisted that something
must be done ; and on March 11th, 175G, Vice-Admiral the Hon.
John Byng was appointed to the command of a fleet, which was
then ordered to proceed to Minorca. The position of second in
command was given to Bear-Admiral Temple West. But this fleet,
which should have been a large and powerful one, was by no means
of formidable proportions. It consisted only of ten sail of the line ;
and even those few ships were not fitted out without the greatest
difficulty and friction. At that late date the Ministry seems to have
' Resols. of Ho. of Comms., May ^nl, 1757.
1756.] BYNG TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 147
been still blind to the importance of Minorca. There were at the
moment twenty-seven ships of the line cruising in the Channel and
Bay of Biscay, twenty-eight ships of the line in commission at
home, and many small craft, which might have been detailed for
the service. But Byng was not permitted to utilise any of these,
or to draw crews from them ; and his mission was evidently
regarded as a wholly subsidiary one. He was directed to take on
board the absent officers of the Minorca garrison and a reinforce-
ment of troops, consisting of the Koyal Eegiment of Fusiliers,
under the command of Colonel Lord Bobert Bertie. To make
room for these men, all the Marines belonging to the squadron were
sent on shore, with the result that, had Byng been successful in
throwing troops into Port Mahon, he would, owing to the absence
of Marines from his ships, have been in a condition unfit for sub-
sequently fighting an action at sea.
The Vice-Admiral prepared his fleet with as much dispatch as
possible, and sailed from St. Helen's on April 6th, arriving at
Gibraltar on May 2nd. He was there joined by some of the ships,
which, under Captain the Hon. George Edgcumbe, were already in
the Mediterranean ; and he received intelligence that the Toulon
squadron had landed a French army in Minorca, and that the enemy
was already in possession of almost every strong position in the island.
Byng communicated to General Fowke, the Governor of Gibraltar,
an order from home to the effect that, subject to certain conditions,
a detachment from the garrison, equal to a battalion of men, was
to be embarked on board the fleet. But General Fowke and his
advisers came to the conclusion, firstly, that it would be extremely
dangerous, if not impracticable, to throw succour into Port Mahon ;
and secondly, that the garrison of Gibraltar was already too weak to
spare the specified detachment without danger to itself. Yet as the
fleet was in great want of men, and as Edgcumbe's ships had left
their Marines, and some of their seamen, in Minorca to assist in the
work of defence, the Governor permitted 1 captain, 6 subalterns,
9 sergeants, 11 corporals, 5 drummers and 200 privates to embark,
it being represented to him that, without such reinforcement,
several of the ships would be absolutely unable to go into action.
Captain Edgcumbe, with his little squadron, had been obliged to
retire from off Minorca upon the appearance of the French. He
had left behind him Captain Carr Scrope of the Dolphin, who
commanded the naval detachment on shore, and who was to
L 2
148
MAJOB OPEBATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1756.
act as signal officer in the event of the appearance of a British
squadron before the island. Ere Bj^ng, with an easterly wind,
sailed from Gibraltar on May 8th, he had been joined by the whole
of Captain Edgcumbe's little force, excepting the Phoenix, which
had been blockaded at Palina, Majorca, by two French frigates,
and which was only able to get out upon the appearance of the
British fleet off that island. The wind was for the most part
easterly until 9 p.m. on the 18th, when a brisk northerly breeze
sprang up ; and the squadron, having sailed large all night, sighted
Minorca at daybreak next morning. Byng at once sent ahead the
Phcenix, Chesterfield and Dolphin to reconnoitre the mouth of
Mahon Harbour, to pick up intelligence, and to endeavour to send
ashore a letter to General Blakeney. Captain the Hon. Augustus
John Hervey, the senior officer of the advanced squadron, drew in
with the shore and endeavoured to communicate with the castle of
St. Philip ; but, before he could effect anything, the enemy's fleet
appeared in the S.E., and the detachment had to be recalled.
Vice-Admiral Byng then stood towards the foe and made the
signal for a general chase. Both squadrons ^ made sail towards one
' The British and Frenth Fleets ik the Action off Minorca, May 20th, 1756.
British.
Frekch.
Ships.
Gnus.
Commamiers.
Defiance
Portland i .
Lancaster .
Buckingham
Captain . .
Intrepid
Revenge .
Princess Louisa '
Trident . .
Bamillies .
Ctilloden
Kingston
Fkigates, etc
Deptford 1 2 .
Chi^sterjield >
Phcenix 1
Fortune l
t^jjiTimint •
60
50
66
68
64
64
64
60
64
90
74
60
50
40
20
14
20
•Ji)
(Capt. Thomas Andrews
I (2)-
,, Patrick Paird.
( „ Hon. George Edg-
t ciinibe.
iRear-Admiral Temple
(Capt. Michael Everitt.
„ Charles (Watford.
„ James Vouug (1").
/■ ,, Frederick Coru-
1 wall.
„ Tlidma.'i Noel.
i „ Philip Durell (1).
' iVice-Adm. Hou. John
<^ Byng(B).
(Capt. Arthur rJardiiicr.
,, Henry ANaid.
„ AVilli'ani Pan7C2).
„ John Amherst.
„ John Lloyd (2).
f „ Hon. Augustus
I John Hervey.
Com. Jervis Ma|ile.sdeu.
Capt. James fiikhrist.
r'liiii. lien.janiiii Marlo\v.3
Ships.
Orphee .
Hippopotame
liedoutahle .
Sage . . .
Guerrier
Fier .
Foudroyant .
Temeraire .
Content .
Lion .
Couronne .
Triton .
Fkigates, inct
Junon ...
Hose ....
Gracieuse . .
Topaze .
Nymphe .
Gims. I
Flag-Offieers.
64
50
1i
64
74
50
84
74
64
64
74
64
46
26
26
24
26
M. de Glaudevez (Chef
L d'Escadre).
fM. de La Galissonniere
I (Lieut.-Geneial).
(M. de La Clue (Chef
I d'Escadre).
1 \\ ere in th>- .Meditcnaiicau uniier Capt. the Hon. U. Edgcuiubc, before Aduural Pjnig's arrival.
- The /iiplford, having been originally iilace<l in the line between the Cullvdai and the /iingflo7i, and tlieii
removed from it, was later ordered to take the place of the di.^abled Intrepid.
3 Capt. Carr Scrope being on service ashore at Port Mahon.
* La Galissonniere menti ms only four French frigates as having been present.
1756.]
BYNG'S ACTION OFF MINORCA.
149
1
another ; and at 2 p.m. the British Commander-in-Chief made the
signal for a Hne of battle ahead. Bat, the wind dropping, this
order could not be properly carried
out. In the meantime he took the
precaution of reinforcing such of the
ships as were most weakly manned,
by means of drafts from the frigates ;
and he directed that the Phoenix,
which had been reported as unfit for
general service, should be made ready
to act as a fireship in case of necessity.
At about six o'clock in the eveninsf
the enemy advanced in order, with
twelve ships of the line and five
frigates ; the van being commanded
by M. Glandevez, the centre by M. de
La Galissonniere, and the rear by M.
de La Clue. An hour later the French
tacked, and went away a distance of
about six miles, with a view to gaining
the weather-gage ; and Byng, to pre-
serve that advantage, tacked likewise
On the following morning two tartans,
which had been sent out by M. de
Eichelieu with soldiers to reinforce
M. de La Galissonniere, were chased
by the British ships, one of them
being taken by the Defiance, and the
other escaping. That morning at
daybreak, the weather was hazy, and
the enemy was not at once seen ; but,
a little later, he came in sight in
the S.E.
Captain Mahan's account of the
action which followed may be here
quoted, as it admirably summarises [///^repw should be flying up into the
^ '' wind. She is here represented as before
what occurred. the wind.]
byng's action, may 20th, 1756.
I.— At 2 P.M.
British, black; French, ivhite.
[The angle of approach was somewhat
greater than as shown in the plans.]
■^
1 ^ '^
1 ^ ^
4 ""
/ . 1 *
byng's action, may 20th, 1756.
n.— At 2.30 P.M.
British, black ; French, lohite.
" The two fleets," he writes, " having sighted each other on the morning of
May 20th, were found after a series of manoeuvres both on tlie port tacli, with an
easterly wind, heading southerly, the French to leeward, between the English and the
150
MA JOE OPERATIONS, 171-1-1762.
[1756.
liarbour. Byng ran dowii in line ahead off the wind, the French remaining by it, so
that when the former made the signal to engage, the fleets were not parallel, but
formed an angle of from 30° to 40° (PI. I.). The attack which Byng by his own account
meant to make, each ship against its opposite in the enemy's line, difficult to carry out
under any circumstances, was here further impeded bj^ the distance between the two
rears beinf much freater than that between the vans ; so that his whole line could not
come into action at the same moment. When the signal was made, the van ships kept
away in obedience to it, and ran down for the French so nearly head on as to sacrifice
their artillery fire in great measure (PI. II.). They received three raking broadsides
and were seriously dismantled aloft. The sixth
English ship " {Intrepid) " counting from the
van, had her foretopmast shot away, flew up
into the wind, and came abacK, stopping and
doubling up the rear of the line (PI. III.). Then
undoubtedly was the time for Byng, having
committed himself to the fight, to have set the
example and borne down, just as Farragut did
at Mobile when his line was confused by the
stopping of the next ahead ; but according to
the testimony of the flag-captain, Mathews's
sentence deterred him. ' You see. Captain
Gardiner, that the signal for the line is out, and
that I am ahead of the ships Louisa and
Trident' (which in the order should have been
ahead of him). ' You would not have me, as
admiral of the fleet, run down as if I were going
to engage a single ship. It was Mr. Mathews's
misfortune to be prejudiced by not carrying
down his force together, which I shall endeavour
to avoid.' The affair thus became indecisive;
the English van was separated from the rear
and got the brunt of the fight. One French authority blames Galissonniere for not
tacking to windward of the enemy's van and crushing it. Another says he ordered the
movement, but that it could not be made from the damage to the rigging ; but this seems
improbable, as the only injury the French squadron underwent aloft was the loss of
one topsail-yard, whereas the English suftered very badly. The true reason is probably
that given and approved by one of the French authorities on naval warfare. Galisson-
niere considered the support of the land attack on Port Mahon paramount to any
destruction of the English fleet, though he thereby exposed his own. ' The French
navy has always preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to that,
more brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of taking some ships ; and therein
it has approached more nearly tlie true end that has been proposed in war.' The
justice of this conclusion depends upon tiic view that is taken of the true end
of naval war." ^
:
, 0 .
» ^
0 :
* 0 6
%
^ ^i
% * 0 (»
(i
1 ^ ^
^ ^0 /
*"" ' '/
* ■ /
f
1 1
* *
byng's action, may 20th, 1756.
III.— 3 P.M.
The losses (see following page^) in killed and wounded were
nearly equal ; but the French lost no officers of rank, whereas in
Byng's fleet Captain Andrews, of the Defiance, was killed, and
Captain Noel, of the Princess Louisa, was mortally wounded.
The British ships also suffered much more than the French in
Inn. of Sea Power ujion Hist.,' 286, 287.
1756.]
BYNG'S ACTION OFF MINORCA.
151
their masts, yards and rigging ; so much so, in fact, that Byng
deemed it right, before ventm'ing to do anything further, to call a
council of war on board the Bamillies, and to summon to it not
only the naval officers, but also several of the land officers who
were on board the ships. The questions debated in this council,
and the conclusions arrived at, were as follows : —
1. Whether an attack on the French fleet gave any prospect of relieving Mahon ?
Eesolved : It did not.
2. Whether, if there were no French fleet cruising at Minorca, the British fleet
could raise the siege ? Eesolved : It could not.
3. Whether Gibraltar would not be in danger, should any accident befall Byng's
fleet ? Eesolved : It would be in danger.
4. AVhether an attack by the British fleet in its present state upon that of the
French would not endanger Gibraltar, and expose the trade in the Mediter-
ranean to great hazards ? Eesolved : It would.
5. Whether it is not rather for His Majesty's service that the fleet should proceed
immediately to Gibraltar ? Eesolved : It should proceed to Gibraltar.
As a result, the squadron sailed for Gibraltar, and, on the way,
occupied itself in repairing such damages as could be repaired at
^ The losses in killed and wounded in the two fleets were as follows : —
Burns H.
Fkench.
Ships. Killed.
Wounded.
Ships. Killed.
Wounded.
Defiance .... 14
45
Orpliee ....
10
0
Portland
6
20
Hipijopotame
2
10
Lancaster
1
14
Bedoutahle .
0
3
Buckingham .
3
7
Sage .
0
8
Captain .
6
30
Guerrier .
0
43
Intrepid .
9
36
Fier . .
0
4
Princess Louisa
3
13
Foudroyant
2
10
Temeraire
0
15
Content .
5
19
Lion .
2
7
Couronne
0
3
Triton
5
14
Totals
42
165
Tot;
lis
1
26
136
London Gazette of June 26th, 1756. Lists in Beatsou, iii. 118, put the total losses
at— British, 43 killed, 168 wounded ; French, 38 killed, 181 wounded. La Galissonniere
puts the French loss at 38 killed, and 1 15 wounded. It may be that 26 French were
killed outright, and that 12 more died of their wounds. No two accoimts of the
number of wounded can be expected to agree exactly, some enumerators naturally
including among the wounded men with only slight injuries.
152
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2.
[1756.
sea. At the Kock the Admiral ^ found reinforcements,'- which had
been sent out to him under Commodore Thomas Broderick,^ the
Ministry, after Byng's departure from England, having apparently
realised for the first time the full extent of the danger in the
Mediterranean.
It was unfortunate for Byng that the first detailed news of what
had happened off Minorca reached the Government through French
channels. M. de La Galissonniere's dispatch cannot now be found
in the Archives de la Marine in Paris, and possibly it no longer
exists ; but a copy of it, or a translation, reached the Secretary
of the Admiralty some time before Byng's own dispatch arrived
in England ; and upon the former the Government took action,
recalling Byng and West, and sending out Vice- Admiral Sir
Edward Hawke and Bear-Admiral Charles Saunders to supersede
them. The important part of this dispatch of La Galissonniere's *
is as follows : —
" At half-past two in the afternoon the two squadrons were in line of battle and
began the engagement. The English consisted of eighteen sail, of which thirteen were
of the line, and oars, of twelve sail of the line and four frigates. The action lasted
almost three hours and a half, but was not general during the whole of the time. The
English ships that had suffered most from our broadsides got away to the windward,
out of gunshot. They continually preserved this advantage that they might keep
clear of us as they pleased. After having made their greatest efforts against our rear
division, which they found so close and from which they received so hot a tire that
they could not break in upon it, they made up their minds to sheer off, and did not
appear again during the whole of the next day, the 21st. Speaking generally, none of
their ships long withstood the fire of ours. Our vessels suffered but little. They were
re])aired in the night, and on the following morning were tit for action." ..." Our
total killed was thirty-eight, and woimded one hundred and fifteen."
' On June 4th, 1756, Byng was promoted to be Admiral of the Blue.
^ Reinforcement despatched to Admiral the Hon. John Byng uuder Commodore
Broderif
Ships.
Prince Geonje.
Ipswich
Xassau
Hampton Court
his.
Guns.
80
64
64
64
50
Commanders.
jCommod. Thomas Brodericl
\Capt. Abraliam North.
„ Richard Tyrrell.
„ James Saycr.
„ James Webb.
„ Edward Wheeler.
^ This officer, who was born in 1704, and died a Vice-Adniiral in
spelt liis name Broderick. It was, however, properly sjiclt Brodrick.
■* As published in the journals of the time.
rO'.i, usually
1756.] BFNG'S DISPATCH. 153
It may here be pointed out, in passing, that this report makes
the British fleet to have been considerably superior to the French,
whereas if there were any real difference between them it was only
a very slight one ; and that it does not agree, in other respects, with
the facts as they are now accepted.
Before going further, it is right to print the dispatch which Byng
addressed to the Admiralty on May 25th, and in which he gave his
version of what had happened. It is right also to say that the
Admiralty, after receiving this dispatch, kept it for some time
before making it public, and that, when it did publish it, gave
it to the world in a mutilated condition. The complete dispatch
was printed by Byng after his return to England, and ran as
follows : —
Ramillies, off Minorca, May 25th, 1756.
" Sir, — I have the j^leasure to desire that you will acquaint their Lordships that,
having sailed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the 19th, having been joined hj
his Majesty's ship PnoiNix off Majorca two days before, by ivho7n I had confirmed the
intelligence 1 had received <>t Gibraltar, of the strength of the French fleet, and of their
being of Mahon. His Majesty^s colours luere still flying at the castle of St. Philip ;
and I could perceive several bomb-batteries -playing on it from different parts. French
colours I saio flying on the luest part of >St. Philip. I dispatched the Phoenix,
CI tester field, and Dolphin ahead, to reconnoitre the harbours mouth; and Captain
Hervey to endeavour to land a letter for General Blakeney, to let him know the fleet
ivas here to his assistance ; though every one was of the opinion tve could be of no use
to him; as, by all accounts, no place was secured for covering a landing, could we have
spared the people. The Phanix was also to make the private signal betioeen Captain
Hervey and Capdain Scrope, as this latter ivould undoubtedly come off, if it were
practicable, having kep)t the Dolphin^s barge with Mm : but the enemy^s fleet appearing
to the south-east, and the ivind at the same time coming strong off the land, obliged me
to call these ships in, before they could get quite so near the entrance of the harbour
as to make sure what batteries or guns might be placed to prevent our having any
communication with the castle. Falling little wind, it was five before I could form
my line, or distinguish any of the enemy's motions ; and could not judge at all of their
force, more than by numbers, which were seventeen, and thirteen appeared large.
They at first stood towards us in regular line; and tacked about seven; which I
judged was to endeavour to gain the wind of us in the night ; so that, being late,
I tacked in order to keep the weather-gage of them, as well as to make sure of the
land wind in the morning, being very hazy, and not above five leagues from Cape
Mola. We tacked off towards the enemy at eleven ; and at daylight had no sight of
them. But two tartans, with the French private signal, being close in with the rear
of our fleet, I sent the Princess Louisa to chace one, and made signal for the Rear-
Admiral, who was nearest the other, to send ships to chase her. The Princess Louisa,
Defiance, and Captain, became at a great distance ; but the Defiance took hers, which
had two captains, two lieutenants, and one hundred and two private soldiers, who were
sent out the day before with six hundred men on board tartans, to reinforce the
French fleet on our appearing off that place. The Phcenix, on Captain Hervey's ofter,
prepared to serve as a fire-ship, but without damaging her as a frigate ; till the signal
was made to prime, when she was then to scuttle her decks, everything else prepared,
as the time and place allowed of.
154 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [175G.
" The enemy now began to appear from the mast-head. I called in the cruisers ;
and, when tliey had joined me, I tacked towards the enemy, and formed the line ahead.
I found the French, were preiDaring theirs to leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured
to weather me. They were twelve large ships of the line, and five frigates.
"As soon as I judged the rear of our fleet the length of their van, we tacked
altogether, and immediately made the signal for the ships that led to lead large, and
for the Deptford to quit the line, that ours might become equal to theirs. At two
I made the signal to engage : I found it was the surest method of ordering every ship
to close down on the one that fell to their lot. And here I must express my great
satisfaction at the very gaUant manner in which the Eear-Admiral set the van the
example, by instantly bearing down on the ships he was to engage, with his second,
and who occasioned one of the Fiench ships to begin the engagement, which they did
by raking ours as they went down. The Intrepid, unfortunately, in the very begin-
ning, had her foretopmast shot away ; and as that hung on her foretopsail, and backed
it, he had no command of his ship, his fore-tack and all his braces being cut at the
same time ; so that he drove! on the next ship to him, and obliged that and the ships
ahead of me to'throwlall back. This obliged me to do also for some minutes, to avoid
their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our adversary out of the
line, who put before the, wind, and had several shots fired at him by his own admiral.
This not only caused the enemy's centre to be unattacked, but the Eear-Admiral's
division rather uncovered for some little time. I sent and called to the ships ahead of
me to make sail, and go down on the enemy ; and ordered the Chesterfield to lay by
the Intrepid, and the 'Deptford to supply the Intrepid's place. I found the enemy
edged away constantly ; and as they went three feet to our one, they would never
permit our closing with them, but took advantage of destroying our rigging ; for
though I closed the Rear-Admiral fast, I found that I could not gain close to the enemy,
whose van was fairlyidrove from their line; but their admiral was joining them, by
bearing aAvay.
"By this time it]was past six, and the enemy's van and ours were at too great a
distance to engage, I perceived some of their ships stretching to the northward ; and
T imagined they were going to form a new line. I made the signal for the headmost
ships to tack, and those that led before with the larboard tacks to lead with the
starboard, that I might, by the first, keep (if possible) the wind of the enemy, and, by
the second, between the Eear-Admiral's division and the enemy, as he had suffered
most ; as also to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived to be in very bad condition,
and Avhose loss would give the balance very greatly against us, if they attacked us
next morning as I expected. I brought to about eight that night to join the Intrepid,
and to refit our ships as fast as possible, and continued doing so all night. The next
morning Ave saw nothing of the enemy, though we were still lying to. Mahon was
N.X.W. about ten or eleven leagues. I sent cruisers to look out for the Intrepid and
Chesterfield, who joined me next day. And having, from a state and condition of the
squadron brought me in, found, that the Captain, Intrepid, and Defiance (which latter
has lost her ca])tain), were much damaged in their masts, so that they were in danger
of not being able to secure their masts froperly at sea ; and also, th'it the squadron in
general were very sickly, many killed and wounded, and nowhere to put a third of
their number if I made an hospital of the forty-gun ship, which was not easy at sea ;
I thought it proper in this situation to call a council of war, before I went again to
look for the enemy. I desired the attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and
Lord Eobert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their opinions upon
the present situation of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make sure of protecting the latter,
since it ivas found impracticable either to succour or relieve the former with the
force we had. So, though lue may justly claim the victory, yet we are much inferior
to the weight of their ships, though the numbers are equal ; and they have the advantage
of sending to Minorca their wounded, and getting reinforcements of seamen from their
1756.] FALL OF PORT MAHON. 155
transports, and soldiers from their camp; all which undoubtedly has been done in this
time that we have been li/ing to to refit, and often in sight of Minorca ; and their ships
have more than once appeared in a line from our mast-heads.
^^ I send their Lordships the resolutions of the council of ivar, in which there ivas
not the least contention, or doubt arose. 1 hope, indeed, we shall find stores to refit us
at Gibraltar ; and, if I have any reinforcement, will not lose a moment of time to
seek the enemy again, and once more give them battle, though they have a great
advantage in being clean ships that go three feet to our one, and therefore have their
choice how they tvill engage us, or if they luill at all ; and ivill never let us close them,
as their sole view is the disabling our ships, in ivhich they have but too ivell succeeded,
though we obliged them to bear up.
" I do not send their Lordships the particulars of our losses and damages by this,
as it would take me much time ; and I am willing none should be lost in letting them
know an event of such consequence.
" I cannot help urging their Lordships for a reinforcement. If none are yet sailed
on their hnowledge of the enemy''s strength in these;seas, and which, by very good intelli-
gence, will in a few days be strengthened by four mare large ships from Toidon, almost
ready to sail, if not sailed, to join these.
" I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene, bylway of Barcelona; and am making
the best of my way to cover Gibraltar, from which place I propose sending their
Lordships a more particular account. I remain, Sir, your most humble servant, —
"J. Byng.
" Hon. John Clevland, Esq."
The above dispatch appears to have arrived in England on
June 16th ; but it was not pubHshed in the Lo?idon Gazette until
June 26th, and then only with the omission of those passages which
are now printed in italics. The omissions, it is clear, were some-
what unfair, and, being calculated to prejudice Byng, they show the
bias of the Ministry, which, previously inclined to underrate the
importance of Minorca, at length seemed disposed to attach the
utmost significance to it. The dispatch is, however, an unsatis-
factory one, even as it stands. It is too full of excuses, too
apologetic, to be the work of a strong and self-reliant man. It
smacks, indeed, more of a Persano than of a Nelson or a Saumarez.
To avoid a break in the narrative, it may here be said that the
town of Port Mahon defended itself gallantly, but had to capitu-
late, on June 29th, on honourable terms. The garrison was sent to
England.
Commodore Broderick, with the reinforcement, had reached
Gibraltar on June 15th, and was there found by Byng on his arrival
there on June 19th. The Admiral at once began preparations to
return to Minorca ; but, while he was still engaged in these, on
July 3rd, the Antelope, 50, came in with Vice-Admiral Sir Edward
Hawke, Eear-Admiral Charles Saunders, and the order for the
supersession of the Commander-in-Chief and Eear-Admiral West.
156 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
She had sailed from home on Jmie 16th. Captams Gardiner and
Everitt, Captain WiUiam Gough (who had been a Heutenant of the
Bamillies, and who had since been appointed captain of the Experi-
ment), and Commander Christopher Basset (who had also been a
lieutenant of the Bamillies and had been appointed after the action
to the command of the Fortune), were also recalled, besides other
officers, who were required as witnesses in England. The original
order to Hawke directed only the supersession of Byng ; but after
Hawke's departure from England and the receipt of Byng's dispatch
of May 25th, the Admiralty decided to go further and to make
prisoner of the late Commander-in-Chief. He sailed for England
in the Antelope, on July 9th, and, upon arriving at Spithead on
July 26th, he was put under arrest. He was landed on August 19th
and sent to Greenwich. There he remained in confinement until
December 23rd, when he was removed to Portsmouth. His trial
began on board the St. George in Portsmouth Harbour on
December 27th, and continued until January 27th, 1757. On that
day sentence was pronounced, and the Admiral was transferred to
the Monarch, then in harbour.
The court-martial, summoned to try Byng, consisted of Vice-
Admiral Thomas Smith (4), who was president, Eear-Admirals
Francis Holburne, Harry Norris and Thomas Broderick, and nine
captains. After hearing the evidence, the court agreed to thirty-
seven resolutions or conclusions, which embodied, among others,
the following : —
That when the British fleet, on the starboard tack, was stretched abreast, or was
about abeam, of the enemy's line. Admiral Byng should have caused his
ships to tack together, and should have immediately borne right down on
the enemy ; his van steering for the enemy's van, his rear for its rear, each
ship making for the one opposite to her in tlie enemy's line, under such sail
as would have enabled the worst sailer to preserve her station in tlie line of
battle.
That the Admiral retarded the rear division of the British fleet from closing with
and engaging the enemy, by shortening sail, in order that the Trident and
Princens Louisa might regain their stations ahead of the RamilUes ; wliercas
he should have made signals to those shijjs to make more sail, and should
have made so much sail himself as would enable the Culloden, the worst
sailing ship in the Admiral's division, to kec]) her station with all her plain
sails set, in order to get down to the enemy with as much expedition as
possible, and thereby proi:)erly support the division of Eear- Admiral West.
Tliat tlie Admiral did wrong in ordering the fire of the RamilUes to be continued
before lie had placed her at proper distance from the enemy, inasmuch as he
tliereby not only threw away his sliot, but also occasioned a smoke, which
prevented his seeing the motions of the enemy and the positions nf the ships
immediately ahead of the RamilUes.
1757.] BYNG'S COURT-MARTIAL. 157
That after the ships which had received damage in the action had been refitted as
circumstances would permit, the Admiral ought to have returned with his
squadron off Port Malion, and endeavoured to open communication with the
castle, and to have used every means in his power for its relief, before
returning to Gibraltar.
In short, the court considered that Byng had not done his
utmost to reheve St. PhiHp's Castle. It also considered that
during the engagement he had not done his utmost to take, sink,
burn, and destroy the ships of the enemy, and to assist such of
his own ships as were engaged ; and it resolved that the x4.dmiral
had fallen under the 12th Article of War ^ ; and the court decided
that, as the 12th Article of War positively prescribed death, without
leaving any alternative to the discretion of the court under any
variation of circumstances, Admiral Byng should be shot to death,
at such time and on board such ship as the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty should direct.
" But," concludes the thirty-seventh resolution, " as it appears by the evidence of
Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, Captain Gardiner and other officers
of the ship, who were near the person of the Admiral, that they did not perceive any
backwardness in him during the action, or any marks of fear or confusion, either from
his countenance or behaviour, but that he seemed to give his orders coolly and dis-
tinctly, and did not seem wanting in personal courage, and from other circumstances,
the court do not believe that his misconduct arose either from cowardice or disaffection ;
and do therefore unanimously think it their duty most earnestly to recommend him as
a proper object of mercy."
The court forwarded the sentence to the Admiralty, with an
accompanying letter signed by all the members. In this the
officers represented the distress of mind which had been occasioned
to them by being obliged to condemn to death, under the 12th
Article of War, a man who might have been guilty of an error of
judgment only ; and, for the sake of their consciences, as well
as for Byng's sake, they warmly pleaded for an exercise of
clemency.
In consequence of this letter, and of the recommendation to
^ " Every person in the fleet, who, through cowardice, negligence, or disaffection,
shall, in time of action, Avithdraw, or keep back, or not come into fight, or engagement,
or shall not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which it shall be his duty to
engage ; and to assist all and every of his Majesty's ships, or those of his allies, which
it shall be his duty to assist and relieve ; every such person, so offending, and being
convicted thereof by the sentence of a court-martial, shall suffer death." — -Act of
22 George II., Art. 12.
This article superseded one in the Act of 13 Car. II., which, after the word
" death," had the words, " or such other punishment as the circumstances of the offence
shall deserve, and the court-martial shall judge fit."
158 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
mere}', the opinion of the twelve Judges was asked for as to the
legahty of the sentence which had been pronounced. The decision
was given on February 14th, 1757, and was to the effect that the
sentence was legal. Some of the members of the court then made
an effort to save Byng by applying to Parliament to release them
from the oath of secrecy, by which they were bound not to reveal
the votes or opinions of individual members, upon the allegation
that they had something vital to disclose relative to the sentence.
Byng was respited, and a Bill for the desired purpose passed the
Commons, but was thrown out by the Lords, it not appearing to
that House that there was anything material to be divulged. The
fact is, that certain members simply desired to be able to make
public the fact that, had they reahsed that the result of their
sentence would be the infliction of the death penalty, their sentence
would have been other than it was. The severity of the punishment
caused Vice-Admiral the Hon. John Forbes, one of the Lords of
the Admiralty, to refuse to sign the sentence, and it also induced
Eear-Admiral West, who had been offered a command, to decline
it, on the plea that although he could answer for his loyalty and
good intentions, he could not undertake to be held capitally
responsible on all occasions for the correctness of his judgment.
Byng, both during his trial and after his sentence, behaved like
a brave man. It was at first ordered that he should be executed on
the forecastle of the Monarch. This ignominy was, however, spared
him at the solicitation of his friends. On March 14th, 1757, the
day appointed for the carrying out of the sentence, the Marines of
the Monarch were drawn up under arms upon the poop, along
the gangways, in the waist, and on one side of the quarterdeck.
On the other side of the quarterdeck was spread some saw-dust,
on which w^as placed a cushion ; and in the middle of the quarter-
deck, upon the gratings, a platoon of nine Marines was drawn up
in three lines of three. The front and middle lines had their
bayonets fixed, as was customary on such occasions. The captains
of all the ships in Portsmouth Harbour and at Spithead had been
ordered to attend with their boats ; but, to avoid crowding, they
were directed to lie abreast upon their oars, without coming on
board. A little before twelve o'clock, the Admiral retired to his
inner cabin for about three minutes, after which the doors of the
outer cabin were thrown open, and the Admiral walked from his
after cabin with a dignified pace and unmoved countenance. As
1757.]
BYNG'S EXECUTION.
159
he passed through the fore cabin, he bowed to his acquaintances
there, and, saying to the Marshal of the Admiralty " Come along,
my friend," went out upon the quarterdeck. There, turning to
the Marshal, he politely bowed and gave him a paper containing
a sober vindication of his position, adding: "Remember, sir, what
I have told you relative to this paper." He next went to the
cushion and knelt down. One of his friends, following him, offered
ADMIRAL THE HON. JOHN BYNG.
{From Pi. Houston's engraving after the portrait by Hudson.)
to tie the bandage over his eyes, but Byng declined the service and
blindfolded himself. The Marines, in the meantime, advanced two
paces and presented their muskets, waiting for the Admiral to give
them the signal to fire. He remained upon his knees for about
a minute, apparently praying, and then dropped a handkerchief,
the signal agreed upon. Six of the Marines fired. One bullet
missed ; one passed through the heart ; and four others struck
different parts of the body. The Admiral sank to the deck, dead.
160 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1756.
A little later the corpse was put into a coffin ; and in the evening
it was sent on shore to the dockyard, whence it was forwarded to
the family burial place at Southill, in Bedfordshire. His monument
bears this inscription : "To the Perpetual Disgrace of Public
Justice, the Hon. John Byng, Esq., Admiral of the Blue, fell a
Martyr to Political Persecution, March 14th, in the year mdcclvii ;
when Bravery and Loyalty were insui!icient Securities for the Life
and Honour of a Naval Ofticer."
The tragedy, viewed from nearly every aspect, is to be most
heartily regretted. Byng was neither traitor nor coward ; but he
was not an original genius, and, having seen Mathews punished for
doing a certain thing, he believed that under no circumstances was
it his duty to do anything even remotely of the same kind. His
chief fault was that he was not independent enough, where a great
object was to be gained, to shake himself loose from formulas and
precedents, and to dash in when occasion allowed him. Yet, in
one way, the sentence may have been productive of good. It may
have taught the admirals who followed the unfortunate Byng, that
they must pay more attention to victory than to red tape, and
that not even the most honest devotion to conventional methods
is so great a merit in a naval officer as success against the enemies
of his country.
Sir Edward Hawke, soon after his arrival at Gibraltar, sailed
with the fleet to Minorca, but found that the island had fallen, and
that the French army and fleet had returned to Toulon. The
enemy had no longer any squadron at sea in the Mediterranean,
and the Vice-Admiral therefore had to confine himself to protecting
British trade and preserving British prestige. This he did with
conspicuous energy and success. On December 3rd, 1756, he set
out with part of his fleet for home, leaving Bear-Admiral Charles
Saunders in command.
It has been said that Vice-Admiral Charles "Watson, Commander-
in-Chief in the East Indies, arrived off Fort St. David in the middle
of May, 1756. He had not been there long ere he received an
important piece of news, to the effect that six large French East
Indiamen, full of troops, were expected in India, where they were
to be fitted as men-of-war. Thereupon, in response to an urgent
summons, he went to Madras, where he learnt that the Nawab of
Bengal, Surajah Dowleh, had seized Cassimbazar and Calcutta.
Almost at the same moment Watson received orders from the
1757.]
WATSON TAKES CALCUTTA.
161
Admiralty to return with his squadron^ to England. He had,
however, sufficient strength of character to disregard orders which
he knew had been sent to him under misconception of the position
in India ; and he proceeded at once to the mouth of the Ganges,
with a detachment of troops under Lieut. -Colonel Clive. In spite of
great difficulties he assembled at Fulta, on December 15th, a force
consisting of the Kent, Tiger, Bridgeivater, Salisbury, and Kingfisher,
with some ships belonging to the East India Company, He there
found Governor Blake and other fugitives from Calcutta, and learnt
of the horrible fate of those Europeans who had been less fortunate,
and who had been confined in the infamous Black Hole. Watson
reinforced his command by the purchase of a craft, which he named
the Thunder, and fitted as a bomb under the command of Lieutenant
Thomas Warwick. The squadron sailed on December 27th ; and
on the 29th the force was landed, and Fort Bougee-Bougee was
attacked. This place was captured by an impromptu assault,
brought on by an incursion into the works of a drunken British
seaman named Strachan ; and on December 30th the white troops
were re-embarked, and the squadron proceeded up the river, the
sepoys of the Company's service marching parallel with it along
the shore.
On January 1st, when the ships entered the channel between
Eort Tanna and the battery opposite to it, the enemy abandoned
both. The Salisbury was left there to bring off the guns from the
works, and to demolish the defences, and at night the Vice-Admiral
manned and armed the boats of his squadron and sent them a few
^ The Squadron under AacE-ADMiKAL Watson in the East Indies, 1756-1757.
Ships.
Guus.
Commanders.
Kent ....
70
fVice-Adm. Charles Watsou (B).
\Capt. Henry Speke.
Cumherland .
66
jKear-Adm. George Pocock (R).
\Capt. John Harrison.
Ti<ier ....
60
„ Thomas Latham.
Salishury .
50
„ William Martin (2).
Bridgeivater .
24
,, Henry Smith.
Triton'^
24
„ Edmund Townley.
Kingfisher .
14
Com. Richard Toby.
Thunder, bomb^ .
..
„ Th(imas Warwick.
Blaze, fireship^ ^ .
••
Lieut. ?
1 Arrivea from Englaud, after the rest of the squadron had gone to Bengal.
2 Purchased and armi'd by the Vice-Admiral in India.
3 Could not make the Gauges, and had to boar away for Bombay.
VOL. III.
M
162
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1
<0l
miles up the river, where they boarded and burnt some fireships,
which had been collected there. Early on the 2nd, Colonel Clive,
with the troops, landed and began the march towards Calcutta ; the
Kent, Tiger, Bridgeicater, and Kingfisher proceeding as the army
advanced. At 9.40 a.m. the enemy opened upon the Tiger from
their batteries below • Calcutta, but abandoned them as the ships
drew near. At 10.20 the Tiger and Kent began a hot cannonade
VICE-ADMIRAL CHARLES WATSON.
(From E. Fisher's engraving after the portrait hy Hudson.)
of Fort William, and after two hours drove the defenders out of it.
In this action the British lost only nine seamen and three soldiers
killed, and twenty-six seamen and five soldiers wounded. Calcutta
was at once occupied.
The Vice-Admiral later detached an expedition, the naval part
of which was under Captain Richard King (1), who was serving as a
volunteer in the squadron, to seize the town of Hugli, thirty miles
above Calcutta. Another expedition, under Captain Speke, burnt
1757.] WATSON TAKES CHANDERNAGORE. 163
the enemy's granaries at Gongee, and, assisted by the troops,
defeated a body of natives which had attacked them. This action
provoked Surajah Dowleh to send a large army against Calcutta.
Clive obtained from the Vice-Admiral the aid of a detachment of
seamen, under Commander AVarwick, and tried to bar the way to
the city ; but, being misled by his guides in a fog, he had to retreat
upon Calcutta. In this affair Lieutenant Lutwidge of the Salisbury
was mortally wounded, and seventeen seamen were killed and
fifteen wounded. Clive, however, quickly regained his former
advanced position, and so disconcerted his opponent that the latter
sued for a peace, which was concluded on February 9th. The
British might undoubtedly have obtained more favourable terms
than they did, had they not been anxious to patch up all their
differences with the native princes, in order to be able to concentrate
the whole of their resources in opposition to the French in India.
These matters having been settled, the Vice-Admiral made
preparations for at once attacking Chandernagore ; but the French
made overtures for the neutrality of the place, and thus to some
extent delayed him. Failing in their efforts in this direction, the
French began to tamper with Surajah Dowleh. In the mean-
time, however, Watson and Clive invested Chandernagore. On
March 19th, the British boats destroyed some French fireships
which were collected near the town. On the 21st, Kear-Admiral
Pocock joined the flag ; but he had been obliged to leave his own
flagship at Ballasore, as she drew too much water to come up the
river ; and he arrived in a boat. On the '22nd he hoisted his flag in
the Tiger. On the 23rd there was a general bombardment of the
fort from land and water ; and, after three hours' hot firing, the
French capitulated. The Salishury, owing to an accident, was
unable to get into action. The Kent lost 19 killed and 49 wounded ;
the Tiger, 13 killed and 50 wounded. Among those hurt was Eear-
Admiral Pocock.
The fugitives from Chandernagore were received and sheltered
by the Nawab, who acted throughout with great duplicity ; and, as
the British soon afterwards learnt of a plan of his own discontented
subjects to depose him, they determined to aid and abet it. It
cannot be pretended that the negotiations to this end were altogether
honourable to those Englishmen who were concerned in it ; and
Vice-Admiral Watson declined to be a party to certain questionable
undertakings, which, in pursuance of the resolution, were entered
iVi 2
164 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
into by Clive and the council ; but his name was, without his
privity, affixed to the treaty with the malcontents. Clive then
attacked the Nawab, and on June 23rd, 1757, defeated him at
Plassey. This victory eventually led to the fall and death of
Surajah Dowleh, and to the establishment in his place of Meer
Jaffier, a nominee of the British. The settlement was barely con-
cluded when, on August 16th, Vice-Admiral Watson died. His part
in the foundation of the British Empire in India has scarcely been
done justice to, and his loss, just then a serious one, would have
been much more severely felt than it was, had he not had as his
successor so capable an officer as Eear-Admiral Pocock.
Commodore James, of the East India Company's service, in
the Revenge, 22, had been stationed off Pondicherry to watch
the motions of the enemy, and had been joined there by H.M.S.
Triton, 24. But these vessels were driven off in September by
a strong French squadron ; and, since Pocock's ships were in a rather
bad condition, and some of them temporarily unfit for action, the
situation began to look threatening, especially seeing that an
expected British reinforcement, under Commodore Charles Stevens,
had been detained at Bombay, and did not actually sail thence for
the coast of Coromandel until January 20th, 1758.
Indeed, the French were making great efforts to defend their
challenged possessions in India. They had already fitted out an
expedition, the naval command of which was given to the Comte
d'Ache, and the military, to General Comte de Lally. The squadron
consisted of three king's ships, and one ship and a frigate belonging
to the French East India Company, with about 1200 troops on
board. D'Ache sailed on March (3th, 1757, but was driven back to
Brest by a storm, and, while there, was deprived of two of the
king's ships, in order that they might be despatched to Canada.
Instead of them he received five more East Indiamen. He sailed
on May 4th, and on December 18th reached Isle de France, where
he found four additional armed East Indiamen. Choosing the best
vessels at his disposal, he put to sea with them on January 27th,
1758. The further movements of d'Ache and of Pocock will be
referred to later. Operations in other quarters during 1757 must
first be followed.
On the Leeward Islands' station. Commodore John Moore (1)
relieved Kear-Admiral Thomas Frankland and rendered valuable
service in protecting trade. On the Jamaica station, Eear-Admiral
1757.]
FOBBESrS ACTION WITH DE KEB SAINT.
165
Thomas Cotes was in command, and was not less successful. In
the autumn, learning that the French were assembling, at Cape
Fran9ois, a convoy for Europe, he sent the Augusta, Edinburgh
and Dreadnought to cruise off that place to intercept it. This
convoy was to be escorted by M. de Kersaint, with a small squadron,
which Cotes believed would be little, if at all, superior to that under
Captain Arthur Forrest of the Augusta. But de Kersaint was
reinforced at Cape Frangois, and had in consequence a considerably
more powerful command ^ than the British officer. On October 21st, ^
de Kersaint issued forth, hoping by his very appearance in such
force to drive Forrest away. The latter, upon the French being
signalled, summoned his brother captains on board the Augusta,
and, when they met him on his quarterdeck, said, " Well, gentle-
men, you see they are come out to engage us." Upon which
Captain Suckling answered, " I think it would be a pity to dis-
appoint them." Captain Langdon was of the same opinion.
"Very well," replied Captain Forrest; "go on board your ships
again " ; and he at once made the signal to bear down and engage
the enemy. The French had seven vessels to the British three.
Captain Suckling took the van, Captain Forrest the centre, and
Captain Langdon the rear. The action began at about 3.20 p.m.,
and continued very briskly for two hours and a half, when the
French commodore ordered one of his frigates to come and tow
him out of the line. Others of his squadron soon followed his
example ; and eventually the French made off.. The British ships
were all much cut up aloft. The Augusta lost 9 killed and
29 wounded ; the Dreadnought, 9 killed and 30 wounded ; and the
Edinburgh, 5 killed and 30 wounded. The loss of the French is said
^ The British and Frexch Squadroxs engaged ox October 21st, 1757.
British.
1
Feen
:h.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships. Guns.
Commanders.
Aiir/nsta.
Dreadnought .
Edinburgh .
60
60
61
Capt. Artliiir Forrest.
„ ]\Iaiiriie Suckling.
,, William Langdon.
Intrlpide
Sceptre ....
Opinidtre .
1 Greenwich .
'. Outarde ....
Sauvage ....
Licorne ....
74
74
64
50
44
32
32
M. de Kersaint.
^ On the same day, forty-eight years later, was fought the battle of Trafalgar.
Nelson, before going into action, recalled the fact that the day was the anniversary of
his uncle's gallant behaviour, and regarded it as of good omen.
166
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1
ioi.
to have exceeded 500 in killed and wounded. Few pluckier or more
creditable actions have ever been fought ; and it is worth noting
that among the British captains, all of whom greatly distinguished
themselves, one, Maurice Suckling, was a maternal uncle of Lord
Nelson, and Nelson's earliest patron. Forrest had to bear up for
Jamaica, in order to get his ships refitted. De Kersaint, in the
meantime, picked up his convoy and sailed for France. But, at the
CAPTAIN' MAURICE SUCKLING, K.N., CONTKOI^LEIl OF THE NAVY, 1775-78.
(By permmio)), from the portrait by BardweU, in the possession of Capt. Thomas Suckling, B.N.)
very end of his voyage, he met with a severe storm, in which
the Opinidtre, Greemvich, and Outarde drove ashore and were
wrecked.
On the North American station Lord Loudoun, the new military
commander-in-chief, had formulated in the autumn of 1756, a plan
for the conquest of Cape Breton; and, in the winter, the Ministry
at home approved his scheme. On January 3rd, 1757, he laid
a general embargo on all outward-bound ships in American colonial
1757.] FLANS OF LORD LOUDOUN. 167
ports. His objects were, firstly, to prevent the communication of
intelligence to the enemy ; secondly, to obtain the necessary trans-
ports ; and thirdly, to secure additional seamen for his Majesty's
ships. The measure, though perhaps it was wise, produced strong
dissatisfaction both in America and at home ; and, in spite of the
precaution, the French heard of the project. In the early spring,
therefore, they sent a fleet and strong reinforcements to Louisbourg.
Loudoun assembled at New York ninety transports ; and,
presently. Sir Charles Hardy (2), Governor of New York, received a
commission as Kear-Admiral, with orders to hoist his flag and co-
operate with the military commander-in-chief. He first hoisted his
flag in the Nightingale, 20, but removed it later to the- Sutherland, 50,
Captain Edward Falkingham (2). The army, consisting of 3500
men, was all embarked by the 25th ; but, just as the fleet was ready
to sail, news arrived that a French squadron, of five ships of the
line and a frigate, was cruising off Halifax. This delayed the
departure of the expedition until the Rear-Admiral had sent two
sloops to reconnoitre. As they saw no enemy, Hardy sailed on
June 5th, and a few days afterwards disembarked his forces for
refreshment and exercise at Halifax, where were found three
infantry regiments and a company of artillery, bringing the total
force up to about 11,000 men.
Loudoun would scarcely have left New York with so feeble
a convoy ^ as that which was available under Hardy, had he not
had reason to expect to meet at Halifax Vice-Admiral Francis
Holburne, with a fleet from England, to support him. But, owing
to mismanagement at home, Holburne did not leave St. Helen's for
Ireland, where he was to pick up troops, until April 16th ; and
sailing from Cork on May 27th, he did not reach Halifax until
July 7th, when the season was almost too far advanced for the safe
commencement of an enterprise which could not but be met with
the most vigorous opposition. Moreover, the French had been
beforehand, and had despatched from Brest a fleet, which, under
M. de Beauffremont, went first to the West Indies, and, proceeding,
entered Louisbourg on June 5th, finding there four sail of the line
which a few days earlier had arrived from Toulon under M. du
Eevest. A further reinforcement from Brest, under M. Dubois
^ Sutherland, 50, Captain Edward Falkiugham (2); Nujhtingale, 20, Captain
.James Campbell (2) ; Kennington, 20, Captain Dudley Digges ; Vulture, 16, Commander
Sampson Salt ; and Ferret, 14, Commander Arthur Upton.
168 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
de la Motte, sailed on Maj^ 3rd, and, evading the British blockade,
reached Louisbourg on June 29th, when the united French
squadrons included eighteen sail of the line and five frigates, a
force much superior to that which Holburne and Hardy were able
to dispose of. The town also contained 7000 regular troops.
Dubois de la Motte had been expressly ordered to protect Louis-
bourg, and on no account to hazard an engagement with the
British fleet unless he should be in such overwhelming force as to
place the question of his success beyond a doubt. It is right to
point this out in order to excuse him for having neither annihilated
Holburne, nor blockaded the British in Halifax.
Vice-Admiral Holburne sent the Winchelsea, 20, Captain John
Eous, and other frigates, to look into Louisbourg. Eous returned,
and, in consequence of his report, the army was re-embarked on
August 1st and 2nd, and a rendezvous was appointed in Gabarus
Bay, six miles west of Louisbourg. Eous seems to have underrated
the strength of the French forces ; but truer information concerning
it was presently received from some papers which had been dis-
covered in a prize. This led to the abandonment of the project.
Some regiments remained in Halifax ; others, under convoy, went
to the Bay of Fundy, to Fort Cumberland, and to Annapolis Eoyal ;
and the rest, with Loudoun, against whom there was a great outcry,
returned to New York.
Holburne, however, was not satisfied, and resolved to reconnoitre
Louisbom^g for himself. Leaving, therefore, a few vessels for the
defence of Halifax, he sailed on August 16th, and arrived before the
place on August 20th. Near the harbour's mouth some of his ships
got close enough in to draw the fire from the island battery. The
Vice-Admiral was thus able to satisfy himself that the strength of
the enemy had not been exaggerated. Dubois de la Motte signalled
his fleet to unmoor, whereupon the British tacked, stood off, and at
nightfall bore away. On September 11th, Holburne was again at
Halifax, where he found reinforcements of four sail of the line from
England, under Captain Francis Geary.
The original project could not then be persisted in, but Holburne,
after watering and rewooding his fleet, which by that time consisted
of nineteen sail of the line, two fifty-gun ships, and several frigates,
sailed for Louisbourg with the intention of blockading the French,
until the approach of winter and shortness of supphes should oblige
them to come out and fight him. On September 2 1th, he was only
15.
55
a.
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1757.] STORM OFF LOUISBOURG. 169
about sixty miles south of Louisbourg, when a fresh easterly gale
sprang up. In the night it veered to the southward and blew an
awful hurricane until about 11 a.m. on the 25th. Then, fortunately,
it again veered to the north, otherwise the fleet could scarcely have
been saved from destruction. The Tilhunj, 60, Captain Henry
Barnsley,^ who, with nearly all the crew, was lost, struck and went
to pieces. The Grafton,'^ 70, Captain Thomas Cornewall, bearing
the broad pennant of Commodore Charles Holmes, also struck, but
was got off. The Ferret, 14, Commander Arthur Upton, foundered
with all hands. All the other ships of the fleet were seriously
damaged, no fewer than twelve being dismasted either wholly or in
part. It was the fiercest hurricane ever experienced by anyone then
on the station ; and it naturally put an end to Holburne's plan. The
Vice- Admiral sent his most damaged ships direct to England, under
Sir Charles Hardy (2) and Commodore Charles Holmes, and went
with the rest to Halifax, whence, having refitted, he too sailed for
England, leaving a few ships under Captain Lord Colville, of the
Northumberland, 70, to winter at Halifax. Lord Colville had
orders to endeavour, when the season should permit, to prevent
supplies from getting into Louisbourg. The French force there,
however, put to sea at the end of October, and, after suffering from
very bad weather during the voyage, reached Brest at the end of
November.
The proceedings of M. de Kersaint on the Jamaica station have
already been described. Previous to going thither he had cruised
on the coast of Guinea ; and, in the absence of any sufficient British
squadron there to oppose him, had taken many prizes. He had also
attempted Cape Coast Castle, but had been beaten off by the resource
and courage of Mr. Bell, the Governor.
In the Mediterranean, Bear- Admiral Charles Saunders, who had
been left in command after the return to England of Sir Edward
Hawke, heard at the end of March that four sail of the line^the
same which later reached Louisbourg — and one frigate, under
M. du Eevest, had quitted Toulon. He therefore left Gibraltar on
April 2, 1757, to intercept them with the Culloden, 74, Benvick, 64,
Princess Louisa, 60, Guernsey, 50, and Portland, 50. On April 5th,
^ In some Navy Lists of the period this officer appears as Barnsby. He was a
captain of 174:8,
2 She lost her mainmast, foi-etopmast, and rudder ; but the ship was safely steered
to England by means of a jury- rudder devised by Commodore Holmes. {See plate.)
170
MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1757.
at 5 P.M., he sighted the enemy and, being to leeward, formed his
hne. At sunset the French did the same, and began to fire at very
lone ran^e. The British chased, and gained so much on them that
the Guernseij and Princess Louisa were able to engage ; but in the
night the French got away. Vice-Admiral Henry Osborn arrived
with reinforcements in May, and assumed the command ; but,
though the trade was well protected and many prizes were taken.
■.^JU^
ADMIRAL SIR ClIAKLKS SAUXPERS, K.B.
(Frotii a portrait in the ' Naml Chronicle' 1802.)
no further fleet operations of any importance took place on the
station during the year.
It has been said that M. Duljois de la Motte escaped from Brest
in May 1757, with nine sail of the line and four frigates, and
reached Louisbourg. He was enabled to escape by the fact that
the blockading squadron before the place, under Vice-Admiral
Temple West, had been driven from its station by bad weather.
West was afterwards relieved by Eear-Admirai Thomas Broderick,
1757.] EXPEDITION AGAINST ROOHEFORT. 171
who remained cruising till Jnne, when Vice-Admiral the Hon.
Edward Boscawen took the command of the squadron for about a
month. Prizes were made, but there was no meeting between the
fleets of the two countries.
As the French still notoriously cherished the design of an in-
vasion of England, the Ministry determined if possible to be before-
hand and to deal a blow on the French coasts. A military officer,
who had made a short stay at Eochefort before the outbreak of the
war, gave information concerning the condition of the defences of
that port, which, though supposed to be weak, contained' a most
valuable dockyard, arsenal, and foundry. The representations of
this officer. Captain Clarke by name, induced the authorities to
undertake an expedition against the town, and they were the more
readily inclined to adopt this course seeing that nearly the whole of
the French army was believed to be employed in Germany, and that
but few troops were supposed to be available on the Atlantic seaboard.
The scheme was kept secret ; but a large squadron was prepared
and entrusted to Admiral Sir Edward Hawke {BamiUies, 90),
Vice-Admiral Charles Knowles {Neptune, 90), and Eear- Admiral
Broderick (Princess Amelia, 80) ; and troops were collected and em-
barked under Lieut. -General Sir John Mordaunt and Major-Generals
Conway and Cornwallis. The instructions to Sir Edward Hawke
were " to attempt, as far as it shall be found practicable, a descent
on the coast of France, at or near Bochefort, in order to attack and,
by vigorous impression, force that place ; and to burn and destroy to
the utmost of his power all such docks, magazines, arsenals and
shipping as shall be found there."
The fleet consisted of sixteen sail of the line, besides numerous
frigates, small craft, and transports ; and it sailed on September 8th ;
but its destination was not known, nor even suspected, by any with
it, except the chiefs, until September 14th, when the alteration of
course revealed it.
On the 20th Sir Edward Hawke issued orders to Vice-Admiral
Knowles, directing him to attack Isle d'Aix ; and at noon the Vice-
Admiral proceeded to execute these directions ; but, in doing so, he
chased a two-decked French ship, which escaped into the Garonne
and gave the alarm. Early on the 23rd the Vice-Admiral, with the
Neptune, 90, Captain James Galbraith ; Magnanime, 14., Captain
the Hon. Eichard Howe ; Barflear, 90, Captain Samuel Graves (1) ;
Torhay, 74, Captain the Hon. Augustus Keppel ; Boijal William, 84,
172 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
Captain Wittewronge Taylor, and two bombs, the Firedrale and
Infernal, attacked the works on Aix. The Macjnanime got into
action within forty yards of the fort, and, she being well seconded
by the Barjieur, in half an hour the position surrendered. It was
taken possession of, and the defences were later destroyed. In the
meantime vessels were sent to reconnoitre, and to sound for a
suitable place of disembarkation on the mainland ; but it was
discovered that a landing in any case would be difficult, and that,
if opposed, it could scarcely be effected. At a council of w^ar, held
on the 2oth in the Neptune, it was therefore decided not to proceed ;
but at another council of war, on the 28th, this decision was re-
versed, and it was determined to attempt an attack, in spite of the
fact that the enemy, who had been very active, was then better than
ever prepared. Yet when, in the early morning of the 29th, all was
ready, the wind blew off shore, and the scheme had finally to be
abandoned. On October 1st the fleet sailed for England, and on the
6th arrived at Spithead. The collapse of the expedition, and the
waste of money, which its mismanagement by the Government had
entailed, caused grave public dissatisfaction.
Almost immediately afterwards a fleet of fifteen sail of the line
and several frigates, under Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and Vice-
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen, was sent to sea with a view
to intercept the home-coming French squadron from Louisbourg.
It sailed from Spithead on October 22nd, but, when on its station,
was dispersed by a gale ; and, before it could regain its assigned
position, M. Dubois de la Motte got into Brest unperceived, except
by the Vanguard, Captain Robert Swanton, which sighted it on
November 23rd, and which was engaged by some of the enemy.
M. Dubois de la Motte finally called off his chasers for fear of
attracting the attention of the British fleet. Hawke and Boscawen,
therefore, returned to Spithead on December 15th.
The Earl of Loudoun was in 1758 succeeded as military com-
mander-in-chief in North America by Major-General Abercrombie ;
and it was determined to begin operations for the year with the
siege of Louisbourg. Admiral Boscawen, Eear-Admiral Sir Charles
Hardy (2), and Commodore Philip Durell (1), were nominated to the
command of the fleet which was designed for the service ; and, in
January, Hardy sailed in the Captain, 64, for Halifax, to assume
charge of the ships already there, and with theim to blockade
Louisbourg as soon as the season should permit. Early in February,
1758.]
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NAVY.
173
Durell followed him in the Diana, 36, to make the necessary local
preparations ; and on February 19th Boscawen himself sailed with
the fleet. After Boscawen's departure, Sir Edward Hawke was
despatched to blockade the French Channel ports, while Commodore
Charles Holmes cruised off the north coast of Holland, and assisted
in obliging the French and their allies to evacuate Emden. At
the same time, troops were assembled in the Isle of Wight for an
ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE POCOCK, K.B.
{From an engraving hi/ Ridley, after the portrait hy Hudson.)
intended incursion upon the coast of France, and Admiral Lord
Anson assumed the command of the blockading fleet before Brest,
while a squadron for the descent upon the French coast was collected
under Commodore the Hon. Eichard Howe. It should be added
that reinforcements were sent to India, under Captain Richard
Tiddeman ; that a small force under Captain Henry Marsh went to
the west coast of Africa ; and that an expedition, ultimately en-
trusted to Commodore John Moore, sailed later for the West Indies.
174
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1758.
Havino- thus summarised some of the chief naval movements of
1758, we may proceed to give accounts of the squadrons and their
principal doings.
In the East Indies Vice- Admiral Pocock was joined in Madras
Eoad, on March 24th, by Commodore Charles Stevens, and, on
April 17th, sailed, with the object of getting to windward of Fort
St. David, to intercept the French squadron which was expected on
the coast. Comte d'Ache had reached Mauritius on December 17th,
1757, and had there joined the small squadron under M. Bouvet,
with whom he sailed on January 27th, 1758, and made for the coast
of Coromandel ; but, owing to the monsoon, he did not anchor off
Fort St. David until April 28th. Having eleven vessels, the French
cut off the escape of H.M.S. Bridgeioater, 24, Captain John Stanton,
and Triton, 24, Captain Thomas Manning, which were lying there,
and which, to save them from capture, were run ashore and burnt.
D'Ache detached thence the Comte de Provence, 74, and the Dili-
gente, 24, to carry to Pondicherry M. de Lally, the new governor of
the French East India possessions. On the 29th, at 9 a.:m., ere the
detachment had disappeared, Pocock sighted the French squadron
which then consisted of eight ^ ships fit for the line, whereas the
British consisted of only seven. ^ Pocock signalled for a general
chase ; upon which the French weighed and stood out to sea
E. by N., with the wind from the S.E. At 12.30 p.m. Pocock got
within three miles of the enemy, who waited for him in line of battle
ahead. He then hauled down the signal for a general chase and
^ Nine were actually put into line by the French.
^ British axd Frexch Squadrons in the Action off Cuddalore
ON April 29th, 1758.
Bfillisil.
1
Fkench.
Ships.
Guns.
Coiumainlers.
Ships.
Gims.
Commanders.
Tiger
Salishur;/ .
Elizabeth . . .
Tarmoiith . . .
Cumherlaml
60
50
64
64
56
Capt. Thomas Latham,
f „ John Stukley
I Somerset.
jCommoil. Charles Stevens.
'Capt. Richapl Kemptn-
1 felt.
iVice-Admiral George
i I'ocock.
(Capt. John Han-isou.
,, AVilliani Hrereton.
„ George Legge.
„ Nicholas Vincent.
„ Hon. James Colville.
Bien Aime .
Vtngeur ....
Condi ....
Due d'Orleans . .
Zodiaque . . .
St. Louis . . .
Moras ....
Sylphide. . . .
Due de Bourgojne.
581
541
441
561
U
501
441
36
60
T4
24
Capt. fie La Palliere.
„ Bonvet (2").
,, tie Kosbau.
„ tie Surville (2).
f Comte tl'Ache.
ICapt. Gotho.
,, Joaunis.
,, Bee tie Lievre.
„ Mahe.
,. tl'Apret.
Weipnouth ... 00
Qneenborouf/h . . 24
Protector, .Htore.ship
Comte de Provence.
Diligente . . .
„ tie La Chaise.
' Ijuus actually lu^untc I. hiith ot these ships could, and later did, tarry iiinro.
1758.] POCOGK AND D'ACHE OFF CUDDALORE. 175
made that for line of battle ahead, with the ships at a distance of
half a cable apart. The Cuniherlancl and Tiger, sailing badly, did
not get into their positions until 2.15, when Pocock bore down on
the Zodiaque, d'Ache's flagship, which occupied the centre of the
French line. The captains of the Newcastle and Weymouth un-
fortunately mistook the signal for the line, and did not close up to
the ships ahead of them ; and, when the Vice- Admiral signalled for
closer action, these ships did not obey. The enemy opened fire as
the British approached. The Cumberland was so long in getting up
that the Vice-Admiral, and the three ships ahead of him, had, for
some time, had to sustain the whole fire of the French. Yet, Pocock
did not return a shot until his ship had hauled up exactly abreast of
the Zodiaque, and then, at 3.55 p.m., he made the signal to engage.
Commodore Stevens, with the ships ahead of the Vice-Admiral,
behaved magnificently, but the three ships astern did not properly
support the van. This might have been serious, and even fatal, if
there had not been corresponding mistakes and derelictions of duty
on the French side. The captain of the Due de Bourgogne took up
a post behind the French line, and, in the most cowardly manner,
fired across it at the British ; and the Sijlphide, 36, a weak ship,
which seems to have improperly found a place in the line, was
driven out of it at the first broadside The Gonde lost her rudder,
and was also obliged to fall out. In the van and centre, however, the
action was for the most part fought with the greatest determination
on both sides. In her somewhat belated attempts to get into action,
the Gumherland nearly fouled the Yarmouth, and forced her to back
her topsails, thus obliging the Newcastle and the Weymouth to back
theirs likewise. But when the Cumberland had at length gained
her station, the Newcastle held back, in spite of signals from the
Vice-Admiral, and in spite of the Weymouth's hailing her to close
up ; whereupon the Weymouth hauled her wind and, passing to wind-
ward of the Newcastle, got into line ahead of her and quickly obliged
the Moras to bear away. The Cumberland in the meanwhile en-
gaged the St. Louis, so materially relieving the Yarmouth.
In the height of the engagement explosions of powder on board
both the Zodiaque and the Bien Aime caused some confusion.
D'Ache signalled for those of his ships which had withdrawn to
return to the action ; but they paid no attention. Still the fight was
hot, and the Tiger was very hard pressed until she was assisted
by the Salisbury and Elizabeth. As the battle neared its termina-
176 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
tion, the ship and frigate which had been detached by d'Ache to
Pondicherry, and which M. de Lally had refused to allow to
return at once, although d'Ache had signalled for them, were coming
up ; but, the British rear then closing somewhat, and the fugitive
French vessels not rejoining, d'Ache at about 6 p.m. bore down to
his friends, and then, hauling his wind, made for Pondicherry. His
final movement, which seems to be thus rightly interpreted, appeared
to Pocock to have a different significance ; for he wrote :■ —
" At half-past four p.m. the rear of the French line had drawn pretty close up to
their flagship. Our three rear shiits -were signalled to engage closer. Soon after,
il. d'Ache broke the line and put before the wind. His second astern, who had kept
on the Yarmouth's quarter most part of the action, then came up alongside, gave his
fire, and then bore away ; and a few minutes after the enemy's van bore away also."
From this, as Captain Mahan points out, it would appear that
the French deliberately, before leaving the scene of the action,
effected upon the principal English ship a movement of concentra-
tion, defiling past her.^
Pocock hauled down the signal to engage, and rehoisted that for
a general chase ; but such of his ships as had fought well were too
disabled to come up with the enemy, and, night approaching, he
stood to the southward wdth a view of keeping to the windw^ard of
the enemy, and of being able to engage him in the morning, if the
French did not weather the British. With this object he ordered
the Queenhorough, 24, ahead to observe the enemy ; and he con-
tinued to endeavour to work up after the French until 6 a.m. on
May 1st, w^hen, as he lost ground and pursuit appeared to be useless,
he anchored three miles south of Sadras.
In this battle, which was fought about twenty-one miles from
Lampraavy, the British had lost 29 killed and 89 wounded. At
10 P.M. on the day of the action, the French anchored off Lam-
praavy. There, owing to the loss of her anchors and to damage to
her cables, the Bien Aime drove ashore and was wrecked ; all her
crew, however, being saved. In the engagement the French had
suffered far more severely than the British, having lost 162 killed,
and 860 wounded ; for the ships had been full of troops and the
English fire had been directed, as usual, against the hulls rather
than against the rigging. D'Ache afterwards proceeded to Pondi-
cherry, where he landed 1200 sick, and superseded M. d'Apret,
captain of the Due de Bourgognc, by M. Bouvet. It seems to have
' ' Tnfl. of Sea Power,' 308.
1758.] D'ACEE AT PONDICHERRY. ill
been chiefly owing to the backwardness of the captains in the
British rear that the French were not completely defeated.
At about the time of the action, the French on land had taken
Cuddalore, the garrison of which was allowed to retire to Fort
St. David. That place was soon afterwards besieged by M. de Lally.
Pocock received some additional men from Madras, including eighty
lascars, and, having repaired the worst damages of his ships, tried in
vain to work up along the coast. He then stood to sea, and on
May 10th had stretched as far south as lat. 9° 30', whence he
endeavoured to fetch to the windward of Fort St. David ; but,
standing in, he met with a strong west vnnd, and, being unable to
get higher than Lampraavy, he anchored there on May 26th. On
the 30th he sighted Pondicherry, and saw the French squadron in
the road.
D'Ache, upon descrying the British, called a council of w^ar,
which decided that the ships should remain moored close under the
batteries to await attack ; but M. de Lally, arriving from before
Fort St. David, insisted that the British should be met at sea, and
sent out to the fleet 400 lascars as a reinforcement. As de Lally
had the supreme command in India, d'Ache weighed with eight ships
of the line and a frigate ; yet, instead of bearing down on Pocock,
who could not work up to him, he kept his wind and plied for Fort
St. David, whither de Lally returned by land to prosecute the siege.
But no sooner had de Lally departed than the governor and council
of Pondicherry, who had full powers during de Lally's absence,
recalled d'Ache to protect their town. This order was most service-
able to the British ; for, soon after the return of the French squadron,
three valuable East India Company's ships, which must otherwise
have been taken, got safely into Madras.
Chiefly owing to the bad sailing of the Cumberland, Pocock failed
to get up with the French squadron. On the 6th he heard that
Fort St. George was likely to be invested ; and, realizing that should
this be so, his ships would be unable to re-water on the coast, he
made for Madras, where he brought his defaulting captains to court-
martial. Captain George Legge, of the Newcastle, was dismissed
the service ; Captain Nicholas Vincent, of the Weymouth, was dis-
missed his ship ; and Captain William Brereton, of the Cumherland,
was sentenced to the loss of one year's seniority as a post-captain.
Fort St. David capitulated on June 2nd, and M. de Lally destroyed
the place. Had he then gone at once to Madras, he could have
VOL. III. X
178 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
taken it easily ; but he delayed, and, in the interval, Fort St. George
was considerably strengthened. Instead of going to Madras, he
attacked Tanjore, in order to obtain payment of some money which
had been promised by the king to M. Dupleix in 1749. Before
Tanjore, his army, weakened by sickness and want of provisions,
was defeated ; and, being obliged to raise the siege and to retire,
closely pursued by his native opponents, he had some difhculty in
reaching Carical. On his retreat thither he learnt that d'Ache,
then off Pondicherry, had intimated his intention of proceeding to
Mauritius. He therefore sent to remonstrate with the French
commodore, and was thus able to induce him to postpone his
departure.
Yice-Admiral Pocock refitted, and, on July 25th, sailed with a
favourable wind southward along the shore to seek the enemy. On
the 26th he anchored off Lampraavy, where he took or burnt some
small craft of the enemy. On the evening of the 27th he got within
nine miles of Pondicherry, and saw the French fleet at anchor in
the road. On the 28th, at 10 a.m., the French got under sail and
stood to the southward with a land breeze ; on which Pocock
signalled for a general chase ; but the enemy kept to windward and
anchored early next morning off Porto Novo. AVhen the land breeze
arose, the French weighed and stood to windv/ard ; and at about
8 A.M. were out of sight. In the afternoon Pocock burnt the French
ship Bestitution, a British prize, off Porto Novo, At 10 a.m. on
August 1st he again sighted d'Ache, who was getting under sail off
Tranquebar, and who soon afterwards formed his line of battle
ahead with starboard tacks on board, and seemed to edge down
towards the British, But when Pocock made sail and stood for the
French, they hauled on a wind. At about 1 p.m., however, they
formed line of battle abreast and bore down on Pocock under easy
sail. He, at 1.80, signalled for a line of battle ahead with the
starboard tacks on board, and stood to the eastward under topsails,
or with the maintopsails square so as to allow his ships to take
station, in waiting for the enemy. At 5 p.m, the French van was
abreast of the British centre at a distance of about two miles. The
enemy stood on till his van was abreast of the British van, and then
kept at about that distance until 6.30, when he hoisted his topsails,
set his courses, and stood to the south-east. Admiral Pocock
signalled to his van to fill and stand on, and made sail to the south-
ward, keeping his line until midnight, when he judged the French
1758.]
POCOOK AND WACEE OFF NEGAPATAM.
179
to have tacked. He then signalled the fleet to wear, and stood after
the enemy to the westward. But, at daylight on the 2nd, the enemy
was not to be seen. In the evening, however, four sails were sighted
inshore to the north-west; and on the 3rd, at 5 a.m., the British
sighted the French fleet off Negapatam, about three miles to wind-
ward, formed in hne of battle ahead, with the starboard tacks on
board. ^
Pocock also formed his hne of battle ahead on the starboard tack,
and stood towards the French; and, seeing that the Comte de
Provence, 74, led their van, he ordered the Elizabeth, 64, to take the
place of the Tiger, 60, an inferior ship, as the leader of his own line.
At 11 A.M., the wind dying away, the British were becalmed; though
the enemy still had a hght breeze from off the land, and, with it,
stood on, their line stretching from east to west. On that course the
French passed at right angles so close to the rear of the British that
they might almost have cut off the Cumberland and Newcastle, the
sternmost ships. At noon a sea breeze sprang up, and gave Pocock
the weather-gage. Both fleets thereupon formed line afresh ; and at
12.20 P.M. Pocock signalled to bear down and engage.
The Elizabeth and Comte de Provence began the action ; but, the
latter's mizen catching fire, she had to quit the line and cut away
the mast. The French charge Pocock with throwing inflammables
on board of them ; but the Vice- Admiral does not seem to have taken
any special measures for setting his opponents on fire, though
certainly in this battle they were unusually unfortunate in that
respect. The Elizabeth' s next opponent was the Due de Bourgogne,
which, being hardly pressed, would have been assisted by the
^ List of the British and French Squadrons in the Actiox off
Negapatam, on August 3rd, 1758.
Bkitish.
French.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Yarmouth . . .
Elizabeth . . .
Tiger
Weymouth . . .
Cumberland
Salisbury . . .
Newcastle . . .
64
64
60
60
56
50
50
24
iVice-Adm. (ieorge Po- 1
i cock.
ICapt. John Harrison. i
jCommod. Charles Stevens.'
i^Capt. Richard Kempeu-
{ felt. 1
„ Thomas Latham,
f ,, John Stukley ;
I Somerset.
„ William Martin (2).
„ AVilliam Brereton.
, , Hon. James (Jol v ille.
„ DigbyDent(3)
Zodiaque
Comte de Provence
St. Louis
Yengeur. . .
Due d'Orle'ans .
Due de Bourgogne
Conde . . ■
Moras . . .
Diligente
74
64
64
60
60
50
50
24
Comte d'Ache.
Capt. de La Chaise.
„ de La Palliere.
,, de Surville (2). -
„ Bouvet (2).
,, Bee de Lievre.
Queenborough . .
N 'A
180
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1758.
Zodiaque, had not the latter had her wheel carried away by a shot
from the Yarmoiitli, her first antagonist. To repair it, she went
under the lee of the Due cV Orleans ; but, as soon as she returned to
the line, one of her lower-deck guns burst, and a fire broke out near
her powder room. In the consequent confusion, her new steering
gear gave way, so causing the ship to fall on board the Due
d' Orleans ; and, while the two ships were entangled together, both
REAR-ADMIRAL RICHARD KEMPENFELT.
(From a lUhofjraphed engraving htj Ridley.)
were heavily cannonaded with impunity by the Yarmouth and Tiger.
By that time the Conde and Moras had been driven out of the line ;
and, at 2.8 p.m., the Zodiaque being free, M. d'Ache bore away. He
was followed in about a quarter of an hour by the rest of his ships.
Pocock signalled for closer action ; and the retiring enemy was
badly mauled as he went off under all possible sail. The signal for
a general chase followed ; whereupon the French cut away the boats
which most of them had towing astern ; and crowded to the N.N.W.
1758.] D'ACEE RETIRES TO MAURITIUS. 181
A running fight was maintained till about 3 p.m., when the French
were out of range. Pocock, however, pursued until dark, and, at
about 8 P.M., anchored three miles off Carical, w^hile the French
pursued their course to Pondicherry.
The fight, considering its indecisive character, was a very bloody
one, especially on the side of the French, who lost 250 killed and
600 wounded. The Zodiaque alone lost 183 killed or dangerously
wounded. On the British side, however, only 31 were killed and
166 wounded. Both d'Ache and Pocock received slight injuries ;
and Commodore Stevens had a musket wound in his shoulder.
Aloft the British suffered more than the French ; and, had the
weather not been fine, many of them must have lost their masts.
D'Ache refitted at Pondicherry ; and, being apprehensive of an
attack there, anchored his ships close under the town and forts.
Feeling also that he could not, in his then state, again fight the
British, and that his remaining on the coast might lead to disaster,
he again announced his intention of proceeding to Mauritius. M. de
Lally and the French military and civil officers were astounded at
this new determination, and endeavoured to dissuade him ; but he
was supported by his captains, and, having landed 500 marines and
seamen to reinforce the army on shore, he sailed for his destination
on September 3rd. Pocock could not believe that d'Ache had any
idea of withdrawing from the scene of operations, and supposed that
he would presently set out on a cruise. The Queenborough, 24, was
therefore despatched to get news of the French ; but she failed to
obtain any. The British sailed from Madras on August 20th for
Bombay, calling at Trincomale for water. The Admiral ordered the
Beveuge, a Company's ship, to cruise off that port ; and she actually
sighted, and was chased by, d'Ache on his way to Mauritius ; but,
though the British put to sea, they could not come up with the
enemy. Pocock afterwards continued his voyage to Bombay.
In spite of the withdrawal of d'Ache, between whom and
M. de Lally the worst possible relations existed, the latter continued
his activity, and on December 14th laid siege to Madras. The town
was hard pressed, when, on February 16th, 1759, Captain Richard
Kempenfelt, with two twenty-gun ships and six other vessels,
containing men and stores, arrived. Early on the 17th de Lally
raised the siege, retiring in such haste that he left behind him much
of his siege artillery, and large quantities of stores and ammunition.
It was a remarkable and dramatic instance of the influence of sea
182 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [1758.
power upon history. Had d'Ache held the sea, and had he been in
a position to prevent the arrival of reinforcements and stores, the
place must have fallen. The raising of the siege of Madras may be
said to mark the beginning of the end of French dreams of empire
in India.
On the Leeward Islands' station, where Commodore John
Moore (1) commanded in 1758, no fleet action or engagement of
much moment happened during the year ; but there was great and
commendable activity; and more than one of the transactions in
those seas will be found noticed in the next chapter.
On the Jamaica station, likewise, there were very few events of
importance, though the enemy's trade suffered severely, thanks to
the excellent dispositions of Vice- Admiral Thomas Cotes and to the
vigilance of his cruisers.
It has been seen that in North America preparations had been
made for a new attack on Louisbourg. Eear-Admiral Sir Charles
Hardy (2) placed himself off that port as soon as the season permitted ;
but, owing to fog and gales, he was unable to prevent the entry into
the harbour of M, du Chaffault, who took out a strong squadron
from Brest. Du Chaffault, however, fearing to be blockaded, left
there six ships of the line and some frigates under M. de Beaussier
to assist in the defence, and himself went to Quebec. Hardy only
succeeded in intercepting the Fouclroyant, 22, and a few other
French craft bound up the St. Lawrence. The Foudroijant pluckily
stood a short action with the Captain, 64, ere she surrendered. She
had on board a large amount of very valuable stores.
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen, who had been appointed
to the command of the expedition against Louisbourg, sailed from
Portsmouth in February. At the very commencement of his voyage
he lost the Invincible, 74, Captain John Bentley, which, missing
stays, ran on a shoal east of St. Helen's and became a total loss.
But the D/iJ)Iin, 74, was as quickly as possible substituted for
her by the Admiralty ; and she carried out Major-General Jeffrey
Amherst, who was to command the military forces. The Dublin
met Boscawen on May 28th, as he was coming out of Halifax with
his fleet ; but, being very sickly, she went on into port, while
Boscawen with his whole force, numbering in all one hundred and
sixty-seven sail of various kinds, made for Gabarus Bay. The fleet
was dispersed by bad weather, and the main part of it did not reach
the rendezvous until June '2n(l. Among the celebrated men who
1758.] CAPTURE OF LOUISBOUBG. 183
shared in this expedition were George Brydges Eodney, Edward
Hughes, later the opponent of Suffren, and James Wolfe, the hero
of Quebec.
The French were found to be well prepared, Louisbourg being
very thoroughly fortified, especially on the sea face. Between the
day of his arrival and January 8th, General Amherst several times
caused the troops to be put into the boats, ready for landing ; but
on each occasion he was compelled by the state of the surf to desist
and to re-embark them. In the interval the enemy was busy on
his defences, and never omitted to fire on the ships when they
ventured within range. On the 8th the army was again put into
the boats ; and it was decided to make three separate attacks.
Those on the centre and right were intended as feints or diversions,
and were to be made in Freshwater Cove and on White Point
respectively. That on the left was to be the real attack. It was
made under Brigadier-General Wolfe, under cover of the Kenning-
ton, 28, Captain Dudley Digges, and Halifax, 12. The Diana, 36,
Captain Alexander Schoiaberg, Gramont, 18, Commander John
Stott, and Shannon, 36, Captain Charles Meadows,^ covered the feint
in the centre ; and the Sutherland, 50, Captain John Rous, and
Squirrel, 20, Commander John Cleland (1), the feint on the right.
These ships, as soon as they had taken up their stations, began
a hot cannonade ; and, a quarter of an hour later, Wolfe's division
landed in the steadiest manner through the surf under a heavy fire.
Many men were unavoidably drowned through the oversetting of
boats, and much ammunition was wetted ; but the troops, fixing their
bayonets, drove the defenders from their position near the beach ;
and, before night, all the other troops had been landed. Almost
immediately afterwards the wind arose, and communication with the
fleet was cut off for several days. Siege operations were begun on
June 13th, the troops being at first much annoyed by the fire of
the French ships in the harbour. The Admiral landed his Marines
to assist. On the 28th the enemy sank the Apollon, 50, Fidele, 36,
Biche, 16, and Chevre, 16, in the mouth of the harbour to blockade
the entrance ; and on July 9th he made a vigorous but ineffectual
night sortie. On July 21st the Entreprenant, 74, one of the largest
French ships in the harbour, took fire, blew up and set in flames two
1 Properly Medows, but the Navy List spelling is Meadows. This gentleman,
afterwards known as Charles Pierrepont, became Viscount Newark and Earl Mauvers.
He resigned while yet a captain, and died in 1816.
184
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1758.
more ships of the hne, the Celebre, 64, and the Capricieux, 64.
All three eventually become total losses. The fire from the two
remaining ships of the line being still troublesome, Boscawen, on
the night of the 25th, sent into the harbour in boats 600 seamen,
under Captains John Laforey and George Balfour ; and these, in
spite of a very fierce fire from the vessels and batteries, executed
their mission. Laforey took the Prudent, 74, which, being aground,
he burnt. Balfour carried the Bienfaisant, 64, and tow^ed her into
the north-east harbour. This decided the issue. Boscawen was
making preparations to send in six ships of the line, when the
governor proposed terms ; and, after a brief correspondence, the
place was surrendered on the 26th. About 3600 combatants
became prisoners of war ; and 216 guns, besides mortars, were
taken. AVith Louisbourg was surrendered, not only the island of
Cape Breton, but also that of St. John.^ Boscawen sent home
Captain the Hon. George Edgcumbe with the naval dispatches.
The colours which were captured were placed in St. Paul's
Cathedral.
Immediately after the fall of the place, Boscawen sent Kear-
Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2), with seven ships of the \\i\e, to destroy
the French settlements at Miramichi, Gaspee, etc., General Wolfe
' Tlie islaml of St. John was renanic<l Prince Edward's Island in 1799, in honour
of Priiiif F-rlward, Duke of Kent, and fatlier of H.INI. Queen Victoria.
1758.]
BOSCAWEN AXI) DU CHAFFAULT.
185
accompanying him. Some ships were also sent to the island of
St. John, with a garrison for it. General Amherst, who heard at
about that time of the repulse of Abercrombie at Ticonderoga,
embarked six battalions under convoy of the Captain, 64, for
Boston, and then marched for Lake George. Boscawen left Mr.
Durell, who in the meantime had been promoted to be a Kear-
Admiral, with a part of the squadron, to winter in America, and
himself sailed for England. On his passage, his squadron became
separated, so that when, on October 27th, as he was entering
the Soundings, he sighted the French squadron returning from
Quebec under M. du Chaffault, he had with him in company only the
Naniur, 90, (flag). Captain Matthew Buckle (1), Royal William, 84,
COMMEMORATIVE MEDAL OF THE CAPTURE OF LOUISBOURG, 1758.
{^From an original kindly lent by R.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg, li.N^.)
Captain Thomas Evans, Somerset, 64, Captain Edward Hughes,
Bienfaisant, 64, Captain George Balfour, Boreas, 28, Captain the
Hon. Eobert Boyle Walsingham, Trent, 28, Captain John Lindsay,
Eclio, 28, Captain John Laforey, with two fireships ; and the
Bienfaisant was useless, having but a few rounds of powder on
board. The French squadron consisted of the Tonnant, 80,
Intrepicle, 74, Heros, 74, Protee, 64, and BeUiqueux, 64, besides a
frigate, and the Carjiarvon, a captured British East Indiaman. The
enemy, being on the contrary tack, passed the British squadron, very
near, to leeward ; and, in passing, discharged his broadsides.
Some of the British ships returned the fire ; but, the wind blowing
hard, most of the vessels could not open their lower ports; and
thus, in this partial action, very httle damage was done. Boscawen,
in spite of the superiority of the French, changed his course and
186 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
stood after them. The night was very stormy ; but, on the follow-
ing morning, the enemy was again discovered, though his force
then consisted of only four ships of the line and a frigate, one
ship of the line having evidently lost company in the darkness.
Boscawen also had lost sight of all his frigates. He nevertheless
renewed the chase ; yet, although there was at first no great
distance between the squadrons, the British did not gain ground.
The only prize made was the Carnarvon . The rest of the French
ships got away. One of them, the BeUiqueux, was afterwards taken
off Ilfracombe by the Antelope, 50. Boscawen arrived at Spithead
on November 1st.
For their services in North America both Boscawen and Amherst
received the thanks of the House of Commons. The conquest
which had been effected, besides being very important in itself, had
involved a loss to the enemy of six ships of the line and five frigates,^
and had deprived France of one of her best fisheries, and of a
valuable station for the privateers which long had preyed on the
coast commerce of the American colonies. It paved the way for
future British successes on the North American continent, and
sounded the death knell of the French dominion there. In fact,
just as the raising of the siege of Madras was the turning point of
the struggle in India, so the capture of Louisbourg was the turning
point of the struggle in North America ; and both results were
brought about by the force of sea power.
It has been said that in 1758 a small squadron under Captain
Henry Marsh was despatched against the French settlements in
West Africa. It is curious to note that this belligerent expedition
was first suggested by a Quaker, Mr. Thomas Cumming, who had
been on the coast, and who knew some of the native princes. One
of these had promised his co-operation against Goree and Senegal,
and had undertaken, in case of the success of the adventure, to
grant exclusive trading privileges to British subjects. Cunnning
represented that a force of a certain strength would be required for
the service ; but the administration unwisely cut down his estimates,
and repeatedly deferred action, until Mr. Samuel Touchet, an
influential London merchant, warmly seconded the project. The
force finally assigned for the service consisted of the Harwich, 50,
' In addition to the three frigates sunk in the mouth of the harbour by the enemy,
the Diane (renamed Diana), .30, had been taken by Sir Charles Hardy (2), and the
Echo, 28, had been captured by the Juno and Scarhorough.
1758.] CAPTURE OF SENEGAL. ^ 187
ComixLodore Henry Marsh, the Nassau, 64, Captain James Saver,
the Bye, 20, Commander Daniel Dering, the Swan, 16, Commander
Jacob Lobb, and the two eight-gmi busses, London and Portsmouth,
Commanders Archibald Millar and James Orrok, together with five
small hired vessels carrying from four to eight guns apiece. The
troops included 200 Marines under Major Mason, and a detachment
of artillery with ten guns and eight mortars. Mr. Cumming
accompanied the expedition, which sailed from Plymouth on
March 9, 1758.
From Tenerife, where the squadron called for wine and water,
Mr. Cumming", in the Swan, went on in advance to arrange for
assistance from the natives ; but, before he could conclude matters,
the squadron itself arrived on the coast. Marsh decided not to
wait for negotiations, but at once to proceed ; and on April 23rd,
he reached the mouth of the river Senegal, and sighted the
French flag flying on Fort Louis in midstream, twelve miles
above the bar.
The enemy had armed a brig and six sloops, and had placed them
above the bar to defend the channel through it. These much
annoyed the British boats, which went in to sound. In the mean-
time troops were put into the small craft. On the 29th the Swan,
with the busses and armed vessels, weighed and made up the river
with a fair wind. The London, and some of the small craft, were
wrecked on the bar ; but no lives were lost ; and most of the rest of
the vessels got in safely, and made for the enemy's ships, which
promptly retired under the guns of the fort. On May 1st the work
surrendered ; but the actual handing over of the place was delayed,
owing to the action of the natives, who, not thinking that their
interests had been sufficiently secured, blockaded the French. The
difficulty being got over, the fort was occupied. In it ninety-two
guns were found ; and, with it, sixteen craft of various sizes were
given up. The entire estimated value of the capture was about
^£200,000. Podor, and other stations further up the river, were
included in the capitulation. For his services Mr. Cumming was
granted a pension during his hfetime. These possessions had long
supphed negro slaves to the French settlements in the West Indies ;
and for that reason their loss was soon severely felt.
Commodore Marsh, leaving a few small vessels on the spot,
sailed next to attack Goree, about ninety miles to the southward.
He arrived off the island on May 24th, and at once began a hot
188 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
cannonade, having anchored his ships with springs on their cables.
But he had miscalculated the strength of the defence ; and in about
two hours and a half he had to signal his httle squadron to cut, as
the rigging and spars, as well as the hulls, were badly mauled, and
about twenty men were killed, and forty wounded. This check was
owing purely to the inadequacy of the force employed ; and towards
the end of the year, the Government sent out a stronger squadron
to complete Commodore Marsh's work. In the meantime the
Nassau, Swan and Portsmouth returned to England, with such
trade as was bound thither ; and, later, the Bye sailed with a convoy
for the Leeward Islands. Marsh himself escorted the trade which
was bound for Jamaica.
The new expedition was entrusted to Commodore the Hon.
Augustus Keppel, who hoisted his broad pennant in the Torbay, 74,
Captain Thomas Owen, and who had under him the Nassau, 64,
Captain James Sayer, the Fougueux, Captain Joseph Knight, the
Dunkirk, 60, Captain the Hon. Kobert Digby, the Lichfield, 50,
Captain Matthew Barton, the Prince Edward, 44, Captain William
Fortescue, the Experiment, 20, Captain John Carter Allen, the
Boman Emperor, 20, Commander William Newsom, the Saltash, 14,
Commander Walter Stirling, and the two bombs, Firedrake,
Commander James Orrok, and Furnace, Commander Jonathan
Faulknor (1). At Cork he picked up troops, under Lieut. -Colonel
Worge, who had been appointed governor of Senegal ; and, after
some delay, he finally sailed thence on November 11th, 1758.
In the early morning of November 29th, owing to an error in
reckoning caused by bad weather, the Lichfield ran ashore on the
coast of Marocco, and became a total loss.^ On the same occasion
a transport also went to pieces. On December 28th, after having
made a short stay at Santa Cruz, in the Canaries, the squadron
sighted Goree, and at 3 p.m. anchored in the road in eighteen
fathoms of water, the island bearing S.W. by S. distant about four
miles. The Saltash and the transports containing the troops were
sent into the bay between Point Goree and Point Barrabas ; and,
early on the 29th, the troops from them were disembarked in boats
in readiness to land on the island upon signal being made by the
Commodore. Most of the ships gradually took up their assigned
* There was unfortunatelj'' some loss of life. The survivors were detained by the
Sultan of Marocco until ransomed, witli other British subjects, for 170,000 dollars.
Captain Barton was tried for the loss of his ship, and honourably acquitted.
1758.] CAPTURE OF GOREE. 189
positions on the west or leeward side of Goree, and moored head
and stern under a heavy fire. At 9 a.m. the attack was begun by
the Prince Edward ; but the cannonade was not general until about
noon, some of the vessels experiencing difficulty in taking up their
stations. The bombardment was then rapidly effective ; for, after
a brief parley, followed by an almost equally short renewal of the
action, the enemy surrendered; whereupon Keppel landed his Marines
to take possession. About three hundred French, and many negroes,
became prisoners of war. The British loss was inconsiderable.
After escorting Colonel Worge to Senegal, and cruising for a short
time off the coast, the Commodore returned to England.
In the Mediterranean Admiral Henry 0 shorn and Eear- Admiral
Charles Saunders commanded. The French had on several occasions
discovered the wisdom and advantage of despatching in winter
their reinforcements of ships and troops for abroad, since they
found that the British blockading squadrons and squadrons of
observation were frequently prevented at that season by fogs or
bad weather from obtaining touch of the outward-bound detach-
ments. But one of their divisions which, under M. de La Clue,
left Toulon in December, 1757, for North America and the "West
Indies, was forced by the vigilance of Admiral Osborn into Cartagena,
and was there blockaded. The French Government, in response
to M. de La Clue's representations, sent five ships of the line and
a frigate, under M. Duquesne, to endeavour to join him there, and
then to assist him in breaking the blockade. Two of the line-of-
battleships succeeded in getting in, but the rest of the force was
not so fortunate. On February 28th, off Cape de Gata, Osborn
at daybreak sighted four strange sail near his fleet, and ordered
them to be chased. The French ships separated, but each was
pursued. At 7 p.m. the Bevenge, 64, Captain John Storr, brought
the OrpMe, 64, to action ; and, on the Berwick, 64, coming up,
the enemy struck. In the Bevenge, thirty-three were killed and fifty-
four wounded, among the latter being Captain Storr. The Orphee
was but six miles from Cartagena when she ha^ed down. Meanwhile
the Monmouth, 64, Captain Arthur Gardiner, the Siviftsure, 70,
Captain Thomas Stanhope, and the Hampton Court, 64, Captain the
Hon. Augustus John Hervey, chased the largest of the enemy, the
Foudroyant, 84, flag ship of Duquesne. The Monmouth, being
far ahead of her consorts, got up with and engaged the enemy
at 8 P.M. and fought her gallantly. AVhen Gardiner fell his place
]90 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1758.
was taken by Lieutenant Eobert Carkett/ till 12.30 a.m., when
the Frenchman's guns were reduced to silence. Not until then
was the Swiftsure able to get up. Captain Stanhope hailed the
foe to know whether she had surrendered, but was answered with
a few guns and a volley of small arms, whereupon he poured in
a broadside and part of a second, and the enemy promptly sur-
rendered. She had 100 killed and 90 wounded, while the Monmouth
lost only 28 killed and 79 wounded. It was a magnificently con-
ducted action, and Lieutenant Carkett was deservedly rewarded
with the command of the prize. Wlien measured, at Gibraltar,
she was found to be 185 feet 3 inches in length from stem to
taffrail, and to have a length of keel of 155 feet. She was thus
about 12 feet longer than the large British first-rates of her day.
Moreover she carried 21 and 42-pounders, whereas the Monmouth
was armed only with 12 and 24-pounders.
As for the other French vessels, one, the Oriflamme, 50, was
driven ashore by the Monarch, 74, Captain John Montagu, and
the Montagu, 64, Captain Joshua Kowley. The last, the Pleiade, 26,
escaped by superior sailing.
Eear-Admiral Saunders was reheved in the spring by Eear-
Admiral Thomas Broderick (W.), who went out in the Prince
George, 80, Captain Joseph Peyton (1), which was unhappily burnt
by accident on April 13th with a loss of 485 lives. Osborn con-
tinued to blockade the French in Cartagena until he was obhged
to go to Gibraltar to refit, leaving only some frigates to look out
off the port. M. de La Clue then escaped and retm^ned to Toulon.
A httle later Osborn, being in bad health, had to resign his
command. He was succeeded by Kear- Admiral Broderick.
The part borne by H.M.S. Seahorse and Stombolo, under
Commodore Charles Holmes, in obliging the French and Austrians
to evacuate Emden in March, 1758, scarcely merits detailed descrip-
tion here. Suffice it to say that the service was creditably performed.
Other events in waters near home must, however, be described at
some length.
Learning in the spring of the year that the French were fitting
out a considerable squadron to escort a convoy to America from
Isle d'Aix, the Admiralty ordered Admiral Sir Edward Hawke to
^ Lieutenant, 1745. Captain, for this service, March 12th, 1758. Commanded
Stirlinf/ Castle, 64, in Byron's action, 1779, and in Rodney's action in the AVest Indies,
1780, and was lost in her in the hurricane of October 10th, 1780.
1758.] EAWKE OFF ISLE D'AIX. 191
endeavour to intercept it. He sailed from Spithead on March 11th
with seven ships of the Hne and three frigates, and on the night
of April 3rd arrived off the island. At 3 o'clock next morning he
steered for Basque Eoad, and at daylight sighted a number of
vessels, escorted by three frigates, some miles to windward. He
gave chase but they got into St. Martin, Bhe, except one brig,
which was driven ashore and burnt by the Hussar, 28, Captain
John Elliot. At about 4 p.m. Hawke discovered, lying off Aix,
the French men-of-war Florissant, 74, Sphinx, 64, Hardi, 64,
Dragon, 64, and Warivick, 60, besides six or seven frigates, and
about forty merchantman, which had on board 3000 troops. At
4.30 the Admiral signalled for a general chase, and at five the
enemy began to slip or cut in great confusion, and to run. At six
the British headmost ships were little more than a gunshot from the
rearmost of the French ; but, by that time, when many of the
merchantmen were already aground on the mud, the pursuers
were in very shoal water ; and, further pursuit being dangerous,
and night coming on, Hawke anchored abreast of the island. On
the morning of the 5th nearly all the French flotilla were seen
aground four or five miles away, several being on their broadsides.
When the flood made the Admiral sent in the Intrepid, 64, Captain
Edward Pratten, and the Medwaij, 60, Captain Charles Proby,
with his best pilots, as far as the water would serve ; and ordered
them to anchor there. They did so in about five fathoms, of which
three fathoms were due to the rise of the tide. The enemy was
very busy in lightening his ships, and in hauling and towing such of
them as could be moved towards the mouth of the Eiver Charente ;
and by evening some of the French men-of-war had been got thither.
The British frigates did what they could, by destroying the buoys
which they had laid down over their jettisoned guns and gear,
to prevent the ultimate salving of the merchant vessels. That day
150 Marines were put ashore on Isle d'Aix ; and, under Captain
Ewer, they destroyed the works there and safely re-embarked.
Hawke sailed on the 6th, having effectually prevented the despatch
of supphes to America, and, it may be, so facihtated the conquest
of Cape Breton and its dependencies.
A greater continental expedition, consisting of two squadrons
of men-of-war, and about 14,000 troops, under Lieut.-General the
Duke of Marlborough, was prepared somewhat later in the year.
One naval squadron, which was designed to directly co-operate
192 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
with the army, was entrusted to Commodore the Hon. Richard
Howe. The other squadron, composed of upwards of twenty sail
of the line, was commanded by Admiral Lord Anson, having under
him Admiral Sir Edward Hawke. This force w^as intended to
cruise off Brest and to prevent any French squadron from inter-
fering with the operations of Howe and Marlborough. As on some
previous occasions, the main object of the projected demonstration
on the coast of France was to divert French attention, and, by
calling off troops from elsewhere, to assist the King of Prussia and
other British alhes on shore; but the precise destination of the
armament was kept very secret.
Howe's squadron consisted of one ship of the line, four 50's,
ten frigates, five sloops, two fireships, and two bombs, convoying
one hundred transports, twenty tenders, ten storeships and ten
cutters ; together with a number of flat-bottomed boats, which
were carried on board the ships, and which were to be used for
the landing of troops. On May 27th the whole armament was
assembled at Spithead. On June 1st Anson weighed and sailed
to the westward ; and Howe soon afterwards made sail and steered
straight across the Channel.
At 8 A.M. on June 2nd, after a stormy but not unfavourable
night, Howe sighted Cape La Hougue. The French were quickly
alarmed, and, from his course, probably formed a shrewd guess as
to his destination. The tides, and the frequent calms which super-
vened, compelled the British to anchor repeatedly, but on June 5th
the entire force stood into Cancale Bay, six miles east of St. Malo.
At 11 A.M. the Duke of Marlborough went in shore in a cutter to
reconnoitre and was fired at. By 2 p.m. all the fleet was at anchor,
and the signal was made for the flat-bottomed boats to be hoisted
out. Howe shifted his broad pennant to the Success, 24, Captain
Paul Henry Ourry, and stood in with the Rose, 24, Captain Benjamin
Chve, Flamborough, 28, Captain Edward Jekyll, and Diligence, 16,
Commander Joseph Eastwood, to silence the batteries, clear the
beach, and cover the landing. This he did, and then signalled for
part of the troops to disembark. The landing was effected in good
order and without loss, i> spite of some musketry fire from the
enemy posted on a hill Ijehind Cancale. These sharpshooters, how-
ever, soon fled as the troops advanced. More soldiers were after-
wards landed, and before dark a large force was ashore. It lay on its
arms for the night. The rest of the arm}^ with the guns and stores,
1758.] EXPEDITION TO CHERBOURG. 193
was landed on the 6th ; and, at dawn on the 7th, the whole of
it except one brigade, that of Major-General the Hon. George
Boscawen, marched away in two columns. It is not intended
here to follow the military movements on shore : it is only necessary
to say that it was ultimately considered impracticable to attempt
St. Malo, and that, after doing a great deal of damage, the army
returned and re-embarked on the 11th and 12th. The loss up to
that time had not been more than thirty killed and wounded.
Owing to adverse winds, the fleet did not leave Cancale Bay till
June '21st ; and, after crossing and recrossing the Channel, it was
on the 2(3th close in with Le Havre. It was intended to effect a
landing near that town ; but the enemy was found to be well
prepared. On the 29th, therefore, the fleet bore away before
the wind for Cherbourg and anchored two miles from it. The
batteries on shore fired, doing, however, no harm. Preparations
were made for a descent ; but, a gale springing up and blowing on
shore, there was a very great surf, and, when the weather grew
worse, the fleet was in considerable danger. The crowded condition
of the ships had begun to breed sickness ; the horses on board were
almost starving for want of fodder ; and, as nothing was to be gained
by waiting, Howe weighed and re-anchored at Spithead on July 1st.
The army was immediately landed in the Isle of Wight to refresh
itself. In the course of this expedition the French frigate G^tirlande,
22, was taken by the Benow7i, 32, Captain George Mackenzie, assisted
at the last moment by the Rochester, 50, Captain Robert Duff.
Some of the troops in the Isle of Wight were sent to reinforce
the allied army in Germany ; and the remaining part of the military
force was then entrusted to Lieut. -General Thomas Bligh, an officer
who, though he had rendered good service, was then too old for
the command. The squadron, having refitted and been strengthened
by the arrival of the Montagu, 60, Captain Joshua Eowley, again
sailed on August 1st, when it had re-embarked the troops ; and on
August 6th it anchored in Cherbourg Eoad and was again fired at
from the shore. The defences had been improved since the previous
visit of the fleet, and many troops were in the town. Howe, who
had with him Prince Edward,^ second son of the Prince of Wales,
^ H.Pi.H. Edward Augustus. Born, 1739 ; went to sea, 1758 ; Captain, June 14th,
1759; created Duke of York and Albany, 1760; Rear-Admiral of the Blue, 1761;
second in command in the Channel, with Howe as his flag-captain; Vice- Admiral
of the Blue, 1762; Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, 1763; died at Monaco,
September 14th, 1767; buried in Henry the Seventh's Chapel at Westminster.
VOL. III. Q
194 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
serving as a midshipman, accompanied General Bligh to reconnoitre ;
and arrangements were made for a landing. The fleet moved to
Marais Bay early on the 7th, leaving only a frigate and a bomb
before the town. Howe, whose broad pennant was then in the
Pallas, 36, Captain Archibald Cleveland, signalled to the frigates
and small craft to coyer the disembarkation. These drove off the
enemy, and the troops were put ashore with little opposition. All
the infantry had been disembarked by the evening. On the 8th
the cavalry and artillery followed, and a march was begun on
Cherbourg, six miles to the eastward. The place was entered
without any fighting, the enemy retiring from the forts as well
as from the town at the approach of the British. By the 15th, the
pier, works, magazines, etc., had been destroyed, and the various
vessels in harbour had been sunk, burnt, or carried off. On the
16th the army re-embarked, having lost but twenty killed and
thirty wounded, although there had been frequent small skirmishes.
Cherbourg w^as not then an important naval station, and the
destruction of its harbour was a blow more mortifying than serious
to the French.
The fleet sailed on August 17th, and on the 19th anchored in
Portland Boad. But the authorities were not satisfied with what
had been done, and a continuation of the operations was ordered.
The fleet, therefore, put to sea again on August 31st, and on
September 3rd anchored in the Bay of St. Lunaire, about six miles
v/est of St. Malo. On the following day the army landed and
encamped. On the 5th, Bligh detached a small force to burn some
shipping at St. Brieuc ; and, on the same day, the Commodore and
General reconnoitred the bank of the River Eance to see if St. Malo
could be attacked on that side. As the west bank was found to be
well fortified and held, the design against the town was abandoned.
On the day following, at a council of war, the Commodore stated
that he did not consider it safe to re-embark the troops in the Bay
of St. Lunaire, as the bottom was rocky and the weather threatened
to be not good ; and he expressed his desire to remove the fleet to
the Bay of St. Cas, and to embark the army there.
The troops therefore marched off on the 7th ; but, unfortunately,
they wasted their time and did not make the best of their way.
They were much harassed by small parties of the enemy in woods
and hedges, and had frequent encounters with organised bodies of
soldiers, losing men continually. On the night of the 9th, the
1758.J THE DISASTER AT ST. CAS. 195
General, whose intelligence service seems to have been almost
non-existent, learnt, to his surprise, of the presence, only three miles
from him, of a large force under the Due d'Aiguillon. The Bay
of St. Cas was then only four and a half miles off; and an officer
was sent in haste to Howe to inform him that the army would
proceed thither as quickly as possible. The Commodore, in the
early morning, made as good a disposition of his ships as time
permitted, in order to cover the re-embarkation. In the meanwhile,
the retreat had begun, but it was 9 p.m. ere the heights above the
Bay were gained. The strange error was committed of re-embarking
all the guns and horses before the infantry. Nevertheless, by
11 A.M., two-thirds of the army were on board. At about that time
the enemy's cavalry and infantry appeared, and opened a battery of
guns on those who remained on the beach, doing great execution
there and in the boats. G-radually the French descended from the
hills ; and at last, after a desperate struggle, they seized the village
of St. Cas. There were then on shore only about seven hundred
British under Major-General Bury, whose dispositions and move-
ments were excessively rash. At length the French got close up to
the retiring British, whose ammunition was then exhausted ; and a
rout followed. Part plunged into the sea, part seized and held a rock
on the right of the Bay, whence many were taken off by the boats ;
but the majority had to surrender. The army lost, in killed,
wounded, or taken prisoners, eight hundred and twenty-two officers
and men. Of the naval officers who were superintending the
embarkation, Captains Joshua Eowley, Jervis Maplesden, and
William Paston, and Commander John Elphinstone (1), were taken.
The further naval loss, however, was but eight killed and seventeen
wounded.
The fleet which, under Lord Anson, was intended to cover the
operations under the Hon. Eichard Howe and General Bligh, con-
sisted of twenty-two sail of the line and eight frigates. It blockaded
Brest and annoyed the enemy's trade, but returned to Plymouth on
July 19th, without having encountered the French. Sir Edward
Hawke being ill, his place was taken by Eear-Admiral Charles
Holmes. The fleet went back to its station on July 22nd, and
in August it was joined by a contingent under Vice- Admiral Charles
Saunders. The three admirals continued to cruise until the middle
of September, by which time the operations against the French
Channel ports had been concluded. Anson and Holmes returned
o 2
196 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
to England, leaving Saunders to blockade Brest and to endeavour
to intercept the French squadron which was expected from Quebec ;
but he did not fall in with it, and himself went back into port in
the middle of December.
In 1759 the French made extraordinary efforts to retrieve their
position at sea, and once more resorted to the old expedient of
threatening an invasion, chiefly wdth a view to crippling British
activity in distant parts of the world. But the situation of Great
Britain was then in every respect much stronger than in 1756,
when similar tactics had been tried ; and the scheme did not produce
the desired results. British troops were sent from England to the
Continent, to North America, and to the West Indies ; and a most
formidable expedition was organised against Canada ; while, on the
other hand, the French paid so much attention to menacing the
British in the home seas that they almost entirely overlooked
the business of protecting their own dominions abroad.
In the course of the year France assembled three expeditionary
forces : one at Vannes, in Brittany, under the Due d'Aiguillon,
which was to be convoyed to Ireland by a fleet under M. de Conflans
and M. de La Clue ; one on the coast of Normandy, which was to be
despatched from Le Havre against England ; and the smallest of
the three, at Dunquerque, to be convoyed to Scotland or Ireland
by M. Thurot and six frigates and corvettes. To meet these and
other preparations the militia was embodied, and the following dis-
positions of ships were made. Commodore William Boys watched
Dunquerque; Admiral Thomas Smith (4)^ and Commodore Sir Piercy
Brett (1) commanded a force in the Downs ; Eear-Admiral George
Brydges Rodney cruised in the Channel, and kept an eye on the
ports of Normandy ; and Sir Edward Hawke blockaded Brest.
Elsewhere, Boscawen commanded in the Mediterranean ; Rear-
Admiral Samuel Cornish went with reinforcements to the East
Indies ; the squadron on the Leeward Islands' station was
strengthened by a division under Captain Robert Hughes (2), and
by trooj)s under Major-General Hopson ; and Vice-Admiral Charles
Saunders and Major-General Wolfe were despatched against the
^ Thomas Smitli was called by the seamen of his day " Tom o' Ten Thousand,"
because, while first lieutenant of the Gosport, in the absence of the captain, he compelled
a French frigate in Plymouth Sound to lower her topsails by way of salute. For this
act Lieutenant Smitli was court-martialled and dismissed the service, but, on the
following day, both restored and posted. Captain, 17o0; Eear-Admiral, 1747; Vice-
Admiral, 1748; president of the court-martial on Byng; Admiral, 1757; died, 17G2.
1759.] FOCOCK AND U ACBE. 197
French in Canada. The operations of this important and successful
year in the various parts of the world may now be followed in
greater detail.
In the East Indies, Vice-Admiral Pocock, who had refitted his
squadron at Bombay, sailed for the coast of Coromandel on
April 7th, endeavouring to get thither in advance of the French
fleet, which was expected back from Mauritius. He succeeded in
this object, and then cruised to intercept the enemy. On June 30th
he was joined by the Grafton, 68, and Sunderland, 60, with five
East Indiamen full of stores, of which he was greatly in need. On
August 3rd he sailed for Pondicherry, and, during the rest of the
month, cruised off that port, but could learn nothing of the enemy,
and was at length obliged by lack of provisions and water to
proceed to Trincomale. He sailed again thence on September 1st,
having a few days earlier sent the East India Company's frigate,
Revenge, to cruise off Ceylon and to keep a look-out for the French.
M. d'Ache had reached Mauritius in September, 1758, and had
there found a reinforcement of three sail of the line and several
French East India Company's ships. But provisions were so
scarce that he had to send one of the men-of-war and eight of the
Indiamen to South Africa to purchase supplies. These reached
Cape Town in January, 1759, and returned to Mauritius in April
and May. M. d'Ache was thus enabled to sail on July 17th for
Bourbon and Madagascar, to pick up further stores, and thence
for India. He reached Batticaloa in Ceylon on August 30th, and,
having there learnt something of the movements of the British
squadron, sighted it off Point Pedara ^ on September 2nd. His force
consisted of eleven sail of the line, besides two frigates ; that of
Vice-Admiral Pocock, of only nine sail of the line and one frigate.
On that same day, at about 10 a.m., the Revenge signalled to the
Vice-Admiral that she saw fifteen '^ sail in the south-east, standing
to the north-east. These were the enemy. Pocock signalled for
a general chase, and stood towards the French under all possible
sail ; but, the wind failing, the British were unable to get up. In
spite of his great superiority, d'Ache apparently did all that lay in
his power to avoid an action, although Pocock was equally anxious
to provoke one. After much fruitless manoeuvring the French were
lost sight of, and Pocock then stood to the north for Pondicherry,
1 Called also Point Palmyra. It is the N.E. point of Ceylon.
- It does not appear that there were really more than thirteen.
198
MAJOR OrERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1759.
where he expected to find his foe. He arrived off that place in the
early morning of the 8th, but saw no ships in the roadstead. At
1 P.M., nevertheless, he sighted the enemy's fleet to the south-
east. He was then standing to the northward with a sea breeze.
On the morning of the 9th, the French were again visible ; and
at '2 P.M., the wind springing up, the Vice- Admiral once more
signalled for a general chase. Two hours later the enemy appeared
to have formed a line of battle abreast, and in that formation bore
down. But no action resulted.
At 6 A.M., however, on September 10th, the French bore S.E.
by S., distant eight or nine miles, sailing in line of battle ahead on
the starboard tack. Pocock,^ in line of battle abreast, bore down
on them with the wind about N.W. by "W. At 10 a.m. the enemj^
wore, and formed a line of battle ahead on the larboard tack ; and
an hour afterwards Pocock did the same, the Elizaheth leading.
The action was begun on the British side by Kear-Admiral Stevens,
who, in the Grafton, attacked the Zodiaque. The tactics of the
day present no features of special interest ; and the action is
chiefly remarkable for the fury w^ith which it was fought ; for the
fact that, owing to various defects, two of the British ships were
able to take only a very insignificant part in the engagement ; and
because, in the evening, the whole of the superior French squadron
bore away and stood to the S.S.E. under a crowd of sail. Most
of the British ships were far too damaged to be able to pursue ;
* Order of battle (on the starboard tack) of the British and French sqviadrons in the
East Indies in the action of September 10th, 1759 : —
British.
Fkekch.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
FAizaheth . . .
jXewcastle . . .
Tiger
Grafton ....
Ynrmmith . . .
Cumberland i . .
Salisbury . .
64
50
60
68
66
r>H
.50
60
i;o
Capt. Richard Tiddeman.
„ Colin Michie.
„ 'Williani Hrercton.
[Rcar-Admiral Charles
1 Stevens {U).
Capt. Richard Kempen-
folt.
1 Vice- Admiral Georpe
i Roccek (R).
(Capt. John Harrison.
r ,, John Stukley
t Somerset.
,, IMghy 1 lent (3).
/ ,, Hon.' .Tames Col-
) Yille.
f ,, Sir AVilliaxn Baird,
1 Bart.
Actif ....
Minotaure .
Due d' Orleans .
St. Louis
Yengeur . . .
Zodiaque . . .
Comic de Province.
Due de Bourgoone.
Illustre ....
Fortune ....
Vcntaure
6t
74
60
60
64
74
74
60
•^4
64
70
Capt. de Surville (2).
„ de La Palliere.
(Lieut. -General Comte
^ d'Ache.
Capt. de La Chaise.
,, Bouvet(2).
., de .Sinville (1).
Sunderland.
Weymouth .
Sylphide. . . .
IHligente . . .
36
24
Q)irfn1iOioufih .
-•
,. Robert Kirk.
» Had been a 66-guu ship, but was reduced to a 5S to ease licr.
1759.] D'ACHE QUITS THE FIELD. 199
and, having ordered the Revenge to observe the motions of the
French, Pocock lay to on the larboard tack to enable his most
shattered vessels to repair damages. At dawn on September 11th
the French were seen in the S.S.E., about twelve miles away,
lying to on the larboard tack, the wind being about west. On
perceiving the British, they at once wore and brought to on the
other tack, and so continued until evening, when they were so far
off that they were almost out of sight. At that time, the wind
veering to the east, Pocock signalled his ships to wear, and stood
under easy sail to the south-west ; the Sunderland towing the Neiv-
castle, the Weymouth the Tiger, and the Elizabeth the Cumberland.
The loss sustained by the French in the engagement was, all
things considered, enormous, amounting, as it did, to nearly 1500
killed and wounded. Among the killed were the captains of the
Zodiaque and Centaure, and among the wounded was d'Ache himself.
The French made for Pondicherry. The loss on the British side
was also very heavy, being 569 killed and wounded, including 184
who were either killed outright or died of their wounds. Among
the killed was Captain Colin Michie of the Newcastle, and among
the wounded were Captain Somerset of the Cumberland and Captain
Brereton of the Tiger.
On September 15th the British anchored in the Eoad of
Negapatam ; and, having hastily completed their refitting, Pocock
sailed with his ships again on the 20th. On his way to Madras he
had to pass Pondicherry, where the French were lying ; and, un-
willing to pass it by night, or to do anything to prevent M. d'Ache
from fighting another action, he so arranged matters as to appear off
the town at daybreak on September 27th. There he lay with the
wind about W.S.W., with his maintopsails to the mast, and with
but just sufficient steerage way on his ships for the proper main-
tenance of the line. Thus the British drifted slowly to leeward, yet
not until Pocock had given d'Ache the fullest possible opportunity
to come out and fight. But the latter had no such intention ; and,
after weighing and making a few meaningless demonstrations, he
returned to port and there announced his intention of sailing
immediately for Mauritius. He carried out this determination on
September 30th, in spite of the anxious remonstrances of the shore
authorities, and especially of M. de Lally. His principal motive for
thus acting seems to have been his knowledge that Pocock was
about to be reinforced by four ships of the line from England.
200 MAJOR OPERATIO:SS, 1714-1762. [1759.
Pocock, being short of water and stores, and with ships in
bad condition, returned to Madras, where he anchored on Sep-
tember 28th. Thence he sailed on October 16th for Bombay,
and on the 17th fell in with Eear-Admiral Samuel Cornish, with
three ships of the line, one 50-gun ship,^ and three East Indiamen,
which last, and the troops which had been brought out as reinforce-
ments, were sent on to Madras escorted by the Queenborough. They
reached that place on October 27th. Pocock proceeded to Bombay,
and, after making various dispositions, sailed on April 7th, 1760, for
England with a very valuable convoy, arriving in the Downs on
September 22nd following. He left behind him Eear-x\dmirals
Stevens and Cornish.
Alluding to this last action, Mahan, after referring to the
numerical superiority of the French, says :
" The fruits of victory, liowever, were with the weaker fleet, for d'Ache returned to
Pondicherry and thence sailed on the 1st of the next month for the islands, leaving
India to its fate. From that time the result was certain. The English continued to
receive reinforcements from home, while the French did not ; the men opposed to Lally
were superior in ability; place after place fell, and in January, 1761, Pondicherry
itself surrendered, surrounded by laud and cut off from the sea. This was the end of
French power in India ; for though Pondicherry and other possessions were restored at
the peace, the English tenure there was never again shaken, even under the attacks of
the skilful and bold Suffren, who twenty years later met difificulties as great as d'Ache's
with a vigour and conduct which the latter at a more hopeful moment failed to show." ^
Vice-Admiral Pocock was deservedly made a K.B. for his services
and promoted to be Admiral of the Blue.
Such naval successes as the French won in the East after the
departure of Pocock were confined to the capture of the East India
Company's factory at Gombroon in the Persian Gulf, and the
reduction of certain British settlements in Sumatra. These successes
' lieinforcement which reached Vice-Admiral Pocock in the East Indies in
October, 1759 : —
Mai-s.
Gllll!:.
(_'(iiiiiuaiitlers.
Lenox .....
74
(■Rear-Admiral Sanuiel Cornish (15.).
tCajitain Ilobcrt Jocelyn.
Due iV Aqtiitaine
64
„ Sir William Hewitt, Bart.
York .....
60
„ Vincent' Pearce (2).
Fnlmorith ....
50
Richard Hughes (8).
' Intl. of yea Power,' 310.
1759.]
FIASCO AT MARTINIQUE.
201
were merely raids, without influence on the course of the war or on
the future of Franco-British commercial rivalry. The Dutch, seeking
to profit by the temporary difliculties of the British, attempted, with
seven East Indiamen and some troops from Batavia, to seize Chinsura
on the Ganges, but were checkmated by the energy of Colonel Clive,
Governor of Bengal, and by the gallantry of the masters of several
British East Indiamen, who, under Wilson of the Calcutta, took or
drove off the enemy on November 24th, 1759, after a sharp action.
The captured Dutch vessels were afterwards returned to their owners,
on security being given for the payment of £100,000 damages.
The British force on the Leeward Islands' station, under Commo-
dore John Moore, was strengthened by eight ships of the line under
Captain Eobert Hughes (2), and by troops under Major-General
Hopson, in order that the force might reduce some of the French
Caribbee Islands, which were supposed to be weakly garrisoned.^
The troops left England in November, 1758, under convoy of Captain
Hughes, and reached Carlisle Bay, Barbados, in January, 1759.
There Commodore Moore was met with. On the 13th of that month
the whole force sailed for Martinique, and on the afternoon of the
15th entered Fort Eoyal Bay. On the morning of the 16th the
Bristol, 50, Captain Leslie, and the liipon, 60, Captain Jekyll,
silenced and occupied a fort on Negro Point. The Winchester, 50,
Captain Le Cras, Woolwich, 44, Captain Peter Parker (1), and
Roebuck, 44, Captain Thomas Lynn, cannonaded the batteries in the
Bay of Cas des Navires, where it was intended to disembark troops.
^ List of the British fleet on the Leeward Islands' station under Commodore John
^loore in 1759 : —
Ships.
! Guns. I
Commanders.
C'amhridi/e
St. George
Norfolk .
Buckingham
Burford
Berwick.
Lion . .
Jiipon .
Panther
Winchester
Bristol .
80
90
74
70
70
64
60
CO
60
50
50
/Commodore John Moore.
ICapt. Thomas Burnett.
,, Clarke Ciaytou.
,, Robert Hughes (2).
„ Kichard Tyrrell. 1
„ James Gambier (1).
„ William Harmau.
f „ William Tre-
\ lawney.
,. Edward Jekyll.
f ,, Molyneux Shuld-
l iiam.
,, Edward Le Cras.
, , Lachliu Leslie.'-'
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Woohvich . . . 1 44
Capt. Peter Parker Cl).3
Roebuck . .
44
,, Thomas Lvnn.
Ludloio Castle
40
„ Edward Clark (1).4
Benoivn .
32
„ George Mackenzie.
Amazon .
26
,, William Norton.
Bye . . .
20
,, Daniel Dering.
Bonetta .
14
,, P>ichard King (I).
Weazel . .
14
Com. John Boles.
Antigua .
13
,, AV'cston Vai'lo.
Spy . . .
10
,, "William Bayne.
Jiingfisher, bciml)
8
,, Sabine Iteacon.
Falcon, boml) .
8
., Mark Robinson (1).
Grenado, Ijomb
8
,, Samuel Uvedale.
Infernal, bomb
8
,, James ^Mackenzie.
1 Later, Capt. Lachliu Leslie. - Later, Capt. Peter Parker (1). 3 Later, Capt. Daniel Bering.
4 Brought out the second battalion of the Royal Highlanders from Scotland.
The above were eventually joined by the Lancaster, 66, Captain Eobert Mann (2),
the Emerald, 28, and the Griffon, 28.
202 MAJOB OFERATIOXS, 1714-1762. [1759.
A landing was effected at about 4 p.m. under Captains Molyneux
Shuldham, James Gambier (1), and Thomas Burnett; and, by the
following morning, nearly the whole army was ashore. But against
4400 British, available for the service, there were at least 10,000
French, including their militia ; and, after some small operations
had been attempted, General Hopson, despairing of success, with-
drew his troops to the transports.
The expedition then proceeded to St. Pierre, the capital of the
island. But, on his arrival off that place on the 19th, the Commodore
did nothing except send in the Bipon, 60, Ca^Dtain Jekyll, to attack
some batteries, the reduction of which would not in the least have
influenced the general fate of the island. Jekyll was quite un-
supported ; and, having fought from 2 till 4.30 p.m. with great
gallantry and silenced one battery, he was obliged to cut his cable
and tow off. The position of the Bipoii was for some time not
unlike that of the Formidable under Captain de St. Bon at the
attack on Lissa in 1866. She narrowly escaped grounding, and
could not entirel}^ get clear till 6 p.m. Jekyll behaved magnificently.
It was then decided to abandon the attempt on Martinique, and
to attack Guadeloupe ; and on the morning of the 20th the squadron
sailed to the northward. By noon on the 22nd it was oft' Basse
Terre. After the town had been reconnoitred and a council of war
held, it was determined that on the morning of January 23rd the
citadel and various batteries of Basse Terre should be cannonaded
and, if possible, silenced, by the Lion, 60, Captain William
Trelawney, St. George, 90, Captain Clarke Gayton, Norfolk, 74, Cap-
tain Eobert Hughes (2), Cainhridge, 80, Captain Thomas Burnett,
bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Moore, Panther, 60,
Captain Molyneux Shuldham, Burford, 70, Captain James Gam-
bier (1), Benvick, 64, Captain William Harman, and Bipon, 60,
Captain Edward Jekyll. The last named got aground, and was
again in the greatest danger, until relieved by the Bristol and
Boehuck. At about 5 p.m. the enemy's fire was silenced. Neverthe-
less, the town was rather wantonly destroyed on the following day
by the fire of the four bomb ketches. Indeed, Commodore Moore
exerted from the first much unnecessar}'' force. He might have
landed his troops a little to the north of the town, and so captured
the place, which was open on the land side ; but he preferred the
useless and risky expedient of opposing his ships to forts. In the
action, however, only about thirty men were killed and about sixty
1759.] CAPTUBE OF GUADELOUPE. 203
wounded, among the latter being Captain Trelawney, of the Lion.
Commodore Moore, of course, gained his object ; and on the 24th
the army was put ashore and Basse Terre and Fort Eoyal were
occupied. The advantage was, unfortunately, not pressed ; and the
French governor retired to the mountainous interior of the island,
and was there able to make a most courageous stand for upwards of
three months.
During the interval, the Commodore detached the Eoebuck, 44,
Captain Lynn, the Winchester, 50, Captain Le Cras, the Berivick, 64,
Captain Harman, the Panther, 60, Captain Bhuldham, the Wool-
wich, 44, Captain Dering, and the Benoicn, 32, Captain Mackenzie,
under Captain Harman ; and this force, on February 13th, made
itself master of Port Louis on the Grande Terre side of the island.
But the guerilla warfare and comparative inactivity played havoc
with the troops. There were great numbers of sick ; and many of
them had to be sent to Antigua. On February 27th General Hopson
died, and was succeeded in the chief military command by Major-
General the Hon. John Barrington. This ofticer was beginning to
take somewhat more energetic measures than had previously been
displayed, when the army was partially deprived of the assistance
of the fleet in consequence of the arrival in the West Indies of
M. de Bompart, with five ships of the line and three large frigates,
containing troops intended for the relief of the French islands.
Commodore Moore felt it necessary to proceed to Prince Rupert's
Bay in the Island of Dominica, so that he might be in a position to
watch and promptly follow the motions of the enemy, who lay in
Great Bay, Fort Eoyal, Martinique. The operations on shore were
thereafter conducted chiefly by the army. The inevitable capitula-
tion was signed on Ma)' 1st, M. de Bompart not having interfered.
Nevertheless, after Guadeloupe had surrendered, he made a brief
descent upon the island, and then, learning the truth, returned to
Martinique. Moore heard of this movement of the French squadron,
and put to sea in search of the enemy ; but he failed to find him,
and once more anchored in Prince Eupert's Bay. After the capture
of Guadeloupe, General Barrington sunnnoned, and received the
surrender of, Marie Galante, the Saintes, La Desirade and Petite
Terre. A little later Moore, reinforced by the Baisonnahle, 64, and
the Nassau, 64, proceeded to Basse Terre Eoad, and, on June 25th,
despatched part of the army to England under convoy of the
Boebuck.
204 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
Their inferiority of force prevented the French from attempting
anything of importance against either the British fleet or the British
garrisons in the West Indies; and, as no French fleet put to
sea, Moore had subsequently to confine himself to repressing the
enemy's privateers and to protecting British trade. On the Jamaica
station, where Vice-Admiral Cotes still commanded, the situation
was very similar ; and, though useful work was done by the cruisers,
no event of importance happened.
In North xA.merica the plans which had been formulated by the
Earl of Loudoun during his commandership-in-chief continued to
be carried out after his supersession ; and, in pursuance of these,
four considerable expeditions were entered upon in 1759, the object
of all being the ending of French rule in Canada. Three of these
expeditions, one against Fort Niagara, under Brigadier-General
Prideaux ; one against the French settlements on Lake Erie, under
Brigadier-General Stanwix ; and one under Major-General Amherst
against Crown Point and Ticonderoga, were mainly military. The
fourth, under Yice-Admiral Charles Saunders and Major-General
Wolfe, against Quebec, was fully as much naval as mihtary. All,
however, were parts of a single scheme, which was designed to
occupy the French in several quarters simultaneously, and so to
prevent them from concentrating their full strength at any one
point. The various expeditions were intended ultimately to assist
one another; but that all the schemes did not accurately dovetail
as originally intended is only natural. That mistakes should be
committed and that there should be in some cases lack of fore-
sight and of due preparation, were matters of course. Yet, in
spite of local insuccesses, the great combined undertaking was
in its results triumphant, thanks largely to Saunders and, above
all, to Wolfe.
Prideaux's force of about 5000 men started on May 20th from
Schenactady up the Mohawk Kiver, and so, amid great difficulties,
to Oswego on Lake Ontario ; whence, leaving there a detachment,
it crossed the lake and reached Niagara on July 6th. In the
operations General Prideaux was killed by accident, and the com-
mand devolved upon the Colonial colonel. Sir William Johnson,
Bart., who, after defeating a reheving force of the enemy, received
the surrender of the fort on July 25th. Johnson, being short of
ammunition and supplies, then returned to Oswego, where he
rehnquished his command to Brigadier-General Gage, who Ijuilt a
1759.] INVASION OF CANADA. 205
fort there, while Captain Joshua Loring, B.N., superintended the
construction of two large vessels for the navigation and command
of Lake Ontario and the Eiver St. Lawrence.
The expedition under General Stanwix was completely success-
ful, but it was so purely a military one that there is no need to
describe its operations here.
The expedition under General Amherst against Crown Point and
Ticonderoga was in many respects a large and powerful one ; yet it
should have included a great number of ship's carpenters, and
quantities of supplies for the creation of a naval force on Lake
Champlain. This provision was, however, overlooked. About
June 1st, the army was assembled at Fort Edward, and on
June 11th it marched to the banks of Lake George. Such boats
and radeaux as could be built were of an unsatisfactorj^ nature ;
but at length a motley flotilla was collected, and the army embarked
and proceeded down the Lake. On June 22nd the troops were landed
near the Second Narrows and advanced against Ticonderoga, which
on the 25th was evacuated and blown up, the enemy retiring on
Crown Point. The boats and radeaux were then laboriously got
into Lake Champlain. On August 1st, Amherst learnt that Crown
Point had been abandoned ; and on the 4th he occupied it. He at
once set to work to endeavour to put a suitable naval force on Lake
Champlain, so that he might be able to press on and effect a
junction with the force under Wolfe. But, owing to the lack of
preparations, there were delays ; and, although the French force on
the Lake was in part taken or destroyed, the approach of winter
obliged Amherst at the end of October to cut short his advance and
to return to Crown Point. Thus, both Prideaux and Amherst, who
were to have held forth helping hands to Wolfe, failed, perhaps
through no fault of their own. Only Stanwix, whose object was
rather diversion than actual and immediate co-operation, completely
gained his end. It is not the least of Wolfe's merits that, in spite
of the lack of expected help, but with the cordial co-o^^eration of the
Navy, he brought to a triumphant conclusion the most important
and difficult expedition of the four.
Wolfe had with him ten battahons of infantry, three companies
of grenadiers and some companies of artillery and rangers, about
9200 men in all. The fleet, w^hich was to convoy and support the
force, was under Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders and Bear-Admirals
Philip Durell (1) and Charles Holmes, and consisted of twenty sail of
206
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1759.
the line, two fiftj^-gim ships and numerous frigates and small craft. ^
Part of this fleet was already on the North American station under
Durell, and had wintered at Halifax. As soon as the season per-
mitted, Durell had entered the River St. Lawrence, and on May 23rd
got up as far as Isle Bic. Holmes w^ent out from England to
Halifax early in the year 1759 to forward preparations ; and on
February 17th Saunders and Wolfe sailed from Spithead. The
main body of the expedition was gradually assembled at Louisbourg
in the island of Cape Breton ; and there it was joined by the troops
in garrison. On June 1st it began to leave the harbour ; and on the
23rd the fleet found Eear-Admiral Durell near Isle Coudres, and
obtained from him some French pilots whom he had secured b}' a
ruse. Durell, reinforced, was left off Isle Coudres to bar the river,
and Saunders, hoisting his flag in the Stirling Castle, 64, Captain
Michael Everitt, proceeded, and on June 26th anchored off Isle
d' Orleans, a few miles below Quebec.
The Marquis de Montcalm, who defended the city, had taken all
possible precautions, and had removed the buoys and marks. His
main army was about 14,000 strong, and lay at Beauport, to the
immediate north-east of Quebec. Detachments of it were posted
down the river at points whence it was expected that the advancing
^ List of the British fleet employed on the expedition to Quebec, 1759 : —
-lliJ)^.
tjUIlS
I oiumainlei^
1
jVice-Adiniral Cbarles
^^eptune . . .
90
< Sauudeis (B).
ICapt. Bioiirick Hartwell.
(Eear-Adiuival Philip
Princess Amelia .
80
} DurenCl)(R).
ICapt. Jolm Bray.
|l!ear-Admival Charles
Dublin ....
1i
•j Holmes (W).
(Capt. A\illiam Goostrey.
Royal William. .
84
„ IIuKh Pigot (1).
Terrible ....
74
,, KithanH'iillins(l)
Shrewsbury . .
74
,, Hugh Palliser.
yorthumherlani .
70
r ,, Alex. Lord Col-
[ ville.
Vanguard . . .
70
,, Pfpbert Swanton.
Devonshire .
66
,, 'William Gordon.
Orford ....
66
,, Piichard Spry.
.Somerset. . . .
64
„ Edward Huglies.
Alcide ....
64
„ James Douglas (1).
Deilford ....
64
,, Thoi-jie FowUe.
Captain ....
64
,, John Amherst.
Trident ....
64
„ Julian Legge.
Stirling Castle. .
64
„ ^Michael Everitt.
Prince Frederick .
64
,, Pobert Jiouth.
Medivay ....
60
,, Charles Proby,
Pembroke . . .
60
,, JoliU AVheelock.
Prince of Orange .
60
,, Samuel Wallis.
Centurion . . .
50
,, ■\Villiam Mautell.
Sutherland . .
00
„ John Kous.
Diana ....
32
„ Alexander Schom-
l berg.
Richmond . . .
:;-j
f „ Thomas Hanker-
1 sou.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Trent . .
Lizard .
Echo . . .
Lowestoft .
Seahorse.
Scarborough
Mir us . .
Nightingale.
Hind. .
Squirrel .
Fowey
Scorpion .
Porcupine .
Hunter . .
Zejihyr .
Baltimore, bomb
Pelican, bomb
Jiacehorse, bomb
Vesuvius, I'.s.
Cormorant, f.s
Strombolo, f.s.
Boscawen, a.s.
Halifax, a.s.
Rodney, cutter
Crown, st.s.
28
Capt. John Lindsay.
28
,, James Doake.
28
„ John Laforev.
28
,, Joseph Deane.
24
,, James Smith.
24
., John Stott.
20
/ ,, John Elphinstone
\ (1).
20
/ ,, James Campbell
I (2).
20
,, Robert Bond.
20
„ George Hamilton.
20
( „ George Anthony
I Tonvn.
14
Com. John Cleland (1).
14
,, John Jervis.
10
/ ,, AVilliam Adams
t (2).
10
f ,, William Greeu-
l wood.
8
., Eobert Carpenter.
8
,, Edward Mouutford.
8
,, Francis Pichards.
16
,, James Chads.
16
,, Patrick Mouat.
16
Lieut. Kichard Smith.
16
Com. Charles Douglas.
12
Lieut.
4
Lieut. Hon. Philip Tuftou
Perceval.
18
Com. Joseph Jlead.
besides transports, etc.
1759.] ATTACK ON QUEBEC. 207
British could be annoyed. He had also thrown up strong works on
the north side of the river, between the Biver St. Charles and the
Falls of Montmorency, and had armed two hulks in the Eiver
St. Charles to defend the communications with the army and
Quebec. The Governor of the Province, Captain de Vaudreuil,
was, however, a naval officer, while the Marquis de Montcalm was
a soldier ; and there was not a good understanding between them.
Montcalm prudently desired to make his preparations with a view
to the necessity of a retreat ; but de Vaudreuil maintained that
such precautions were needless, and that if the whole French force
were concentrated on the north side of the river, the worst the
British could do would be to demolish some of the houses in
the city.
On June 27th, the British army landed on Isle d'Orleans and the
French defences were reconnoitred. Towards night the ships were
disposed to the best advantage, and measures were taken to prevent
damage from the enemy's fireships, which were known to be in
readiness higher up. A certain number of Marines had been taken
from those ships which had been left at Isle Coudres under Durell,
and these were distributed throughout the fleet. At midnight on
June 28th, the French sent down seven fireships and two fire rafts ;
but they were grappled and towed clear by the activity and good
conduct of the seamen. Vice- Admiral Saunders then decided to
move some of his vessels into the open space of water immediately
below the town, known as the Basin of Quebec ; and, to afford them
some protection, he induced General Wolfe to order the occupation
of Point Levis by Brigadier-General Monckton, The enemy tried
to dislodge this force on July 1st by means of floating batteries, but
in vain. The batteries were driven back by the fire of the Trent, 28,
Captain John Lindsay. Ultimately some large ships were stationed
a little higher up the river. Above these were frigates ; and again
above them armed boats rowed guard every night. The enemy
thereupon ordered such ships as he had uj) to Batiscan, sixty miles
above Quebec, but kept most of their crews in the city to assist in
working the guns. Batteries were erected on Point Levis to
bombard Quebec, and, the works on Isle d'Orleans having been com-
pleted, Wolfe, on July 9th, embarked his troops, and under convoy
of the Porcupine, 14, Commander John Jervis, and the Boscaive?i,
armed ship, 16, Commander Charles Douglas, effected a landing on
the north shore of the river below the falls of Montmorency.
208 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [1759.
On July 18th the Sutherland, 50, Captain John Eons, the
Squirrel, 20, Captain George Hamilton, two armed sloops, and two
transports, passed the town without loss, and gained the upper river.
On Juty 31st, supported b}^ the fire of the Centurion, 50, CaxDtain
William Mantell, an attempt was made to land troops below the
enemy's entrenchments ; but the force had to be drawn off to the
beach. Some efforts were then made to destroy the French ships
above the town and to open communication with General Amherst,
who was supposed to be advancing from Crown Point. The Loives-
toft, 28, Captain Joseph Deane, the Hunter, 10, Commander
Wilham Adams (2), two armed sloops, and two storeships, passed
up to co-operate ; but it was found that the force could not be got
further than about thirty miles above Quebec.
On August 29th, the Seahorse, 24, Captain James Smith, two
more armed sloops, and two more storeships, were sent past the
town in preparation for a projected attack on Quebec from the west.
Eear-Admiral Holmes took command of the flotilla on the upper
river. On the night of September 4th, all the flat-bottomed boats
and many vessels passed the town ; and as many troops as could be
spared were sent up with them. On the evening of the 12th, all the
boats remaining below the town were filled with Marines ; and on
the following morning at break of day they made a feint of landing
on the northern shore below the city, under cover of the fire of the
frigates and sloops. Troops had been already got into the boats on
the upper river, where Wolfe himself then was ; and in the starlight
they moved still further up, a French corps under M. de Bougain-
ville ^ marching parallel with them along the north bank. An hour
before daylight the boats turned and rowed down at great speed,
current and ebbing tide being both in their favour, and were followed
by the ships. The whole force quite outstripped the French, who
attempted to keep up with it. Just as day was breaking the boats
arrived eastward of Sillery, a short distance above Cape Diamond,
those containing the Hght infantry falling a little low^er down.
There the attacking force disembarked at the foot of a woody
precipice, scaled the height, and dispersed the guard on the summit ;
' Louis Aiitoine de Bou.uainville. Born, 1729; begau life as a lawyer; secretary
to the French embassy in Loudon, 1755; had previously, in 1752, been elected a
Fellow of the Eoyal Society for a treatise on the integral calculus ; aide-de-camp to
Montcalm in Canada; founded a French colony in the Falkland Islands, 1763; circum-
navigated the globe, 17GG-68; commanded at sea during the war of American Ecvolu-
tion; vice-admiial, 1791: made a senator hy Kapoleon; died, 1811.
1759.] CAPTURE OF QUEBEC. 209
and presently the whole army was pouring up the steep slopes, and
forming on the top, to await the approach of the main body of the
French, who, under Montcalm, were seen to be in motion.
The action began early. At 8 a.m. the sailors dragged up a gun,
which was most useful. By 10 the battle had become very general,
the enemy advancing with courage to within thirty yards, but then
wavering under the British fire, and being followed up with the
bayonet. It was at that time that Wolfe, at the head of the Louis-
bourg Grenadiers, received a second wound, which proved mortal.
The Marquis de Montcalm was also fatally wounded. After some
further fighting, the French retreated to the city. General the
Hon. George Townshend, who succeeded to the command, fortified
the position which had been won. iVdditional ships were brought
up ; and batteries were being erected to bombard Quebec, when, on
the 17th, the enemy offered to surrender. The Vice-Admiral and
General, and the French commandant, signed the capitulation on the
morning of the 18th. Later in the day the upper town was taken
possession of by troops under Lieut. -Colonel Murray, and the lower
town by seamen, under Captain Hugh PaUiser, E.N. The Vice-
Admiral's dispatches were sent to England by Captain James
Douglas (1), of the Alcide, who was knighted by the King, and
presented with ^500 wherewith to buy a sword. Throughout the
British dominions a public thanksgiving was ordered. Wolfe's
body was sent home in the Royal William, 84, and a monument to
his memory was erected at the national expense in Westminster
Abbey.
Saunders sent back to England his larger ships under Holmes
and Durell, and followed in October, leaving Captain Lord Colville
in command, with his own ship (the Northu7nherland, 70), the
Alcide, 64, the Trident, 64, the Pembroke, 60, the Prince of
Orange, 60, and several frigates, in North America. The Bace-
horse, bomb. Commander George Miller (1), and Porcupine, 14, Com-
mander John Macartney, were left to winter at Quebec.
After the British fleet had retired, the French- ships at Batiscan
also fell down the river, waiting at Cape Eouge for a fair wind to
carry them past the batteries of Quebec. On November 22nd, three
of them, the merchantmen Soleil Boyal, 24, Senecterre, 24, and Due
de Fronsac, 24, drove ashore in a gale and were lost. On the 24th,
in the night and on the ebb, the rest came down vdth a favourable
breeze ; and, although the garrison was ready for them, and every
VOL. III. P
210 Major opebations, 1714-1762, [1759.
possible gun was fired at them, they all got past safely except one,
another merchantman, the Elisabeth, which took the ground on the
south side of the river. Her crew made preparations for blowing
her up, and then wdth the assistance of the crews of the merchant-
men Machault, 24, and Chezine, 22, boarded and carried a British
schooner in which they escaped. On the following morning Com-
mander Miller, of the Racehorse, went on board the Elisabeth, and
ordering a light to be struck, inadvertently blew up the ship and
destroyed most of his party. He and his lieutenant survived to
be removed, but were so fearfully injured that they died within a
few days.
The campaign was a most successful one, chiefly because the
French had made but faint efforts to divert British attention from
the main objects which were kept in view by Mr. Pitt. On the
other hand, the British would not allow their attention to be
diverted in the slightest degree. Beatson rightly observes that : —
" had M. de Bompart, \vlieu he found he could uot prevent the island of Guadeloupe
from falling into our hands, steered for Xew York with his squadron, he might have
made such an impression there as would have obliged General Amherst either to come
himself, or at least to make such a detachment from his army as would perhaps have
disabled him from acting on the offensive for the remainder of the campaign. From
New York, M. de Bompart might have gone to Halifax, or St. John's, Newfoundland,
or both. An attack on either of these places would have obliged Admiral Saunders to
make such a detachment from his fleet as might have greatly diminished our efforts
before Quebec, and, perhaps in the end, would have proved the ruin of the enterjnise ;
while before such detachment could have been able to overtake M. de Bompart, he
might have done his business, and sailed for Euroi:)e."
It w^as of course inevitable, when France was straining all her
resources in order to invade Great Britain and Ireland, and when
there were no considerable British forces in the Mediterranean, that
she should endeavour to collect as large a naval force as possible at
Toulon, and then to send it round to join her main fleet at Brest.
Vice-Admiral Broderick commanded in the Mediterranean. Early
in the spring of 1759 his small squadron was reinforced by several
ships from England, and he received, and was able to carry out,
orders to watch Toulon. But Pitt was not content with merely
reinforcing the Mediterranean fleet. On April 14th, Admiral the
Hon. Edward Boscawen, with three more sail of the line and some
frigates, left Spithead to take over for a time the chief command on
the station, and on April 27th he arrived at Gibraltar. There he
made arrangements as to the dispositions of cruisers and convoys ;
1759.] BOSCAWEN AND DE LA CLUE. 211
and, sailing on May 3rd, joined Vice-Admiral Broderick off Cape
Sicie on May 16th, and assumed the command.
The French squadron prepared at Toulon was in charge of
M. de La Clue ; and, when the British arrived off the port, it was
almost ready for sea. The French were carefully blockaded, or
rather, watched with a view to preventing them from leaving
without being detected and followed. On June 7th, before they
attempted to come out, Boscawen chased two French frigates, and
drove them into a fortified bay near Toulon, whither on the 8th, he
ordered the CuUoden, Conqueror and Jersey, under the orders of
Captain Smith Callis, to proceed, and, if possible, destroy them.
The ships were gallantly taken in ; but, when under the batteries,
they were becalmed ; and, after a sharp two hours' engagement, they
had to be recalled without having accomplished their object. The
CuUoden lost 16 killed and 26 wounded : the Conqueror, 2 killed and
4 wounded : and the Jersey, 8 killed and 15 wounded ; and all the
vessels were badly damaged aloft.
The Admiral continued on his station until he was compelled, at
the beginning of July, to go to Gibraltar for provisions and repairs.
Preferring Salou^ for watering purposes, he put in there on the 8th,
remaining until the 24th ; and thus he only reached Gibraltar on
August 4th. Meanwhile he ordered the Lyme, 24, Captain James
Baker, to cruise off Malaga, and the Gibraltar, 24, Captain
William M'Cleverty, to cruise between Estepona and Ceuta to keep
watch for the enemy. On August 17th the latter descried the
French fleet, consisting of ten sail of the line, two fifty-gun ships
and three frigates, close in under the Barbary shore. Captain
M'Cleverty made at once for Gibraltar, and arrived off Europa Point
at 7.30 P.M., when he signalled the force and situation of the enemy
to the Admiral, who sent off an officer to the Gibraltar, ordering
her to keep sight of the foe and from time to time to signal to him
accordingly. The British squadron was not quite ready for sea, and
Boscawen's flag-ship, the Namur, in particular, had not so much as
a single sail bent. Still, a httle before 10 p.m., the whole fleet, of
thirteen sail of the line and two fifty-gun ships besides frigates, was
out of the bay.
Owing to the haste in which they had gone out, and to the
Admiral, after leaving harbour, carrying a press of sail to the
westward, the ships were, on the following morning, in two well
' A few miles south-west of Tarragona. ■
P 2
212
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1759.
defined divisions. The Warspite, Culloden, Stviftsure, Intrepid,
America, Portland, and Guernsey, which had lain at anchor near the
Namiir and had put to sea along with her, were still with her.
Vice-Admiral Broderick, in the Prince, with the rest of the
squadron, was many miles astern. At 7 a.m. on the 18th, ^ the
advanced division sighted the enemy to the westward. There were
then visible only seven sail, and it afterwards proved that the rest
had gone, without orders, into Cadiz during the night. De La Clue
first thought that the ships coming up behind him were his own
missing vessels ; but he was disabused when Boscawen signalled a
general chase to the N.W. At 9 a.m. the British Admiral ordered
his sternmost ships to make more sail. This soon had the effect of
bringing up the Vice-Admiral's division, which enjoyed a fine easterly
^ British and French fleets off Gibraltar in August, 1759 : indicating, the order in
which the advanced British ships got into action on August 18th ; the loss suffered by
each in the action ; and the fate of the French ships.
BitlTISH.
1
r.EKCH
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Killed.
Wounded.
Ships.
Guns.
Fate.
1 Admiral Hon. Edward)
{ Boscaweu (B). ]■
(Capt.AlattliewBuckle(l)l
Ocean ^. . .
80
Burnt.
6. Namur . .
90
13
44
Redoutdble
74
Centaure . .
74
1
n'ite-Adniiral Thomas
I Broderick (B).
Tevii-raire . .
74
VTaken.
Prince .
90
Modeste .
64
jCapt. .Joseph Peyton (1).
1
Souverain .
74
) Escaped, Aug.
) 18-19.
Newark. . ,
80
< ,, William Hol-i
( bi>urne. J
••
5
Guerrier .
Fantasque . .
74
64
6. Warspite .
74
„ John Bentley.
U
40
Lion . .
64
1. Culloden .
74
,, Smitli Callis.
4
15 i
Triton . . .
64
Parted company,
Aug. 17-18;
and entered
Conqueror .
70
„ William Lloyd (l).i
2
6
Fier. . . .
50
7. Swijtsure .
70
64
,, Th(juuis Stanhope.
„ Francis AVillium
Drake.
5
32
Orijiamme. .
50
26
Edgar . .
Chimere
Cadiz.
St. Albans .
64
„ Edward Vernon (2)
6
2
Minerve
24
8. Intrepid
60
„ Edward Pratten.
6
10
Gracieuse . .
24
2. America
60
,, James Kirke.
3
16
r rince ss)
Louisa . 1
60
„ Robert Harland (2). •
Jersey . .
60
,, John Barker (1).
4. Guernsey .
50
(Lieut. ^Michael Kearny 1
I (acting). J
..
14
3. Portland .
50
40
Capt. Jervis Maplesden.
„ Eichard Gwynn.
6
12
Ambuscade.
Rainbow .
40
„ Christopher Basset.
Shannon .
36
,, Charles Meadows.
Active .
36
,, Herbert Sawyer( I ).
Thetis . .
32
,, John Jlontray.
Lyme . .
24
,, James Baker.
Gibraltar .
24
f „ ■William .M'Cle-
l veity.
Glasgow
24
„ Andrew Wilkinson.
.sheerness .
24
„ John Clark (1).
Tartar' s
Prize. .,
24
„ Thomas Baillie(l).
Favourite .
16
Com. Timothy Edward?.
i
Gramoiil .
16
„ Philiii Affleck.
1
yKlna, f.s. .
8
„ Kiclianl Hi kerton.
1
SalamanderA
f.s. . .]
8
f ,, Hon. John Leve-
i son (Jower.
K.xchauged >hips.
Flag of M. de La Clue. Suffren. who was iu her, thus became for the second time a prisoner to the British.
1759.] THE ACTION OFF LAO OS. 213
breeze, while the enemy had barely enough wind to give them
steerage way. Thus the British gained on the chase till, at about
1.25 P.M., Boscawen signalled to engage.
At 1.30 P.M. the enemy began to fire at the headmost British
ships as they came up ; and since Admiral Boscawen perceived that
the French intended to make off as soon as the breeze should reach
them, he naturally desired that the most advanced ships of his fleet
should push on and attack the enemy's van, to stop their flight until
his remaining ships could get up. He therefore ordered the America
and Guernsey to make more sail. At about 2.30 p.m. the CuUoclen
began to fire on the Centaure, the rear ship of the enemy ; and, very
soon afterwards, the America, Portland, Guernsey and Warspite got
into action. The wind had by that time dropped altogether, so far
as the ships which were in action were concerned. The British rear
division, however, still had a breeze, and was thus able to get up in
time to have a share in the victory.
Boscawen, himself, in the Namur, was in action with the stern-
most ships of the enemy at about 4 o'clock. The Siviftsure and
I7it7xpid were at that time to windward of him ; and, hailing the
former, he ordered her to push on for the enemy's van ship. By
about 4.30 p.m., the Namur was close alongside the Ocean; and,
when the two had been engaged for about half-an-hour, the Namur,
having lost her mizenmast and both topsail yards, was disabled, and
fell astern. De La Clue made every effort to take full advantage of
this misfortune to the British flagship. Each of his vessels, except
the Centaure, set all possible sail to get away ; but the Centaure had
been engaged by every ship as she came up, and had stood the brunt
of the fight. At last, her fore and main topmasts had fallen ; and
she was so greatly damaged in every respect that she had no alter-
native but to strike.
The misfortune to the British flagship did not affect the energy
and activity of the British Admiral, who ordered out his barge and
was rowed at once to the Newark, and there hoisted his flag. But,
by that time, the battle proper had almost ceased, and the pursuit
had begun. Boscawen continued it during the whole night. Though
there was a fine breeze, there was also a sHght haze; and, under
cover of this, two of the French ships, the Souverain and Guerrier,
altered their course in the darkness and so escaped. Thus, at day-
hght on the 19th only four sail of the enemy were to be seen. The
British were about three miles astern of them, and about fifteen
214 MAJOR OPEBATJONS, 1714-17(32. [1759.
miles from Lagos. Once more the wind had ahnost died away. At
about 9 o'clock the Ocean ran amocg the breakers, and the three
other ships anchored under the Portuguese batteries. Boscawen
thereupon sent the Intrepid and America to destroy the Ocean,
which, in taking the ground, had carried away all her masts.
Captain Pratten had anchored ; and he failed to carry out the order ;
but Captain Kirke, taking in the America very close, discharged a
few guns into the enemy at point-blank range, and obliged her to
strike. M. de La Clue, who had one leg broken and the other
injured, and who eventually died of his w^ounds at Lagos, had been
landed about half-an-hour previously. Captain Kirke took possession
of the French flagship ; and having removed such officers and men as
were found in her, he set her on fire, deeming it impossible to bring
her off. The Warspite was ordered in against the Temeraire, 74,
and succeeded in bringing her out very little damaged. Vice-Admiral
Broderick's division went against the remaining two ships, and,
after about half-an-hour's action, captured the Modeste, 64. The
Redoutable, 74, ha\'ing been abandoned, and being found to be
bulged, was burnt. In this action the enemy's loss was very severe
in killed and wounded. In the Centaure alone, about 200 w^ere
killed. The loss of the British, on the other hand, w^as very small,
amounting only to 56 killed and 196 wounded.^
" The British," says Beatson, " as well as the French Admiral, was not quite well
pleased with the behaviour of his captains, some of whom, he thought, did not make
sail enough to get up witli the van of the enemy's fleet, which the Admiral wished they
should attack, in order to retard their flight until the rest of the squadron should be
able to join in the action. Others, through mismanagement, he thought, had allowed
their ships to fall to leeward, after they had engaged the enemy some time, and there-
fore could not properly get into action again. But great allowance ought to be made
for this, for just as the British ships came up with the enemy's rear, the wind died
away. They attacked the enemy on the lee side, in order that they might be able to
open their lower ports, some of the ships carrying them very low. Another reason why
some of the British shijis fell so much to leeward was that the French Admiral, on
})erceiving Admiral Boscawen in the Namur, and some ships along with him, pressing
forward to attack his van and centre, made his fleet luft" up as nmcli as they possibly
could, so as to form a sort of crescent ; by which position the whole of his ships in
their van and centre were enabled by their fiie, not only to assist tlie rear, but each
other, in tlieir endeavours to rejiel the attack, which they looked for every moment
from the British Admiral. By this mana:'uvre of M. de La Clue's, such of our ships as
first got up with the enemy's rear, and to leeward of their line, were thrown out ot'
action ; while, for want of sufficient breeze of wind, they could not get into it again.
The Portland, having lost her foretopmast, dropped astern. The Intrepid was to wind-
ward of the Namur; she diil not bear down close enough, but kept aloof, and tired at
the enemy across the other ships." ^
' Boscawen's Disp. See table p. 212, antea. ^ 'Nav. and Mil. Mems.,' ii. 318.
1759.] BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. 215
Bosc9;wen, who said of the battle, "It is well but it might have
been a great deal better," presently rehoisted his flag in the Namur,
and despatched Captain Matthew Buckle, in the Gibraltar, to
England with dispatches. Buckle was graciously received by the
King, and presented with £500 to buy a sword. The Admiral
himself, as soon as his fleet had repaired damages, returned, in
accordance with his instructions, to England, taking with him the
Namur, Warspite, Swiftsure, Intrepid, America and Portland, the
Salamander and Mtna fire-ships, and the prizes Temeraire and
Modeste. These were afterwards followed by the Edgar, Princess
Louisa, and the prize Centaure. Vice-Admiral Broderick, who
remained in the Straits, blockaded Cadiz, in which still lay that part
of the French squadron which had taken refuge there.
Boscawen's rewards were a membership of the Privy Council
and a generalship in the Marines. Captains Bentley, of the War-
spite, and Stanhope, of the Swiftsure, were knighted for their share
in the action ; and the three prizes were purchased, and added to
the Navy under their French names.
Broderick blockaded Cadiz very closely ; but, on November 9th,
he was driven from his station by a storm, and was obliged to send
his flagship to Gibraltar to refit, and to hoist his flag on board the
Conqueror. The Neivark and Culloden had to cut away all their
masts, and run for port. Eeturning off Cadiz, Broderick contmued
the blockade as before ; but the enemy, though by that time superior
in strength, declined to come out and offer him battle. The Vice-
Admiral being a second time driven from his station by a storm, the
French at length ventured forth, and were happy enough to get
safely back to Toulon.
Bear-Admiral George Brydges Bodney was sent in the summer
with a light squadron,^ consisting of one ship of the line, four fifty-
gun ships, five frigates, a sloop and six bomb ketches, to endeavour
to destroy the flat-bottomed boats, and the supplies which had been
^ Squadron under Eear-Admiral Rodney in the Channel, 1759 : AcJiiUes, 60, Eear-
Adiniral George Brydges Rodney, Cai^tain the Hon. Samuel Barrington ; Chatham, 50,
Captain John Lockhart; Deptford, 50, Captain John Holhvell ; Ids, 50, Captain
Edward Wheeler; Norwich, 50, Cajotain George Darby; Brilliant, ZQ, Q&iA&m Hyde
Parker (1) ; Juno, 36, Captain Henry John Philips ; Vestal, 32, Captain Samuel Hood (1) ;
Boreas, 28, Captain Hon. Robert Boyle; Unicorn, 28, Captain Thomas Graves (2);
Wolf, 16, Commander Hugh Bromedge ; Furnace, bomb, Commander Jonathan
Faulknor (1) ; Firedrahe, bomb. Commander James Orrok ; Basilisk, bomb. Com-
mander John Clarke (1) ; Mortar, bomb. Commander Joseph Hunt ; Carcass, bomb.
Commander Charles Inglis (1) ; and Blast, bomb, Connnauder Thomas Willis.
216 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
collected at Le Havre for the projected invasion of England. Sailing
from St. Helen's on July 2nd, 1759, he anchored on the 3rd in the
Koad of Le Havre, and stationed his bombs in the channel leading
to Honflem-. These threw shells into the town, magazines, and
boats for fifty consecutive hours, and did immense damage, without
receiving any injury worth mentioning. Kodney, with some of his
frigates, remained off the port for the rest of the year, and captured
numerous prizes.
Admiral Sir Edward Hawke sailed in June, with a fleet of
twenty-five sail of the line and many frigates, to blockade or, more
strictly, to observe the enemy in Brest. He cruised some leagues at
sea, leaving an inshore squadron of his lighter ships, under Captain
the Hon. Augustus John Hervey, of the Monmouth , 64, close off the
port. He also detached Commodore John Eeynolds (1), m the
Firm, 50, with a small squadron, to watch the French transports
which had assembled in the river Morbihan in preparation for the
invasion of Ireland. When at length the Firm became very foul and
had to go home to refit, she was relieved by the Bochester, Commo-
dore Robert Duff. In the course of the blockade the Achilles, 60,
Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, also had to go home, having
run on a rock when in pursuit of some French vessels. It may be
mentioned that, during part of the summer. Prince Edward
Augustus, afterwards Duke of York, again served as a midshipman,
with Captain Lord Howe, in the Magnanime, 74.
Numerous brushes with the enemy relieved the tedium of the
blockade. On one occasion the French sent out four ships of the
line to attack the inshore squadron ; but Hervey, instead of retiring,
went to meet them ; and, the fleet making as if to support him, the
French withdrew. The intention had been that, if Hervey had
drawn off and left the coast clear, the four ships of the line should
have gained the mouth of the Morbihan, crushed Duff, and then
escorted the French invasion of Ireland. Hervey and the inshore
squadron continued very active, and greatly annoyed the enemy,
until in October the Monmouth, which had become very leaky, had
to return to England.
The approach of the season of bad weather seemed to afford the
French better opportunities for putting into execution their scheme
of invasion, it being impossible, in those days, for a blockading
squadron, no matter how strong or how ably commanded, to always
maintain its position during the autumn and winter. A violent gale
1759.] EAWKE AND DE CONFLANS. 217
of wind, in fact, forced Hawke from his station on November 9th,
and obhged him to x^nt into Torbay. This storm proved the salva-
tion of M. de Bompart, who, with his squadron, was returning from
the West Indies, and who must otherwise have been snapped up by
the British fleet. Most of the men of his ships were turned over to
the fleet under M. de Conflans, who learnt by the arrival of M. de
Bompart that the British had been driven from off the port.
With the hope of being able to effect something against Commo-
dore Duff, de Conflans put to sea on November 14th. Hawke on the
same day got under way from Torbay, and on the 15th was in-
formed by Captain William M'Cleverty, of the Gibraltar (the same
who three months earlier had warned Boscawen of the approach of
M. de La Clue), that the Brest fleet had sailed, and that it had been
seen twenty-four leagues N.W. of Belle Isle, steering S.E. Hawke,
with strategical intuition, made for Quiberon Bay with all possible
sail, rightly judging that the French would take advantage of their
brief liberty in order to make for that neighbourhood, so as to free
the transports which were blockaded by Duff in the Morbihan. But
he was unable to proceed with the speed he desired. Wind from
the S. by E. and S. drove him considerably to the westward and
delayed him. On the 19th, however, the wind became fair ; and, on
that day, Hawke ordered the frigates Maidstone and Coventry ahead
of the fleet, one on the starboard and the other on the larboard bow.
Early in the morning of the 20th he also ordered the Magitanime
ahead to make the land.
The contrary wind which had baffled Hawke also retarded
de Conflans, and was instrumental in saving Duff, who received his
first news that the Brest fleet had put to sea by Captain Gamaliel
Nightingale, of the Vengeance, on the morning of the 20th. Night-
ingale on entering the bay had fired guns to alarm the Commodore.
Duff realised at once the danger that was upon him, and immediately
made the signal for his ships to cut their cables. In a few minutes
they were all under way. He attempted to take them out to sea
round the north end of Belle Isle, but, the wind shifting, the
Belliqueux, 64, Captain Thomas Saumarez, was the only one which
escaped by that passage. She was not able to rejoin until three
days after the battle. Duff then tried to escape by the south end of
the island ; and, in doing so, he was observed by de Conflans, who
made the signal to chase. The Chatham, 50, which sailed very badly,
was almost within gunshot of a French seventy-four, when a man
218
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1759.
on the main-top-gallaut yard of the Bochester hailed that he saw a
sail, and, presently, that he saw a fleet. The Commodore quickly
made out what the fleet was, and at once ordered his little squadron
to tack and chase the enemy. At first the French were puzzled by
this change of policy ; but, as soon as de Conflans discovered the
cause, he recalled his chasers ; and Duff's squadron was thus enabled
in the course of the day to join Sir Edward Hawke.
At about 8.30 a.m. the Maidstone signalled that she had sighted
a fleet ; and at 9.45 the Magnanime announced that the strangers
were enemies. The French were at that time relinquishing the chase
of the Commodore's squadron, and Belle Isle bore E. by 1^. i N.^
Hawke instantly made the signal for a line of battle abreast, in
order to draw up his ships ; and he followed it soon afterwards with
the signal for the seven ships which were nearest the enemy to
^ List of the British and French fleets in the action in Quiberon Bay, November
20th, 1759 :—
Bkitioh.
French.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships.
Guns.
Fate.
lAdmhal Sir Edward Hawke,
Soleil Royal . .
(■Beached and burnt
l by the French.
Koyal George . .
100
<^ K.B.
80 2
(Capt. John Campbell (1).
' Tonnant.
80 3
To the Chareute.
iVice-Aiimiral Sir Charles
Fiirmulable .
80 i
Taken.
Union ....
90
\ Hardy (J).
(Gapt. John Evans.
Orient ....
Jntiepide
»0
74
JTo the Charaute.
Duke
90
,, Thiinia.s Graves (2).
Glorieux
74
,, Vilaine.
A'amur ....
90
,, Matthew Huclde(l).
Thciiie ....
74
Foundered.
Mars
74
Commoil. .,auies Young (1).
Heros ....
74
rTakeu, wrecked,
1 and burnt.
Warspite . . .
74
Capt. Sir .lohii Beutley, Kt.
Hercules. .
74
,. William Foriescue.
Robuste ....
74
To the Vilaine.
Torhay ....
74
f ,, Hon. Augustus Kep-
l pel.
Magni/ique . . .
Juste ....
74
70
,, Charente.
Wrecked.
Magnanime
74
,, Viscount Howe.
Superbe ....
70
Foundered.
hesolution ' .
nero
74
74
,, Heury Speke.
/ ,, Hon. George Edg-
Dauphin Royal .
Dragon ....
70
64
[To the Charente.
(. cumlje.
Xorthumberland .
64
1
Swift sure . . .
70
/ „ Sir Tliouias Stanhope,
I Kt.
Sphinx ....
Solitaire
64
64
V „ Vilaine.
Dorsetshire . . .
70
„ I'eter Denis.
Brillant. . . .
64
„ Charente.
liurford
70
,, James ( laraliier (1).
Fveille ....
64
„ ViLine.
Chichester . . .
70
„ A\ illiam Saltreu Willett.
Bizarre ....
64
„ Chareute.
Temple ....
70
f „ Hon. W'asbiugtou Shir-
l ley.
Jnjiexible . . .
64
„ VJaiue.
Revenge ....
64
,, ,Tohn Storr.
Vesfale ....
.^4
Essex^ ....
Kingston . . .
64
6U
,, Luiius O'Brien.
,, Thcmias Shirley.
Aigrette ....
Calypso ....
36
16
,. Vilaine.
Intrepid. . . .
60
,, Jervis .MapiesJen.
Prince Noir
Montagu
60
,, .fosliua Rowley.
Dunkirk
60
,, JIi'U. Koliert Digby.
Dijiance . . .
60
50
„ I'atrick Baird.
„ Robert Duff.
Rochester . . .
Portland . . .
50
„ ^larriot Arl)uthnof.
Falkland . . .
50
,, Francis .'^aniuel Drake.
Chatham
50
,, John Lockhart.
Minerva
32
,, Alxaud r .Vithur Hood.
Venus . . .
36
,, Thomas Harrisnu (-.;).
Vtnyeance . . .
28
,, (Jam.iliel Nightingale.
Coventry . . .
28
,, Francis liurslem.
Maidstone .
28
,, 1 mdley Digges.
t^'appli ' rp
32
,, .Iclni Strarhaii.
1 Wrecked.
2 Flag of M. de Conflans, Vice- Admiral.
3 Flag of the Prince de liaulTreinnnt-Listen(iis,Cljef d'Escadre.
■* Flag of M. St. Andre du Verger, Chef d'Escadre.
1759.] THE BATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY. 219
chase, draw into line of battle ahead of him, and endeavour to arrest
the French until the remainder of the fleet could get up and bring
about a general engagement.
Upon realising that they were in the presence of the British, the
enemy fell into some confusion, but, in the course of a short time,
seemed to arrive at a determination to fight, and endeavoured to
form a line. While they were executing this manoeuvre, the British
approached very rapidly, the wind being then nearly west. De Con-
flans then suddenly altered his mind, and, instead of waiting to
engage, made off. He was near his own coasts, with the difiiculties
and dangers of which he was fully acquainted and presumably knew
well how to' avoid, while the British were on a lee shore, with which
they were unfamiliar. The weather was tempestuous and was
rapidly growing worse ; and the November day would soon end.
De Conflans therefore endeavoured to keep his fleet together, and
steered right before the wind for the land, which was not more than
about twelve miles distant.^
The wind, as the short afternoon drew to its close, was variable
between N.W. and "W.N.W., and blew in heavy squalls. Yet both
fleets crowded sail, the French to escape, and the British to overtake
them. At 2 p.m. the enemy began to fire at the leading ships of
the British fleet ; and, half-an-hour later, when the Warspite and
Dorsetshire were close up with the enemy's rear, Hawke made the
signal to engage. The British fleet was then to the south of
Belle Isle. A little later the Eevenge, Magnanime, Torhay, Montagu,
Besolution, Siviftsure and Defiance got into action, and hotly
engaged the French rear. Yet this fact did not prevent the
French admiral, who was in the van, from leading round the
Cardinals. The Formidable, carrying the flag of Eear-Admiral
du Verger, was attacked by the ■ Besolution, and, in addition,
received a broadside or two from every other British ship that
passed her ; and, having been severely treated, she struck about
4 o'clock. The loss on board of her was terrible, M. du Verger
and upwards of two hundred others being kifled. The Formidable
was taken possession of by the Besolution. In the meantime, the
ships of the British rear were straining to get into action. The
Thesee, Captain de Kersaint " was hotly engaged by the Magnanime,
1 For Quiberon Bay and its neighbourhood, see chart facing p. 488, in Vol. II.
2 Guy Simon de Caetuampreu, Comte de Kersaint ; born, 1709 ; entered the navy
as a seaman, 1722; lieutenant, 1712; captain, 1745. In Renommee captured Prince
220 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
but was relieved by the disablement of the British ship, which,
being fouled by one of her consorts, fell astern. Very soon after-
wards the Thesee was tackled by the Torhay ; and, in the contest
which resulted, she capsized and foundered, chiefly owing to the
fact that her captain, from motives of self-pride, persisted in fighting
his lower deck guns, regardless of the stormy state of the weather.
All her crew of about eight hundred men, except twenty, were lost.
The Torhay, owing to similar causes, was at one time in danger of a
like fate ; but Captain Keppel closed his ports in time, and saved
her. Another French ship, the Superhe, foundered at about the
same time.
Owing to the gale, the lee shore, and the gathering darkness,
there was at that time great confusion ; and it is almost impossible
to tell exactly what happened. But it would appear that after
having engaged the Thesee, and having been fouled first by the
Warspite and then by the Montagu, Lord Howe, in the Magnanime,
observed the French Hews somewhat disabled to leeward, and,
bearing down and ranging alongside, quickly obliged her to strike.
The Hews anchored, but, owing to the weather, no boat could be
sent to take possession of her ; and, later, her captain ran her ashore
and landed his crew. As night fell, the enemy's fleet divided ; part,
under M. de Beauffremont, the vice-admiral, making to the south-
ward within the Four Bank, and probably designing to attract the
British into danger.
But Hawke would not be tempted to pursue them. Night was
come ; islands, rocks, and shoals were all around ; no pilots were on
board ; the charts were indifferent, and the weather was terrible.
Hawke, therefore, made the signal to anchor, and came to in fifteen
fathoms of water, the Isle de Dumet bearing E. by N. two or three
miles distant, the Cardinals W. ^ S., and the steeples of Le Croisic
S.E., as was discovered in the morning. Unfortunately, the signal
was not taken in, and, consequently, was not obeyed, by many ships
of the British fleet. According to the code then in use, the signal to
anchor by night was made by firing two guns from the flagship,
of Orange. Commanded the AJcide in the East Indies. Some Frencli accounts state
that the Thesee was sunk at Quiberon owing to being run down by Hawlie's flagship
while de Kersaint -was going to the assistance of the Soleil JRoyal ; but these are
clearly incorrect. The Count's son, who saw his father sink at Quiberon, was later a
distinguished naval officer, but, meddling with politics, was guillotined in 1793. He
was then a vice-admiral.
1759.] THE BATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY. 221
without using lights or any other indications to distinguish the
particular purpose for which the guns were fired. At a moment
when there was still a certain amount of firing going on on all sides,
the discharge of two guns from the flagship could of course not be
recognised as a signal except by the few vessels which chanced to be
so near the Admiral as to be aware that he had anchored. The
others either stood out to sea or anchored, as prudence suggested.
Had the French only known the dangerous position in which the
unsatisfactory nature of the signal book had left their enemy during
that stormy night, they might, in the morning of the 21st, have
attacked the small body remaining at anchor near Hawke, and
perhaps have won a decided and complete victory by the mere
strength of superior forces.
The night was dark, and even more boisterous than the evening
had been ; but, though guns of distress were heard from all sides, it
was not possible to send assistance to anyone. On the morning of
the 21st the Besolution was seen to be ashore, and the French Hews
was on the Four Bank. De Conflans's flagship, the Soleil Boyal, in
the obscurity overnight, had come to anchor in the very midst of the
British ; and, when at daylight she perceived her situation, she
slipped her cable and tried to get away, but presently went ashore
near the town of Le Croisic. No sooner was she observed to be in
motion than Hawke signalled the Essex to slip and pursue her ; but
in the ardour of the chase the Essex unfortunately got on the Four
Bank and was also wrecked. It was seen that, while the French
vice-admiral had gone to the southward with part of the fleet, the
remainder had stood to the N. and was engaged in the mouth of the
river Vilaine in getting out guns, stores, etc., and endeavouring to
find a haven up the river. On the 21st and 22nd, by taking ad-
vantage of the flood tide and of what wind there was under the land,
all of them got into the river, whence several of them could never be
brought out again. On the 22nd Hawke ordered the Soleil Boyal
and Heros to be set on fire. The French, however, anticipated him
by themselves burning the former.
On the British side the number of men killed in the action did
not exceed fifty, and only about two hundred and fifty were
wounded.^
As soon as it became known in England that the French had
sailed from Brest, the excitement was great, and every effort was
1 Hawke's Disp. of November 24tli.
222
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1759.
made to meet the situation, Eear- Admiral Geary was detached
with a reinforcement of ships ^ for Hawke ; and other vessels capable
of putting to sea were ordered to be in readiness at a moment's
notice. Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders, returning from the con-
quest of Quebec, learnt in the chops of the Channel that the French
were out and that Hawke had gone in chase of them. Though he
had with him but three ships of the line,^ he realised so fully that no
addition of forces was to be despised, and he had so strong a sense
of his duty, that, on his own responsibility, he steered for Quiberon
Bay with all the sail he could set. But neither Geary nor Saunders
joined Hawke ere the battle. Geary arrived several days too late.
COMMEMORATIVE MEDAL OF HAWKE's VICTORY IN QUIBERON BAY, 1759.
(From an original kindly lent by H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Batteriberg, E.X.)
and Saunders, hearing of the issue of the action,^ altered his course
and steered again for England.
Hawke sent home his dispatches by Captain John Campbell (1),
who, as Captain Matthew Buckle had been, was graciously received
by the King, and presented with £500 to purchase a sword. Hawke
himself received the thanks of the House of Commons and a pension
of ^62000 a year. Nor were other officers who had distinguished
themselves during the campaign forgotten. Boscawen, as has
already been mentioned, was made General of Marines ; Vice-
^ Sandwich, J)0, Uear- Admiral Francis Geary, Captain IJichard Xorbury; Foud-
royant, 84, Captain Richard Tyrrell; Bienfaimnt, 64, Captain George Balfour;
America, 60, Captain James Kirke; Anson, 60, Captain Matthew AVhitwcU; Firm, 60,
Captain John Reynolds (1) ; and Juno, 82, Captain Henry John Philips.
^ Somerset, 64, Yice-Admiral Charles Saunders, Captain Edward Hughes; Van-
guard, 70, Captain Robert Swanton ; and Devonshire, 66, Captain William Gordon.
^ Mahan calls this action "the Trafalgar" of the Seven Years' War. Guc'rin
exclaims : " C'etait La Hougue, moins la gloire et I'honneur franoais sauvt's."
1759.] PRECAUTIONS AGAINST THIRST. 223
Admiral Saunders was made Lieut. -General of Marines, and Cap-
tains Sir Piercy Brett (1), Kt., the Hon. Augustus Keppel, and Lord
Howe, were made Colonels of Marines.
On the 26th Hawke sent Commodore James Young (1), with a
squadron, to anchor in Quiberon Bay, and on the 27th detached
Captain the Hon. Augustus Keppel, with a squadron, to Basque
Eoad, to attack such of the enemy as might be found there. But
before the latter reached his destination, M. de Beauffremont had
lightened his ships and retired up the river Charente, whither the
British vessels were unable to follow him. Neither in the Charente
nor in the Vilaine could the fugitive ships be reached. Time, how-
ever, effected what force could not ; for few of the vessels were ever
again fit for active service. Hawke was relieved by Boscawen, and
returned to England after an absence of ten months.
During the blockade it was notorious that no fleet employed
on similar service had ever before been so amply supplied with
beer, provisions, and vegetables ; but, after the defeat of de Conflans,
in consequence chiefly of the adverse state of the weather, supplies
failed, and the men were obliged to be put upon short allowance.
This gave rise to the well-known satirical lines : —
" Ere Hawke did bang
Monsieur Conflans,
You sent us beef and beer.
Now Monsieur's beat,
We've naught to eat,
Since you have nought to fear."
The small French expedition which had been assembled at
Dunquerque for a descent upon Scotland or Ireland, and which
was to be convoyed by Thurot, was blockaded throughout the
summer and early autumn of 1759 by a squadron ^ under Commodore
William Boys, who, however, was driven from his station by a gale
in October. Thurot then sHpped out and made to the northward,
Boys following as soon as possible, but not being able to overtake
the enemy, and ultimately having to content himself with cruising
^ Squadron under Commodore William Boys, engaged in the blockade of Dun-
querque, etc., 1759 : Preston, 50, Commodore William Boys, Captain John Evans ;
Antelope, 50, Captain James AVebb; Phoenix, 44, Captain Christopher Codringtou
Bethell ; Danae, 40, Captain Heniy Martin (2) ; Liverpool, 32, Captain liichard Knight ;
Stay, 32, Captain Henry Angell ; Argo, 28, Captain John Bladon Tinker ; Tweed, 28,
Captain William Paston ; Hussar, 28, Captain Eobert Carkett ; Surprise, 24, Captain
Charles Antrobus ; Badger, 14, Commander Basil Keith; Alderney, 12, Commander
John Peighin,
224 MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 17U-1762. [1760.
off the coast of Scotland wdh the object of preventing any sudden
raid there. As Thurot's destination was unknown, and as there
were rumours that he contemplated a blow on some port on the
east coast of England, the squadron in the Downs, ^ under Com-
modore Sir Pierc}^ Brett (1), was ordered to Yarmouth. But
Thurot's operations in the British seas did not begin till the following
year, and an account of them may for the present be deferred.
During the year 1760 the British squadrons on active service
were disposed as follows. Commodore Sir Piercy Brett commanded
in the Downs and North Sea ; Eear-Admiral George Brydges
Eodney cruised in the Channel and blockaded Le Havre ; Admirals
Sir Edward Hawke and the Hon. Edward Boscawen relieved one
another in Quiberon Bay, and watched the French vessels in the
Yilaine and Charente, at Brest, Lorient, and Kochfort ; Commodore
Eobert Swanton was despatched with reinforcements to Commodore
Lord Colville in Xorth America ; Captain the Hon. John Byron
was sent wdth a squadron to destroy the fortifications at Louis-
bourg ; Commodore Sir James Douglas (1) relieved Commodore John
Moore (1) on the Leeward Islands' station ; Eear-Admiral Charles
Holmes relieved Vice-Admiral Thomas Cotes at Jamaica ; and
five additional ships were sent to the East Indies to reinforce Eear-
Admirals Charles Stevens and Samuel Cornish. In the Mediter-
ranean Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders succeeded to the command.
In the East Indies, Arcot and Carical, with many other places,
were taken from the French, the Marines serving in several
instances on shore, and the ships co-operating with the land forces
whenever possible. Pondicherry was besieged and blockaded, and
in October the boats of the fleet, under Commander "William
Newsom, acting captain of the Southsea Castle, 40, and Lieu-
tenant Isaac Florimond Ourry, brilliantly cut out from under the
forts the Hermione, 36, and Baleine, 32, which were afterwards
purchased into the Eoyal Navy. The rainy season approaching,
Eear-Admiral Stevens left five ships of the line, under Captain
Eobert Haldane, of the America, 60, to continue the blockade,
and himself sailed on October 23rd for Trincomale. In the mean-
^ Squadron under Commodore Sir Piercy Brett (1), Kt., in tlie Downs and North
Sea, 1759 : Isis, 50, Connnodore Sir Piercy Brett, Kt., Captain Edward Wheeler ;
Woolivich, 40, Captain Daniel Dering; Aicrora, 3G, Ca])tain Samuel Scott; Alarm, 32,
Captain Jolm Paishworth; Aqiiilon, 28, Cajjtaiu Chaloner Ogle (2); Tartar, 28, Captain
John Knight (1); Sohhay, 24, Captain John Dalrymplc; and Deal Castle, 24, Captain
George Tindall.
1760-61.] REDUCTION OF PONDICHERRY. 225
time the siege was actively carried on by Lieut. -Colonel Eyre
Coote.
On December 25th, Stevens retm'ned with four of his ships of
the line, and resmned command off the port. On January 1st, 1761,
a violent hurricane burst upon the shipping. Stevens, whose flag
was in the NorfolJx, 74, Captain Eichard Kempenfelt, cut his cable,
and by gun-signals ordered his captains to do the same ; but, owing
to the violence of the gale and the amount of spray in the air, the
signals were neither heard nor seen. The Panther, 60, Captain
Philip Affleck, the America, 60, Captain Robert Haldane, the
Medivay, 60, Captain John Bladon Tinker, and the Falmouth, 50,
Captain William Brereton, were dismasted, yet managed to ride
out the storm. A worse fate overtook the Newcastle, 50, Captain
Digby Dent (3), the Queenhorough, 20, and the Protector, fireship, all
of which drove ashore and were wrecked about two miles from
Pondicherry, though they lost only seven of their crews. Other
vessels were even more unfortunate. The Due d'Aquitaine, 64,
Captain Sir William Hewitt, Bart., the Sunderland, 60, Captain
the Hon. James Colville, and the Drake, storeship, foundered with
all hands, except seven Europeans and seven lascars. The total
sacrifice of life was about eleven hundred souls. Stevens, however,
resumed his position, and renewed the blockade on January 3rd,
and was next day joined by Rear- Admiral Cornish with additional
ships from Trincomale. Pondicherry was gradually reduced by
famine, until on January 15th it surrendered, and was occupied on
the 16th by the Navy and army. Thus ended the Erench power
on the coast of Coromandel.
On the Leeward Islands' and Jamaica stations the enemy was
in force too feeble to attempt anything of moment. Indeed, only
one action that was fought in the West Indies in 1760 calls for
mention here. In the autumn Eear- Admiral Holmes learnt that
a French convoy, escorted by five frigates, was about to sail from
Cape Eran9ois for Europe and he despatched the Hampshire, 50,
Captain Coningsby Norbury (2), the Boreas, 28, Captain Samuel
Uvedale, and the Lively, 20, Captain the Hon. Frederick Lewis
Maitland (1), to intercept them. On October 16th the French
put to sea, the escort consisting of the vessels mentioned in the
note.^ Next morning at dawn the British ships sighted and
1 Sirhie, 32 ; Due de Choiseul, 32 ; Prince Edivard, 32 ; Fhur de Lys, 32 ; and
Valeur, 20.
VOL. Ill, Q
226 MAJOR OFERATIOXS, 1714-1762. [1760.
chased them, but closed very slowly until evening, when the breeze
freshened. At midnight the Boreas engaged the Sirene, but, being
disabled aloft, fell astern, and could not come up with her again till
2 P.M. on October 18th, off the east end of Cuba, A hot action
then began, and at 4.40 p.m. the Sirene struck, having lost 80 killed
and wounded. The Boreas had lost but one killed and one wounded.
In the meanwhile the ■Hampshire and Lively had been in chase of
the other frigates. Soon after daybreak on the 18th, the Lively,
by using her sweeps, got alongside of the Valeur, and, after an hour
and a half, forced her to surrender, she having lost 38 killed and
25 wounded, and the Lively but two wounded. Both the Sirene
and Valeur were added to the Navy under their own names. The
Hampshire at 3.30 p.m. got between the Due de Choiseul and the
Prince Edward, but the former, having the advantage of the wind,
got into Port au Paix. The latter ran ashore and struck, but was,
nevertheless, subsequently burnt by her crew. On the 19th the
Hampshire and Lively were about to attack the Fleur de Lys,
which lay in the bay to leeward of Port au Paix, when the enemy
saved them the trouble by abandoning and burning the ship.
The conquest of Canada had not been completed when Quebec
fell, and the French still cherished hopes of ousting the British
and of regaining command of the country. On the other hand,
the British were determined to make good their possession. In
the winter of 1759-60, a naval force consisting of the Onondaga, 18,
Mohawk, 16, and several row-galleys and gunboats, was established
on Lake Ontario, with a view to transporting an army down the
St. Lawrence to Montreal. This army, of about 11,000 men
under General Amherst, consisted half of regulars and half of
provincial levies, besides Indians, commanded by Sir William
Johnson, Bart. It was to be aided by another, of 5000 men,
under Colonel Haviland, advancing from Lake Champlain, and by
a third, under Brigadier-General Murray, advancing from Quebec
up the St. Lawrence.
To help these various expeditions. Commodore Lord Colville ^
' Northumberland, 70, CoiiiUKulore Lord Colville, Caiitain William Adams (2);
Alcide, 64, Captain Thomas Hankerson ; Trident, 64, Captain Julian Legge ; Pem-
broke, 60, Captain John Wheelock ; Prince of Oramjc, 60, Captain Samuel Wallis ;
Richmond, 32, Caiitain John Elphinstone (1); Eurus, 20, Captain Nathaniel Batenian ;
Porcupine, 16, Commander John Macartney; and Racehorse, bomb, ^vlncll was already
at Quebec. The above wintered in America, and were joined at various times by the
Devonshire, 66, Captain George Darby; Norwich, 50, Captain "William M'Cleverty;
Greyhound, 24, Cajitain Thomas Francis; and Lizard, 28, Captain James Doake.
1760.] FBENCH ATTEMPTS AGAINST QUEBEC. 'I'll
was directed to enter the St. Lawrence as soon as the season should
allow ; and a reinforcement ^ under Commodore S wanton, consisting
of two sail of the line, three fifty-gun ships, and four frigates, sailed
from England early in the spring.
Knowing of some, at least, of these preparations, the French
made gallant attempts to seize Quebec before the river should be clear
of ice. They sent down the St. Lawrence an army of about 14,000
inen under M. de Levis. General Murray, underrating the force
of the enemy, marched out and attacked him, but was defeated at
Sillery on April 28th. If the French had at once followed up
their advantage, they could probably have taken the place, but
they let slip their chance. Murray was very active in the defence,
and sent the Raceliorse down the river to look for the fleet and
hasten its arrival. On May 9th the Lowestoft, 28, Captain Joseph
Deane, anchored in the Basin, and brought news of the near
approach of Commodore S wanton, who, on the evening of the
15th, arrived in the Vanguard, 70, with the Diana, 36, Captain
Alexander Schomberg. On the 16th, in response to the expressed
wishes of General Murray, the Vanguard, Diana and Lowestoft
worked up towards the enemy's flotilla in the upper river, and soon
obliged it to retire with the loss of the Pomone, 36, which grounded
and was burnt near Cape Diamond, the A talante, 32, which grounded
and was burnt thirty miles higher up, and all the other craft except
a sloop. The active part of this work was done exclusively by the
Diana and Lowestoft, while the Vanguard, dropping down abreast
of Sillery, enfiladed the enemy's trenches there, and compelled their
abandonment. Indeed, this attack induced M. de Levis to raise
the siege on the night of the 16th, leaving behind him 44 guns,
10 mortars, and various stores. Unfortunately, the Lowestoft,
in returning, struck on a sunken rock and foundered, but without
loss of life. Lord Colville, with his squadron, reached Quebec on
the 18th.
All was then in readiness for the projected advance against
Montreal. General Murray's army was escorted up the river by
the Penzance, 40, Captain William Gough, the Diana, 32, Captain
Joseph Deane, the Porcupine, 16, Commander John Macartney,
^ Vanguard, 70, Commodore Robert Swanton; Kingston, 60, Captain William
Parry (2 ) ; Rochester, 50, Captain Thomas Burnett ; Falkland, 50, Captain Francis
Samuel Drake; Sutherland, 50, Captain Benjamin Clive; Penzance, 44, Captain William
Gough ; Diana, 36, Captain Alexander Schomberg ; Vengeance, 28, Captain Gamaliel
Nightingale ; and Loivesto/t, 28, Captain Joseph Deane.
Q 2
228 MAJOB OPERATIOliS, 1714-1762. [1760.
the Gaspee, schooner, 8, and a flotilla of thirty-five small craft, it
having embarked in forty transports on June 13th. Progress was on
several occasions challenged by French batteries ; but the various
difficulties were slowly overcome. Behind the main force followed
some troops from Louisbourg under Lord Kollo. In the interval,
General xVmherst was advancing down the St. Lawrence mider the
conduct of Captain Joshua Loring, E.N.^ In the course of the
advance the Onondaga was taken by the enemy, and, though
retaken, had to be abandoned. Many boats and some small craft
were also lost by the waj^ o\\ang to the great difficulties of naviga-
tion. On September 6th, however, the Commander-in-Chief's army
landed on the upper end of the Island of Montreal, nine miles above
the city. The enemy fled, and Montreal was quickly invested.
As for Colonel Haviland's force, it embarked at Crown Point
on August 11th, and, gradually driving the enemy before it, maae
its way, partly by water and partly by land, to Isle Ste. Therese
near Montreal, appearing there within a few hours of the arrival
of Amherst and Murray in the same neighbourhood. The co-opera-
tion could not have been more exactly timed.
On September 7th a cessation of hostilities was agreed to ; and
on September 8th M. de Vaudreuil capitulated and Canada became
British. The final conquest had been prefaced by the capture or
destruction by Lord Colville of a large number of French privateers
on the St. Lawrence, and by the destruction by Coiximodore the
Hon. John Byron in Chaleur Bay, on July 8th, of the Machault, 32,
Bienfaisant, 22, Marquis de Marloze, 16, and several French small
craft which had taken refuge there in expectation of chance offering
them some opportunity for slipping up the river.
Captain Joseph Deane, K.N., and Major Barre carried home
the dispatches announcing the great success. Each was presented
with £500 wherewith to buy a sword. Byron, who had proceeded
on his own responsibility to Chaleur Bay on the service above noted,
and who had interrupted for the purpose the business of razing to
the ground the fortifications of Louisbourg, subsequently returned
and completed that work.
In the Mediterranean, whither Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders
' Joshua Loring came of a family which had been for some time settled in North
America. Lieutenant, 1745; Commander, 1756; Captain, 1757; chief director of the
Naval Department in the Interior, and Commander-in-Chief of the Lake Flotilla, 1759-
1762; died, 1781.
17G0.] CBUISE OF AI. THUROT. 229
went as Commander-in-Chief in April, 17G0, little of importance
happened, owing to the overwhelming superiority of the British
naval forces. A French division slipped out of Toulon in June ;
but the greater part of it was driven by a squadron, under Captain
Hugh Palliser, of the Shrewshurij, 74, into a port in the island of-
Candia, and was blockaded there until the British vessels had to
withdraw for supplies and repairs, whereupon the enemy got back
to Toulon.
The fortunes of M. Thurot must now be followed. Evading
Commodore Boys, he left Dunquerque on October 15th, 1759. In
his little squadron of six frigates and corvettes, he had thirteen
hundred troops under Brigadier-General de Flobert.^ He first
went to Gothenburg in Sweden, partly to procure stores, and partly,
no doubt, to baftie pursuit or observation. There he remained for
nineteen days, going next to Bergen in Norway. On his way
thither, one of his ships, the Begon, was so damaged in a gale as
to be obliged to return to France. The Faucoii also parted company
early in the voyage. Thurot quitted Bergen on December 5th, and
proceeded, by way of Stromo, in the Faroe Islands, reaching the
neighbourhood of the Irish coast on January 25th, 3760. The
weather confounded an intended descent near Londonderry, and
scattered his squadron, so much so that the Amaranthe'^ never
rejoined, and returned in some distress to St. Malo. As the
ships were by that time all in a sorry plight, and more than one of
them was almost mutinous, the captains implored Thurot to abandon
the descent. But he refused, and put into Claigeann Bay, in the
island of Islay, on February 15th, to refresh.
Thurot left the island on February 19th, and next day anchored
in Belfast Lough, opposite Kilroot Point. The town of Carrick-
fergus was garrisoned by four newly-raised and weakly companies
of the 62nd Eegiment under Lieut. -Colonel Jennings. Thurot
landed about six hundred men on February 21st, and M. de Flobert,
after comparatively little fighting, obliged Colonel Jennings to
surrender the castle. The French requisitioned provisions from
1 De Flobert, from the first, threw difficulties in Thurot's way, regarding him with
contempt and jealousy. Thurot, as a seaman, probably had no high opinion of the
soldier ; for, as Laughton points out (' Studs, in Xav. Hist.,' 346), even until quite
recent times there was a saying on board ship, " a messmate before a shipmate ; a ship-
mate before a stranger ; a stranger before a dog ; but — a dog before a soldier."
^ It is tolerably certain, nevertheless, that the Amaranthe could have rejoined, liad
her captain desired to do so.
230
MAJOR OPEEATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1760.
the town, and made several small prizes in the Lough, rifling
and afterwards burning them ; but de Flobert resisted Thurot's
entreaties to advance and seize Belfast. The whole adventure
cost the French about thirty killed and sixty wounded. The mayor
• and some gentlemen were carried on board as hostages, and at
midnight on February 27th, the enemy, having re-embarked, set
sail to return to France.
The Duke of Bedford, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, upon getting
news of the descent, sent expresses to all the principal ports to
inform the captains of any of H. M. ships that might be there of
what had happened. At Kingsale one of these expresses found
the frigates j^olus, Pallas, and Brilliant,^ which had been driven
from their station with Hawke's fleet on the coast of France.
These at once put to sea and went north. At Dublin, on the 26th,
the senior officer, Captain John Elliot, learnt that the enemy was
still at Carrickfergus. That same evening, he found himself off the
mouth of Belfast Lough, but, the wind being contrary, he could
not get in. On the 28th, at 4 a.m., he caught sight of the French
as they rounded Copeland Island, and gave chase. " About nine,"
continues Captain Elliot, in his dispatch of February 29th to the
Duke of Bedford, " I got alongside their commodore ; and, in a
few minutes, the action became general, and continued very briskly
for an hour and a half, when they all three struck their colours."
The Marechal de Belleisle alone fought well ; the Blonde and
Terpsicliore struck almost as soon as they were engaged. ElHot,
with the prizes, subsequently put into Bamsay, Isle of Man, to
refit. All the vessels were greatly disabled aloft, and the Marechal
de Belleisle, which had suffered most of all, was with difficulty
prevented from sinking.
^ Squadron which, under M. Thurot, escaped from Dunquerque in 1759 ; and
squadron which, under Captain John Elliot, met and captured part of it on
February 28th, 1760:—
French.
Beitish.
Ships.
Gtins.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Losses.
Marechal de Belleisle . .
Blonde
Terpsichore
Began l
Amaranthe'^
Fintrttv '
44
36
24
36
18
IS
Mollis ....
Pallas ....
Brilliant . . .
32
36
36
Capt. Jolin Elliot.
,, IMicliael Clements.
,, James Loggie.
Killed. \S'onnded.
4 15
1 5
0 11
1
1 Had parted company before the action.
1760] BOSGAWEN'S LAST SERVICE. 231
The gallant Thurot/ who fell on this occasion, was an opponent
who, in his method of carrying on the war, had never shut his eyes
to the principles of honour, generosity, and humanity, and who
was scarcely less lamented by his British foes than by his own
countrymen. The three victorious captains were unanimously
voted the thanks of the Irish House of Commons, and the Blonde
and Terpsichore were purchased into the Boyal Navy.
Admiral Boscawen, after the return of Sir Edward Hawke,
sailed to command the fleet in Quiberon Bay, with his flag in the
Boijal William, and with Eear-Admiral Francis Geary, in the
Sandivich, as second in command. While he was going to his
station, the Bamillies, 90, Captain Wittewronge Taylor, of his
squadron, went ashore on Bolt Head in a gale and was lost, the
crew all perishing except one midshipman and twenty-five men.
Boscawen, who was obliged by the heavy weather to return, sub-
sequently shifted his flag to the Namur, and proceeded. His
cruisers took several prizes ; but the enemy's fleet did not — indeed,
could not — come out. The blockade prevented the French from
sending supplies across the Atlantic, and from interfering w4th
British trade. In August, Sir Edward Hawke, in the Boyal
George, relieved Boscawen, who returned to England on Sep-
tember 1st. This was Boscawen's last service. He died at his
house, Hatchlands, near Guildford, on January 10th, 1761.^ Hawke
pursued his predecessor's policy, and was equally successful. Eear-
Admiral Eodney, cruising off Le Havre, was not less energetic.
An expedition, to be commanded by Commodore the Hon.
Augustus Keppel, and to be directed either against Mauritius and
Bourbon or against the coast of France, was in preparation when,
on October 27th, George II. died. This important event led to so
much delay, that on December 13th orders were given for the
fleet to return from St. Helen's, where it lay ready for sea, to
Spithead, and for the troops on board to be disembarked. For
that season the enterprise was given up.
^ Francois Thurot, born at Xiiits, 172G. Son of a small innkeeper; educated by
the Jesuits at Dijon ; apprenticed to a druggist ; surgeon in a privateer, 1744 ; captured
by the British ; escaped ; devoted himself to privateering ; lived for some time in
Loudon ; given a commission in the French navy ; commanded the Friponne, and,
from 1757, the Marechal de Bdleisle. His actions with the Southampton, the Seahorse,
etc., will be found noticed in the next chapter. He was one of the boldest of the French
corsairs.
^ Boscawen w^as, however, buried in the church of St. Michael, Penkevel, Cornwall,
where there is a monument by Eijsbraak to his naemory.
232 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1761.
By 1760 the enemy's navy had been so nearly annihilated that
but two or three of His Majesty's ships were taken by the French ;
and French trade had been so diminished that the British cruisers
made but comparatively few captures — only one hundred and ten
vessels in all. But the British mercantile losses by the ravages
of small privateers were enormous. As many as three hundred
and thirty trading vessels were taken. Few of them, however,
were of any considerable size ; and, in spite of the loss, British
trade flourished exceedingly. It was, no doubt, chiefly owing to its
healthy condition that the commercial marine experienced so many
losses.
In 1761 Vice-Admiral Francis Holburne commanded at Ports-
mouth ; Commodore Sir Piercy Brett (1) in the Downs ; Commodore
Kobert S wanton in the Channel ; Sir Edward Hawke and Sir
Charles Hardy (2) in Quiberon Bay till March, when Commodore
Keppel took charge of the squadron in the Bay of Biscay ; Vice-
Admiral Charles Saunders in the Mediterranean ; Commodore Lord
Colville in North America ; Kear-Admiral Charles Holmes at
Jamaica; Commodore Sir James Douglas (1), and, at the end of the
year, Bear- Admiral Rodney, on the Leeward Islands' station ; and
Eear-Admiral Stevens in the East Indies, until his death, when
the command devolved on Kear-Admiral Cornish.
After the capture of Pondicherry, Mahe was reduced by the
troops under Major Hector Munro, supported by four sail of the
line under Eear-Admiral Cornish. The place surrendered on
February 10th. In May Eear-Admiral Charles Stevens fell a
victim to the unhealthiness of the climate. The French on the
station were by that time practically helpless, and Cornish soon
afterwards went to Bombay to refit. He then proceeded southward
to meet an expedition which he had reason to believe was on its
way out, under Commodore Keppel, to attack Bourbon and
Mauritius ; but all idea of this expedition had, in the meantime,
been abandoned. The means taken, however, to apprise Cornish
of the change of plans were not efficacious ; and the Eear-Admiral
was actually obliged, by scarcity of supplies, to go back to
Madras without hearing any news from home. Two of his ships,
however, the York, 60, Captain Henry Cowbell, and the Chatham, 54,
Captain Thomas Lynn, being unable to keep with the fleet, had
to bear up for the Cape of Good Hope. There they learned from
the Terpsichore, 26, Captain Sir Thomas Adams, Bart., that Keppel
1761.] CAPTURE OF DOMINICA. 233
was no longer to be expected ; and in due course they carried the
intelhgence to the Eear-Admiral in India.
On the Leeward Islands' station, Commodore Sir James
Douglas (1), who was reinforced by four sail of the line and three
frigates,^ with troops from North America under Lord Rollo,
attacked, and, on June 8th, captured, the Island of Dominica.
During the rest of the summer, operations were chiefly confined to
the protection of trade, and the repression of privateering. Towards
the end of the year, it having been determined to prosecute a more
active and offensive policy, and to largely increase the force among
the "West India Islands, Eear-Admiral Eodney was appointed to
the command ; and on November 22nd he arrived at Carlisle Bay,
Barbados, where he was presently joined by the Temeraire and
ActcBon, with troops from Belle Isle, and by a military force from
North America under Major-General Monckton.
On the Jamaica station there w^ere several single-ship encounters,
but no occurrences of first-rate importance. Eear-Admiral Charles
Holmes, dying on November 21st, was succeeded in the command
by the senior officer, Captain Arthur Forrest, of the Centaur,
pending the arrival of Sir James Douglas. In North America,
likewise, little of moment happened, the chief business of the fleet
being to convoy troops to the West Indies. Nor were there any
transactions on a large scale in the Mediterranean, although the
force there was, towards the end of the year, greatly strengthened
by the arrival of a detachment from home under Sir Piercy Brett (1) .
The French scarcely ventured to put to sea ; and, when any of
their ships did issue from port, they were almost invariably
captured.
Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles
Hardy (2) remained in the Bay of Biscay, watching the French ships
in the Vilaine and Charente ; and, to better effect their purpose,
stationed an inshore squadron, under Captain James Gambler (1),
quite close to the mouth of the Vilaine. Yet, in spite of this
precaution, on January 2nd, the night being dark and the breeze
fresh, several of the French vessels slipped out thence, and, though
chased by Gambler, escaped into Brest. After this evasion, the
^ Stirling Castle, 64, Captain Michael Everitt ; Norwich, 50, Captain William
M'Cleverty; Falkland, 50, Captain Francis Samuel Drake; Sutherland, 50, Captain
.Tulian Legge; Penzance, 44, Captain John Boyd (acting); Repulse, 32, Captain
John Carter Allen; and Lizard, 28, Captain James Doake.
234
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1761.
blockading force was needlessly large for the work remaining to
be done, and in March Hawke returned to England, leaving behind
him enough ships to observe the enemy's motions.
The expedition, which had been prex^ared during the previous
year, and had been destined at one time for Bourbon and Mauritius,
and later for the coast of France, was again brought forward in
1761, Commodore Hon. Augustus Keppel being appointed to
command the sea, and Major-General Studholm Hodgson^ the
land forces. The squadron at first included ten sail of the line,
eight frigates, three sloops, three bombs, and two fireships, but
was eventually reinforced with five more sail of the line.- The
army originally consisted of about seven thousand men,^ but about
three thousand more were subsequently sent to the scene of
operations.
The expedition* sailed from St. Helen's on March 29th, and
sighted Belle Isle,^ which it was designed to attack, on April 6th.
That evening Keppel detached six frigates to cruise between the
island and the mainland, in order to sever communications. A
squadron under Captain Matthew Buckle (1), consisting of thirteen
^ Later a field-marshal.
^ British squadron employed under Commodore the Hon. Augustus Keppel in the
expedition against Belle Isle, 1761 : —
Ships.
(jUIlS.
Commauders.
Valiant .
Sandwich
Dragon .
Ttinera ire
Torhay .
Siviftsure
ffampton Court
Essex
Prince of Orange
Achilles .
y/eroi . . .
Jiiickingh ami .
/iurfordi
90
14
li
74
TO
64
64
60
60
74
70
70
[Commod. Hon. August is
•; Kpppel.
(Capt. Adam Duncau.
„ Richai'd Norbury.
f ,, Hon. Aug. John
(. Hervey.
I „ Jlattliew Barton.
,, AVilliaiii Brett,
f „ Sir Thomas Stan-
\ hope, Kt.
,, Carr Scrope.
f ,, Alexander Schom-
\ berg.
,, Samuel Wallls.
f ,, Hcin. Samuel Bar-
I riTi'j;ton.
,, \\illiam Knrt.e.scue.
„ I'eter i'arkfr (1).
„ .lames Gambier(l).
/ „ William Saltren
I Willett.
Ships.
Guns.
Commauders.
Monmouth i
64
Capt. .John Storr.
Lynn ....
44
,, AValter Stirling.
Launceston .
44
,. Edmund Affleck.
.Southampton . .
36
,, Charles Antrobus.
Melampe. . . .
36
/ ., William Hotham
I (0-
„ ^latthew Moore.
Adventure . . .
32
Act (eon ....
28
„ Paul Henry Ounv.
Flamborotigh . .
24
„ Samuel Thompson.
Aldborough . .
24
„ Mitchell Graham.
Escort ....
14
Com. Charles EUvs.
Fly
10
„ George Gay ton.
Druid ....
8
/ ., Hon. John Lut-
l trell.
Firedralce, b.
8
,, .Tames OiTok.
Infernal, b.
8
,, .Tames Mackenzie.
Furnace, h. . . .
8
,, James Chaplen.
Vesuvius, f.s. .
16
,, James Chads.
JEtna, f.s. . . .
16
1 ,, Jlichael Henrv
1 Pascal.
Followed the fleet as reinforcements.
* Its nominal force was 9000, but the regiments were incomi>lete. Hodgson to
Albemarle, March 28th, 1761.
* For Kei)i)ers secret instructions, see 'Life,' by Hon. and Rev. T. Keppel, i. o02.
That biography, however, appears to contain numerous errors.
" For Belle Isle and neighbourhood, see chart facing p. 488 of Vol. II.
1761.] THE EXPEDITION TO BELLE ISLE. 235
sail of the line and three frigates,^ was presently sent to cruise
off Brest to prevent the possibility of interference from that quarter.
Early on April 7th the fleet passed the south end of the island close
in, so as to enable the Commodore and General to reconnoitre,
and at noon it anchored in the Koad of Palais. The Commodore
and General then reconnoitred more closely in a cutter, having
first ordered the boats to be hoisted out, and the troops to be
made ready to land. They found no place more suitable for a
disembarkation than a bay near Point de Locmaria, which they
had remarked in the morning. To distract the enemy, a feint of
landing was made near Sauzon by a detachment under Captain
Sir Thomas Stanhope ; and, on the morning of the 8th, the wind
being north-east, the real landing in force was made near Port
Andro, after the Prince of Orange, Dragon, and Achilles, with two
bombs, had silenced a four-gun battery at the entrance of the bay.
Commodore Keppel gave the signal for the disembarkation from the
Prince of Orange, to which he had shifted his broad pennant from
the Valiant. The boats were led by Captain Matthew Barton,
and, although the enemy offered a most vigorous resistance, the
landing was effected at three different places. But the troops found
it impossible to hold their ground or to mount the well-defended
slopes in front of them, and, after a hot contest, had to retreat with
very considerable loss. The retiring boats were covered by the fire
from the ships.
Bad weather for several days prevented any renewal of the
attempt ; but on the 22nd, while two feints were made elsewhere,
a new landing was prepared under Major-General John Craufurd
at Fort d'Arsic, under cover of the Sandtvich, Dragon, Prince of
Orayige, two bombs, and two armed transports ; Captain Barton,
as before, leading in the boats. The feints were ordered to be
made by Brigadier-General Hamilton Lambart, one near St. Foy
and the other at Sauzon. Lambart was directed, if he saw any
probability of success, to actually land, and to endeavour to hold
^ Namur, 90, Captain Matthew Buckle (1) ; Union, 90, Captain Thomas Evans ;
Boyal William, 84, Captain Hugh Pigot (1) ; Princess Amelia, 80, Captain John
Montagu ; Hero, 74, Captain William Fortescue ; Fame, 74, Captain the Hon. John
Byron ; Cornwall, 74, Captain Eobert Man (2) ; Mars, 74, Captain Kicliai'd Spry ;
Bedford, 64, Captain Joseph Deane ; Prince Frederick, 64, Captain Jervis Maplesden ;
Lion, 60, Captain Echvard Le Cras ; Bipon, 60, Cajjtain Edward Jekyll ; Unicorn, 28,
Captain Charles Douglas ; Tweed, 28, Captain William Paston ; Aquilon, 28, Captain
Chaloner Ogle (2).
236 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1761.
his own. This, in fact, he did under cover of the Swiftsure,
Hampton Court, Essex, and Lynn, and with the assistance of
Marines under Lieut. -Colonel Mackenzie and Captain Murray. As
he effected his object before the intended landing at d'Arsic had
begun, the division intended to attack that place rowed promptly
to Lambart's support, and enabled him to maintain his position
and to drive back the enemy. All the troops were disembarked
by 5 P.M., and the French retired before them to Palais. Batteries
were erected against the town on May 2nd, and in the preliminary
operations before the place, some Marines, under Captain David
Hepburn, greatly distinguished themselves. On May 13th several
advanced redoubts w^ere carried, and the enemy w^as driven from
the town to the citadel, which, from the 16th onwards, was subjected
to a furious bombardment. On June 7th, a large breach had been
formed ; and preparations were being made for storming it, when
the Chevalier de St. Croix, the governor, offered to surrender.
Possession was taken on the 8th. The British in these operations
lost about three hundred and ten killed and five hundred wounded,
besides many men who died of disease. During the whole pro-
ceedings the most perfect harmony prevailed between the naval
and the military chiefs.^ The naval dispatches were sent home
by Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, who, upon his arrival, was,
as was then usual in such cases, presented by the King with £500.
The island was held during the remainder of the war.
After the landing on Belle Isle, Keppel, who had been again
reinforced, despatched Sir Thomas Stanhope with a squadron '^ to
attack such French ships as might be lying in Basque Eoad, and
to destroy the works on Isle d'Aix. No ships were discovered, but
the destruction of the works was satisfactorily accomplished by
Captain Peter Parker (1) of the Buckingham, in company with the
Monmouth and Nassau, assisted later by the Actceon, Fhj and Blast,
^ " I hear some scoundrels have si^read a report tliat the Commodore aud I have
disagreed. I believe there never was more friendship and more harmony between two
persons since the creation of the world than has subsisted between us. . . . The two
services have acted as one corps ever since we left England." Hodgson to Albemarle,
June 8th, 1761.
- Swiftsure, 70, Captain Sir Thomas Stanhope ; Sandiuich, *J0, Captain Richard
Xorbury ; Trident, 64, Captain Benjamin Clive ; Buckinyham, 64, Captain Peter
Parker (1); Monmouth, 64, Captain John Storr; Nassau, Gi, Captain Maurice Suckling;
Frince of Orancje, 60, Captain Samuel Wallis ; Adseon, 28, Captain Paul Henry Ourry ;
Fly, 14, Commander George Gayton ; Blast, bomb, 8, Commander ; Furnace,
bomb, 8, Commander James Chaplen.
1761.]
QUEEN CHARLOTTE'S ESCORT.
237
and by the boats of the squadron. The French prames from the
mouth of the Charente endeavoured to interfere with the operations ;
but the work was completed with very Httle loss on June 21st
and 22nd. Sir Thomas Stanhope continued on the station during
the rest of the year, his ships being occasionally relieved. In
December, the enemy made an ineffectual attempt to destroy them
by means of fireships. Soon afterwards Lord Howe succeeded
Stanhope in the command.
It may here be mentioned, although the matter has nothing to
SIR PETER PARKER (1), BART., ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET.
(From an engraving by Itidloj after a portrait once in the possession of Mr. Valentine Green.)
do with the military operations of the Navy, that, in August, Lord
Anson, as Admiral of the Fleet, hoisted his flag on board the Boijal
Charlotte {ex-Boy al Caroline), yacht, in order to escort to England
the Princess Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who had been
promised in marriage to George III., and who landed at Harwich
on September 6th. Anson's flag-captain on that occasion was
Captain Peter Denis, and the royal yacht was convoyed by the
238 MAJOR OPEEATIONS, 1714-1762. [1761.
Nottingham, 60, Captain Samuel Marshall (1), the Winchester, 50,
Captain John Hale, the Minerva, 32, Captain Alexander Arthur
Hood, the Tartar, 28, Captain John Knight (1), the Hazard, 14,
Commander the Hon. Henry St. John (1), the Lynx, 14, Commander
the Hon. Keith Stewart (1), and a number of small yachts.
During the year there was a disposition, on the part of both
belligerents, to treat for peace ; but the negotiations broke down,
and the prospects of an amicable arrangement were seriously
diminished by the signature, on August 15th, 1761, of what is
known as the Family Compact, between the rulers of France and
Spain. As soon as news of this was received in England, Pitt
desired at once to declare w^ar against Spain, which had for some
time previously behaved in a manner not altogether becoming a
neutral ; but, being overborne, he resigned. Had war been declared
when Pitt wished, the very rich home-coming Spanish treasure-
ships from America might have been seized. As soon as they were
safely in port, Spain took no more pains to disguise her hostility,
the consequence being that, by proclamation dated January 2nd,
1762, w^ar w^as declared by Great Britain, and, by proclamation of
January 16th, by Spain. The Spanish court at once endeavoured
to coerce Portugal into joining Spain and France ; but Portugal was
loyal to her ancient ally, and manfully stood out, although war
was very quickly declared against her as a penalty for her non-
compliance. Substantial British military support was promptly
given her, numerous British officers joined her army, and Com-
manders Joseph Norwood, Thomas Lee (1), and Michael Henry
Pascal ^ took service in her Navy.
It was early resolved to deal with Spain in the most vigorous
and uncompromising manner. It has been stated that a large body
of troops had been ordered from North America to the West Indies
with a view to the reduction of the French Caribbee Islands. The
Ministry determined that these troops should be reinforced from
England, and that, after the newly conquered islands should have
been properly garrisoned, an expedition should proceed to the
attack of Havana. The command of the army assigned for this
service was given to Lieut. -General the Earl of Albemarle. The
command of the squadron was given to Admiral Sir George
Pocock, K.B., with, as his second. Commodore the Hon. A. Keppel,
the Earl of Albemarle's brother.
^ All these officers, ujion their return to England after the peace, were posted.
1761.J THE EXPEDITION AGAINST MANILLA. 239
Another movement induced by the ruptm'e with Spain, was the
despatch of Commodore Sir Piercy Brett (1) , with a strong reinforce-
ment, to Sir Charles Saunders, K.B.,^ in the Mediterranean. Sir
Edward Haw^ke, with Eear- Admiral the Duke of York, cruised off the
coasts of Spain and Portugal ; and later, the same squadron, under
command of Sir Charles Hardy (2) and the Duke of York, left port a
second time on the same errand. While arrangements were thus
made to attack Spain in the West Indies, and, at the same moment,
to distract her attention at home, a small expedition, under command
of Brigadier-General Draper, was despatched from India against the
Philippine Islands.
On the death of Rear- Admiral Holmes, Sir James Douglas (1) was
appointed to the command at Jamaica ; Eear- Admiral Podney still
commanded on the Leeward Islands' station ; and Commodore
Lord Colville remained in North America. Commodore Spry
cruised with a squadron of observation off Brest, until he was
relieved by Commodore Eobert Man (2) ; and Commodore Lord
Howe lay in Basque Eoad until he was relieved by Commodore
Peter Denis. Admiral Holburne commanded at Portsmouth ;
Commodore John Moore (1), in the Downs, and Commodore James
Young (1), in the Channel.
Eear-Admiral Cornish continued to command in the East Indies ;
but, as the Erench had neither settlement nor trade there, he had
little to do against them. When, therefore, war broke out with
Spain, he was able to devote almost his undivided attention to the
new enemy. Colonel Draper, afterwards Sir William Draper, K.B.,
an officer who had distinguished himself at the siege of Madras in
1759, had devoted part of a period of sick leave to inquiring into the
condition of the Spanish settlements in the Philippine Islands ; and
he had discovered that the defences had been much neglected, and
that the Spaniards there trusted rather to their remoteness than to
their strength for their protection.^ Upon the commencement of
hostilities, Colonel Draper laid his information before the Ministry,
and measures were taken accordingly. He was at once sent to
India in the Argo, 28, Captain Eichard King (1), with instructions for
fitting out an expedition against Manilla, and with an appointment
as commander-in-chief of the troops to be employed. The ex-
pedition ultimately consisted of the 79th Eegiment, a company of
^ Vice-Admiral Saunders was so installed, by proxy, on May 26th, 1761.
^ As they appear to have done again in 1898.
240
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1761.
Eoyal Artillery and miscellaneous bodies, which, with 630 seamen
and 270 Marines from the fleet, brought the total of the available
field army up to about 2300 men, who were embarked in Eear-
Admiral Cornish's squadron and in two East Indiamen. The
preparations were begun and completed within three weeks. The
Seahorse, 20, Captain Charles Cathcart Grant, was sent in advance
to intercept any vessels that might be bound for Manilla. A
ADMIRAL Sill lUCUAKD KING (1), BAUT.
{From a litJioiiniph hi/ RkUeii, after ii )ni /nature.)
division of the fleet, under Commodore Kichard Tiddeman, sailed
on July 29th ; and the rest, with the exception of the Falmoutli, 60,
which was left to convoy an Indiaman, followed under the Com-
mander-in-Chief on August 1st. On August 19th the fleet ^ reached
^ Listof H.M. shi])s engaged in the expedition against Manilla: — Norfolk, 74, Eear-
Admiral Samuel Cornish (Vice-Adniiral, October 21st, 1762), Captain Richard Kempen-
felt ; Elizabeth, 64, Commodore Eichard Tiddeman, Captain Isaac Floi'imond Omuy ;
Lenox, 74, Captain Eobert Jocel^'n; Grafton, 68, Captain Ilyde Parker (1); Wey-
mouth, 60, Captain Richard Collins (2) ; America, 60, Captain Samuel Pitchford ;
Panther, 60, Commander George Ourry (acting for Captain "William Newsom) :
1761.] CAPTURE OF MANILLA. 241
Malacca, and there watered and took on board various supplies.
On the 27th it sailed again ; and on September 23rd, to the great
surprise of the Spaniards, who had not heard of the outbreak of
war, it anchored off Manilla. On the 24th the town was summoned,
but without result ; and, in the afternoon, under cover of the Argo,
Seahorse, and Seaford, some troops were landed, in spite of a heavy
surf which caused much loss of, and damage to, material. The
boats on this occasion were under the direction of Captains Hyde
Parker (1), Eichard Kempenfelt and William Brereton. There was
but slight opposition. The rest of the troops and the Marines were
disembarked on the 25th ; and on the 26th a brigade of seamen,
under Captains Collins, Pitchford and Ourry, reinforced them. On
the following days batteries were erected and opened ; and on the
29th the Elizabeth and Falmouth were ordered to co-operate as best
they could with the army, by enfilading the enemy's front. By
October 5th a practicable breach had been made in the works.
Early in the morning of that day this was stormed with success,
and the governor and officers were driven to the citadel, which they
presently surrendered at discretion. Not only Manilla, but with
it also Luzon, and all the Spanish islands, were handed over by the
terms of the capitulation. It was arranged that Manilla should be
ransomed for four millions of dollars to save it from pillage. Owing,
however, to the bad faith of the Spaniards, only half of this amount
was ever paid. The conquest, together with most of the prize
money, was handed over to the East India Company.
During the operations, Cornish obtained news that a galleon
from Acapulco was on her way to Manilla. Accordingly, on
October 4th, he despatched the Panther and Argo to intercept her.
These failed to do so ; but they succeeded in taking, on October 31st,
the Santisima Trinidad, which had left Manilla for Acapulco on
August 1st, having on board treasure worth about three million
dollars. In the meantime, the galleon from Acapulco had arrived
at Palapa, in Samar. It was agreed that, subject to certain
conditions, she was to be surrendered to the British ; but the
arrangement was never carried out, and it is probable that much of
her rich cargo eventually passed into the hands of private persons,
who had no right to it.
Falmouth, 50, Cn\){ixm William Breretou; Argo, 28, Captain Eichard Kiug(l); Sea-
horse, 20, Captain Charles Cathcart Grant ; Seaford, 20, Captain John Peighin ; and
Southse:c Castle, store-ship.
VOL. III. K
242
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1762.
The operations before Manilla were less costly than might have
been expected. The army lost but 115 killed, drowned and
wounded, and the Navy but 35. The only naval officer who was
killed was Lieutenant Porter, of the Norfolk, but, unfortunately,
Commodore Tiddeman was accidentally drowned on the day of the
surrender. Captain Eichard Kempenfelt was sent home with the
naval dispatches. As a reward for the service, Cornish was made
a baronet, and Draper a K.B., and each received the thanks of both
Houses. The colours taken at Manilla were hung in the chapel
of King's College, Cambridge, of which Draper had been a member.
The French empire in North America had ceased to exist ; and
its disappearance had rendered unnecessary the presence on the spot
of part of the large body of troops which had been concerned in the
conquest of Canada. As has already been mentioned, it had been
decided to employ some of them against the French islands in the
West Indies. Eear-Admiral Kodney had left England in October,
1761, and had arrived in Carlisle Bay, Barbados, on November 22nd.
He there found part of the squadron under Commodore Sir James
Douglas (1), which he speedily detached to blockade Martinique.
Troops and transports were in the meantime assembled at Bar-
bados ; and an improvised force of armed hired sloops was sent to
cruise off St. Eustatia to prevent the Dutch from assisting the French
with supplies and provisions. At length, on January 5th, 1762, the
fleet, ^ having on board nearly 14,000 troops from England, Belle Isle,
^ British fleet employed in the expedition against Martinique, etc., 1762 ; —
-i,ip-
Guns
Conimauilers.
Ships.
! Guns.
(VommauiliTS.
Marlborough
Dublin . .
Foudroyant.
Dragon ' . .
Temeraire .
Temple .
Vanguard .
Modeste . .
Stirling Castle
Devonshire .
liaisonnable
Alcide
yultingham.
liocliester
Sullierland .
Jforwich 1 .
Falkland .
-4
84
74
74
70
70
64
64
64
64
64
60
50
50
00
50
Eear-Admiral G. B.
Roduey (B).
('apt. Jdlm HoUwell.
Coiumod. Sir James
JJouf;las(l).
Capt. lid ward Gascoigue. [
„ Hubert Duff. j
,, Hon. Aug. John
llervey.
,, Matthew Baiton.
,, Lucius 0'J?rien.
,, Hubert Swantun.
„ ll(iu. Rubt. lioyle
W'alsiugham.
,, jVIicliael Kveritt.
,, (ieurge Darby.
' ,, M(jlyueu.\ Shuld-
i liam.
,, TliuuiasIIaiikerson.
„ Samuel Marsball(l).
,, Thunias Buniett.
„ .lu ian Legge.
I „ ^Villiam M'Cle-
[ verty.
,, Francis Samuel
I Hake.
Woohvich
Penzance i
Dover l
Fcho .
Stay .
Hepulse
Actaon
Crescent
Lizard .
Levant .
Nightingalt
Foiisey
Greyhound
Hose . .
Antigua.
Barbados
Ferret
Virgin .
Zephyr .
liasilisk, l)uiii1)i
Thunder, Iximb
Greiiado, buml)
Infeinal, bumb
44
44
40
32
32
32
28
28
28
28
28
20
20
20
10
10
16
12
12
8
8
8
8
Capt. William Bayne.
,, John Boyd.
,, C'haloner Ogle (3).
,, John Laforey.
„ Henry Augell.
,, John Garter Allen.
„ Paul Henry OuiTy.
f ,, Thomas Colling-
t wood.
,, James Doake.
,, "William Tucker.
(■ ,, James Campbell
I (2).
,, Joseph Mead.
,, Thomas Francis.
,, Francis Banks (1).
( ,, John iS'cale I'ley-
l dell Xott.
Com. Stair Douglas (1).
„ James Alms (1).
Capt.
Com. John Botterell.
„ Robert Brlce.
Lieut. Robert HasucU.
,, James Hawker.
Com. James Mackenzie.
1 Detached, under Capt. the Hon. Augustus John Hervey, against St. Lucia.
1762.] CAPTURE OF MARTINIQUE. 243
North America and the West India Islands, under Major-General
the Hon. Kobert Monckton, sailed, and, on the 7th, joined Douglas
off Martinique. The coasts of the island had not been properly
reconnoitred, nor had the ships adequate charts on board. The
configuration of the island and the nature of its defences rendered
it desirable to land the troops as close as possible to the places at
which they were to be employed. But, at first, this fact was not
realised ; and Kodney, while detaching only a small squadron to the
G-reat Bay of Fort Eoyal, detached another to La Trinite to make
a feint, and himself anchored with the bulk of his force in St. Anne's
Bay. A division, under Sir James Douglas, silenced the batteries
there, and landed the troops, losing, however, the Baisonnahle,
owing to the ignorance of her pilot. But it was soon found that
the march across to Fort Eoyal from St. Anne's Bay would be an
undertaking too difficult to be entered upon. The works which
had been erected at St. Anne's were therefore blown up, the
troops were re-embarked, and the whole force proceeded to Fort
Eoyal Bay.
The order of the attack having been arranged, the ships went to
their stations early on the morning of the 16th, opening fire upon
the batteries and silencing them by noon, soon after which the
troops were landed in three divisions in Cas des Navires Bay, under
conduct of Captains Molyneux Shuldham, Eobert Swanton and
the Hon. Augustus John Hervey. By sunset two-thirds of the
army were on shore ; and the rest, with 900 Marines, followed next
morning. The distance to Fort Eoyal was not great, only about
five or six miles ; but the country was terribly difficult, and the
defenders fought well from behind every rock and tree, as well as
within artificial works of all kinds. The necessary guns were,
however, dragged to the front, thanks mainly to the energy of the
seamen of the fleet ; and on January '24th, a prehminary attack was
made by a body of troops advancing along the coast parallel with a
detachment of a 1000 seamen in boats ; and the enemy was driven
back. On the 25th, the batteries began to bombard the citadel ;
and on the 27th the key to the whole position was taken. Yet
the citadel did not surrender until February 4th, and not until
February 16th was the whole island in possession of the British.
Captain Darby, of the Devonshire, and Major Gates, later a general
in the army of the revolting American Colonists, carried home the
dispatches announcing the capture of Fort Eoyal ; and each
R 2
244 MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1714-1762. [1762.
received from the King the usual comphment of £500. The
British loss during the operations amounted to about 500 killed
and wounded.
Even before the conquest had been coiupleted, Kodney detached
Captain Swanton to blockade Grenada ; and, when Martinique
had surrendered, Swanton was reinforced b}^ vessels conveying
troops. These reached Grenada on March 3rd ; and on the fol-
lowing day the island was summoned ; but the governor refused to
comply. The inhabitants, how^ever, ignored him, and capitulated
on the 4th ; and the governor himself was obliged to surrender at
discretion on the 5th. With Grenada fell the Grenadines. Swan-
ton, leaving a garrison, returned to Martinique.
On FebruS,ry 24th Captain the Hon. Augustus John Hervey had
been similarly detached against St. Lucia. But he could not satisfy
himself as to the enemy's strength ; and, to discover it, he disguised
himself as a midshipman, and, in the capacity of an interpreter,
accompanied the officer whom he sent to sunnnon the governor,
M. de Longueville. That gentleman refused to surrender ; yet
Hervey learnt so much during his visit that, on the following day,
he made preparations for taking his ships into the harbour. No
sooner did the governor notice signs of their intention to approach
than he capitulated.
Hervey was next about to proceed to St. Vincent to assure the
Caribs that their neutrality would be maintained, and that the
French would be no longer suffered to interfere with them, when he
was recalled by Rodney, in consequence of news having been received
that a French squadron of seven sail of the line and four frigates,^
under M. de Blenac, with seven battalions of troops, had escaped
from Brest, owing to Commodore Spry having been driven from his
station off that port ; and that it was on its way to relieve the
French West India Islands. Spry had detached the Aquilon, 28,
Captain Chaloner Ogle (2), with this intelligence to Eodney. But,
before the arrival of Spry's dispatch, the French squadron had been
sighted on March 8th, on the windward side of Martinique. It lay
to off the coast until the 10th, when it stood for Dominica.
Rodney summoned his detached division to a rendezvous off the
Salines, and, with Sir James Douglas (1), went in search of the enemy ;
but without result. When he had collected his whole force and had
^ Due de Bourgogne, 80 ; Defenseur, 74 ; Hector, 74 ; Biademe, 74 ; ProUe, 64 ;
Bragon, 64 ; Brillant, 64 ; Zephyr, 32 ; BiKgenfe, 32 ; Oixile, 26 ; Ca'ypso, 16.
1762] THE EXPEDITION AGAINST HAVANA. 245
been assured that the French had gone to Cape Frangois, he returned
to Martinique to water. He there found the Aquilon, from which
he learnt trustworthy details of M. de Blenac's strength. He
already knew, thanks to early information sent him by Commander
George Johnstone, commanding the Hornet on the Lisbon station,
of the rupture with Spain ; and he was thus enabled to attack the
Spanish trade in the West Indies before the Spaniards themselves
knew that war had broken out. This important intelligence had
been brought to him by a small French privateer prize, which
Johnstone had entrusted to the Hornet's master; Mr., afterwards
Captain, John M'Laurin. At Martinique Eodney also heard that
a strong Spanish squadron had arrived at Havana and that Jamaica
was believed to be threatened. He therefore sent a frigate to warn
Captain Arthur Forrest, who, as senior officer, had succeeded Kear-
Admiral Holmes on the Jamaica station, and to desire him to join
the main fleet off Cape St. Nicolas, whither he himself intended to
proceed.
He was, however, not quite ready to sail when, on March 26th,
the Richmond, Captain John Elphinstone (1), arrived from England
with orders for him and General Monckton to postpone further
operations pending the appearance of Admiral Sir George Pocock,
who had been commissioned to conduct a secret expedition on an
important scale. This did not prevent Rodney from sending Sir
James Douglas (1),^ with ten sail of the line, to the Jamaica station
with directions to bring Forrest's squadron thence as soon as
possible, and to join Pocock. He also sent Captain Swanton,
with a division, to cruise off the Spanish Main, and himself went
to St. Pierre, Martinique, sending a frigate to meet Pocock at Bar-
bados, where Sir George arrived on board the Namur on April 20th.
Pocock sailed again on the 24th, joined Rodney at Cas des Navires
on the 26th, and, with the greater part of the fleet, proceeded on
May 6th for Havana, leaving Rodney in charge of the Leeward
Islands.
On the Jamaica station Captain Forrest was, of course, super-
^ Dublin, 74, Commodore Sir James Douglas (1), Captain Edward Gascoigne; Cul-
loden, 74, Captain John Barker (1); Z)r«r/rm , 74, Captain Hon. Aug. John Hervey ;
Tiimeraire, 74, Captain Matthew Barton; Tem,ple, 70, Captain Julian Legge; Deuon-
shire, 64, Captain Samuel Marshall (1) ; Alcide, 64, Captain Thomas Hankerson ; StirUng
Castle, 64, Captain James Campbell (2); Nottingham, 60, Captain Thomas CoUing-
wood ; Sutherland, 50, Captain Michael Everitt ; Dover, 40, Captain Chaloner Ogle (3) ;
TJiunder, bomb, Commander Eobert Haswell ; and Grenado, bomb.
246
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1762.
seded by the arrival of Sir James Douglas (1) , who despatched a
squadron under Captain Hon. Augustus John Hervey ^ to blockade
M. de Blenac at Cape- Fran9ois, until the whole Jamaica squadron
should be ready to join Pocock at Cape St. Nicolas.
The Havana expedition, when complete, included about 15,500
men, the whole commanded by George, Earl of Albemarle. The
strength of the fleet will be found set forth in the note." After
leaving Martinique the expedition was joined in the Mona passage
on May 8th by Captain Hon. Augustus John Hervey, and, having
arrived off Cape St. Nicolas on the 18th, was there reinforced on
the 23rd by Sir James Douglas from Jamaica.
It was open to Pocock either to sail by the south side of Cuba,
along the track of the galleons, round the west end of the island and
^ Dragon, 74, Captain Hon. A. J. Hervey ; Temeraire, 74. Captain INIatthew Barton ;
Stirling Castle, 64, Captain James Campbell (2) ; Alcide, 64, Captain Thomas Hanker-
son ; Defiance, 60, Captain George Mackenzie ; Nottingham, 60, Captain Thomas
Collingwood ; Pembroke, 60, Captain John Wheelock ; Dover, 40, Captain Chaloner
Ogle (o) ; Trent, 28, Captain John Lindsay; and Port Malion, 20, Captain Thomas
Lemimere.
^ Fleet imder Sir George Pocock at the reduction of Havana, and on the Jamaica
station, 17')2: —
Shiiis.
Gnus.
Commaiulers.
Ships.
(luiis.
Commanders.
Ltimiral Sir George
Dover ....
40
Capt. Chaloner Ogle (3).
Namur ....
90
Pocock, K.B. (B).
Enterprise*. . .
40
,, .John Houlton.
1
apt
Jolin Harrison.
Richmond .
32
f ,, J()hn Elphinstone
I (1).
ommod. Hon. Augustus
Valiant ....
74
Keppel.
apt. Adam Duncan.
Alarm ....
32
( ,, James Alms (1)
\ (acting).
Cambridge * . .
80
f *
William Goostrey.
Echo
28
,, John Ijendrick.
CuUoden. . . .
74
»>
•Iclin Barker.
Lizard - . . . .
28
,, Francis Hanks (1).
Temeraire . . .
74
)i
Matthew Barton.
Trent ....
-.iS
„ John I^indsay.
Dragon ....
74
tt
Hen. Augustus
Cerberus i . . .
28
,, Charles Webber.
Jolin Hervey.
Boreas ....
28
,, Samuel Uvedale.
Centaur i . . .
74
*i
Tli<imas Lempriere.
Mercury
24
( „ Samuel Granston
\ Goodall.
Duhlin 3 . . . .
74
Edward (iascoigne.
Marlborough . .
70
yt
Thomas Burnett.
Rose
20
r ,, John Neale Pley-
l dell Kott.
Temple ....
Or/ord ....
70
Julian Legge.
66
»>
r^arriot Arbuthnot.
Port Mahon . .
20
„ Eichard Bickerton.
Devonshire .
64
»»
Samuelllarshall(l).
Fowey ....
20
,, Joseph Mead.
BeUeisle ....
64
:*
.Joseph Knight.
Olasgoxu
20
„ Richard Carteret.
Edgar ....
64
f
I
»»
Francis ^\ illiani
Drake.
Bonetta ....
; Cygnet ....
16
Com. Lancelot Holmes,
f ,, Hon. Charles
I Napier (1).
Alcidei . . . .
64
»»
Thomas Hankerson.
16
Hampton Court
64
Alexander lunes.
Merlin ....
j I'orcupinc- . .
16
16
( ,, William Francis
I Bourke.
,, James Harmood.
Stirling Castle . .
64
{
>y
James Campbell
Pembroke . . .
60
»)
John \Vheelock.
1 Barbados .
14
„ , lames Hawker.
Ripon ....
60
»»
Edward Jekyll.
Viper ....
14
„ ,Iohn Frry.
Nottingham . .
60
>»
Thomas Colling-
W0(xl.
Port Royal .
Ferret ....
14
14
„ Stair Douglas (1).
Lieut. I'eter Clarke.
Defiance. . . .
60
i»
Geurcp Mackenzie.
Lurcher, cutter
14
„ Walker.
Intrepid^ . .
60
John Hale.
Thunder, Ixmib
8
Com. Kobert Haswell.
Centurion 3 i . .
50
J,
James (ialbraith.
lirenado, bomb
8
Deptford . . .
SO
»»
J)uilley Digges.
Basilisk, bomb. .
s
„ Lowfield.
Sutherland^ . .
1 50
f >
Michael Everitt.
Hampshire .
1 50
Arthur Usher.
besides storeships,
hospita
1 ships, and transpoiti?.
I'eiiziiiii:i: i .
4(1
"
I'hilip Boteler.
1 Joined after the siege had begun. 2 Esconed troops from North America.
3 Some time with tlie broad pennant of Commodore Sir James Douglas.
* Escorted convoys from .Jamaica to England.
1762.]
TEE EXPEDITION AGAINST HAVANA.
247
so beat down to Havana, or to steer along the north side of Cuba
through the Old Strait of Bahama. The former was the easier,
though the longer, course ; the latter was the shorter, though it was
somewhat difficult and even hazardous, the channel being narrow
and intricate. But the Admiral chose it, since time was precious,
and since it was important as early as possible to secure the only
passage by which the French could send supplies to Havana.
Pocock despatched Sir James Douglas in the Centurion to Jamaica
to bring stores thence, and to hasten forward such ships as were
still there ; and on the 27th, with his huge fleet of about two
hundred sail, the Admiral bore away for the Old Strait of Bahama.
The precautions which he took are described in a letter which, on
June 14th, he addressed to the secretary of the Admiralty. He
placed boats on the most dangerous shoals on each hand to act as
marks ; and he records that he was greatly assisted in the navigation
by Anson's chart, which he found very correct. During the passage,
two Spanish vessels, the TJietis, 22, and Fenix, storeship, were
captured by the Alarm, Captain James Alms (1).
The Strait was passed on June 5th ; and on the morning of the
6th the fleet was brought to about fifteen miles east of Havana, so
that directions might be given to the captains as to the landing.
The conduct of this operation was entrusted to Commodore the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, who had under him six sail of the line and
some frigates. At 2 p.m. the Admiral bore away with thirteen sail
of the line, two frigates, the bombs, and thirty-six victuallers and
storeships, and ran down towards the harbour, in which he saw
twelve Spanish sail of the line ^ and several merchantmen. On the
^ Spaniffh men-of-war taken or destroyed during the expedition against Havana,
1762 :—
^^llips.
(jUUS.
CommaiKiers.
Fate.
Tigre. .
70
fMarquesdel Real Trasporle.
IDuii J. Y. Madariaga.
Reiiia
•70
„ h. do Velasco.
Surrendered with the city.
Soberano
70
,, J. del Postigo.
«
Infante .
70
,, F. do IMedlna.
yeptnno .
70
,, P. Rermudez.
Sunk at mouth of harbour.
c3
Aquildn .
70
Marques Gonzales.
Surrendered with the city.
ft
Asia . .
64
Don F. Garganta.
Sunk at mouth of harbour.
*^
America
60
„ J. Antonio.
Surrendered with the city. Renamed Moro.
<,
Europa .
60
„ J. Vincente.
Sunk at mcjuth of harbour.
Conquistador
60
,, P. Castejon.
1
San Genaro
San Antonio
60
60
|Not in Commission.
VSurrendered with the city.
Venganza .
26
Don D. Argote.
Taken by Iiefiance at Mariel, May 28.
Thetis . .
22
„ J. Poilier.
„ Alarm in the Str.\it, .June 3.
Marie . .
18
,, D. Bonechea.
„ Defiance at JMariel. May 28.
Fenix, st.s.
„ Alarm in the Strait, May 28.
Two inifinished ships upon the stocks were destroyed.
248 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1702.
following morning, the 7th, he made a feint of landing the Marines
about four miles to the west of Havana, while the Earl of Albemarle,
with the w^hole army, landed without opposition between the rivers
Boca Nao and Coximar, six miles east of Moro Castle, under the
conduct of Captains Hervey, Barton, Drake, Arbuthnot, Jekyll, and
Wheelock, B.N. After it had landed, the enemy made some show
of fight, especially when the troops were about to cross the river
Coximar; but the foe was dispersed by the fire of the Mercury,
Bonetta, and Dragon. A detachment of seamen and 900 Marines
were landed to co-operate.
On July 1st, after some progress had been made with the siege,
the Cambridge, Dragon, and Marlborough were ordered to cannonade
Moro ; and at about 8 a.m. they began a heavy fire, which was well
returned till 2 p.m. The vessels were all so much damaged that,
one after another, they had to be called off. The Cambridge lost
24 killed and 95 wounded ; the Dragon, 16 killed and 37 wounded ;
and the Marlborough, 2 killed and 8 wounded. Among the killed in
the Cambridge was Captain Goostrey, whose place was afterwards
taken by Captain Lindsay of the Trent. As this mode of procedure
was found to be too costly, the further bombardment of the defences
was left mainly to the shore batteries, which, aided by mines, made
a practicable breach in the Moro by July 30th. On that day the
castle was carried by storm. In the struggle the commandant, the
gallant Don Luis de Yelasco, was mortally wounded. In honour of
his defence, there has ever since been a ship named the Velasco in
the Spanish navy. The vessels in the harbour took part in the
operations, but were of little avail.
Upon the fall of Moro the siege was pressed, and, on August 11th,
after a particularly heavy bombardment, flags of truce were hung
out on shore and in the Spanish flagship. A little later another flag
was sent to the British headquarters ; negotiations were entered
upon ; and, after some delay, the capitulation was signed on the
13th, and part of the works was taken possession of by the British
on the 14th.
The specie, stores, and valuables found in the place were worth
about £3,000,000 sterling ; and with the city were also taken nine
sail of the line. Two others lying on the stocks had been burnt,
and three more, besides a large galleon, had been sunk in the mouth
of the harbour.^ On the other hand, the British killed, wounded,
^ For tlie names and force of these, see note p. 247.
1762.] CAPTURE OF HAVANA. 249
and missing numbered no fewer than 1790; and many other hves
were lost owing to the nnwholesomeness of the chmate and the
hardships of the siege. The naval dispatches were sent home by
Captain the Hon. Augustus John Hervey, in the Dragon, which on
her passage had the good fortune to capture a French ship valued
at £30,000.
During the siege several Spanish vessels were taken on the coast.
On July 24th the Chesterfield, 40, and four transports with reinforce-
ments of troops from North America, were lost at Cayo Confite,
but the people were saved. Lieutenant Walker, commanding the
Lurcher, cutter, going on June 13th up the Chorera Eiver out of
mere curiosity, had the misfortune to be killed. The prize money
divided amounted to about £736,000. Its division caused much
heart-burning, the shares of the Admiral and general being each
£122,697 lO.s. Q>d. ; wiiile the share of a captain E.N. was but
£1600 lOs. lOf?., of a petty officer only £17 5.s. 'M., and of a seaman
or Marine not more than £3 14.s. 'd\d. It was felt, and perhaps
with reason, that the administration permitted the commanding
officers to appropriate far too large a share of the spoils to them-
selves.
The fall of Havana, apart from its intrinsic significance, had
almost the importance of a great naval victory, owing to the large
number of Spanish sail of the line which shared the fate of the city.
The military conduct of the siege by the Earl of Albemarle has been
blamed, chiefly because, instead of attacking the city where it was
weak, he attacked Moro and Punta Fort, which were strong, but
which, nevertheless, must have quickly fallen had the city itself
been taken. But although there may be justice in this criticism, it
does not appear that anything can be urged against Pocock's conduct
of his part of the business ; unless indeed, it be admitted that he was
wrong to oppose his ships to the Moro on July 1st. For the rest,
the co-operation between the Navy and army was thoroughly loyal
and smooth ; and the behaviour of both was admirable.
Sir George Pocock delivered up the command of the fleet to the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, who by that time had been promoted to be a
Eear-Admiral of the Blue ; and, with the Namur, Culloden, Temple,
Devonshire, Marlborough, hifante, San Genaro, Asuncion,^ and
several other Spanish prizes and about fifty transports, sailed for
England on November 3rd. About six hundred miles west of Land's
^ A prize nierchantnian.
250 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714:-1762. [1762.
End, the squadron was dispersed by a \evj violent gale from the
eastward. Twelve of the transports foundered, though their crews
were happily saved. The Temple came to a similar end. The
Culloden and Devonshire would probably have fared likewise, had
they not thrown overboard many of their guns. Part of the fleet
made Kingsale. The other part, which kept the sea, suffered
terrible privations from famine, thirst and sickness. So anxious did
the Admiralty become, that it sent out several frigates to search for
Sir George ; who, however, safely reached Spithead on January 13th,
1763. The San Genaro, one of the ships which had put into
Kingsale, came to grief when at length she anchored in the Downs.
She was overtaken by another storm, and was cast away. The
Marlborough lost company with the Admiral early on the voyage ;
but she, too, met with very heavy weather, and, owing to leaks, was
obliged to put before the wind, throw her guns overboard, and keep
her crew at the pumps until November 29th, when her people were
taken off by the Antelope, 50, Captain Thomas Graves (2), w^hich was
on her voyage home from Newfoundland. The Marlhorougli, after
having been abandoned, was destroyed. Eear-Admiral Keppel sent
home the rest of the Spanish prizes under Captain Arbuthnot of the
Orford, together with the Centaur, Dublin, Alcide, Hampton Court,
Edgar and some frigates; and, after having acted with energy upon
the station until the peace, he remained to deliver up Havana on
July 7th, 17(33, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.
Some of his vessels then proceeded to Florida to take over that
province : and Keppel himself went to Jamaica, where he was
presently relieved b}^ Eear-Admiral Sir William Burnaby.
In the meantime, the French, taking advantage of the large
withdrawal of troops to the West Indies, of the defenceless condition
of Newfoundland, and of a fog in the Channel, despatched from
Brest, under M. de Ternay, a squadron, which, with 1500 troops
under Comte d'Haussonville, evaded Sir Edward Hawke, crossed
the Atlantic, entered the harbour of St. John's on June 24th and
quickly took the town. On its way, this fleet fell in with three
combined convoys of great value, which it might easily have taken
had it not preferred the ulterior object of the expedition, and had it
not been deterred by the bold front offered to it by Captain Joshua
Rowley, of the Superb, 74, who had with him the Gosport, 44,
Captain John Jervis, and the Danae, 38, Captain Henrj^ Martin (2).
The capture of this convoy would have done Great Britain far
1762.] EE-GAPTURE OF NEWFOUNDLAND. 251
more damage at that moment than the capture of Newfoundland.
Captain Thomas Graves (2), governor of the island, who lay at
Placentia in the Antelojje, 50, at once sent news of the French
descent to Commodore Lord Colville, at Halifax. Colville sailed to
the relief of the island, and joined Graves ; and on August 25th,
M. de Ternay found himself blockaded in St. John's. On
September 11th, troops arrived from Louisbourg, and were landed ;
and the enemy was driven back ; but on the 16th, the blockading
ships being driven from their station by a westerly gale, M. de
Ternay slipped his cables and got away. A relieving squadron had
been sent from England in the meantime under Captain Hugh
Palliser, but de Ternay managed to avoid this force also. After his
departure, the condition of the French was, of course, hopeless ;
and on September 18th Comte d'Haussonville capitulated.
A little expedition of 1762 deserves some mention here in spite
of the fact that the Royal Navy had very little part in it, and that
it had no important results. It was an adventure which, in a
degree, recalls some of the exploits of the Elizabethan era, in that
it was a warlike undertaking by private persons, countenanced,
however, by the administration, and that it was aimed against the
Spanish power in America. A company of British noblemen and
merchants came to the conclusion that an attack upon the province
of Buenos Ayres might be both useful to the nation and lucrative
to the adventurers. They purchased from the Admiralty H.M. ships
Kingston, 50 (which they renamed Lord Clive), and Ambuscade, 28 ;
and they placed these under the orders of Mr. Macnamara, an
officer of the East India Company's marine. They further obtained
the co-operation of two Portuguese vessels, in which were embarked
five hundred soldiers. The little squadron, which also included
five store ships, sailed for Bio de Janeiro, where the final pre-
parations were made, and, proceeding, entered the Biver Plate on
November 2nd. Macnamara found that the Spaniards were better
situated for defence than he had expected. An attempt was made
on Nova Colonia, which had been captured by the Spaniards from
the Portuguese : but it was not successful. In a second attack, on
January 6th, 1763, the Lord Clive took fire and burnt to the water's
edge, her people, however, fighting her to the very last. Of her crew
of three hundred and fifty, two hundred and seventy-two, including
Macnamara, perished. The Ambuscade, though terribly mauled,
managed to get back to Bio. It should be added that the gallant
252 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1762.
Spaniards treated with the greatest generosity those survivors of
the Lord Clive who fell into their hands, and, instead of regarding
them as enemies, treated them as guests whom misfortune had cast
upon their shores.
The year witnessed no events of great importance in the
Mediterranean ; where Sir Charles Saunders was strongly rein-
forced by a squadron under Sir Piercy Brett (1). Some exceedingly
valuable prizes were made on the station ; but the fleets of the
belligerents did not meet. Sir Charles Saunders, and most of the
ships returned to England at the peace, leaving Eear-Admiral Sir
Piercy Brett to take possession of Minorca. Brett was subsequently
relieved by Commodore Thomas Harrison (2).
It has been already mentioned that M. de Blenac got out of
Brest, and sailed for Martinique during a temporary absence from
his station of Commodore Spry, owing to heavy weather. Spry
chased ; but, his provisions threatening to give out, he had to return
to England, having first sent the Aquilon to warn Kodney of what
had happened. During the year the other occurrences in waters
near home were mainly confined to the monotonous blockading of
the enemy's ports, and to the capture of their cruisers. Commodore
Lord Howe lay in Basque Eoad, watching Eochefort and the mouth
of the Charente, until he was relieved by Commodore Peter Denis.
"When M. de Ternay escaped from Brest, the fleet under Sir
Edward Hawke and the Duke of York went in pursuit, but missed
him. This fleet, then under Sir Charles Hardy (2), cruised again in
September and October, and once more in November, but accom-
plished nothing. The cruisers of Commodore Eobert Man (2), who
succeeded Spry off Brest ; of Commodore James Young (1), who
commanded in the Channel; and of Commodore John Moore (1),
who commanded in the Downs, made various prizes ; but the details
of these, and of other minor captures, will be fittingly given in the
next chapter. One episode, in which the force under Commodore
Moore was concerned, may, however, be noticed here.
The Dutch had for some time been supplying the enemies of
Great Britain with provisions and stores ; and the British cruisers,
in consequence, vigilantly searched their merchantmen. The States
General, resenting this, commissioned some men-of-war to protect
the illicit trade ; and, in September, a Dutch flotilla of four merchant-
men, convoyed by a 36-gun frigate, was fallen in with by the
Hunter, sloop; which, being refused permission to search, and l)eing
1762.] THE WAR AND TRADE. 253
too weak to enforce her demands, returned to Moore. He sent the
Diana, 32, Captain Wilham Adams (2), the Chester, 50, Captain
AVilham Hay, the Hunter, 14, Commander James Ferguson, and
the Trial, 14, Commander James Cunningham, with orders to do
what was necessary. Adams found the Dutchmen, and demanded
to know what the convoy had on board. The Dutch captain again
refused to allow a search, and declared that he would fight rather
than permit it ; whereupon Adams sent boats to board each
merchantman. The Dutch fired a gun at the leading boat, and
wounded a man in her, Adams retaliated by firing a gun at the
frigate, which rephed with a broadside. This brought about an
action, which, in fifteen minutes, resulted in all the Dutch ships
submitting. They were taken into the Downs. The merchantmen,
being found to have on board stores for the French navy, were
detained ; but the frigate, which had lost four killed and five
wounded, was dismissed.
During this last year of the contest the enemy took but two
British men-of-war, a sloop and a bomb ketch. The list of the
men-of-war taken by the British will be found in the appendix.
The French merchantmen and privateers taken numbered 120 ; and,
as in previous years, their value was greatly in excess of that of the
British privateers and merchantmen captured, though the number
of the latter was considerably greater. Towards the close of the
campaign the French had very few vessels at sea ; and their trade
was ruined. The Spanish power afloat was never great enough to
be a serious menace.
The first overtures for peace came from France to Great Britain
through the Sardinian envoy in London. In consequence of them,
the Duke of Bedford was sent to Paris, and the Due de Nivernois
came to England, with full powers ; and on November 3rd, 1762,
the preliminaries of peace, between Great Britain on the one side
and France and Spain on the other, were signed at Fontainebleau.
The terms were scarcely proportionate to the measure of the suc-
cesses which had been gained by Great Britain during the war. She
acquired Canada, St. John's, Cape Breton, and that part of what was
then called Louisiana, east of the Mississippi, except New Orleans,
together with the right of free navigation of the Mississippi. France
received permission, subject to certain conditions, to fish on the
banks of Newfoundland, and was given the islands of St. Pierre and
Miquelon as fish-curing stations. Spain refinquished her claim to
254 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1762.
fish on the banks of Newfoundland ; and undertook to restore to
Portugal an}^ places which she might have conquered from that
power, and to cede Florida to Great Britain. But Great Britain
was to restore Havana and its dependencies. Martinique, Guade-
loupe, and Marie Galante also, were to be given back to France,
which, in addition, obtained St. Lucia, previously a neutral island.
Great Britain retained Grenada and the Grenadines, and received
the formerly neutral islands of Dominica, St. Vincent and Tobago.
She also had Minorca restored to her and kept Senegal ; but she
restored Belle Isle and Goree to France. The fortifications of
Dunquerque, should, it was agreed, be demohshed. In Asia, Great
Britain had to restore the conquests made from France ; but France
was to erect no fortifications in her possessions within the province
of Bengal. Louisiana west of the Mississippi was ceded by France
to Spain.
The terms of the treaty, though honourable, could not be con-
sidered as particularly advantageous to Great Britain, seeing that
her maritime superiority in 1762 was such that she might have
seized, and kept, almost what she would. The definitive treaty was
signed at Paris on February 10th, 1763 ; and so ended the Seven
Years' War.
Commenting upon the settlement, Mahan writes : —
" The nation at large and Pitt, the favourite of the nation, were bitterly opposed to
the terms of the treaty. ' France,' said Pitt, ' is chiefly formidable to us as a maritime
and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us above all
through the injury to her which results from it. You leave to France the possibility
of reviving her navy.' In truth, from the point of view of sea-power and of the
national jealousies which the spirit of that age sanctioned, these words, though
illiberal, were strictly justifiable. The restoration to France of her colonies in the
West Indies and her stations in India, together with the valuable right of fishery in
her former American possessions, put before her the possibility and inducement to
restore her shipping, her commerce, and her navy, and thus tended to recall her from
the path of continental ambition which had been so fatal to her interests, and in the
same proiDortion favourable to the unprecedented growth of England's power upon the
ocean. The opposition, and indeed some of the ministry, also thought that so com-
manding and important a position as Havana was poorly paid for by the cession of the
then desolate and unproductive region called Florida. Puerto Hico vras suggested,
Florida accepted. There were other minor points of difference, into which it is
unnecessary to enter. It can scarcely' be denied that with the commanding military
control of the sea held by England, grasping as she now did so many important
positions, with her navy overwhelmingly superior in munbers, and her commercial
and internal condition very thriving, more rigorous terms might easily have been
exacted and would have been prudent. The ministry defended their eagerness and
spirit of concession on the ground of the enormous growth of the del)t, which then
amounted to £122,000,000, a sum from every point of view much greater then tlian
now; but while this draft upon the future was fully justified by the success of the
1762.]
THE END OF THE WAR.
255
war, it also imperatively demanded that the utmost advantages which the military-
situation made obtainable, should be exacted. This the ministry failed to do. . .
Nevertheless, the gains of England were very great, not only in territorial increase,
nor yet in maritime preponderance, but in the prestige and position achieved in the
eyes of the nations, now fully opened to her great resources and mighty power. To
these results, won by the sea, the issue of the continental war offered a singular and
suggestive contrast. France had already withdrawn, along with England, from all
share in that strife, and peace between the other parties to it was sigaed five days after
the Peace of Paris. The terms of the peace were simply the status quo ante bellum.
By the estimate of the King of Prussia, one hundred and eighty thousand of his
soldiers had fallen or died in this war, out of a kingdom of live million souls; while
the losses of Prussia, Austria, and France aggregated four hundred and sixty thousand
men. The result was simply that things remained as they were."
'( 256 )
CHAPTEE XXYIII.
MILITAEY HISTOEY OF THE EOYAL NAVY, 1714-1762.
MiNOE Opeeatioxs.
L. CAER LAUGHTOX.
Eichard Lestock — "The Fifteen" — Moorish Pirates — Exploits of the Hind and the
JBridgewaier — Piracy in the West — Edward Thatch, alias " Blackbeard " — •
Bartholomew Eoberts — Chaloner Ogle off Cape Lopez— Mighells at Yigo —
Smugglers and guarda-costas — The right of search — Salt gathering at the Tortugas
— Stuart and illicit trading — Fandino — Pieprisals — The Shorehani's prizes — The
Frincesa taken — Pearce and Oglethorpe at St. Augustine — Barnet and de Caylus
— The West Indies — Loss of the Tiger — Loss of the Tilbury — Callis at St. Tropez
— Martin at Ajaccio — Naval disasters — The Northumberland taken — The hurricane
at Jamaica — Mostj'n's fiasco — Capture of the Elephant — The Anglesey taken —
Lieut. Baker Phillips — The privateers — Successes of " The Eoyal Family " — The
Jersey and the St. Esprit — M. de Lage — The Nottingham and the Mars — The
Alexander and the Solebay — The Portland and the Auguste — Fox and de La
M<.)tte — Captures and losses — Commodore Pocock's successes — George Walker —
Ca]iture of the Magnanime — The Chesterfield — Piracy — The Blandford — Capture
of the Esperance — The Warwick taken — The Chausey Islands — Fortunatus
AY right — A repulse at Algeciras — Captain John Lockhart — " Error of Judgment "
— Loss of the Greenwich and the Merlin — Destruction of the Aquilon and the
Alcion — Captures — Privateers — Thurot — Ca^rture of the Emeraude — Disasters —
Burning of the Prince George — Capture of the Baisonnahlc — Ca^jfain Brodrick
Hartwell — The Winchelsea taken — The Buckingham and the Florissant — The
Vestal and the Bellone — Capture of the Danae — The Achilles and the Comte de
St. Florentine — The Arethuse taken — Indecisive actions — Convoj^s — Adventures
of the Diademe — Sinking of the Cumberland — The Unicorn and the Vestale — The
Bichmond and the Felicite — The Minerva and the Warwick- — The Bipon and the
Achille — Captures — Capture of the Achille and Boiiffonne — The Bellona and the
Courageux — Last captures of the war.
TT^Oll several years after 1715, the
^»^ij^a^ . ■- ^ _L sending of a fleet to the Baltic
became, as has been already shown, a
species of annual exercise. All these
expeditions were barren of serious
fighting, and there is little to be said of them here. In 1717,
1716.] THE NAVY AND THE PBETENDER. 257
however, when the fleet was under Sir George Byng, it was found
that, although the Swedish men-of-war still kept in port, consider-
able annoyance was occasioned to British trade b}^ the numerous
privateers. Against these Sir George detached various cruisers, of
which none was so successful as the Panther, 50, Captain Eichard
Lestock (2). Many privateers were sent home; but none of them
was of any great force, the average scarcely running to ten small
guns and sixty men per ship. The matter, indeed, is chiefly worth
noticing because it was in this way that Lestock, a man whose sub-
sequent behaviour rendered him notorious, began to come to the
front. His activity on these cruises attracted Byng's attention,
and gained him the name of a zealous officer. Sir George, in con-
sequence, chose him to command his flagship in the Mediterranean
campaign of the following year. The subsequent Baltic campaigns
were less active even than the campaign of 1717.
Nearer home, and on the Barbary coasts, meanwhile, the Navy
was finding work to do ; in the one case in connection with the
pro- Stuart rising, in the other, with the recrudescence of pirac3^
The Pretender landed in December, 1715, and in the middle of
January, 1716, Sir John Jennings, Admiral of the White, was
appointed to the command of a squadron of ten ships wherewith
to cruise on the east coast and in the Firth of Forth. Other ships
cruised on the west coast, also for the suppression of the rebels,
while others again were kept in the Channel to restrain sympathetic
Frenchmen. A body of French officers, trying to escape from
Peterhead, was driven back ; but in spite of all precautions, the
Pretender himself contrived to get away safely. Some imputation
of negligence not unnaturally fell upon the Navy ; but the Govern-
ment was satisfied that reasonable diligence had been shown, and
published in the Gazette the following : —
"The Royal Anne, galley. Pearl, Port Mahon, Deal Castle and Phoenix are
returned from cruising, it appears by the journal of Captain Stuart,^ that he had early
intelligence of the Pretender having put to sea, in a clean-tallowed French snow, which
rowed out of the harbour and close in along shore a good way with her sails furled.
The Port Mahon lay all that night within two leagues of the harbour's mouth, but
'twas so dark there was no seeing a ship a quarter of a mile distant." ^
Every precaution, indeed, seems to have been taken by the
refugees ; and it may be added that they appear to have been
1 The Hon. Charles Stuart; born, 1G81 ; Captaio, 1704; Rear- Admiral, 1729;
Yice-Admiral, 1733 ; died, 1740.
2 Quoted in Lediard, 867.
VOL. III. S
258 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1711-1762. [1716.
aware of the disposition of the various cruisers. Leaving Montrose,
the snow stretched across to the coast of Norway, whence she
coasted southward and made Gravehnes in safety. The ChevaHer
de St. George testified his gratitude and appreciation by knighting.
Mark Forrester, her master. In spite of their faihire to intercept
this snow, the EngHsh ships did good, if unostentatious, work in
helping to stamp out the embers of the revolt, chiefly, of course,
by co-operating with the troops when they chanced to touch
the shore.
Piracy in the Mediterranean continued to demand considerable
attention, but was at length dealt with by the Admiralty on some-
thing like a rational system. In other words, there were ships
constantly cruising against the Barbary pirates ; and there was
thus avoided the great and often bootless expense incurred by the
fitting out of occasional expeditions on a large scale. The reign is
marked by no such fight as that of Captain Kempthorne of the
Mary Rose in 1669 ; but cruisers detached, first by John Baker
and after him by Charles Cornwall, the officers in command on
the station, did efficient service. Of these the Hind, 20, Captain
Arthur Delgarno, in May, 1716, took one Sallee rover, and, in
October following, another, of 24 guns. This latter ship resisted
for two and a half hours before she struck, and then promptly sank,
taking down with her all but thirty-eight of her men. The Bridge-
water, also, in the same year, drove two Sallee ships, each of
16 guns, ashore near their own port. The Barbary pirates, how-
ever, though a real nuisance, were not the only one of the kind,
nor, indeed, were they so serious an obstacle to commerce as they
had been in the seventeenth century. This was, as has been
mentioned, partly due to the constant watch kept upon their move-
ments. A more formidable species of piracy, the piracy of romance,
flourished on the Spanish Main, and spread thence over the high
seas. The doings of the notorious Kidd have been recorded ;
the history of William Dampier shows with what ease British
seamen drifted into this evil course of life; and it will be easily
understood that the Sir Francis Verneys and the Wards of the
era preferred to join the successors of Sawkins, primarily to plunder
the Spaniard, rather than to turn renegade and prey on their own
countrymen in the Mediterranean. But though piracy in the
West was a growing source of anxiety, the bulk of its exponents
confined their attentions with some strictness to foreign flags, and
1718.] " BLAOKBEABD," THE PIRATE. 259
some of them, notably Sir Henry Morgan, compared not unfavour-
ably with the gentleman adventurers of the Elizabethan age. Kidd,
it has been shown, was a decided exception; Avery was another;
and so also was Edward Thatch, commonly called Teach, or, more
commonly still, from his appearance, " Blackbeard." ^ Born in
Bristol about 1675, he had, through the War of the Spanish
Succession, served in privateers, and he did not turn his hand
to piracy till the end of 1716. It is notorious that the pirates
of fact enjoj'ed, to an even greater degree than their brethren of
fiction, the short life and merry one supposed to belong to men
of their calling ; and for his enjoyment of existence, as well as
for his egregious brutality. Thatch stands forth from among many
short-lived contemporaries. About the end of 1717, he took a
large Guineaman, which he named the Queen Anne's Bevenge, and
in w^hich he went cruising, after having mounted her with forty
guns. One of the first incidents of his cruise was the falling in
with H.M.S. Scarhorough, 20, which he beat off after a fight
lasting for some hours. The governor of Carolina entered into
a league with him, and he chose the coasts of that colony and
of Virginia as his scene of operations, and continued haunting their
creeks and preying on the merchants, whether at sea or ashore,
till they petitioned the governor of Virginia to rid them of the
pest. The governor took counsel with the captains of the Lyme, 20,
and Pearl, 40, and concerted a scheme by which Lieut. Eobert
Maynard,^ of the Pearl, was to command two small sloops against
Blackbeard, who had got rid of his great ships, and was lurking
in a sloop in Ocracoke Inlet, one of the entrances to Pamlico
Sound. The sloops under Maynard's command mounted no heavy
guns, while the pirates were known to be well armed in that
respect ; but, on the other hand, the sloops had sweeps, which
their enemy had not. Maynard rowed into the passage on
November 21st, 1718, and with great difficulty, after lightening
his vessel, got close to Thatch, who had run aground. Meanwhile,
the pirate sloop floated, and by a broadside of langridge, did great
damage among Maynard's men, who were much exposed by the
lowness in the waist of their ship. Maynard thereupon kept his
men below as much as possible ; upon which Blackbeard, thinking
^ In .Johnson's ' Lives of the most Notorious Pirates,' he appears as Teach. In
official papers he is Thatch.
2 Died, a captain of 1740, in 1750.
s 2
2t)0 MINOB OPERATIONS, 1711-1762. [1718-
.09
that there were few left to deal with, boarded at the head of fifteen
men. The rival commanders engaged hand to hand, and the fight
went stubbornly on, as usual in such cases, till the pirate's death.
Besides those killed, fifteen pirates were taken, and of them thirteen
were hanged.^ That Thatch had so few men with him was owing
to his having marooned or otherwise got rid of the bulk of his
company shortly before in consequence of a dispute as to the
distribution of prize-money.
There was no lack of men to carry on the abominable work ;
but even of the best known of these desperadoes, such as Stede
Bonnet, Edward England, John Kackam, and Howel Davis, none
arrests the attention in such a degree as Bartholomew Koberts.^
Roberts was, in 1718, mate of a ship which was plundered by
pirates on the Guinea coast, and, joining his captors, was elected
to the command on the death of Howel Davis, their captain. He
cruised with considerable success from Brazil to Newfoundland,
and, in 1721, crossed over to the African coast, where, amongst
other prizes, he took a large ship belonging to the Eoyal Africa
Company. To this ship he turned over, named her the Boijal
Fortune, mounted forty guns in her, and with a 32-gun ship, under
a man named Skyrm, and a 24, continued his cruise. His luck
continued good till on February 21st, 1722, when he and Skyrm
lay anchored under Cape Lopez, there came down on him
H.M.S. SwaUoir, 00, Captain Chaloner Ogle (1), which, since the
preceding year, had been on that coast. Ogle knew with whom
he had to deal ; and when Skyrm, taking him for a merchantman,
slipped in chase, he bore away out of earshot of the Royal Fortune.
He then turned upon Sk5^rm, and, after a sharp encounter, took
him. Returning to Cape Lopez and hoisting the French flag, he
lured Roberts into attacking him. Roberts, overmatched and taken
by surprise, made a desperate fight, which did not cease till he
himself had been killed. Of 262 prisoners taken it is well to
' Of the two who escaped the gallows one was Israel Hands, the master, who at the
time of the action was ashoi-e recovering from a wound received fi-om Thatch, who had
a trick of blowing out his cabin lights and firing cross-handed under the table.
Another practice of Blackbeard's was to light sulphur in the ship's hold, and to try
who could longest withstand the fumes. This was by way of enlivening a dull cruise.
^ Pioberts is said to have been the original of Scott's Cleveland in ' The Pirate,' but
the career of the real does not agree with that of the ideal. The doings of Koberts, as
chronicled in Charles Johnson's ' General History of the Most Xotoi-ious Pirates,' are,
so far as can be ascertained, substantially correct.
1719.] MIGHELLS AT VIGO. 261
notice that 52 were hanged, and that only 77 were acquitted on trial.
The captured ships were taken to England, where they were
bestowed on Ogle,^ who also for this good piece of work received
the honour of knighthood.
In the latter end of July, 1719, preparations were making in
England for a secret expedition against Spain. About fifty trans-
ports were got together to convey a force of four thousand men
under Viscount Cobham ; and, meanwhile, a small squadron was
sent ahead under Commodore Sir Eobert Johnson, in the Weymouth,
to co-operate with the French who were then engaged in the siege
of San Sebastian. In the beginning of August, some French troops
and two hundred seamen were landed by the squadron at Fort San
Antonio. Owing to the strength of the batteries at the entrance
to the harbour, the force was landed some distance to the westward,
advancing from which direction, it destroyed the fortifications and
spiked the guns in the harbour. On September 15th, Johnson,
in the Weymouth, having the Winchester and Dursley Galley in
company, heard that there were two Spanish men-of-war and a
large merchantman lying in Rivadeo. Accordingly the Weymouth
and Winchester appeared off the port on the following day ; boats
were sent in to take soundings ; and the two ships anchored alongside
the enemy and abreast of a battery of eight guns. The battery
was taken, the men-of-war were destroyed, and the merchantman
was brought off. In the meantime, the main expedition had sailed
and was looking for Johnson off the Spanish coast, in hopes of
gaining information from him. This force was commanded by
Vice-Admiral James Mighells, who, detached by Berkeley in the
spring, had learnt of the dispersal of the Spanish fleet intended for
the invasion of Scotland. The object now before Mighells, and
the soldiers under Cobham whom he convoyed, was to proceed to
Vigo and retaliate for this intended insult. Saihng from St. Helen's
on September '21st, 1719, the expedition made Vigo on the 29th
without being joined by Johnson. The fleet at once entered the
harbour and landed the troops about three miles from the town.
On October 1st, the army occupied a strong position under the
walls ; whereupon the enemy spiked the guns in their batteries
and withdrew to the citadel. A bomb ketch was brought up on
the 3rd ; but as she could do little, owing to the greatness of the
range, some forty odd mortars were put ashore ; and on the 4th,
' Captains' Letters, 0 2.
262 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1720.
Fort San Sebastian, which had been occnpied, was armed with
heavy guns from the fleet. The citadel, upon that, surrendered,
its garrison of four hundred and sixty-nine officers and men
marching out on the 10th. The town, it was decided, could not
be held ; but a large quantity of guns, small arms, and ammunition,
which had been collected for the invasion of England, was taken
and brought home. Seven ships, also, were seized in the harbour,
of which three were fitting out for privateers. On the 14th, the
ships reduced Ponte Vedra, at the upper end of the harbour.
There, too, many guns were found ; so that the total number
brought home was one hundred and ninet)' iron and thirty brass
heavy guns, with ten thousand stand of small arms, two thousand
barrels of powder, and other warlike stores. On November 11th,
Vice-Admiral Mighells put into Falmouth with the Enterprize,
Kingsale, and Biddeford, and with most of the transports. The
expedition had been prompt and successful : it had fully attained its
object ; and by sickness, desertion, and the sword it had lost no
more than three hundred men.
The difficulties experienced by British merchants in the Spanish
settlements of the west were a heritage of the days of Elizabeth, and
were by no means smoothed away by the many treaties which had
been entered into between the two nations.^ It is not possible here
to enter into an examination of these treaties ; let it suffice to saj^
that, by forbidding, save under the harshest restrictions, all traffic,
except, of course, that in negroes, which had been granted by the
Assiento, they put a premium on smuggling. "We know the tra-
ditional attitude of English and Spaniards to one another in the
New World, and we have noticed the growth of piracy, testifying to
the existence of a considerable proportion of unsettled spirits among
the British inhabitants of the American colonies. When we con-
sider both the evergreen national hatred, and the bitterness with
which the guarda costas must have regarded the enterprising and
unscrupulous smugglers, we cannot wonder at the tales of brutality
on the part of the Spaniards ; but we must also be prepared to
believe that the Spaniards spoke the truth when they insisted that
the British traders of the islands were not always the lambs
they professed to be, and were, in many cases, but little removed
from pirates. There always has been ill-feeling about the right of
' The texts of these treaties will be found at length in Rousset de Missy, ' Iiecueil
Historique ' ; and in Jean Dumont, 'Corps Universel Diplomatique,' vdI. viii.
1728-33.] DIFFICULTIES WITH SPAIN. 263
search — probably there always will be — nor are we to believe that a
guarda costa, boarding a Jamaica smuggler in 1720, acted with such
civility as we expect from the Customs' House nowadays. On the
contrary, as he often had considerable difticulty in catching his
suspect, he was prone to try to catch him where he could, and to
scruple little whether he caught him in Spanish waters or on the
high seas. Such was the state of affairs, and it is clear that it was
bound, sooner or later, to lead to war. Before passing on to the
war itself, it will be interesting to examine in some detail one or two
of the incidents that thus led up to it.
In the latter part of 1728, a Spanish guarda costa sighted and
bore down on the Dursley Galley, 20, mistaking her for a merchant-
man, and with the intention of searching her. Naturally, the
Dursley Galley did not bring to, and the Spaniard opened fire, which
the British ship warmly returned. After a short fight, in which the
guarda costa lost five men killed and twenty wounded, the Spaniard
surrendered. That she was shortly afterwards released was due
simply to the fact that there was no reason for keeping her, and
Lediard ^ is undoubtedly wrong when he points to this as illustrative
of the difference between Spanish and English methods. As will
presently be shown, British ships that were detained were, at any
rate in most cases, legally detained as being smugglers. The next
incident to be mentioned was connected with the vexed question of
the gathering of salt at the Tortugas. It must be remembered that
the right to gather salt,^ like the right to cut logwood at Campeche,
was denied to the English by the Spaniards, although, in point of
fact, it had actually been acknowledged by the Convention of
Madrid. Early in 1733, a fleet of British ships under escort of the
Scarborough, 20, Captain Thomas Durell (1),^ was loading salt at
the Tortugas, when there came down on it two Spanish men-of-
war, one of sixty, and the other of seventy guns."* Four of the
merchantmen, viz., the Catheri?ie, Two Sisters, Hopeivell, and Three
Brothers, were taken at the outset before the Scarborough could
cover her convoy ; but after that she managed to engage the atten-
tion of the Spaniards so well that the rest of the salt ships made
good their escape.
A point that is apt to be passed over in such an account as this is
that two Spanish ships of the line were quite equal to making mince-
^ Lediard, 913. '■^ Captains' Letters, D 4,
2 Rousset de Missy, i. 441. * Beatson, i. 22.
264 2IIN0E OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1731.
meat of the Scarborough first and of her convoy afterwards, had they
been so inchned. It would appear, then, that the Spaniards, whose
force seems to be exaggerated, and who were probably heav}^ coast-
guard cruisers, believed themselves to be engaging merely in the
reprisals customary in those parts, and that, when they found that
they had before them a King's ship, they refused to fight her for fear
of involving themselves in serious diplomatic entanglements.
Whether the guarda costas are to be regarded as privateers or
not, there is interest in a letter written from Jamaica by Commodore
Edward St. Loe, to Burchett, at the Admiralty, in May, 1728.^
Complaining that Spanish privateers infested the Jamaican coasts,
he said : —
" It's my opinion I could go in and destroy most of them held I but His Majesty's
permission. They, according to my notion, are no better than pirates, having no
commission for what they do, save from the governor of the place."
This is the opinion of a man qualified to judge. It may be
tempered by that of another naval officer who commanded on that
station, and who certainly held no brief for the Spaniards. This
was Eear-Admiral the Hon. Charles Stuart, who was sent out to
Jamaica in the Lion on December 9th, 1729, to take over the
command of the station in succession to St. Loe. Stuart seems to
have begun his commission with the prevailing belief that the fault
lay with the Spaniards, but his attitude changed somewhat as time
went on, and as his knowledge of the British merchants increased.
Writing on October 12th, 1731, to the Duke of Newcastle, he
admitted that the British carried on the trade at their own risk, and
that the ships were good prize if taken. This, he said, led them to
retaliate by robbing such Spaniards as they could overpower, and he
added : —
" I can assure you that the sloops that sail from this island manned and armed on
that illicit trade, have more than once bragged to me of having murdered seven or eight
Spaniards on their own shore. I can't help observing that I believe I am the first
military person who has stood up in the defence of peace and quietness, and for
delivering up vessels, against a parcel of men who call themselves merchants, but they
are no better than pedlars, and one of them formerly in jail for piracy."
His plea for peace and quietness may have been merely the outcome
of his knowledge that, as the British had by far the greater number
of ships in those seas, reprisals would be a losing game. That truth
was abundantly evidenced when war broke out ; for from September,
^ Home Ollice Records, Admiralty, Xo. 06, quoted in 'Eng. Hist. Itev.,' iv. 741.
1731.] BRITISH AND SPANISH CRUELTIES. 265
1739, to November, 1741, the Spaniards took 331 British ships as
against only 231 of their own which they lost/
On September l'2th, 1731, Stuart wrote to the governor of
Havana a strong letter of complaint. It had been hoped that a
better condition of affairs was about to begin, as the King of Spain,
in response to pressure from England, had sent instructions to his
colonial governors to mitigate their harshness to British traders.
But this proclamation was bound to be without effect, for it ex-
empted from its protection all such ships as were engaged in the
illicit trade, while leaving it to the governors concerned to draw the
necessary distinction between legal and illegal trafdc.'"^ So it was
that Stuart never lacked cause of complaint, and, in the instance
cited, ^ made mention "particularly of one Fandino, and others who
have committed the most cruel piratical outrages . . . particularly
about the 20th April last, sailed out of your harbour in one of those
guarda costas, and met a ship of this island,* bound for England . . ."
and so forth, giving the well-known traditional details of the no-
torious Jenkins case. He ended this letter with, " The king, my
master, having reason to believe that these repeated insults on his
subjects could never be continued but by the connivance of the
several Spanish governors in these parts, is determmed to endeavour
to put a stop to these piratical proceedings." But at the same time
he was much attacked by the merchants, who objected strongly to
his saying that they exaggerated their case, and who resented his
interference with their illicit trade, and his endeavours to repress
their cruelties.
Juan de Leon Fandino, probably more from the accident of his
having handled Jenkins than for any other reason, stands out from
among the guarda costa officers. On September 9th, 1731, he de-
tained and plundered the Prince William, William Joy, master, but
this ship was released a month later. Not so the Dolphin, Benjamin
Carkett, master, which was taken by Fandino in July, and sent into
Havana. She was adjudged legal prize, as the governor wrote to
Stuart ; but he added that he intended to chastise Spanish privateers,
1 Lists in Gent. Mag. 1741, pp. 689-698.
^ Beatson, i. 15.
^ This letter, taken from Home Office Eecords, Admiralty, No. 69, is printed in
' Eng. Hist. Eev.,' vol. iv.
■* Jenkins's ship, the Rebecca, is not here mentioned by name, but is identified with
this vessel by a list of ships taken or plundered by the Spaniards down to December,
1737. The Rebecca was taken on April 9th, which in the new style would be the 20th.
266 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1731-42.
who were now no longer necessary, and whose commissions he had
revoked. Stuart, however, must stop ships coming from Jamaica to
Cuba, where British and Dutch ships were then to be found all
through the year.
What ultimately became of Fandino falls into its place here,
though chronologically the story should be postponed. On June 4th,
1742, among the Bahamas, Captain Thomas Frankland, of the Bose,
fell in with, and chased, four ships, which showed British colours.
He chased under the same, and, overhauling them, fired a gun.^
The chase then hoisted the Spanish flag, and fought him furiously,
using all sorts of missiles, from broadsides of shot to poisoned arrows.
Frankland, however, held his fire for the fourth ship, a snow, which
seemed the strongest, giving the others only a few guns as they
chanced to bear. The first three sheered off badly hulled.
"I then endeavoured," says Frankland, "to lay the snow aboard, which she
shunned with the utmost caution, maintaining a warm fire till I had torn her almost to
rags, the commander having determined rather to sink than strike, for reasons you'll
liereafter be sensible of: but in about four hours the people, in opposition to the captain,
hauled doAvn the colours."
The prize mounted ten carriage guns, as many swivels, and had a
crew of over eighty men.
" The captain is Juan de Leon Fandino. ... He is the man that commanded the
guard of coast out of the Havana that took Jenkins when his ears were cut off. . . .
Not but such a desperado with his crew of Indians, Mulattoes and Negroes could have
acted as he did, for we were at least two hours within pistol shot of him keeping a
constant fire."
So much for a story which has long been accounted a myth, both
from its intrinsic improbability, and from the circumstance that
Jenkins, like other merchant skippers who gave evidence before the
House of Commons in 1738, was not on oath.^
In 1739, as has been seen, reprisals were ordered, and instructions
to that effect were sent out to Commodore Charles Brown at Jamaica,
whose broad pennant was then flying in the HcDnpton Coiirt.^ The
bearer of this dispatch was the Hon. Edward Boscawen, of the
Shoreham, who joined Brown at Port Koyal on August 6th, and,
^ Captains' Letters, F.
^ Mr. Lecky's opinion of the trutli of the story is given on page 51 of this volume ;
and neither Stuart's nor Frankland's letter really goes far towards contradicting that
opinion. — W. L. C.
^ The Hampton Court's log is of little value ; details of the cruise will be found in
tlie Commodore's log, bound up with his dispatches in Admirals' Dispatches 17o8-
1742, Jamaica, in the Public Record Office.
1739.] WAR WITH SPAIN. 267
after whose accession, the squadron consisted, besides the two ships
named, of the Falmouth, Diamond, Torrington, Windsor and Drake.
Brown at once proceeded to carry out his orders, and on the following
day the Drake and the Hampton Coiirfs barge brought in a schooner.
On the 14th the whole squadron left Port Eoyal, and proceeded
round Cuba on a cruise, during which, owing to the scarcity of
Spanish ships, they did no great amount of damage, but managed to
collect reliable information as to the strength and distribution of
Spanish men-of-war in those seas. On September 3rd, Captain
Charles Knowles, of the Diamond, was detached in pursuit of a
strange sail, and did not rejoin. The Shoreham was the most
successful ship of the squadron. In her, Boscawen reconnoitred
Havana, and, near that port, destroyed two sloops and took another,
while a little later, about September 15th, he landed at Porto Maria,
and burnt a large quantity of timber and other stores. He was there
attacked by two half galleys and a sloop, but they kept in such shoal
water that the Shoreham, though hulled more than once, could not
get close enough to harm them. Meanwhile, a small fort between
Matanzas and Havana was destroyed. Brown, having stayed for
twelve days off Havana in hopes of falling in with a Spanish
squadron, learnt that none was expected, and, leaving the Windsor
and Falmouth to cruise there till the end of the month, proceeded
round the western end of the island, and, on October 28th, anchored
in Port Eoyal. There he found the Diamond, which had made two
captures — a ship and a brigantine, said to be worth £30,000. These,
with two other small sloops taken, and a few large canoes, represent
the total damage done. In Port Boyal lay Vernon's squadron, to
which Brown had by that time become attached.
Active warfare was at first entirely confined to the West Indies ;
and in European seas the first action of importance took place when
the Princesa, 64, six hundred men, of the Spanish Ferrol squadron,
fell in with the Lenox, Kent, and Orford, which had been detached
from Vice-Admiral John Balchen's squadron. These three ships,
with the St. Albans and Bipon, had been cruising to intercept a
convoy of treasure ships under Pizarro, but saw nothing of them.
Pizarro, for his success on this service, was appointed immediately
to command the expedition which was sent out to round Cape Horn
and to act as a check on Anson. The Princesa was sighted at
9 A.M. on April 8th, 1740, and was at once chased by the three ships,
viz., Lenox, 70, Captain Covill Mayne, Kent, 70, Captain Thomas
268 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1740.
Durell (1), and Orford, 70, Captain Lord Augustus Fitzroy (1).^
The chase was then under French colours ; but, when the Orford
drew up soon after half -past ten, she hoisted Spanish. i\.bout eleven
the Lenox also drew close up. and opened fire with her chase-guns,
being soon followed by the Orford. All three ships came into close
action and gave her many broadsides, for the most part within pistol
shot ; but she made a most stubborn defence, and, though she became
ungovernable, owing to the loss of her foretopmast, early in the en-
gagement, she proved capable of a great deal of passive resistance. In
explanation of this it was pointed out at the time that she was more
heavily armed than the British 70's. The Spanish establishment was,
•24-prs. on the lower deck, 18-prs. on the upper deck, and 8-prs. on the
quarter deck and forecastle, as against 24, 12, and 6-prs. in the British
Xavy ; but it is possible that the Princesa may have had heavier guns
mounted. She was moreover of very stout scantling, and, having small
portholes, was, defensively at any rate, a most powerful ship. It has
also been suggested that, as a fresh breeze was blowing, the British
ships could not use their lower deck guns. This was not so. Covill
Mayne makes special mention of sending the enemy broadsides from
his lower, upper, and quarter-deck guns. The reports clash some-
what ; but, roughly, the middle part of the action seems to have
been fought with the Princesa out of hand, the Kent on her larboard
beam, and the Lenox or Orford on her starboard side, and the third
ship always under her stern, raking her fore and aft. In the after-
noon the Orford had her fore rigging so much disabled that she
dropped astern and had to lie to to knot and splice ; but meanwhile
the raking fire from the Lenox had carried away the Princesa' s main
and mizen masts. The Orford, having repaired damages, drew up
again ; and thereupon the enemy struck her colours, having main-
tained an almost hopeless struggle with the utmost gallantry for
close on seven hours. Not unnaturally Lord Augustus Fitzroy
claimed that she had struck to him, and sent the first boat on board,
following closely himself. To Covill Mayne's indignation he
received the sword of her commander, Don Pablo Agustin de
Aguirre, and took charge of her papers. There was some angry
protest, but the matter seems to have blown over. The prize, rated
as a 70, continued for some years as one of the best two-deckers in
the British Navy.
The next operation that falls within the scheme of this chapter
^ Captains" Letters, vols. ^I '.», aud F 5.
1740.]
THE FLORIDA EXPEDITION.
269
was not so satisfactory to British pride. General Oglethorpe,
commanding the troops on the North American station, conceived
the notion that it would be to His Majesty's service to take
St. Augustine, in Florida.^ Accordingly he consulted with the
General Assembly of Carolina, asking what troops could be spared
to him ; and he also gained the adherence to his plan of Captain
Vincent Pearce (1), of the Flanihorough, the Commodore on the
station. The project was first suggested to Pearce in January, 1740 ;
but the general found some difficulty in putting it on a working
basis, and it was not till April that he renewed his request for the
co-operation of his ships. These were : —
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Flanihorough
20
Captain Vincent Pearce (1).
Hector
44
„ Sir Yelverton Peyton, Bart.
Squirrel
20
„ Peter Warren.
Phoenix
20
„ Charles Fansliaw.
Tartar
22
„ the Hon. Georo;e Townsheud.
Spence
6^
„ William Laws.
Wolf .
8
Commander William Dandridge.
Hawk .
6^
and a schoor
ler.
8
1 aud ten swivels.
aud four swivels.
When Oglethorpe's request was finally made the squadron was
just on the point of starting on a cruise, and was therefore in
perfect readiness for immediate action. The Sqim'rel was sent off
St. Augustine pending the arrival of the rest of the force ; and
she was annoyed by six half-galleys that lay there, and which, during
calms and light winds, proved of considerable service to the
Spaniards. The Wolf w^as sent on to join Warren towards the
end of April, and on the 28th the Squirrel took a sloop belonging
to the king of Spain. This prize mounted eight 4-prs. and six
swivels, and had eight thousand pieces of eight on board. In May
the Hector and Spence joined the ships off the bar of St. Augustine,
Pearce meanwhile lying in St. John's Eiver co-operating with the
troops then on the advance from the northward. Two small forts,
St. Francis de Pupa and Fort Diego, were taken by Oglethorpe,
who then returned to the mouth of the St. John's Eiver, whence
on May 31st a general advance was made. On June 1st Pearce
proceeded off St. Augustine, and found the Spaniards getting away
their guns from a battery on the Island of St. Eustatia. He
^ Captains' Letters, vol. P 8.
270 JIINOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1740.
promptly sent in his boats, ordering the Wolf and Spence to cover
the attack; but the enemy gave no trouble, making off into the
harbour on the approach of the boats. On June 5th it was decided
at a council of war that the ships could remain on that coast
till July 5th ; on the 7th there was another skirmish with the
galleys ; and on the 13th the island was occupied by two hundred
seamen and as many soldiers. Two days later Colonel Palmer was
killed at Fort Moosa and his party driven back ; a serious reverse
which gave the enemy free communication to the landward.
Meanwhile guns were brought into position on the island, and
two small craft were fitted to serve against the galleys, there being
so little water on the bar that the ships could not get in. On
June 20th the governor was summoned to surrender, but promptly
refused. Deserters soon afterwards came into the British camp
with news that the galleys were very badly manned and could easily
be taken. As it had been discovered that the range was so great
that the guns on the island could have little effect, a council of war
was held with the view of seeing whether this information should
be acted upon. Pearce, however, was averse from taking the risk :
possibly he had doubts of the deserters ; and he persisted in his
refusal though the land officers offered to put one hundred soldiers
into the boats to take the places of those seamen who were absent
in the batteries ashore. On this Colonel Vanderdussen pointed out
how badly off the troops would be when the ships left the coast ;
for the galleys would cut their communications. Pearce found that
there was no port near where he could lay his ships up for the
hurricane season ; and, not being too well manned, he had to refuse
a request that he would leave two hundred seamen to reinforce the
troops. It was by that time July ; and the moment had come
when, in accordance with the council of war of June 5th, the ships
were to leave the coast. "Without any friction, therefore, between
Oglethorpe and Pearce, it was decided that nothing further could be
done,^ and on the 5th the whole force withdrew, the ships covering
it from any attempt on the part of the galleys.
In July, 1741, Captain Curtis Barnet, of the Dragon, 60, was
detached from Vice-Admiral Nicolas Haddock's squadron with the
two 44-gun ships, Fevershain and Folkestone, and with orders to
cruise in the neighbourhood of the Strait of Gibraltar. Being off
^ Bound up with Pearce's letters are his log for three mouths, the minutes of the
councils of war, and letters from Oglethorpe, Vanderdussen, Peyton and others.
1741.] BARNET AND DE CAYLUS. Til
Cape Spartel on the '25th of the month he chased and came up with
three ships, which he had reason to beheve were two Spanish
register ships under convoy of a frigate. The Feversham had fallen
astern, and the other two ships did not come up with the strangers
till after dark. Barnet hailed to know what they were, and was
answered that they were Frenchmen from Martinique. He explained
that he was an English man-of-war, and that it was his duty to
satisfy himself that they were not Spaniards ; Init, to his demand
that his boat should be allowed to board them, he received no
response save incivilities. Finding that he could do nothing by
talking, and being confirmed in his belief that the ships were really
Spanish, he opened fire, after due v/arning. The ships were, how-
ever, really French, being the Boree, 62, the Aquilon, 46, and the
Flore, 26,^ under the command of Captain de Caylus, in the first
named. A brisk action ensued, and the British ships, as the Fever-
sham was still far astern, being somewhat at a disadvantage, soon
found themselves obliged to lie to for half an hour to knot and splice.
In the morning, they and their consort again came up with the
Frenchman, and a boat was sent on board the Boree under a flag of
truce. The truth at once appeared ; but it also appeared that the
ships, being on their way from the West Indies, and knowing the
state of relations between the two countries, were under the convic-
tion that war had broken out. Barnet's lieutenant was requested to
swear before the French officers whether this were the case or not,
and was able to satisfy them that the two monarchies were still at
peace. It is hard to say that either Barnet or De Caylus was to
blame ; but the trouble might have been avoided had M. de
Pardaillan, the captain of the Aquilon, been less suspicious of a
British ship ranging alongside cleared for action. The blame really
lay with the government which, though knowing that war was
inevitable, hesitated to declare it. As it was, the ships parted with
mutual apologies, and with a loss in killed of eleven men on the
British side, and of about thirty-five, among whom was M. de
Pardaillan, on board the French ships. All the vessels, moreover,
had their masts and rigging much cut.
Meanwhile, in the West Indies, several of the cruisers which
were detached by Vernon had better fortune than the main fleet.
Some fell in with register ships of considerable value, and others did
good service by capturing dispatch vessels. Of these latter the
^ Froude, i. 289. ^ Barnet's letter in Beatsou, iii. 31.
272 MINOB OPERATIONS, 17li-1762. [1742.
Worcester, 60, took a Spanish 24-gun ship bearing dispatches to the
viceroy of Mexico, and the Squirrel, 20, .Captain Peter Warren,
captured a large privateer belonging to Santiago de Cuba. It is
said that the importance of this prize lay in information gained from
her papers that the French squadron, under M. d'Antin at Port
Louis, was intended to join with the Spaniards at Havana.^ Be that
as it may, M. d'Antin's squadron was rendered ineffective by putrid
fever,^ and the breach with France was postponed. Captures in the
West Indies, as in home waters, were frequent ; but so great was
the number of the enemy's privateers, and so large the number of
British merchantmen, that the balance was not in favour of Great
Britain ; and the London merchants, dissatisfied with the conduct
of the war, fell to petitioning Parliament for a redress of grievances.^
Early in the next year the Tiger, 50, Captain Edward
Herbert (1), was lost on a key near Tortuga. The crew got
safely ashore with a quantity of stores and provisions, and raised
on the island a fortification, in which they mounted twenty of the
ship's guns. It was well that they did so, for the Spaniards, hearing
of the misadventure, sent the Fuerte, 60, to capture them. She was,
however, lost in the attempt, and the Tiger s men, after two months
on the island, managed in their boats to take a sloop, in which they
reached Jamaica. Though several prizes of value were made during
the 5'ear, 1742, there was only one that calls for note. This was
the guarda costa already mentioned, commanded by Fandino, the
man who is alleged to have ill-treated Jenkins, and whose capture
has been described as a fitting conclusion to the Jenkins episode.*
The Spaniards at that time sent out a new governor to Cartagena,
and with him a reinforcement of over a thousand men. The troops
were in five ships of the Caracas company, of which two mounted
40, two 30, and the fifth 12 guns. The squadron was dispersed by a
hurricane, and two of the ships were lost, while the others, one of
the 40's and both the 30's, fell in on April 12th, 1742, with the
Eltham, 40, Captain Edward Smith, and the Lively, 20, Com-
mander Henry Stewart. After some hours' hard fighting, night
ended the engagement, and the Spaniards bore up for Puerto Eico.
As they had lost in killed and wounded some six hundred men,
' Beatson, i. 115.
^ Poissonnier Desperrieres, 'Maladies des gens de Mer,' p. 2U5,
8 Beatson, i. 121-25. See also Gent. Mar/. 1741, pp. 689-698.
■• See above, pp. 51 and 260.
1743.] MATHEWS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 273
including the new governor among the former, it^ may be said that
the reinforcement had been practically annihilated.
On September 21st, 1742, the Navy sustained a heavy loss in the
destruction of the Tilbury, 60, Captain Peter Lawrence, by fire, off
Hispaniola. The cause of the accident was a drunken scuffle ; and
the whole of the story, down to the loss of one hundred men, corre-
sponds almost exactly with that of the destruction of the Paragon
during Penn's return from the West Indies in June, 1655.^
The destruction of five Spanish galleys at St. Tropez in June,
1742, was a spirited piece of service. Captain Eichard Norris, of
the Kingston, 60, had been detached, with the Oxford, 50, and Duke,
fireship, in company, to blockade them; but as St. Tropez, being a
French port, was neutral, there would have been no attack had not the
galleys been so ill-advised as to fire upon the British. On June 13th,
therefore, Norris gave orders to Commander Smith Callis, of the
Duke, to go in and do his utmost to destroy the galleys at the mole.
Calhs went in on the 14th, and fired his ship with such good effect,
that the whole of the five were destroyed. So rapidly did he carry
out his orders that nothing was saved from the Duke, not even the
ship's or officers' papers.^ For his success, Callis was posted to the
Assistance.
Early in 1743, Vice-Admiral Thomas Mathews, hearing that the
Spanish ship Sa7i Isidoro, 70, was lying in the Bay of Ajaccio, sent
in the Ipstvich, 70, Captain William Martin (1), Bevenge, 70, Captain
George Berkeley, and the Anne Galley, fireship, to bring her out.
Her captain refused to yield to the odds arrayed against him, and
opened fire, but finding it impossible to hold the ship, he ordered her
to be burnt. She blew up before all her people had been taken out
of her, and a considerable number of men perished.
Apart from this piece of work, there was little done in the
Mediterranean, though the cruisers continued to send in prizes, and
to annoy the enemy's coast. In June, however, the enemy contrived
so far to avoid the blockading squadron as to carry fifteen shiploads
of warlike stores from Majorca to Genoa for the use of the army in
Italy. Mathews at once appeared off that port with six sail of the
line, and overawed the Genoese into sending the supplies back to
Corsica, there to lie till the conclusion of the war.
' Beatson, i. 149.
2 See above, Vol. II. p. 208.
^ Captains' Letters, C 14. Callis to Thomas Corbett, August lltli, 1742.
VOL. III. T
274 21JX0B OPEEATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
The following year, 1744, was very far from being a fortunate
one for the British navy. The fiasco off Toulon was supplemented
by the capture of the Seaford, 20, Solebay, 20, and Grampus, 14, by
de Eochambeau, by the throwing away of the Northimiberland, 70,
and by the loss, through stress of weather, of the Victory, 100,^
Orford, 70, Colchester, 50, St. Albans, 50, Greenwich, 50, and other
ships of less value. Against this tale of disaster we could oppose
merely the capture of the Medee, 26, on April 27th, by the Dread-
nought, 50, Captain the Hon. Edward Boscawen,^ and Gh-ampus, 14,
which formed part of the fleet of Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (1) ,
off the coast of Portugal.
Of these misfortunes that requiring most particular notice here is
the loss of the Nor thumb erlaiid. This ship, commanded by Captain
Thomas Watson (1), w^as detached in chase of a strange sail on
May 8th by the Vice-Admiral, who was then homeward bound from
the Tagus. In view of the sequel, it is worth remembering that
Watson was a good and brave ofticer, favourably known in the
service for his work as Vernon's flag-captain at Puerto Bello and
Cartagena. But his skull had been fractured, and his mind im-
paired, so that " a small matter of liquor rendered him quite out of
order, which was his unhappy fate that day." ^ The weather grew
thick, the chase was lost sight of, and the signal was made for the
NorthumherlancV s recall ; but Watson held on. Soon three sail
were made out to leeward, and as he bore down on them under a
press of sail, it was seen that they were two two-decked ships and a
frigate. They were, in point of fact, the
Ships. (Juus. I Commanders.
Content . . . j 64 [ Captain de Couflans.
Mars . . . .64 ,, du Perrier.
Venus .... 26 ,. d'Acho.
The French ships lay to under topsails, while the Northumberland
bore down on them. Properly handled, the British ship would have
' See the previous chapter.
2 Boscawen's nickname in the service dates from this time. The seamen transferred
the name of the ship to the man ; and lie went through life as " Old Dreadnought."
^ 'A true and authentic Narrative of the action Letween the Nortliamherland and
three French men of war ' .... By an Eye Witness. 8vo, 1745.
1744.] CAPTURE OF TEE NORTHUMBERLAND. 275
had them at a disadvantage, for they were widely separated, and the
Content, a mile to windward of her consorts, made no attempt to
rejoin them. Watson, therefore, had the option of disabling her
before the others could interfere, or of following the counsel of his
master, Dixon, who advised him to stand close-hauled to the north-
ward^ under a press of sail, and so to lead the enemy across the
course of the British fleet. This advice was disregarded, and no
reasonable nor customary measures were taken to put the ship into a
fit state for action.
"We bore down so precipitately that our small sails were nut stowed, nor top-
gallant sails furled, before the enemy began to fire on us, and at the same time we had
the cabins to clear away ; the hammocks were not stowed as they should be ; in short
we had nothins; in order."
^o
Instead of engaging the weathermost ship, the Content, Watson ran
down to leeward without answering her fire, and so had to deal at
once with his three enemies. Even then, there was no real reason
why the ship should be taken, for the French gunnery was so
extremely bad that she was little hurt, and had but few men killed.
But Watson fell early in the action, none of the lieutenants were on
deck to take command, and the Master ordered the colours to be
struck, though there was fight enough left both in the ship and in
her crew. The Northumberland was taken into Brest, and till the
1st of June, 1794, for fifty years, the trophy name found a place on
French navy lists. When the officers returned to England from
their captivity, a court-martial was held. The first lieutenant,
Thomas Craven, was honourably acquitted, but Dixon, the master,
was condemned for surrendering the ship. The court took into
consideration the good advice which he had given his captain before
the action, and sentenced him only to be imprisoned for life in the
Marshalsea. The court found also "that Captain Watson had
behaved very rashly and inconsiderately, to which was owing chiefly
the loss of her " ; but death had settled his account.'-^
The hurricane that devastated Jamaica on October 20th was one
of the most violent upon record. Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) was
at sea with a great part of the fleet, and so escaped its fury ; but
eight ships of the Koyal Navy, besides a great number of merchant-
men, were either wrecked or driven ashore. The Greenwich, 50,
' The wind was westerly.
■^ Minutes of Court Martial held at Portsmouth on February 1st, 1744-5. R. 0.
vol 27.
T 2
276 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
Captain Edward Allen, was sunk, with the loss of her captain, a
lieutenant, and seventy men ; the Lark, hulk,^ sank, and one hundred
and ten men with her; and the St. Albans, 50, Captain William
Knight, Bonetta, sloop, Commander William Lea, and Thunder,
bomb, were also total losses. The Prince of Orange, 60, Montagu,
60, and Experiment, 20, went ashore, but were got off again. ^ The
history of the year at sea was about as disheartening as possible ; and
1745 saw no marked improvement.
On January 6th, 1745, four sail of the line, the Hampton Court, 70,
Captain Savage Mostyn ; Captain, 70, Captain Thomas Griffin (1) ;
Sunderland, 60, Captain John Brett ; and Dreadnought, 60, Captain
Thorpe Fowke, cruising off Ushant, sighted and gave chase to three
French ships to the north-east. These were the Neptune, 74, and
Fleuron, 64, homeward bound from Martinique, with a vast quantity
of specie on board, worth four millions sterling, it is said, and in
company with the privateer Mars, George Walker, master, which
they had captured two days before. As the captain of the Fleuron
told Walker, w^ho was a prisoner on board his ship, the French
commodore had made a great mistake in interrupting his journey to
Brest for so trifling an object as the Mars. This was hardly compli-
mentary to Walker, who at that time, with Fortunatus Wright, did
as much to uphold British prestige at sea as any captains of the
Koyal Navy ; but it was true, and, had the two French ships fallen,
they would richly have deserved their fate. As it was, they were not
captured ; and the story, as disclosed in the subsequent court-martial,^
and in an able comment thereon addressed to the House of Commons,*
is very unpleasant reading.
It is desirable here to enter into the matter in some detail,
for it shows the alarming state to which British naval prestige
had fallen, and it explains the necessity for the new Naval Discipline
Act of 1749.
The French ships, after their long passage, were both sickly and
foul, and the English, with a fresh southerly breeze, gradually crept
up. The Captain, the leading ship, kept away after the Mars, and
took possession of her at dusk, leaving the others to continue the
^ Formerly a 44-gun nhip.
2 Beatson, i. 193.
' Minutes of the Court Martial, etc. 1745, 8vo.
* 'An Enquiry into the Conduct of Captain Mostyn, being remarks on the ]\Iinutes
of the Court Martial, etc. Humbly addressed to the Hon. House of Commons by a
Sea Officer.' 1745, 8vo.
1745.] BEHAVIOUR OF CAPTAIN MOSTYN. 217
chase. The Sunderland carried away her main topmast, and dropped
astern ; but at sunset the Hampton Court was close up with the
enemy. The Dreadnouglit, saiHng very badly, could not quite get
up, and Mostyn shortened sail to wait for her. All through the
night and during the next day, the position continued the same,
the Dreadnought sailing no faster than the chase and the Hampton
Court not engaging without her. At last, after ranging abreast of
the Neptune, but out of gunshot to windward, Mostyn decided that
nothing could be done, and left the French to carry their valuable
cargo into Brest. ^ Of course the two ships ought to have been
taken. Griffin, who was senior ofdcer, had no business to bear
away after the Mars ; yet, apart from that, it was Mostyn's duty
to have engaged as soon as he came up, and to have detained the
enemy till the Dreadnought could get into action. Griffin, at the
court-martial, stated that when he bore away he believed the Mars
alone to be a ship of war and the other two to be merchantmen
under her convoy. He was accordingly acquitted ; but, as the
other three ships had no doubt whatever as to the nature of the
Neptune and Fleuroii, and as the Captain was nearest to them, the
opinion of the service was unfavourable to the commanding officer
of the ship last named. As for Mostyn, the evidence went that, in
the fresh breeze that was blowing, the Hampton Court's lower deck
ports could not be opened, while both the enemy's ships could fight
all their guns, to leeward as well as to windward. It was further
stated that the Hampto?i Court lay along so much that shot from
her upper deck guns, at extreme elevation, would have struck the
water fifty yards from their muzzles. This, however, was mere
conjecture, and does not explain why not a shot was tried. It
might have been possible to knock away a spar, and to give the
Dreadnought a chance of coming into action. As to the French-
man's lower deck guns being run out to leeward, the writer of the
appeal to the House of Commons ^ points out that the witness who
swore to this fact proved too much. Those on board the Hampton
Court, in her position to windward, were not in a condition to see
whether the enemy's lee ports were open or not. There was no
cross-examination; and the Court decided that Mostyn " had done
his duty as an experienced good ofiicer, and as a man of courage
^ The Fleuron was, however, hlowii up in Brest liarbour before lier treasure could
be taken out of her.
- Believed to be Vernon.
278 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
and conduct." It is difficult to believe that this decision was come
to without bias. At anj' rate, it by no means satisfied public
opinion ; and, a year later, the Hampton Court, with Mostyn still in
command, went out of Portsmouth Harbour to the cry of " All's
well ! there's no Frenchman in the way." ^
On February 20th following, the Chester, 50, Captain Francis
Geary, and Sunderland, 60, Captain John Brett, fell in in
the Soundings with the Elephant, 20, then on her way home
from the Mississippi, and having twenty-four thousand pieces
of eight on board. They chased, shot aw^ay her main topmast,
and captured her. This was but a mere flicker of success, closely
to be followed by another loss and by another unsatisfactory
court-martial.
On March 28th, the Anglesey y 44, Captain Jacob Elton, one of
the ships cruising to command the entrance of the Channel, put
out of Kingsale, whither she had been to land some sick, amongst
whom was her first lieutenant. On the following day, a fresh
westerly breeze blowing, a large sail was sighted to windward.
Elton, making sure that she was his consort the Augusta, piped to
dinner, and paid no further heed. Meanwhile, the stranger came
down fast ; but it was not till she was close to the Anglesey that,
yawing slightly, she showed French ornamentation on her quarter.
Then all was hurry and confusion. Elton, to gain time, ordered the
foresail to be set ; but the only effect of this manoeuvre was to bury
the lee lower deck ports in the sea and almost to swamp the ship.
The enemy, which proved to be the Apollon, 50, belonging to the
French navy, but fitted out by private adventurers, ran close under
the stern of the Anglesey and rounded-to on her lee quarter, pouring
in a heavy fire. Elton and the Master fell at the first discharge,
and the command devolved on the second lieutenant. Baker Phillips.
The decks were not cleared ; the ship was half-full of water ; and
sixty men were dead or wounded. Phillips could not order the
helm to be put up without falling aboard a ship as full of men as
his was of water ; so, taking hasty counsel with Taafe, the third
lieutenant, he decided that no effective resistance could be offered,
and ordered the colours to be struck. It is difficult to see what else
Phillips could have done. William Hutchinson, " the Mariner," laid
down that a ship attacked as the Anglesey was ought to be box-
hauled, and to pass under the enemy's stern raking him, as the
' Charnock, iv. 431.
1745.] CASE OF LIEUT. BAKER PHILLIPS. 279
Serapis subsequently did in the course of her action with the
Bonhomme Bichard. But in 1745 Philhps could not have had
the advantage of a study of Hutchinson's ' Treatise on Practical
Seamanship ' ; and, being a young man and inexperienced, he acted
as most other men in his position would have done. The ship
was lost by being engaged to leeward. The subsequent court-
martial ^ —
" was unanimously of opinion that Captain Elton, deceased, did not give timely
directions for getting his ship clear or in a proper posture of defence, nor did he
afterwards behave like an officer or a seaman, which was the cause of the ship being
left to Lieutenant Phillips in such distress and confusion. And that Lieutenant Baker
Phillips, late second lieutenant of the said ship, by not endeavouring to the utmost
of his power after Captain Elton's death to put the ship in order of fighting, not
encouraging the inferior officers and common men to fight courageously, and by
yielding to the enemy, falls under part of the tenth article. They do sentence him to
death, to be shot by a platoon of musqueteers on the forecastle, . . . but . . . having
regard to the distress and confusion the ship was in when he came to the command,
and being a young man and unexperienced, they beg leave to recommend him for
mercy."
The recommendation was ignored, and the sentence was duly
carried into effect. It is difficult to say what was the reason of this,
and it has been suggested in explanation that there was a suspicion
that Phillips was in the pay of the Young Pretender. No hint of
this appears in the minutes of the court-martial ; but it must be
remembered that the terror of an invasion was at that time very
great, and that men may be swayed by motives which they do not
acknowledge even to themselves. Whether as a result of this court-
martial or not, it remains to be recorded that not a ship wavered in
her allegiance, though there were undoubted Jacobites in the fleet. ^
The one action of the year that had a direct bearing on the result,
the engagement between the Lion and the French ship Elisabeth,
has already been described.^
A number of valuable prizes continued to be made, chiefly in the
West Indies. The greatest success fell to the privateers ; but in
December, 1744, the Bose, 20, Captain Thomas Frankland, had fallen
in with and taken the treasure-ship Concepcion, bound from Cartagena
to Havana. The prize mounted twenty guns and had a large crew ;
but her value lay in the enormously rich cargo which, after a stubborn
fight, became the property of the British. As she was not condemned
1 25th and 26th June, 1745. P. E. 0., vol 28.
^ Vide e.g., P. E. 0. Courts-martial, vol. 29. Lieutenant William Johnston, for
treason, July loth, 1745.
3 Supra, Chap. XXVIL, p. 110.
280 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1745.
by legal process, the exact value of her lading is unknown. It will
be enough, however, to say that it consisted chiefly of gold, silver,
and jewels, and that such additional finds as 20,000 and 30,000
pistoles, made after the ship had been cleared, were looked on by
comparison as trifles. The privateers which harmed the enemy
most at that time were the Prince Frederick, Duke, and Prince
George, fitted out by a London firm in the summer of 1745, and
cruising under one James Talbot, master of the first-named,
as commodore.^ The profit resulting from this single cruise,
dB700,000, was so enormous as to tempt the merchants to repeat
their scheme ; and the ships were sent to sea again in the following
year under George AValker. Subsequently to his capture by the
Fleuron, Walker had commanded the privateer Boscaiuen, which,
as the French royal frigate Meclee, had been the first prize of the
war, and had been renamed in honour of her captor.
The French West India trade of 1745 went out under the convoy
of the Magnanime, 74, and other ships of war. Vice-Admiral Isaac
Townsend had, however, received news concerning the convoy, and,
on October 31st, intercepted it off Martinique. Townsend, in the
Lenox, together with the Dreadnought and Ipsioich, engaged the
men-of-war, while the smaller ships were sent off in chase of
the flying merchantmen. Several of these latter were picked up
to leeward or were driven ashore, but the men-of-war escaped by
taking refuge under the batteries.^
In the Mediterranean, meanwhile, the only action of import-
ance was that between the Jersey, 60, Captain Charles Hardy (2),
detached from Captain Henry Osborn's squadron, and the St.
Esprit, 74. The action was very severe, lasting for two hours and
a half, at the end of which time both ships were crippled. The
St. Esprit returned to Cadiz with the loss of her foremast and
bowsprit, and with twenty men killed.
It has been said that the Apollon was a royal ship in private
employ. This hiring out of the State's ships was by no means an
uncommon practice with the French ; and, on the break up of their
main fleet subsequent to the battle off Toulon, it was carried out
on a considerable scale. M. de Lage, a man whose chief merit lay
in his self-assertiveness, succeeded in obtaining from the Admiral
of France an acting commission as commodore, with authority to fit
' Beatsoii, i. 2i)4 ; J. K. Laugh ton : ' Studies in Xaval History,' i^. 2n7.
^ Beatson, i. 28(3.
1745.] CRUISE OF M. DE LAGE. 281
out a squadron at his own expense. The crews were to be raised
from the government hsts of seamen and marines, but were to be
paid by de Lage. But the men had a pecuhar dishke to the
adventurer, and would not volunteer ; and it was with the greatest
difficulty that, after a hot press, two ships of the line and two
frigates got to sea in April, 1745. These were the Ferine, 74,
Orijiamme, '54, Diane, 30, and Volage, 30. Three times did
de Lage put to sea, and three times was he driven in by bad
weather. On each return to port numbers of men deserted, and
finally he had to pay off the Fermc. With the three ships that were
left, he put to sea for the last attempt at the end of March, 1746.
On the 29th he was sighted by Commodore the Hon. George
Townshend, who had with him at that time the Bedford, 70, and
Essex, 70, and two bombs, but who, contenting himself with a
distant view, chose to believe that the enemy was of superior force,
and declined to engage.^ De Lage stood over to the coast of Spain
where, on April 4th, off Cape St. Martin, the Volage, which had
chased out of sight of the squadron, was taken, after an obstinate
resistance, by Caiptain John Fawler, of the Stirling Castle, 70. On
the following morning her consorts hove in sight ; and Fawler,
believing himself to be in no fit condition to engage them, cut adrift
the prize, which he had taken in tow. She was therefore retaken,
and with her, a lieutenant and twenty-five men. Fawler w^as tried
by court-martial at Gibraltar on October 6th and 7th following ; and
the court, though it acquitted him for not engaging de Lage,
condemned him for not destroying the prize, which, as he had had
possession of her all night and had learnt from the prisoners that
her consorts were in the neighbourhood, he should and could
have done.
When de La Jonquiere, driven out of America by putrid fever and
small-pox, was on his way back to Europe, he had a narrow escape
from falling in with Anson, then in command in the Channel.
Indeed, so near were the fleets to one another that the French ship,
Merciire, 56, doing duty as a hospital, was taken, when but a little
separated from the main body. Two other ships failed to reach
France ; the Ferine, 54, which had been sent to Quebec with
military stores, and which had fallen in with the British blockading
squadron, and the Mars, 64, which had been driven by stress of
weather to Martinique. Thence, after refitting, she had sailed for
1 Court-martial on Townshend, February 9th, 1746-47. P. K. O., vol. 30.
282 MINOR OPEEATIONS, 1714-1762. [1746.
home ; but she \Yas seventy-five men short of her complement and
verj' sickly, so that, when she fell in, on October 11th, 1746, with
the Nottingham, 60, Captain Phihp de Saumarez, cruising to the
south-west of Cape Clear, she was not in a condition to make effective
resistance. The fight was, nevertheless, maintained for two hours,
ere the Mars, reduced to a wreck, with twelve men killed and
forty wounded, as against three killed and sixteen wounded in the
Nottingham, struck. But for the fineness of the weather it would
have been impossible to send her in. She was added to the Navy.
In 1746, the privateers on both sides continued to have a good
share in the hard knocks, and from time to time did excellent
service. There are two of their exploits which specially claim
mention. On April 10th the Alexander privateer, one hundred and
forty men, Philhps master, was cruising off Khe, when she saw
a frigate, with a store ship in company, standing into St. Martin.
This was the Solehaij, 20 guns and two hundred and thirty men,
which had been taken by de Kochambeau on the Portuguese coast
nearly two years before. Phillips boarded her athwart the bowsprit,
at the very entrance to the road, and carried her, killing fifteen of
her men. Phillips, like Walker, was kept out of the King's service,
which he was desirous of entering, by the stringency of the regula-
tions, and had to be content with an acknowledgment of five hundred
guineas and a gold medal. The second instance occurred on May 1st,
when, as has been briefly noted in the previous chapter, H.M.S.
Greyhound, 20, with the sloops Baltimore and Terror, fell in off the
west coast of Scotland with two heavy French privateers of 32 and
34 guns respectively. The British were severely handled and beaten
off, and Commander the Hon. Eichard Howe (afterwards Earl Howe),
then of the Baltimore, was badly w^ounded.
On February 9th, 1746, the Portland, 50, Captain Charles
Stevens, cruising in the Soundings, fell in with and engaged the
French Auguste, 50, four hundred and seventy men.
" After two-and-a-lialf hours' close action," wrote Stevens, " she struck, having
fifty killed, ninety-four wounded, all her masts so shattered that they went by the
hoard, and so many shot in the hull, that, with the late hard easterly wind, I was
obliged to put away with her before it a hundred leagues to the westward, and am now
towing her for Plymouth." '
The Portland had five men killed and thirteen wounded, and lost
her main yard.^ The Auguste was bought into the service, and,
' J. K. Laughton : 'Studies in Naval History,' p. 255. ^ Charnock, v. 229.
1747.] CRUISE OF CAPTAIN THOMAS FOX. 283
as the Portland's Prize, cruised with success. On November 19th of
the same year, in company with the Winchelsea, 20, the Portland
sighted the Subtile, 26. The Winchelsea, in which Samuel (after-
wards Viscount) Hood was then a heutenant, outsailed her consort,
and, after a very severe action, fought the chase to a standstill, so
that, on the Portland's coming up, the Frenchman struck im-
mediately.-^ The rest of the doings of single ships and light
squadrons in European waters during the year may be dismissed
with a mere reference to the destruction of the Ardent, 64, which was
chased ashore in Quiberon Bay in November by Lestock's squadron
when returning from its fruitless descent on Lorient.
Before Anson's victory of May 3rd, there was little done at sea
in 1747 ; and, after it, the enemy began to show great signs of that
exhaustion which, consequent on their second defeat in October, put
an end to the war. Anson's work was w^ell supplemented when
Captain Thomas Fox, of the Kent, 74, having put to sea with
a small squadron in April, fell in, to the westward of the Bay of
Biscay, on June 20th, with the large fleet of French West Indiamen
which he had long been anxiously awaiting. The merchantmen were
under the convoy of M. Dubois de La Motte, whose force consisted
of three sail of the line and a frigate, a force inferior indeed to the
six ships ^ of Fox's squadron but not so far inferior as to justify the
flight which followed. M. de La Jonquiere, in his encounter with
Anson, had earned the gratitude of his country by deliberately giving
himself to be crushed that he might save his convoy ; de La Motte
shrank from the sacrifice, and took his men-of-war unscathed into
Brest, while, of the AVest Indiamen, about fifty, to the value of
upw^ards of a million, were picked up either by Fox himself or by
Eear-Admiral Sir Peter Warren's squadron to leeward.
On the following day the Etoile, 46, escorting five merchantmen,
was driven ashore at Cape Finisterre by Sir Peter AVarren, and
was burnt. ^ A few days later, an attempt to execute a somewhat
similar exploit ended in disaster. The Maidstone, 60, Captain the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, which had been cruising in the Soundings
and in the Bay of Biscay, chased an enemy's ship inshore at Belle
^ The Subtile was added to the Royal Xavy as the Amazon.
2 Kent, 74, Captain Thomas Fox ; Hampton Court, 70, Captain Savage Mostyn ;
Eagle, 60, Captain George Brydges Rodney ; Lion, 60, Captain Arthur Scott ;
Chester, 50, Captain Philip Durell (1) ; Hector, 44, Captain Thomas Stanhojie ; with
the fiireships Plufo and Dolphin.
3 Troude, i. 318 ; Beatson, i. 372 ; Charnock, iv. 187.
284 MIXOB OPEBATWNS, 1714-1762. [1747.
Isle on June •27th. Venturing too close in, the Maidstone ran
aground and became a total wreck ; and Keppel and his men were
made prisoners of war.
Other captures of note made during the course of the summer
in European waters were those of the Bellone, Loup, and Benommee.
The Bellone, a 36-gun frigate bound from Nantes to the East
Indies, was taken by the Edinburgh, Eagle, and Nottingham, was
bought into the service as the Bellona, and was at once sent out
to cruise, with Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington in command.
The Loup had been the British sloop Wolf, taken by the Erench
two years earlier. It is interesting to notice that she was captured
by the Amazon, 26, which, as has been mentioned, was originally the
Erench Subtile. The Wolf, in Erench hands, had been used as a
privateer, but resumed her duties as a 14-gun sloop in the British
Navy, curiously enough, under the orders of Commander George
Vachell, who had had her before her capture in 1745.^ The
Amazon, whose captain was Samuel Eaulknor(2), son of that
Samuel Eaulknor (1) who had perished with Balchen in the Victory
in 1744, continuing her cruise, fell in, on September 12th, with the
Benommee, 32. A severe but indecisive action followed, and left
both ships badly crippled. They parted company in the night,
but, next day, the Benommee, having the further misfortune to fall
in with the Dover, 50, Captain the Hon. Washington Shirley, was
taken, and, with her, M. de Confians, who was going out in her
to take over the government of San Domingo.
The Erench force under M. de I'Etenduere, which suftered
defeat on October 14th, 1747, at the hands of Hawke, had under
its convoy a large fleet of merchantmen for the West Indies.
Hawke, after the battle, was not in a fit state to pursue the convoy,
but, with admirable promptness, at once victualled the Weazel,
sloop, and despatched her to warn Captain George Pocock, who
had succeeded Captain the Hon. Edward Legge as commodore on
the West India station, of its approach. Thanks to this prompt-
ness, Pocock, though his squadron was scattered when the news
reached him, was able to capture many of the merchantmen. The
Captain took eight, the DreadnougJit six, the Dragon five, the
Ludlow Castle another, and the privateers on the station ten more.
The twenty taken by Pocock were valued at i'100,000."
• He was lust with lier off the Irish C(»ast in January, 174!).
2 yv.nts.m. i. 368 and 408.
1747.] THE ADVENTURES OF THE GLOBIOSO. 285
It still remains to describe the most noteworthy of the minor
actions of the year 1747.^ Mention has already been made of
George AValker, a man who would have done credit to any service,
and who was kept out of the Navy only by the regulations which
made it impossible to offer him therein any command which he
would be likely to accept. His fortune on two or three occasions
brought him into close contact with the Eoyal Navy, but never more
closely than in the present instance. Walker, it has been seen,
took over Talbot's squadron of privateers on the latter's retirement.
He enlarged it, and, like his predecessor, cruised with great success
against the enemy's commerce. On October 6th, 1747, the " Eoyal
Family," so called because all the ships composing it were named
after members of the reigning house, were standing out of Lagos
Bay when a large ship was sighted coming in towards Cape
St. Vincent. They immediately gave chase ; and the stranger bore
away to the westward, being, like the British ships, in some doubt
as to the enemy's force. She was, in fact, the Glorioso, a Spanish
74, which had previously landed at Ferrol about three millions of
treasure from the Spanish Main, and was then bound to Cadiz.
She was a fine pow^erful ship, though, as was general in that
service, she carried no heavier guns than 24-pounders. This was
not her first hostile meeting during the voyage, for on July 14th
she had fallen in at the Azores with the Lm'k, 40, Captain John
Crookshanks, and Warwich, 60, Captain Robert Erskine. The
Warwick had attacked but, left unsupported, had been beaten to
a standstill ; and the Glorioso had made off. For this fiasco,
Crookshanks, who was the senior officer, was cashiered. A few
days later the Spaniard had met with the Oxford, 50, with the
ShoreJiam, 24, and Falcon, 14, in company ; but they had made
room for her as being of superior force.
It was now for Walker to try his hand. He believed that there
was treasure still on board ; but when, at about noon on the 6th,
he overhauled the chase, his frigate, the King George, 32, was alone.
It had fallen flat calm, and the rest of the "Royal Family" had
not been able to get up, so that the King George and the Glorioso
lay looking at one another, each uncertain as to what the other
was. In the evening a breeze arose, and the Glorioso headed in-
^ J. K. Laughton : ' Studies in Naval History,' pp. 239 sqq. P. R. 0. Courts-
martial, vol. 32, December 28tli, 1747, on Smith Callis of the Oxford, and,
]"'ebruar}^ 1st, 1748, on Crookshanks of the Lnrh.
286 . MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1747.
shore, followed by the privateer which, on closing, hailed for
information. The Spaniard answered with a cross-question, and,
on finding that the ship alongside was British, poured in a broad-
side, which was returned at once ; and the ships ran slowly in to the
land, engaged yard-arm to yard-arm. There have been instances
enough of frigates attacking ships of the line ; the capture of the
Guillaume Tell in 1800 was directly due to the embarrassing atten-
tions of the Penelope ; and no small share of Edward Pellew's great
name is due to the manner in which, in the Indefatigable, 44, he
hung on to the Droits de VHomme in a gale of wind on a lee shore,
till he left her a hopeless wreck. But this is the only instance in
which a frigate, in a smooth sea and fine weather, voluntarily
placed herself, yard-arm to yard-arm, with a ship of the line ; and
not the least wonder of it is that the frigate was only a privateer.
Fortunately for the King George, many of the enemy's shot either
went over her or took effect in her spars ; yet, in spite of that,
after some hours her position began to be critical. On one of her
consorts, the Prince Frederick, coming up, however, the Glorioso
took to flight. On the morning of the 8th, the King George was
too disabled to pursue, and the Prince Frederick, with two other
ships of the squadron, was making sail after the chase when a large
vessel was seen coming up from the eastward. She was made out
to be British, and Walker at once sent to explain the situation to
her captain. She was the Russell, 80, Captain Matthew Buckle (1),
homeward bound from the Mediterranean, but with only half a crew
on board ; and, even of these, some were sick. As the Bussell crowded
sail in pursuit the chase was seen to be sharply engaged with some
vessel unknown which presently blew up. It was thought at first
that she was the Prince Frederick, but she was in reality the
Dartmouth, 50, Captain James Hamilton (2), which had been drawn
to the scene of action by the firing of the previous night. Out of
her crew of three hundred only fourteen, including a lieutenant,
were saved. Shortly afterwards the Russell in her turn came up,
and began a hot action which lasted for five hours, at the end of
which time the enemy's main-top mast went overboard and she
struck. So short-handed was the Russell that the number of the
prisoners was a serious embarrassment, and many of them had to be
sent away in the privateers.
Towards the end of 1747 Captain Dubois de La Motte went
out to San Domingo with a convoy of merchantmen. His force
1748.] TEE MAGNANIME TAKEN. 287
consisted of the Magnanime, 64, and a new Etoile, 42. On
November 18th four British men-of-war were seen/ of which one
mounted 60 and another 50 guns. From these M. de La Motte
protected his convoy. There was some desultory firing, and the
merchantmen, with the exception of six, got safely away. No
sooner was the Magnanime back in France, than she was ordered
to the East Indies, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore the
Marquis d' Albert.-^ On January 31st, 1748, she was sighted in the
north-west by the fleet then cruising under Hawke to the westward
of Ushant. The Magnanime had been partially dismasted in a gale
a few days previously, and was then on her way back to Brest
to refit. Directly she was sighted, the Nottingham, 60, Captain
Eobert Harland (2), was detached in chase; but, immediately
afterwards, it became apparent that the enemy was a ship of force,
and the Portland, 50, Captain Charles Stevens, was also ordered
to follow her. The Nottingham was engaged for nearly an hour
before Stevens could come up, and suffered somewhat severely,
losing in all sixteen men killed and eighteen wounded. The loss
of the Portland was only four men wounded, its smallness being due
to the disabled condition of the French ship, which allowed the
Portland to keep on her quarter and rake her at will. After
a stubborn resistance, lasting for six hours, the enemy struck,
having lost, out of a crew of six hundred and eighty-six men,
forty-five killed and one hundred and five wounded. The prize
was a very fine ship, and was added to the British Navy under
her old name. Her capture was the last one of importance in
the war.
The 10th of October, 1748, was marked by the mutiny of the
Chesterfield, 40, which was stationed on the coast of Africa. On
the date named, while the ship lay off Cape Coast Castle, and
the captain, O'Brien Dudley, and others were ashore. Lieutenant
Samuel Couchman organised a rising, and, persuading the lieutenant
of Marines, the carpenter, and thirty men to join him, got possession
of the ship. The boatswain, Mr. Gastrien, was of those on board
the most zealous in his attempts first to dissuade, and afterwards to
^ This is on the authority of Troude, i. 319. Beatson makes no mention of it, and
as Troude gives no English names it is hard to say what tlie ships were.
^ Troude, i. 321. There is some doubt as to the date of the capture of the
Magnanime, but as she had been in the West Indies in December, January 31st, the
latest date given, seems the most probable. Cf. Beatson, i. 409.
288 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1748-51.
ove^po^vel•, the mutineers ; but had Couchman and his party been
men in any way equal to the risky part which they had set them-
selves to play, there can be no doubt that it would have gone very
hard indeed with the boatswain and the loyal party. The mutineers,
however, having first tried to reason a few more into joining them,
and having failed, left the well-disposed members of the crew to
roam about the ship . and concert plans at their leisure. On the
12th, therefore, the boatswain took counsel with the gunner, who
was ill in his cabin, and, thus getting hold of twenty pistols, armed
a few resolute men and recovered the ship. A court-martial was
held on board the Invincible at Portsmouth on June 26th, 1749, to
inquire into alleged neglect of dut}^ on the part of Captain O'Brien
Dudley, and to examine into the reasons for his being ashore with so
many of his officers to the detriment of the service. Captain Dudlej^
proved that there had been no cause to suspect latent mutiny, and
that he and his officers were ashore on duty. He and they were,
accordingly, acquitted of all blame. As for Couchman and John
Morgan, the lieutenant of Marines, they were tried on the 28th and
30th respectively, and both were condemned to be shot. On the
] 0th July six men were tried for the same offence, and of them two
were acquitted and the rest hanged.^
Till the outbreak of the next war the Navy had little to do, and,
as was usually the case in a time of comparative quiet, it turned its
attention to the Mediterranean pirates. A small squadron was sent
out, with Captain the Hon. Augustus Keppel in the Centurion, 50, as
Commodore. Keppel had a special mission to the Dey of Algier, to
treat with him, or, if necessary, to force him to restrain his piratical
cruisers ; and the story told - is that the Dey professed astonishment
that the King of England should have sent a beardless boy to treat
with him. Keppel, who was twenty-six, was, no doubt, nettled, and
is said to have answered: " Had my master supposed that wisdom
was measured by length of beard, he would have sent your Dey-
ship a he-goat." When the angry Dey threatened his visitor with
death, Keppel, pointing to his squadron, is said to have explained
that there were enough of his countrymen there to honour him with
a glorious funeral pyre. Whether there be truth in the story or not,
' P. Pi. C). Coiirts-martial, vol. 33. See also Beatson, iii. 89.
'•^ A suspiciously similar storj' is told of the behaviour of the Be.y of Tripoli to
Shovell m 1675. There is no reference to tlie affair in tlic Hon. and Piev. Thomas
Koiipel's 'Life' of his relative.— AV. L. C.
1755.] THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 289
the fact stands that in June, 1751, the difficulties were smoothed
over, and that Keppel returned to England in the following month
and paid off.
It was not until after some months of unofficial hostilities in
North America, and until after the receipt in England of Boscawen's
dispatch relative to the capture of the Alcide and Li/s, that the
Seven Years' War was fairly set on foot.
Thus far the British had been the gainers in the struggle that
still awaited a formal initiation. They had taken two ships, and they
had lost but one, the Mars, 64, which had grounded while going into
harbour at Halifax on the return thither of Boscawen's squadron at
the end of June ; and which it had been impossible to get off again.
Soon afterwards, on the night of August 13th, 1755, the Blandforcl,
20, Captain Richard Watkins, when on her way to South Carolina,
fell in off' Brest with a French squadron homeward bound from the
"West Indies under M. du Guay. She did what she could to get
away, and, even when surrounded, attempted some resistance ; but
the British 20-gun frigate of that period was " a pigmy with a pop-
gun armament;" and she was easily taken possession of and sent
into Nantes.^ The sequel is curious as testifying to a tardy zeal on
the part of the French to avert the consequences of their aggressions.
With a parade of regard for legality, the Blandford was restored by
the French Government ; but Great Britain was not thus readil}'
appeased, and she quickly retaliated by capturing the Esperance,
commanded by Comte de Bouvet. That ship, nominally a 74, but
having only twenty-four guns mounted, was on her way home from
Louisbourg, when on November 13th, 1755, she fell in with Byng's
fleet, which had sailed from Spithead a month before. The Orford,
64, Captain Charles Stevens, was ordered to chase, and soon began
a close action, in which the Bevenge, 64, Captain Frederick Corn-
wall, presently joined. The Espey-ance, however, made a stout
resistance, and did not strike till the squadron began to draw up.
She was an old ship, and had been so severely handled that, con-
sidering the badness of the weather, it was judged useless to try to
keep her afloat. She had lost ninety killed and wounded out of a total
of three hundred. Her surviving people were, therefore, taken out
of her, and she was set on fire. This was on the 15th, when it was
first possible to send a boat on board her, although she had been
1 P. R. 0. Cuurt-martial on Watkiiis, October 6th, 1755. Vol. 36.
VOL. III. U
290 JIIXOB OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [1756.
making signals of distress ever since her capture on the 13th. Byng
wrote ^ concerning her : —
" Slie was in the raost distressed condition I ever saw a ship, extremely leaky and
not able to carry any sail, having only her lower masts standing and foretopmast, and
not one yard across except the spritsail yard."
On March 11th, 1756, still prior to the declaration of war,
the Warwick, 60, was taken by the French near Martinique. Seeing
that, according to a French account,^ this ship was taken by a frigate,
it is interesting to turn to the story of the affair as given by her
commander, Captain Molyneux Shuldham, at the subsequent court-
martial.'^ The Warwick had been detached on December 21st,
1755, by Commodore Thomas Frankland, to cruise in the neigh-
bourhood of Martinique ; and shortly after reaching her station
she began to be very sickly. As, however, the sickness began to
decrease, and as there was no information of any French ships of
force being in those waters, Shuldham resolved to continue his
cruise.
On March 11th, at daybreak, three sail w^ere sighted, and, they
being obviously of superior force, and the private signal being
unanswered, the Warwick bore away under a press of sail. The
strangers were, in fact, the French 74-gun ship Prudent, and the
two frigates Atalante and Zeplujr, then on their way out from
France under the command of Captain d'Aubigny of the Prudent.
The Wanvick was one of the smallest of her class, was a dull sailer,
had less than three hundred men fit for service, and was so crank
that she could rarely use her lower deck guns. As there was a
heavy sea running, she was unable to use them on the occasion in
question ; and she had to rely almost entirely on the 9-pounders of
her upper deck and quarter-deck. The Atalante, 34, Captain du
Chaliault, was the first to come up with the chase, and, hanging on
her quarter, out of reach of her weather broadside, kept up a galling
fire. The wind shifted in a hard squall ; both ships were taken
aback ; and before the Wanvick, whose rigging was much cut, could
pay off her head, the Prudent drew close up and opened fire. Shuld-
ham ordered the great guns to play upon the commodore only, and
the small-arm men to keep up their fire on the Atalante ; but it was
' Admiral's Dispatches, Channel Fleet, vol. 2. Byng, November 19th, 1755.
2 Troude, i. 338.
3 P. K. 0. Courts-martial, vol. 38, March 27th, 1758.
1756.] HOWE TO THE CHAUSEY ISLANDS. 291
still impossible to use the lower deck guns, the ship being half
swamped ; and after half an hour more, being defenceless and un-
manageable, she struck her flag. Shuldham remained a prisoner of
war for two years, and on his release was adjudged by the court-
martial, held to inquire into the loss, to have done his duty.
An indecisive action was fought on May 17th, 1756, between the
Colchester, 50, and Lyme, 28, Captains Lucius O'Brien and Edward
Vernon (2), on the one hand, and the French ships' Aqailon, 50, and
Fidele,^ 26, on the other. The French ships were standing in for
Eochefort in charge of a convoy, when, quite near the forts, they
were sighted by the British and chased. The convoy was ordered
to make the best of its way, and the men-of-war gave battle to
cover its retreat. The ships paired off, the Colchester engaging the
Aquilon, while the frigates fought it out together; but so equal were
the forces on both sides, that, when they parted by mutual consent,
and with heavy loss, no definite result had been arrived at as the
outcome of seven hours' hard pounding.
A small expedition, planned and carried into effect during the
summer of 1756, deserves mention on account of the relief which
it afforded to British trade in the Channel. The enemy was busy
fortifying the Chausey Islands, which lie off Granville, being influ-
enced thereto by the fact that the islands afforded a refuge to the
8t. Malo privateers, and were also close to the Channel Islands, upon
which the French had designs. It was desirable that the fortifica-
tions should not be proceeded with, and Captain the Hon. Eichard
Howe, of the Dunkirk, 60, was sent with a small squadron, consisting
of a 20-gun frigate and some small craft, to put a stop to the work.
With Howe went three hundred men of the Jersey garrison ; but
there was no fighting, for the French commandant, after some
dispute about terms, was content to respect the force arrayed against
him, and to surrender on the conditions offered. The fortifications
were immediately destroyed. The conquest, small though it was,
would not have been so easily effected, had all the works been
completed, for the situation was strong ; and the approach to it was
difficult, and wholly exposed to the fire of the fort, which was
designed to mount thirty guns.^
^ Troude, i. 339, calls her CyUle, but there was no ship of the name in the French
Navy List. O'Brien, in his report to Ecscawen (Admirars Dispatches, Channel Fleet
vol. 4), called her Lafiddelh.
^ Beatson, i. 520.
u 2
292 MINOR OPEllATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1756.
Consequent upon Byng's action, there was a lull in the Medi-
terranean. The French had no fleet at sea there ; and Hawke's
command was for the most part uneventful. Its most interesting-
episode was one which brought him into contact with Fortunatus
Wright/ the most noteworthy of all the British privateers who ever
plied in the Mediterranean. At the outbreak of the war Wright was
at Leghorn, where he had been building a small vessel in readiness
for emergencies. But Tuscan sympathies were so entirely French
that Wright, when on the point of sailing, found himself strictly
limited as to the force he might embark. However, he got outside
the port, took on board more guns and men from ships which had
sailed under his convoy, and at once beat off a large French privateer
which was cruising in readiness to intercept him. Following this,
he put back to Leghorn to refit, but was at once ordered, or rather
forced, to bring his ship inside the mole, where she was detained on
a charge of having violated the neutrality of the port. A diplomatic
squabble began, and was continued until Captain Sir William
Burnaby appeared on the scene. Wright had contrived to let
Hawke know how matters stood ; and Hawke had immediately
despatched Burnaby, in the Jersey, 60, together with the Iris, 50,
to set matters straight. The mission of Sir William was to convoy
the trade from Leghorn, and to see the St. George, Wright's ship,
safe out of that port. To the representations of the governor and
the Austrian or French sympathies of that officer, Burnaby had
nothing to say ; but he made it abundantly clear that he was
authorized, and in a position, to repel force by force, should any
resistance be offered ; and the Jersey, the Iris, the St. George, and
the merchantmen went out of Leghorn in peace.
Another somewhat invidious piece of service that fell to the lot
of Sir Edward Hawke was the cutting out, from under the guns of
the Spanish port of Algeciras, of a British merchantman which had
been carried thither by a French privateer. The Spaniards were,
like the Tuscans, strongly French in their sympathies ; and, after
refusing to order the French ship and her prize out of their port,
they helped the privateer to pour a murderous fire into the attack-
ing boats. The boats lost one hundred and fifty men killed and
wounded, but the ship went back to Gibraltar with them, and the
memory of the affair stood over until 170-2.
^ Gomel- Williams : ' Liverpool Privateers.' J. K. Lauglitun : ' Studies in Xaval
History.'
1756-57.] LOCKE ABT IN THE TARTAR. 293
The only other captures of men-of-war made chiring 1756, were,
on the one hand those of the Arc en del, 50, and Chariot Royal, 36,
in July and March respectively, the vessels being at the time
engaged in carrying stores to Louisbourg, and on the other, that of
the small brig Adventure, mounting six 3-pounders. After a stout
resistance, she struck to the privateer Infernal of Havre. But
many privateers of force were taken ; and in that kind of service
Captain John Lockhart,^ of the Tartar, made a great name both
for energy and for success. The Tartar was a frigate of 28 guns and
180 men, and Lockhart, who was appointed to her in March, 1756,
continued cruising in her for two years, during which time he took
many large privateers of equal or superior force. Among these were
the Cerf of 22 guns and 211 men, the Grand Gideon of 26 guns and
190 men, and the Mont Ozier, of La Eochelle, of 20 guns and 170 men.
In engaging the last named, Lockhart was severely wounded, but
no sooner had he rejoined his ship, after an absence of two months,
than he took off Dunnose the Due d'Aiguillon of St. Malo, of
26 guns and 254 men. These are but some of the many large prizes
made by the Tartar.
In February, 1757, while Lockhart was ashore wounded, the
ship went out under the command of her first lieutenant, Thomas
Baillie (1), and took the Victoire, privateer, of Le Havre, of 26 guns
and 230 men, which was bought into the Eoyal Navy under the
name of the Tartar s Prize. The Gramont, 18, taken in the
following October, was bought in under her own name, as also was
the Melampe, the finest of all the Tartar s prizes. This ship was
taken, after a long chase and a stubborn action, early in November.
She was of 700 tons, mounted 36 guns, and had a crew of 320 men.'-
Her capture proved to be the last of the achievements of Lockhart
while a frigate captain, for the Admiralty testified its appreciation of
his successful cruising by moving him into a fifty-gun ship, and so
limited his activity.
At the very end of 1756 there occurred an incident, which,
though of no great importance in itself, throws some light on the
interpretation of the Naval Discipline Act, and has in consequence
some bearing on the fate of Byng. It is an instance of what a
court-martial accepted as an " error of judgment," and as such is
recommended to the attention of those who have been led to believe
that it was merely for an " error of judgment " that Byng suffered. On
^ Afterwards Sir John Lockhart Eoss, Bart. ^ Beatson, ii. 77.
294 MINOR OPEBATIONS, 1714-1762. [1
(0(
the morning of December 27th, Captain Thomas Graves (2)^ in
the Sheerness, frigate, discovered a large ship making for Brest.
There was some doubt as to what the stranger was ; for it was
known that French ships of the Hne were in the neighbourhood, and
the vessel in question looked as if she might be one of them. The
weight of opinion on board the Sheerness was to the effect that the
enemy was a sixty-gun ship, and it was well seen that she was just
ending a long voyage and was very foul. The Frenchman tried to
get away before dawn, but, when she discovered the Sheerness' s force,
she shortened sail to wait for her. In point of fact, the enemy was
only an East Indiaman, and the court, satisfied on that point,
decided that Graves, who kept away, ought to have gone down and
discovered her force by engaging her. His holding aloof was not
attributed to negligence, disaffection, or cowardice. It was agreed,
however, that he had laid too great a stress on his orders, to carry
intelhgence to Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Knowles ; that his fault
was an " error of judgment ; " and that his case fell under the thirty-
sixth article. He was, in consequence, publicly reprimanded by the
president of the court.
On March 16th, 1757, being then off Cape Cabron, San Domingo,
the Greemoich, 50, Captain Robert Eoddam, saw to windward eight
large vessels. She made sail from them, and they gave chase ; and
eventually, on the 18th, the three leading ships came up with her
and opened fire. These were the Diademe, 74, Eveille, 64, and a
frigate. The Greemoich was quite hemmed in, and at length, seeing
that her position was hopeless, she struck.^ The prize was fitted out
against us, and fought against Forrest on October 21st of the same
year, but, being sent back to France after the action, was lost near
Brest. Another vessel captured from the Royal Navy during the
year was the Merlin, 10, which struck to the French privateer
Machault, 30, on April 10th. Commander John Cleland (1), of the
Merlin, was endeavouring to rejoin a convoy from which he had
been separated, when the privateer bore down upon him.^ It had
been, and was still blowing hard ; and the Merlin, as was usual with
ships of her class, had her decks full of water, and had quite enough
to do to look after herself. The guns were all secured fore and aft ;
and, save with small arms, it was impossible to make any resistance.
^ Afterwards Admiral Lord Graves.
2 r. E. 0. Courts-martial, vol. 37, July 14tli, 17r.7.
^ 7/)., vol. 37, July 5th, 1757.
. I0(
.] CAPTURE OF THE DUC D'AQUITAINE. 295
The prize did not remain long with the French, being retaken in the
autumn by the Lancaster and Dimkirk.
During the whole of the year 1757, though British squadrons
were constantly cruising on the enemy's coast, there was no meeting
of fleets. The captures of armed ships by our cruisers were
numerous enough, but the vessels taken were, in almost every
instance, privateers. There were exceptions however. The Aquilon
and Alcion were destroyed, and the Emeraude, Hermione, Bien
Acquise and the French East India Company's ship Due cV Aqiiitaine ,
manned and armed as a ship of war, were taken. The Aquilon, 60,
was met, on May 14th, by the Antelope, 50, Captain Alexander
Arthur Hood, which was cruising off Brest. After a short action
the Aquilon was run on the rocks of Audierne Bay, where she
became a total wreck. The Due d'Aquitaine, for a Company's
ship, was most powerful, mounting as she did fifty 18-pounders on
two decks and having a crew of nearly five hundred men. On the
night of May 30th the Eagle, 60, Captain Hugh Palliser, and the
Medwaij, 60, Captain Charles Proby, sighted her in the Bay of
Biscay. She had landed her cargo at Lisbon, and was then on her
way round to Lorient. At daylight the Medway shortened sail to
clear ship, and the Eagle, passing ahead of her, engaged at close
range. The Medway was foul and could not get up at once, the
result being that, when she did reach the scene of action, she was
too late. The enemy had been beaten to a standstill, and had lost
her main and mizen masts together with fifty men killed ; and she
struck her flag as the Medway came up. Charnock^ says that she
had ninety-seven shot holes through both sides, which would seem
to imply that, in the thickness of her planking, she differed con-
siderably from a ship built exclusively for war purposes ; but the
Admiralty thought her stout enough, and ordered her to be bought
into the service. Another French man-of-war destroyed during the
year was the NympJie, 36, which was driven ashore at Majorca by
the Hampton Court.
In the account given of the captures of privateers during 1756 it
will have been noticed that the majority of the prizes were vessels
of considerable force. In fact, it may be said that the beginning
of the Seven Years' War saw a great increase in the size of the
average French privateer. During the remainder of the struggle,
this increase in size was maintained : for, as the French navy grew
1 Biog. Nav,, V, 487.
296 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
more and more exhausted, there was ever more and more work for
private venture, seeing that the growing British commerce proved
an ever more and more tempting bait. France, in short, sought
to use the authorised and officially encouraged privateer, instead
of the national vessel, as the cheapest weapon for a gnerre de course.
This Great Britain never did. Her privateer was always a supple-
mentary, and often a much-suspected, cruiser. Of the privateers
taken during the year 1757, there were many representatives of the
large class. For instance, the Invincible of St. Malo, which fell
to the Unicorn, 26, Captain John KawHng,^ after a stubborn fight,
was a 24-gun frigate, and had been cruising with a consort mounting
eighteen guns. Again, the Comte de Gramont, not to be confounded
with the ship taken in the previous year, was a frigate of thirty-six
guns and three hundred and seventy men. She was taken by the
Lancaster, Captain the Hon. George Edgcumbe, and the Dunkirk,
Captain the Hon. Kichard Howe. If it be needful to multiply
instances of the strength of these privateers, mention may be made
of the Telemaque, 26, taken by the Experiment, 24, Captain John
Strachan; of the Vainqueur, 24, taken by the Ambuscade, 32,
Captain Bichard Gwynn ; and of another 26-gun ship, taken by the
Fortune, sloop, Commander William Hotham (1).
The most interesting of the French privateers at sea at that date
was Fran9ois Thurot.'^ Thurot was appointed to the command
of a regularly constituted squadron, and sailed from St, Malo on
July 16th, 1757, with two 36-gun frigates, the Mareclial de Belleisle
and Chauvelin, both with a main-deck armament of 12-prs., and
with two sloops. On July 25th he fell in, off Portland, with the
Southampton, 32, Captain James Gilchrist, then on her way to
Plymouth with stores and money, and, after a brisk action, was
beaten off.
"As the action is one which Thurot's French biographer considers especially
glorious, it is well to ]wint out that the French frigates were each of them more than
a nominal match for the Southamj^ton. The point is that Thurot, with two frigates
againf-t one, each larger, heavier, and with a more numerous crew, did not capture the
one ; and, with the best will in the world, it is difficult to see the great glorj' which,
from this non-capture, redounds to the French Navy. It looks indeed as if M. Thurot
had conceived his special work to be plundering comparatively helpless merchant-
ships, rather than fighting sturdily defended men-of-war ; and that, when he found the
Southampton no easy capture, he stomached his loss — amounting, on board the
Belltish alone, to fourteen killed, twenty-six wounded — and hauled to the wind. U'hat
' Cajitain Rawling was mortally wounded, and died on ]May 18th, 17r)7.
2 See pp. 196, 22;3, 224, 22! 1-231 antea.
1757.] CAPTURE OF TEE EMERAUDE. 297
this is the correct view to take of Thurot's conduct seems confinned by the facts of
another action which he fought off Flushiug on 1st August, with the Seahorse, a
24-gun frigate, carrying 9-pounders. After an engagement lasting three hours and a
lialf, the Seahorse was almost dismantled and had eight men killed, and seventeen badly
wounded. She was of much smaller force than either the Belleisle or the Chauvelin,
and ought to have been captured. That she was not, was due not so much to her
material strength as to the moral weakness of her opponents.'"
The Southampton was afterwards attached to the grand fleet
under Hawke's orders, and was sent to look into Brest. On
September 21st, Gilchrist saw a ship in chase of him, and promptly-
made sail towards her. The wind fell light, and it was not till the
afternoon that the ships drew close together. The action which
then took place was very bloody. The enemy lost sixty men killed
and wounded, chiefly in an unavailing attempt to board, and the
loss in the Southampton was twenty killed and thirty wounded.
The Frenchman, having lost both her first and second captains,
hauled down her colours, and was found to be the royal frigate
Emeraude, 28. She was bought into the British Navy under
the name of the Emerald. On November 23rd a night action was
fought by the Hussar, 28, Captain John Elliot, and Dolpliin, 24,
Captain Benjamin Marlow, with a French two-decked ship. Who
the stranger was did not appear at the time, but the frigates so
handled her that at the end of two hours she sank. None of her
crew could be picked up. It was learned afterwards that she was
the Alcion, 50.
It has already been stated that Hawke and Boscawen cruised
during the year to intercept M. Dubois de La Motte's squadron
on its way home from Louisbourg,'"^ and that they failed to meet
with it. Two only of the French ships, the frigates Bien Acquise, 36,
and Hermione, 28, fell in with the British cruisers ; and they were
taken possession of without difliculty.
If 1758 was a year of great successes for the British Navy, it
was nevertheless not without its disasters. The earliest of these, the
loss of the Invincible, needs no further notice than it has already
received,^ but the burning of the Prince George, 90, in the Bay
of Biscay on April 13th, merits some detail of description.* A letter
from the ship's chaplain gives a good account of the mishap, though
^ J. K. Laughton : ' Studies in Naval History,' pp. 333-35.
- See 13. 172 antea.
^ See p. 182 antea.
•* P. E. 0. Minutes of Courts-martial, vol. 38, May 10th, 1758.
298 MINOR OPEBATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
it does not suggest its cause. At half-past one in the afternoon
word was passed that the fore part of the ship was on fire. The
people assembled on the quarter deck ; it was ascertained that the fire
had begun in the boatswain's storeroom, buckets were passed, and
all possible measures were taken to get the flames under, but without
effect. A considerable sea was running, and it was hoped that the
opening of the lower deck ports would be of avail ; but even this
was useless. Presently, although the magazine had been flooded,
it appeared that there was no possible chance of saving the ship.
The barge was, therefore, ordered to be got out, to put the Eear-
Admiral, Thomas Broderick, in a place of safety. But he, seeing
forty men in her, preferred to trust himself to the waves, and, after
swimming about for an hour, was saved by a boat from one of the
convoy. The captain, Joseph Peyton (1), was also picked up, as
were most of the oflicers ; but, either by the over-setting of boats,
or in the flames, no fewer than four hundred and eighty-five men
perished as against two hundred and sixty who were saved. The
merchantmen, it was complained, held aloof to windward ; and their
boats were busier in salving gear than in saving lives.
There were many prizes made during the year 1758, and, while as
before a large proportion were heavily armed privateers, many were
ships of war. On the North American station, the Boreas, Captain
the Hon. Eobert Boyle, took the Diane, 36 ; and in European waters
the Loire, 36, was taken by the St. Albans and Favourite, and the
Base, 36, was driven ashore at Malta by the .Monmouth and Lyme,
and was burnt where she lay. One of the most interesting of the
actions was a brush between the Solehay, 28, Captain Robert Craig,
and Dolpliin, 24, Captain Benjamin Marlow, and Thurot's ship,
the Marechal de Belleisle, the armament of which he had
increased to 44 guns by cutting a few extra ports on the lower
deck. The vessel was thus no longer a frigate proper ; on the other
hand she was not a two-decked ship at all comparable to the
English 44's. Perhaps the only other instance of a ship being
similarly armed is that of Paul Jones's Bonliomme Bicliard. In the
Belleisle's case, however, the change seems to have been beneficial,
and Thurot is credited with having made a number of prizes before
he was brought to action by the Dolphin and Solehay on May 26tli.
The Dolphin was first in action ; but, having the slings of her
main-yard shot away, she dropped astern ; and the Solehay came
up and in her turn occupied the Frenchman's attention while the
1758.] CAPTURE OF THE BAISONNABLE. 299
DoIphi)i was getting her main-yard up. In due time the Dolpliin
again got close ; but, about three and a half hours from the
beginning of the action, the Belle isle wore and made sail away.
Both the British frigates were much damaged aloft, and, probably,
even if they had not been they would have stood no chance against
Thurot in sailing. The storj^ of Thurot's final cruise has been
already told.-^
On May 29th the Baisonnahle, 64, then on her way to Louis-
bourg, was sighted by Captain Edward Pratten, who, in the
Intrepid, was cruising off the French coast with a small squadron.
He detached the Dorsetshire, 70, Captain Peter Denis, and the
Achilles, 60, Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, in chase. The
Dorsetshire had beaten the enemy to a standstill before the Achilles
came up, and had killed sixty-one Frenchmen and wounded one
hundred more, while she herself had lost but fifteen killed and
twenty wounded. The arrival of the Achilles settled the matter;
and the prize, being a fine ship, was bought into the Boyal Navy.
In July the Shrewsbury, 74, Captain Hugh Palliser, was detached
by Anson, together with the Unicorn, 20, and Lizard, 28, to cruise
as near Brest as possible and watch the French fleet in the road.
On September 12th the British vessels sighted a fleet of coasters,
which, under convoy of the Thetis and Calypso frigates, were
working so close in shore that it was a matter of great difficulty
to cut them off. Captain Brodrick Hartwell, in the Lizard, managed,
nevertheless, to get between the frigates and part of the convoy,
the result being that the Calyjjso was driven ashore and destroj^ed
at the entrance to Audierne Bay, and that of the coasters many
were either taken or destroyed. On October 2nd the Lizard did a
further piece of service by capturing the Due d'Hanovre, privateer,
14 ; and, a little later, the Torhay, Captain the Hon. Augustus
Keppel, took the Rostan, a privateer of twenty-six guns and three
hundred and twenty men. This prize was bought into the Royal
Navy under the name of the Crescent. Beatson says ^ that the
French concealed ninety men in her hold in the hopes of recapturing
her from her prize crew, but that the people below betrayed them-
selves too soon and were overpowered.
In extra-European waters, the Winchelsea, 20, Captain John
Hale, while on her way home from Carolina, w^as taken on
October 11th by the Bizarre, 60. The Winchelsea attacked in
1 See pp. 229-231 anfea. ^ Beatsou, ii. 191.
300 MINOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758-59.
order to cover her convoy, and, till the Bizarre ran ont her lower
deck gnns, did not realise the immense superiority of the enemy's
force. AVhen she did so, she hauled her wind and tried to
<>-et away ; but, as she was under a jury mainmast, she stood no
chance of accomplishing her purpose, and, after a little firing,
hauled down her colours.
On the Jamaica station, in 1758, there was little for British
cruisers to do save to cut up the enemy's commerce, and to capture
his small privateers. The only action of any note was between the
Dreadnought, 60, Captain Maurice Suckhng, and the Assistance, 50,
Captain Eobert Wellard, on the one hand, and the Palmier, 74,
which had previously taken the Storl', 10, on the other. On the
morning of September 2nd, the British ships came up with the
Frenchman off Port au Prince ; but, unfortunately, a calm prevented
the Assistance from seconding her consort ; and the Palmier, having
disabled the Dreadnought, made sail and escaped. On the Leeward
Islands' station much the same state of affairs prevailed ; but, on
November 3rd, Captain Kichard Tyrrell, in the Buckingham, 70,^
cruising off St. Eustatia to intercept a French convoy from
Martinique, was sharply engaged with the Florissant, 74, which,
with two frigates,- had charge of the merchantmen. The frigates
took some part in the action, but were soon beaten off; and the
ships of the line fought on from about three o'clock till dark. It
was claimed that the Florissant struck ; and it is possible that she
did so ; but the BucTxingham was much disabled,^ and the French-
man, taking advantage of the fact, made sail away from her.
The interest of 1759 was almost entirely confined to the actions
of the main fleets ; and, although it was the decisive year of the war,
there were few actions by detached cruisers. The first and most
stubborn of these was fought between the Vestal, 32, Captain
Samuel Hood (1), and the Bellone of equal force. The Vestal had
been cruising for a year, chiefly in the Soundings, but, on
February 12th, had sailed with Eear-Admiral Holmes for North
America. On the 21st, being then in advance of the squadron,
she sighted a sail ahead. It was soon seen that the stranger was
un enemy ; and, signalling this fact to Holmes, Hood made sail
' The Weazel, 14, being in conipauy.
- Aigrette, 38, and Atalante, 28.
^ She lost seven killed and forty-six wounded, among the latter being Captain
Tvrrell,
1759.] CAPTURE OF TEE BANAK 301
in chase. The Rear-Admiral detached the Trent, 28, reputed to
be a fine sailer, to support the Vestal ; but it may here be said that
the Trent had no share at all in the engagement, she being still four
miles astern when the enemy struck. The action lasted from two
in the afternoon until six, when the Bellone had lost forty men
in killed alone, and was totally dismasted. The Vestal ^ had only
her lower masts standing. She returned to Spithead with her prize,
which was bought into the Navy and renamed Repulse.
On March 19th, the Isis, 50, Captain Edward Wheeler, and
-Mollis, 32, Captain John ElHot, cruising off Isle Dieu, fought an
engagement with four French frigates which were employed on
convoy service. Only two of the enemy were closely engaged,
and of these one, the Blonde, 32, escaped ; but the other, the
Mignonne, 20, lost fifty-five killed and wounded out of a crew of
one hundred and fifty, and was taken possession of. On the
27th, the Windsor, 60, Captain Samuel Faulknor (2), took, off
Lisbon, the French East Indiaman Due de Chartres, mounting
twenty-four 12-prs., but pierced for sixty guns. There were four
East India ships in company, but the other three made off'.
On the following day there was fought a much more interesting
little action. The Southampton, 32, Captain James Gilchrist, and
Melampe, 24, Captain Wilham Hotham (1), cruising in the North
Sea, fell in with and engaged two French frigates. The MelaiJipe
fought them both for three-quarters of an hour before the
Southampton could come up ; and she suffered so much aloft that
she dropped astern. One of the French ships made sail away while
the Southampton was engaging the other, and while the Melampe
was refitting. When Hotham drew up again, the French ship
struck. She proved to be the Danae, 40 ; and she had lost her
captain, second captain, and about thirty men killed, besides a great
number wounded. She was added to the Eoyal Navy as the Danae.
Gilchrist was himself severely wounded by a grape shot, and lost
the use of an arm. He was given a pension of s6300 a year for life,
and could not be employed again ; but, a generation later, the martial
ardour of his family again showed itself in the career of Thomas
Cochrane, tenth Earl of Dundonald, a son of Gilchrist's sister.
On April 4th, Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, in the
Achilles, 60, took, to the westward of Cape Finisterre, the very large
privateer, Comte de St. Florentine, also mounting sixty guns. This
^ Whicli lost five killed aud tweutv wounded.
302 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17(32. [1759-60.
prize, too, was bought into the Navy, as also was the Aretliuse, 36,
which was taken by the Venus, 36, Captain Thomas Harrison (2),
on the coast of Brittany on May 18th.
AVhen M. de La Clue's fleet had been shattered and dispersed,
the Souverain, 74, made for the Canaries, whence she returned to
Kochefort. On her way thither she fell in on October 10th with the
Hercules, 74, Captain Jervis Henry Porter, which engaged her in
a running fight till the British ship fell astern owing to the loss
of her maintopmast. Another French ship of the line, which was
met with and brought to action during the j'ear 1759, was the
Palmier, 74, which, having a frigate in company, fell in, when on
her way home from the West Indies, with the Tliames, 32, and
Coventrii, 28. The British frigates attacked her ; and as the sea
was rough and she could not use her lower deck guns, they had her
somewhat at a disadvantage. They shot away her foretopmast
and did her other considerable damage, and, but for the assistance
which her frigate was able to give her, would have stood some chance
of taking her.^ As it was, they hung on to her in the hope of falling
in with some other British cruiser, keeping out of gun-shot by day,
and pouring in broadsides by night. They had not, however, the
fortune to meet with a friend ; and, after a long chase, they had the
mortification of seeing the Palmier run into Brest.
In March, 1760, the French fitted out the Malicieuse, 32, and
Opale, 32, in order to intercept the Portuguese trade, which, they had
heard, was to be convoyed by a single sloop. Near the Bayona
Islands '" they fell in with the Penguin, 20, Captain William Harris,
which tried to get away, but which they overhauled and took.
They judged her not worth keeping, set fire to her, and continued
their cruise, till it was spoilt on April 4th by the Flamhorough , 20,
Captain Archibald Kennedy,^ and Biddeford, 20, Captain Lancelot
Skynner (1), which, though not powerful enough to take them,
hung on to them in a most dogged manner and eventually put them
to flight.* Meanwhile the convoy reached Lisbon in safety. Of
other little successes in European waters, perhaps not the least
complete was that of Captain the Hon. Augustus John Hervey
of the Dragon, 74, who, while attached to Boscawen's fleet, on
^ Beatson, ii. 351.
2 P. Pv. 0. Courts-martial, vol. 40.
* Later Earl of Cassilis.
■* In this gallant action, both Captain Skynner and his lieutenant were mortally
wounded, the latter surviving, however, until April 10th.
1760.J ADVENTURES OF THE DIADEME. 303
July l'2th, being then close in shore off Isle Groix, was fired on
by a small fort. That evening he went ashore with his boats,
surprised the guard, dismounted the guns of the battery, tumbled
the pieces over the rocks, and eventually went off to his ship with
the whole of the guard and with not a single man hurt/
Of Boscawen's cruisers, the Centaur, 74, which had been taken
the year before in the action with M. de La Clue, fell in off Cape
Finisterre with the VaUlant, 64, and Amethyst, 32, homeward
bound from the West Indies. Deceived by her appearance they
let her come close up ; and it was not till they saw that she was
clearing for battle that they realised that she was no longer a
French ship. They made all possible sail, and got away by night
into Corunna. Another of Boscawen's cruisers, the Niger, 32,
Captain John Albert Bentinck, fell in with the Diademe, 74,
escorting store-ships to Martinique. For some days the frigate
hung on to the Frenchman, both in the hope of cutting off some
of the convoy, and of meeting a ship of the line that could deal
with the seventy-four. In the course of her attempts on the
convoy, she ventured close enough to be severely mauled, and so
had to leave the enemy in order to make good her damages. A few
days afterwards, the Diademe was sighted and chased by the
ShreiDshurij, 74, Pallas, 36, and Argo, 28. The Shreivsburij sailed
very badly, the Argo was busy with the convoy, and it was left
to the Pallas, Captain Michael Clements, to attack single handed.
She was but a frigate, and fought only in the hope of knocking
away a spar or two and enabling the Shrewshurij to come up.
Unfortunately she exposed herself to the enemy's broadside, and
very soon had to be content to leave the big ship alone. This
voyage of the Diademe bears a certain resemblance to the last cruise
of the Glorioso. She was annoyed by frigates all along her route,
and she ended with an affair with a heavy ship of the line. The
Glorioso, of course, had been harder put to it, and was ultimately
taken. The French ship . was more fortunate. The Boyal
William, 80, which chased her at the conclusion of her voyage,
had not time to come up with her before she found safety in
Corunna.
The loss of the Citmheriand, 56, Captain Eobert Kirk, which
sank at her anchors near Goa, on the night of November 2nd, 1760,
was adjudged to have " proceeded from her being entirely decayed,
1 P. R. 0. Admiral's Dispatches, Channel, vol. 4, July 27th, 1760.
304 MINOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [1761.
and not in a condition to have proceeded to sea." ^ There was
nothing extraordinary in the loss of the ship, save that it resulted
from the fact that she was one of the rather numerous vessels which
were at the time kept on service when they ought to have been
in the ship-breaker's yard. In many cases, no doubt, the fault lay
with the Admiralty ; but it must be borne in mind that ships were
not then built under . cover, and that the decay of vessels built
in the open was often so irregular as to bafHe calculation.
On January 8th, 1761, the Unicorn, 28, Captain Joseph Hunt,
cruising off Penmarck, fought a sharp action with, and captured,
the Vestale, 32, which later became the Flora in the British Navy.
The captains of both ships were mortally wounded. On the
following day the Unicorn chased, but could not come up with,
the Aigrette, 32, and, on the 10th, saw her engage the SeaJwrse, 20,
Captain James Smith, then carrying out astronomers to India
to observe the transit of Venus. Again she tried to come up,
but could fiot; and the Aigrette, having mauled the Seahorse'^
considerably, refused to be further detained and forced to fight
at a disadvantage.
In January, the Felicite, 32, left Cherbourg for Martinique ;
but no sooner was she outside than she met the Biclimoncl, 32,
Captain John Elphinstone (1). The ships sighted one another
in the evening, but the action did not begin till half-past ten the
next morning (January 24th), when they engaged broadside to
broadside, standing in for the land. Still close together, they both
ran ashore near Scheveningen, and continued serving their guns
in that position. Presently the Biclimoncl floated, and was set
to leeward by the tide. The Frenchmen seized their opportunity
and escaped to the shore. They had lost very heavily, and their
captain had been killed; but the casualties on board the Richmond
amounted only to three killed and thirteen wounded. Next day,
when the Felicite was boarded, the dispatches which she had been
carrying to Martinique were found to be still in her. They were
taken out, and the ship was set on fire.
On the same day, but in the Mediterranean, the Waricich, the
ex-British 60-gun ship, with, however, only thirty-four guns mounted,
was attacked, while on her way to the East Indies, by Captain
' P. Pu 0. Courts-martial, vol. 41.
2 Which was, in consequence, obliged to return to port. When she sailed again she
was commanded by Charles Cathcart Grant, Captain James Smith having been
appointed to the Gtiernsey, 50.
1761.] CAPTURE OF THE WARWICK. 305
Alexander Arthur Hood in the Minerva, 32. The wind was fresh
from, the east, and the sea was heavy. The enemy lost her mainmast
and foretopmast, but Hood waited for her to come up again, and
presently the ships fell foul of one another. The Minerva in turn
lost her foremast and bowsprit, and fell astern ; but she cleared
away the wreck very promptly, stood off to the Warwick and forced
her to strike. The loss was curiously even, fourteen killed and
thirty- two wounded in the Warivick as against fourteen killed and
thirty -four wounded in the Minerva. No sooner had the Warwick
struck, than the Minerva rolled away her remaining masts. The
capture of the Brime, 36, a week later, in the Soundings, by the
Venus and Juno, presented no unusual feature. She was added to
the Navy.
On March 9th, the Bipon, GO, Captain Edward Jekyll, one of
Commodore Buckle's squadron off Brest, chased a French sixty-four
and a frigate. They bore away from him, and during the night
he lost sight of them ; but, on the following day, with a fresh breeze
aft and a heavy sea, he overhauled a sixty-four, which proved to
be the Acliille. The ships engaged at half -past nine at night yard-
arm to yard-arm, running before the wind at a great rate ; and the
Bijyon was half swamped by the water that came on board through
her lower-deck ports, which could only be opened from time to time.
To make matters worse, one of her lower-deck guns burst, killing
and wounding many men and throwing the whole deck into
confusion. After this all her mid-ship and forward ports on that
deck were kept shut, yet she managed to shoot away the enemy's
foreyard and foretopmast. The Bipon then came to the wind to
wait for the Frenchman, and the enemy ran down under the stern
of the British ship. Fortunately the Acliille was in such great
confusion that she missed the opportunity of raking the Bipon. As
soon as the Frenchman had passed to leeward, Jekyll gave orders
to wear ship and follow her, but his rigging was so much cut that
the manoeuvre took a long time, and when it was complete the
enemy's lights were no longer visible.
There were other single-ship actions at about the same time.
On March 13th, 1761, the Vengeance, 26, Captain GamaHel Nightin-
gale, took the Entreprenant, an armed ship of force equal if not
superior to her own. On March 16th, the Bedford, 64, took the
frigate Comete, 32, off Ushant ; and on April 3rd, the Hero and
Venus took the Bertin, an East India ship pierced for sixty-fom-
VOL. III. X
306 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1761.
guns, but then armed en fiilte and outward bound with soldiers on
board. On April 1st, the Orifiamme, 40, really a 50-gun ship,
was taken in the Mediterranean, after a short action, by the I sis, 50,
whose captain, Edward Wheeler, was killed in the fight. Another
easy capture was that of the Ste. Anne, a heavily-armed merchant-
man, which was taken on the Jamaica station by the Centaur, 74,
Captain Arthur Forrest, on June 5th. She was pierced for sixty-
four guns, but had at the time only forty on board. When,
however, she was added to our Navy, her full number of gnns
was mounted.
On July 14th, the Thunderer, 14, Captain Charles Proby, cruising
with the Modeste, 64, Captain the Hon. Kobert Boyle Walsingham,
Thetis, 32, Captain John Moutray, and Favourite, sloop, Commander
Philemon Pownall, for the purpose of intercepting the Achille, 64,
and Bouffonne, 32, which it was believed were ready to sail from
Cadiz, discovered that those ships had slipped out of port. The
squadron fell in with them, however, on the 16th, brought them
to action on the 17th, and in due course took them both,^ the
Achille being carried by a boarding party from the Thunderer, which
had had a great part of her poop blown up by the bursting of an
upper-deck gun. The Bouffonne struck to the Thetis. The Thunderer
lost seventeen killed, and one hundred and fourteen, including
Captain Proby, wounded, most of the casualties being due, however,
to the accident to the gun.
The most brilliant of the actions fought between cruising ships
in 1761 remains to be described. On August 13th, i\ie Bellona, 74,
Captain Kobert Faulknor (2), and the Brilliant, 36, Captain James
Loggie, met the Courageux, 74, and the two 32-gun frigates, Malicieuse
and Hermione, off Vigo. The meeting took place in the evening ;
but it was bright moonlight, and the ships kept sight of each other
till morning, when the enemy, who up to that time had been trying
to escape, decided to engage. On the 13th, it had been believed that
the British vessels were both ships of the line ; on the 14th, how-
ever, the French commodore fell into the opposite error of taking
the Bellona for a 50-gun ship. He signalled to the frigates to
engage the Brilliant, while he himself closed with the Bellona. The
Brilliant accepted her share with alacrity, and gave the frigates
so much to do that they were unable to interfere in the combat
between the seventy-fours, The duel between the Bellona and
' Trovide denies it, i. 427.
1761.] THE BELLONA AND THE COVRAGEUX. 307
Coiirageux was fought out in a fine breeze and a smooth sea. The
first broadside was fired from the Frenchman when the ships were
within musket-shot ; and so good was the gunnery under the favour-
able conditions that prevailed, that, in nine minutes from the start,
the Bellona's mizen-mast went over the side and the rigging was
so much cut that the ship became unmanageable. Faulknor was
afraid that the enemy might get away, and promptly called for
boarders ; but the Courageux sheered off, and the attempt had to
be abandoned. With great difficulty, Faulknor managed to wear
ship, a manoeuvre which brought him up on the Frenchman's
starboard quarter. A few broadsides fired from his new position
settled the fate of the day. The Courageux, much damaged, and
with about two hundred men killed and another hundred wounded,
struck, and was taken possession of. The frigates made sail away.
The total duration of the action was no more than forty minutes.
It was much the fashion to speak of the French as always firing
at the rigging, and as seizing the earliest opportunity to escape.
Certainly this is stated to have been the procedure in luany
instances where the facts will not support such an assertion ; but
in this case something of the sort does seem to have happened,
owing partly no doubt to the enemy's having accepted battle
through a misunderstanding of the force he had before him. It
is not easy to suggest any other explanation for the condition of
the Bellona, and for the Courageux, which lost more than three
hundred men, having killed and wounded only four-and-thirty.
The new year, 1762, opened with affairs in a peculiar condition.
Great Britain was paramount at sea, whereas France was exhausted.
There was, indeed, nothing new in this ; it had been the prevailing
state of things since the action in Quiberon Bay. What was strange
was that France, having received a new ally in virtue of the
Family Compact, gained no real accession of force, although the
Spaniards entered upon the war with a considerable number of
ships. Why this happened was because, as has been already
noticed, the French ports were so closely watched that nothing
could get out without running the risk of immediate capture, and
because the Spa,niards concentrated all their naval forces for the
protection of their colonies and lost them, en masse, in distant seas.
The result, as far as Spain was concerned, was, that she was
hopelessly beaten without anything worthy the name of a naval
battle having taken place in European waters. The French, too,
X 2
308 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1762-
were so utterty exhausted that there was not only no fleet action
fought but also not even a ship of the line to be taken.
Short accounts of a few frigate actions w^ll, therefore, finish the
story. Captain Thomas Harrison (2), in the Venus, 36, had a large
share of good fortune. On January 6th, he took, after a short action,
the Boulogne, 20, on her homeward journey from the Isle of France,
with a valuable cargo on board, and, amongst other passengers, the
Comte d'Estaing. On March 17th, he took a 14-gun privateer out
of San Sebastian ; on May 6th, he captm-ed another privateer of the
same force out of Bayonne ; and on June 4th, a large Spanish
privateer of sixteen guns, twenty swivels, from Bilbao, struck to him.
These were by no means all the privateers he took, either Spanish
or French, but the cases supply typical instances of the force of
the ships he had to deal with. Another somewhat notable capture
of a privateer was made on the night of March 7th. The
Milford, 28, Captain Robert Mann, fell in with the Gloire, a French
letter of marque, mounting sixteen 6-prs., besides swivels, and bound
to San Domingo, and took her after a sharp action. The Milford
lost only four killed and thirteen wounded, but among the former
were Captain Eobert Mann,^ and his first lieutenant. The richest
capture of the war was made by the Active, Captain Herbert
Sawyer (1), and the Favourite, sloop, Commander Philemon
Pownall, two of Sir Piercy Brett's cruisers, which, on May 21st,
intercepted the register-ship Hermione, bound from Lima for Cadiz.
The summons to surrender was the first intimation to the Spaniards
that war had broken out ; there was no resistance whatsoever ; and
in this easy manner did treasure to the value of about half a million
pass into British hands. On the Jamaica station, the Fotvey, 24,
(9-prs.), Captain Joseph Mead, fell in, off Cape Tiberon, with the
Spanish royal frigate Ventura, 26 (12-prs.), and fought her for an
hour and a half, when the ships separated, much damaged. On the
following morning the action was resumed with vigour, and
contmued till the Ventura struck. The Foivey lost ten killed
and twenty-four wounded, and the Ventura, forty in killed alone.
On August 18th, the Bochester, cruising in the Channel, in
conjpany with the Maidstone and Beiiommee, took the Guirlande, 26,
a French frigate ; and on September 1st, the Lion, 60, one of a small
* Commander, 1756 ; Captam, 1757. His name is very cousisteiitly spelt Mann in the
Navy Lists of the period, whereas that of his contemporary Eobert Man (2), presently
to be mentioned, who died an Admiral in 1783, is spelt with one n only. — W. L. C.
1762.]
CONCLUSION OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAB.
309
squadron detached, under Commodore Eobert Man (2), by Hawke
to cruise off Brest, took the Zephyr, 32, which had, however, only
twenty-six guns mounted, and which was then carrying troops and
stores to Newfoundland. The last capture made from the French
during the war was that of the Oiseau, 26, which struck to the
Brime, 32, Captain George Anthony Tonyn, in the Mediterranean,
on October 23rd.
J^*"*^
fe'H'^^
( 310 )
APPENDIX TO CHAPTERS XXVII. AND XXVIII.
LOSSES OF THE BELLIGERENT POWERS.
L. Carr Laughtox.
Note. — These lists, like tanse ou p. 535 et seq. of Vol. II., are tentative ; but they are not so meagre a< the lis-ts given by
the best-kno'nu historians of the period, eg., Charnock, Peatson, and Troude. Those authorities liave been
largely checked by reference to Captains' Letters, Muster Books, Minutes of Courts-Martial, and i ther papers
i f like nature , but it is an almost impossible ta,-k to ensure completeness.
(a.) LOSSES OF H.M. SHIPS FROM 171-i TO 1763.
Year.
1716 Nov. 10 1
1717
1719
1720
.Tan. 29
Keb. 14
.Mar. 28
Nov. 24
1721
i Dec. 7
1722 April 15
10
1724 ?
1729 Nov.
1736 Dec.
1740 Jan. ?
1741 I J«n. 13
JIar.
Apr. 16
May 14
I Aug.
Oct. 4
1742
Jan. 12
.June 14
Aug. 15
Sept. 21
1743
1744
Auguste .
Hazardous
Sorlings .
Crown
Burf'jrd .
Blandford
Monc'c
Milford . .
Royal Anne .
Hind .
Oreyhound .
Betlford .
Cruiser (prizj)
P.oyal Anne, galley
Princess Louisa,
Triumph, (prize)
Otter . . .
Wolf . . .
Galicia (prize)
Wager . .
Anna (pink) .
Tryal (brig-slooij)
Jan.
Feb. 11
May 8
Summer
»»
)»
Oct.
5
20
»»
>*
Tiger ...
Duke (J. s.) .
Gloucester
Tilbury .
Drake . .
Grampus .
Saltash .
Looe .
Astnra, s.s. .
Orford
Anne daltey, f.s.
Northumherlani
Solebay .
Sea ford .
Grampus .
Victory .
«. Albans .
Greenwich .
honetta .
Thunder, boml)
Lark (hulk) .
Colchester
Hornet
Guns. [^
Commander.
Lost his life on the
occasion.]
60 Capt. Robert Johnson.
42
50
70
50
20
40
tl4
70
28
f St.
I sh.
14
50
S
50
60
tl4
tl4
tl4
44
70
8
70
20
20
16
IfO
50
50
14
8
50
14
,, John Roberts.
„ Charles Vanbrugh.
*Capt. Erasmus I'hillips.
;, Hon. George Clinton.
*Ci'pt. John Furzer.
*Capt. Francis Willis.
20
20
12
40 I
18 i
8 : Com. John Gage.
Fate.
Capt. Daniel Hoare.
,, David Cheap.
Com. Charles Saunders.
Capt. Edw. Herbert (1).
Com. Smith Callis.
Capt. Matthew Michell.
,, Peter Lawrence.
Com. Peter Toms.
Capt. Ashby Utting.
Com. R' bert Swantou.
Capt. Perry Ma>nc.
*Com. Mackie.
*Capt. Thomas Watson (1).
,, '1 homas Bury (1).
,, Thomas Pye.
Com. Richard Collins (1).
f*Ad. Sir John Balchen.
l*Capt. Samuel Faulkuor(l).
*C pt. William Kniglit.
*Capt. Edward Allen.
*Com. William Lei.
Com. Thomas Gregory (2).
Capt. ."-ir Wm. Hewett, Et.
Wrecked in the Baltic.
Lost at sea.
Lost.
Lost at entrance of Tagus.
Lost in the Mediterranean.
Foundered in the Bay.
fLost in Yarmouth Roads.
(Crew saved.
Lost.
Lott.
Wrecked off Guernsey.
Taken by guarda costas : reston d.
Sunk.
Lost.
Fonnf'ered off the Lizard.
Lost (ex-Lauvceston).
Foundered off Sambala Keys.
A\' recked in the South Seas.
AV recked on coast of Florida.
Burnt as useless at Cartagena.
^Vrecked in the South Seas.
{Broken up at Juan Fernandez.
Scuttled by order.
Wrecked on a key near Tortuga.
E.xpended at .St. Tropez.
Burnt liy onier in tlie Soutli Sfas.
Accidiutally Ijurut in \V. Indies.
Lost in I he Channel (?).
Lost.
i Lost in the ^V. Indies.
Lost in America.
Accidentally burnt at Piscataciu:).
\Vrecked in Gulf of Mexico.
' Expended off Toulon.
I Taken by tlie French.
Taken bj' the French ; rctak' u.
JTaken by the French.
(Lost in tl e Cliaunel.
Uv' recked in a hurricane at Jamaica.
AV'recked on the Kentisli Knoi k.
Taken by the French ; retaken.
11 of as carrying 14 guns. Sometimes, however, they are credited with 20, sometimes
,s to be tha' they often carried 8 guns and 12 swivels or patercroes ; thus the 14 would
t These sloops are usually spoke
with only 8. 'I he explanation seem ...._, ^ .
he arrived at by rating a swivel conventionally as half a gun. But in reality their armament was rather haphazard.
LOSSES OF H.M. SHIPS FROM 17U TO 1763.
311
Commander.
Year.
Date.
Ships.
Guns.
[* Lost his life ou the
Fate.
occasion.]
1744
t'walloiv
16
"^Vrtcked.
Salisbury. . .
50
Taken by the French ; retaken.
1745
Feb.
16
Weymouth . .
60
Capt. Warwick Calmady.
^\■l■e^kell in Leeward Islands.
Mar.
28
Anglesey . . .
44
* ,, Jacob Elton.
Taken by Apullon, 50.
Juue
Blandford . .
20
,, Edward Dodd.
Taken by French in \\'. Indies.
Nov.
14
Fox ....
! 20
* ,, Edmund Beavor.
Foniidpved off" Oniiliir • all lost
Lyme . . . ' .
20
L t^UlJl.tCldl Lfll UKAliUiXl , it.ll iUBv.
Foundered in the Atlantic
Mercury. . .
14
XVUllLlCld* 111 lillC -rtl'lOllljiV.
Taken by the French.
Wolf : . . .
]4
Com. George Vachell.
Taken by the French ; retaken.
Fame ....
14
Foundered.
Sapphire's Prize
14
^Vrecked.
Hazard . . .
12
Taken by the rebels ; retaken.
Mediator . . .
10
Sunk.
Blast, bomb . .
Achilles . . .
8
8
JTakeu by two Spaniards near Jamaica.
Falcon
8
Taken by the Freucii.
1746
Oct.
19
Severn. . . .
50
Capt. William Litle.
Taken by M. de Conflans ; retaken 1747.
Dec.
Hornet . .
14
Taken by the French.
Albany . . .
14
Com. Stephen Colby.
Taken by the French.
Saltash
14
AVrecked in the Channel.
Lightning, bomb
8
„ William JIartin (2).
Capsized near Leghoiii ; 45 drowned.
Louishourg, f.s. .
8
Taken by the Hrench.
1747
July
7
Maidstone . .
' 50
Capt. Hon. AugustusKeppel
Wrecked on Belle Isle.
Sept.
Whitehaven, armed
sp.
14
Com. Carr Scrope.
Burnt by accident off Irish coast.
Oct.
8
Dartmouth . .
50
*Capt. James Hamilton (2).
Blown up in action with Gloiioso.
1748
Fowey, . . .
1 20
' 14
,, Francis William Drake
Wrecked in G. of Floiida.
Savage . . .
Wrecked on the Lizard.
1749
Jau.
Wolf ....
14
*Com. George Vachell.
jR.-Ad. Hon. Edward Bos-
AVrecked off Ireland.
1
April
12
JVamur . . .
74
< cawen.
[Capt. Samuel Marshall (1).
IWrecked in E. Indies ; 600 lost.
j>
)5
Apollo, bosp. .sh.
18
Wrecked iu E. Indies.
,,
13
Pembroke . .
eo
* ,, Thomas Finch er.
Wrecked in E. Indies ; 330 lost.
1755
Juue
Aug.
13
Mars ....
64
20
,, John Amherst.
„ Richard \Vatkins.
AV recked at Halifa.x.
Blandford . .
'Taken off Brest ; restored.
1756 ! Mar.
11
Warwick . . .
60
,, Molyneux Shuldham.
Taken at Martinique.
1
Adventure .
6
Lieut. James Orrok.
Taken by privateer Infernal.
Oswego . . .
Ontario .
sloop
sloop
|Surrendered at Oswego.
1757
Mar.
18
Greenwich .
50
Capt. Robert Roddam.
Taken in W. Indies.
April
19
Merlin . . .
10
Com. John Clelaud (1).
Taken off Brest ; retaken.
Sept.
24
Tilbury . . .
Ferret . . .
60
10
*Capt. Henry Barns'ey.
*Com. Arthur Upton.
\Lost in a hurricane off Louisbourg.
1758
Feb.
19
Invincible
74
Ccipt. John Bentley.
Lost near St. Helen's.
April
13
Prince Georf,e .
90
fR.-Ad. Thomas Broderick.
ICapt. Joseph Peyton (1).
J Burnt at sea ; 485 lost.
}»
28
Triton. . . .
24
24
„ John Stanton.
,, Thomas Manning.
{Destroyed iu the E. Indies.
Bridgewater . .
»»
29
London (buss") .
Wrecked in R. Senegal.
Aug.
Oct.
11
Stork . . . .
10
20
,, William Tucker.
,, John Hale.
Taken iu W. Indies.
Winchelsea . .
Taken by French ; retaken.
Nov.
29
Lichfield .
50
,, Matthew I'ai-ton.
Wrecked on African coast ; 130 lost.
1759
May
Tartar's Prize .
24
„ 'Jhomas Baillie (1).
Sprang a plank iu Mediterranean.
Nov.
20
21
Resolution . .
Essex ....
74
64
,, H(nry Speke.
„ Lucius O'Brien.
jWrecked on Fom- Bank in Quiberon Bay.
Mermaid . . .
20
, , James Hackm n.
AVrecked among the Bahamas.
Haivke . . .
12
Taken off C. Clear ; retaken 1761.
Falcon (bomli) .
8
Com. Mark Robinson (1).
AVrecked on the Saintes, Guadeloupe.
1760
Feb.
15
Ramillics. .
90
*Copt. Wittewronge Taylor.
"Wrecked on Bolt Head.
Mar.
28
Penguin .
1 20
,, William Harris.
Taken and burnt.
May
17
Lowestoft . . .
28
,, Joseph Deane.
V\ recked in the St. Lawrence.
»>
Virgin . .
i 12
Com. Edward St. Loe (2).
Taken by French ; retaken, .Sept.
Oct.
4
Harwich . . .
50
Capt. \Villiam Marsh.
AN'recked on the Isle of Pines.
*f
Griffin . . .
20
„ Thomas Taylor (1).
Wrecked lu ar Barbuda.
Nov.
2
Cumberland . .
56
,, Robert Kirk.
Foundered near Goa.
Lyme ....
28
20
70
, , Sir Edward V( rnon (2)
,, John Elphinstone (1)
Wrecked in North Sea.
Eurus.
Wrecked in St. Lawrence.
Conqueror . .
Wrecked on St. Nicholas Island.
Newcastle. . . .
Queenhorough . .
EO
20
„ Digby Pent (3).
1 Lost in a hurricane off Pondii berry ;
( crews saved.
1761
Jau.
1
Protector, f.s. . .
Due d'Aquitaine
64
* „ Sir William Hewitt, Bt.
1 Lost in a hurricane off Pondicherry ;
Sunderland . . .
,Z>«i-e (store-ship 1 .
60
10
* „ Hon. James Colville.
( crews lost.
Mar.
Pheasant (cutter) .
16
f *Com. Bartholomew (.?) Nel-
i son.
Foundered iu the Channel.
April
4
Speedwell. . . .
10
Lieut. James Allen.
Taken at Vigo by AchilU:
Dec.
30
Biddeford . . .
20
*Capt. Thomas Gordon (2).
Wreiked ne:ir Fiamborough Head.
1762
Feb.
Raisonnable . . .
64
,, Jlolyneux Shuldham.
Lost at ^lartinique.
Epreuve ....
14
Com. Peter Blake.
Lost iu returning from South Carolina.
Savage ....
9
Lost in Torbay.
312
APPENDIX.
Commauiier.
Year.
Date.
Ships.
Guns.
[ ' Lo^t his life ou the
occasion.]
Fate.
1762
May
Hussar
28
Capt. Eobert Carkett.
Lost in the ^\'. Indies.
July 2t
Chesterfield .
40
I>ost ill Old Strait of Bahama.
Sov. 29
Marlborough .
70
„ Thomas Burnett.
) Founders d ou passage home from
Dec. 18
Temple
Southsea Castle
/lumber . .
Gramont .
Scorpion .
Perei/rine
70
40
40
!.><
16
16
,, Thomas Collingwuod.
,, AVilliam Newsom.
,, Richard Ouslow.
Com. Patrick Mouat.
*Com. Edward Knowles.
i Havana.
Lost at ilauilla.
Lost on llazeboro' Sands.
Taken at St.,Johii's,Xewfoundland.
Lost ill Irish Sea.
Fouuiiered on waj' to AV. Indies.
li63
Jau.
San f.eiiaro .
60
AVretked in tlie Downs.
Basilisk (bomb^
s
Com. Lowfleld.
Taken by Audacieux, privateer.
(b.) LOSSES OF THE FRENCH XAYY, 1744-48, 1755-62.
''OTE. — French East ludiameu, if serving with, or in lieu of ships of, the French Navy, are, in a few instances,
included below.
Year.
Hat.-
.Ships
1744 ' Apr,
1745 I Jan.
1746
4
10
Feb. 20
Mar. 26
May 19
Feb.
Apr.
Aug.
9
4
4
4
n
14
Nov. 19
Oct.
1717 May
3
3
3
3
3
3
June 21
Sept. 13
Oct.
>»
14
M
14
14
14
14
i>
14
1748
Jan.
31
1755
June
8
Nov.
13
1756
Mar.
July
12
1757
May
14
30
."^ept.
21
Nov.
23
»»
.Autumn
Medee
Fleuron ....
Elephant ....
Panthere .
Vigilante.
Auguste ....
Volage ....
Mercure (en flflte) .
Ferme
Mars
Ducd'Orleans* . .
Subtile ....
Ardent ....
Casaubon. . . .
Parfait ....
Embuscade .
Fine
Flore
Maligne (si lop) . .
Invincible
Serieux ....
Diaviant ....
Jason
Gloire
Pubis (flilte) . . .
Etoile . . . . .
Kenommce
Monarque
Terrible ....
Neptune ....
Fuugueux
Trident ....
Secerne ....
Castor
Bellone ....
Lys
Magnanime .
Lys (en flute)
Alcide
Esperance (en flute)
Chariot Hoyal .
Arc en Ciel .
Aquilon ....
Dae d'Aquitaine
Emeraude
Alcion ....
liien Acquise.
Hermione
Merlin ....
Guns.
Fate.
26
64
20
26
64
50
32
56
54
64
30
26
64
60
54
40
30
24
.' >*
74
64
52
50
40
26
46
32
74
74
70
64
«4
50
28
36
26
74
64
64
74
36
50
50
50
28
50
36
'1*
lc>
Renamed Intrepid.
Renamed Isis.
Taken by Dreadnoupht and Gi'ampus.
Accidentally burnt at Brest.
Taken by Chester and Sunderland.
Taken by V.-Adm. Martin in the Channel.
Taken by Commodore Warren at Louisbourg.
Taken by Portland, lienamed Portland's Prize.
Taken ; retaken next tlay.
Taken by Namur.
Taken by Pembroke.
Talien by yoltingham.
AVrecked in E. Indies.
Taken b.y Portland. Renamed Amazon.
Captured and burnt.
JAccidentally burnt at Chcbucto.
Taken by Defiance.
Wrecked at ^lontl■ose.
Taken by Greyhound, privateer.
Taken.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Destroyed by Warren.
Taken by li"ver.
Taken by Ilawke.
Taken by Ilawlce.
Taken by Hawke.
Taken by Hawke.
Talceii liy Hawke.
T'aken Ijy Haw ke.
Taken by Ilawke.
Taken.
Taken.
Taken by yottin(/ham and Portland.
(Taken off Louisbourg.
Taken and burnt.
Taken Ijy Lichfield and Xorwich.
Taken by Torbay.
Destroyed by Antelope.
Taken by Eagle and Medway.
Taken by Southampton.
Sunk by Hussar and Dolphin.
Taken.
Taken.
Retaken 1)V Lancaster and Dunkirk.
* Ideally a ship of the East India Company, but was serving with the tieet.
LOSSIJS OF TEE FRENCH NAVY, 1744-1762.
313
Year.
Date.
1T57
1758
Feb. 28
., 2S
„ 28
Apr. 7
„ 30
May 29
Ships.
1759
1760
1761
1762
Aug.
Feb. 21
Mar.
>>
May
Aug.
19
27
28
18
13
16
"
18
Nov. 20-/
22 \
May
■ 6(
July
i
Sept.
Oct.
"!
>}
19
»>
I
Jan.
8
,,
-1
Mar.
Apr.
30
16
1
3
>>
June
5
July
17|
Aug.
13
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
18
1
15
Xymplie
Escarboucle ....
A bloop
Foudruyant ....
Orijlammc
Orphce
Galatee .....
Bien Aime ....
Diane
Raisonnable ....
Echo
Apollon
cite ere
Biche ... . .
Fidtle
Guirlande
Entreprenant
Capricieux\ j, -
Prudent
Bienfaisant . . . .
Rhinoceros . . . .
Calypso
Due d'Manovre . . .
Belliqueux . . . .
Opinidtre . . . .
Outarde
Greenwich . . . .
Robuste (en flute) . .
Loire
Rose
4 ships building . . .
Bellone
Mignonne . . . .
Due de Chartres .
Daiiae
Arelhuse
Berkeley
Hermione
Ocean
Bedoutahle . . . .
Temeraire . . . .
Centaure
Modeste
!<oleil Royal . . . .
ForiiiMahle . . . .
Heros
Thesee . . • .
Stiperbe
Juste
Jnjiexiblc
Pi/mone .
Atalante
MachauU . . . .
Bienfaisant .
Marquis de Alarloze
Vierge (e.K Virgin) . .
Sirine. . . . .
Prince Edouard
Valeur
Fleur-de-Lys
Sermione . . . .
Baleiue
Epi'euce
Vestale
Felicite ....
Warwick (en ilute 3i) ,
Brune
Comete
Orijiamme (en fliite")
Bertin (eu flute 28)
Faisan . . . . .
Ste. Anne (en flute 40) ,
Bo'iffonne . . . .
Aehille
Courageux . . . .
Aniinone
Sardoine
Leopard
Guirlande ...
Zephyr
Crnzon (schooner) .
36
16
16
80
50
64
22
58
36
64
26
50
16
16
26
24
74
64
64
74
64
36
14
64
64
44
50
74
44
36
32
20
60
46
36
20
26
80
74
74
74
64
80
80
74
74
70
70
H4
36
32
32
22
16
12
32
32
20
32
36
32
14
32
60
32
32
50
64
16
64
32
62
74
14
14
60
26
26
6
Fate.
Destroyed at Majorca.
Taken b}' fsis.
Taken by Phcenix, iirivateer.
Taken by Muniiioutli.
Destroyed by Monarch and Montugii.
'laken by Revenge and Berwick.
Taktn by E.^sex and Pluto.
VVreckeii in E. Indies.
Taken by Boreas.
Taken by Dor.'-etshire and AchiUes.
Taken by Juno.
>Sunk by French at Louisboui'g.
Taken by Rochester and Renown.
VBunit by accident at Louisbourg.
[Cut out by boats at Louisbourg.
Taken and burnt by Jsis.
Driven ashore and destroyed in Audierne Bay.
Taken by Lizard oft' Brest.
Taken by Antelope off llfracombe.
-Wrecked near Brest.
Taken by Alcide and Acta'on.
Taken by St. Albans in Mediterranean.
Destroyed at Malta by Monmouth.
Burned at >St. Servand.
Taken by Vestal.
Taken by .Eolus and Isis.
Taken by Windsor.
Taken by Southampton and Melavipe.
Taken by Chatham, Venus and Tluxmes.
Taken by Crescent.
Taken by Cotea at Jamaica.
lOestroyed by Boscawen.
I Taken by Boscawen.
Destroyed by Boscawen.
Burnt by Hawlce.
Taken by Hawke.
Taken and burnt by Hawke.
Sunk by Hawicc
Sunk by Hawke.
Wrecked at mouth of Loire.
Wrecked in Yilaiue.
[Destroyed at Quebec by Swauton.
[■Destroyed at Chaleur Bay by Byron.
Retaken by Temple and Griffin
Taken by Boreas.
Destroyed by Holmes.
Taken by Lively.
Destroyed by Holmes.
|Cut out at Poudicherry.
Taken by Xiyer.
Taken by Unicorn.
Taken and destroyed by Richmond.
Taken by Miner ca.
Taken by Venus and Juno.
Taken by Bedford.
Taken by Isis.
Taken by Bero and Venus.
Taken by Albany.
/Taken by Admiral Holmes's squadron on
( Jam lica station.
Taken by Thetis and Modeste.
Taken by Thunderer.
Taken by Bellona.
JTaken by Mars and Oxford in Bay of Biscay.
Burnt at Quebec with plague on board.
Taken.
Taken by Lion.
Taken by Venus.
314
APFENDIX.
Year.
Date.
1762
Ships.
Oiseau
Opale .
Ecureuil .
Dragon
Juntn.
ffermione.
Zenobie .
Mtitine
Minerve .
Aigle .
Guns.
Fate.
26
Taken by Krune.
2n
Taken by Phanix.
10
Taken by Fame and Lion.
64
Lost at Cape Frangois.
40
Lost off .Mahon.
32
Lost coming out of Dimqiievque.
26
[,ost off Portland.
24
Lost on the Doggersbank.
24
Lost near Villa Franca.
50
Lost in Strait of Belle Isle.
(c.) LOSSES OF THE SPANISH NAVY, 1718-19, 1739-18, 1762.
XoTE. — It is possible that a few of the small craft mentioned may have belonged to the Caraccas Company.
Itl8 I Aug. 11
Aug. ll{
An
Aug.
g. ll'^
Aug. li{
1719
.Jan. '. 6
1727 Mar. 11
1739 Dec. 6
Xov. 23{
174;o Apr. S
„ 2«
Oct. 23
1741 Feb.
Mar. ? 6
25
] etc.
,, 30
Aug.
1742 Feb.
.Iiiue 1)
? I7f2
? 1742
? 174i
Real San Ftlipe.
Principe de Asturias
San Cat los .
Santa Isabtla .
Santa Rosa .
Vol ante ....
Juno
Real
San Isidvro
Sorpresa ....
Aguila ....
A 4th rate . . .
Esperanga .
A 4th rate . . .
iS. J van Menor .
ffermione
Conde de Toidouse .
San Fernando .
Tigre . . .
2 bombs ....
1 bomb ....
1 fireship ....
4 stureships .
1 settee ....
Santa Rosalia . .
San Pedro .
A frigate ....
.V. S. del Fosario .
2 storeships . .
Astraia ....
Triunfo ....
Princesa ...
1 sloop* . .
2 storeships .
Guipnscoa
ffermione.
1 patacbe
Galicia
San Carlos
Africa ...
Conquistador
San Felipe .
Dragon ....
1 frigate* ....
Fuerte ....
San Juan
Santa Teresa
Sledad ^galleys.
San Felipe
S. Genaro
Invencibile ....
,5?. Juan i:autistn (3r) nieu)t .
San Joaquin (IIO men)! .
San Jcse (32 men)t
74
70
6U
60
60
44
36
60
46
36
24
54
46
44
20
44
30
to
26
10
10
64
60
46
20
20
64
8
74
54
20
70
70
60
to
80
60
24
60
70
-Taken by Bjnig in the battle cff C. pe Passaro.
> Taken by Walton's divijion.
Burnt after capture.
Burnt bv Mari.
Burnt.
Taken.
Burnt at Messina.
Taken at Messina.
Sunk at Messina.
Taken.
Burnt by Mari.
Taken by Walton's divisim.
Burnt by Mari.
Taken.
Burnt.
Driven ashore.
Lost in Fay of 'I'aranto.
J'aken by Royal Oak.
Taken by Royal Oak.
Taken by Slieerness.
Taken at Puerto Eello.
Taken by Kent, Lenox and Orford.
Taken near St. Augustine by Squirrel.
Taken liy Diamond.
Lost off Saut.i Martha.
Founilered at sea.
Broken up :it St. Catherine's.
Taken at Cartagi ua ; afterwards biuiit.
Scuttled at Cartiigeni by Spaniards.
Scuttled at Cartagena by Spaniards.
Scuttled at Cartagena by Spaniards.
Bunit fit Carfcigena liy Spaniards.
Burnt at Cart: gena by Spaniards.
Taken by Worcester.
(Wrecked while trying to take the fhiii's cumpany
I i>f the Tiger.
}Buri.t at St. 'I ropez.
Burnt at Havana.
iTaken or destroyed.
• These may perhaps be identified with some of the ships m which head-money was paiil in 1746, and
which are given at the end of tlie losses fur 1742.
+ 1 he only record of these ships is that they were meu-of-war taken or destroyed, but not at Puerto Belli i in-
Cartagena. Head-money was being paid for them in 1746, at the same time as for the Princesa and other ships
taken before 1742 ; hence it may be inferred that their loss was prior to the earlier date. See note * above.
LOSSES OF THE SPANISH NAVY, 1718-1762.
315
Year. 1 Date.
Ships.
1743
1Y44
1745
1746
1747
1748
1762
June 20
Feb. 11
Oct. 9
Oct. 1
3
May 28
,, 28
„ 28
June 3
Aug. 13
Aug.
Oct. 31
(V. S. lie Cabadcnra* .
S. Isidoro
Poder . . .
Conde de Chincan .
Cumefcidn (treasure ship)
Forte de Nantz (?) . .
OlorviSO
Ccnrjuistador . . . .
Africa
Finix, f.s
Venganza
Marte
Thetis
Neptuno
Asia
Eurofa
/ Tigre
Beina.
Sohercino ....
Infante ....
Aquildn ....
America,
('onquistadf.r
yan Genaro .
San Anto7iio .
•I ships (building) .
Santisimn Trin idad
\'entiirii
Guns.
56
70
CO
24
32
74
64
70
18
24
18
22
70
64
60
70
70
70
70
70
60
60
60
60
22
26
Fate.
Taken by Centurion.
Burnt at Ajaccio.
TaUeu by Berwick ; afterwards burnt.
Taken by Ripon in W . Indies.
Taken by Rose.
Taken.
Taken by Russell.
Taken by Kuowles iu "SV. Indies.
Burnt by Knowles iu \\'. Indies.
Taken by Alarm.
Taken by Defavce.
Taken by Defiance.
Tat en liy Alarm.
>Sunk at the eutrai ce to Havana.
Surrendered w ith Havana.
Destroyed at Havana.
Tai-enat Manilla.
Taken bv the Fuirrii .
* ^ot a man-of-war.
( 31(J )
CHAPTEE XXIX.
voyages and discoveeies, 1714-1762.
Sir Clements Maekham, K.C.B.
Clipperton aud Shelvocke to tlie Pacific — Voyages to Hudson's Bay -Expeditions of
Barlow, Vaughan, Scroggs, and Middleton — The search for a North- West Passage
— Henry Ellis's Voyage — Coats's book on Hudson's Bay — Anson's Voyage — The
value of naval Exploration.
TN 1718 there was war between the German
Emperor and Spain ; and some London
adventurers obtained a commission from the
government at Vienna to cruise against the
Spaniards in the Pacific. The commission
was received from the authorities at Ostend ;
and the ships, fitted out in the Thames, were named the Prince
Eugene and the Starhemberg. A retired naval heutenant named
Shelvocke was to have had the former, a ship with thirty-six guns
and a complement of one hundred and eighty men ; while the Starhem-
berg, mounting twenty-four guns, was to have been entrusted to
John Clipperton, the man who had deserted Captain Dampier. But
the owners were displeased with Shelvocke for his extravagance
when he went to Ostend for the commissions, so they disrated
him, giving Clipperton the chief command in the Prince Eugene,
and transferring Shelvocke to the Starhemberg. Meanwhile war
broke out with Spain, so the names of the ships were changed to
Success and Speedwell, the Ostend commissions were returned with
thanks, and the expedition sailed under British colours. Shelvocke
for the time stifled his resentment at having been superseded ; and
the ships sailed from Plymouth on February 13th, 1719, Soon
afterwards a gale of wind gave Shelvocke an opportunity of parting
company with his superior officer, with all the wine and brandy on
board his ship. His chief mate was Simon Hatley, who had been
witli Woodes Kogers, and William Betagh was his " captain of
1719-22.] VOYAGES OF CLIPPERTON AND SHELVOCKE. 317
marines." With both these officers Shelvocke, who was a free
drinker, had constant quarrels. In rounding Cape Horn the ship
was driven down to 61" 30' S., where the cold was intense. " We
had continued squalls of sleet, snow, and rain," says Shelvocke ;
and the only sea bird was a disconsolate black albatross. Simon
Hatley thought it was a bird, of ill-omen which brought the snow
and mist ; and he shot the albatross. He believed that this act
would bring a fair wind : but, on the contrary, it continued foul
and tempestuous for another month. Shelvocke touched at the
island of Chiloe, plundered and burnt the town of Payta, on
the Peruvian coast, and arrived at Juan Fernandez on May
4th, 1720. There the Speedwell parted her cable, was driven on
shore, and became a total wreck. The crew worked hard at a
new vessel, of 20 tons, which was launched on the 5th of October
and named the Becovery. Shelvocke embarked with forty-six men,
leaving eleven Englishmen on the island. He shaped a course
to the Peruvian coast and captured a fine vessel of 200 tons at
Pisco, leaving his own little craft for the Spanish crew. Sailing
northward, they encountered the Success off Quibo, but they parted
company almost immediately. The two vessels met again three times
on the coast of Mexico, but without exchanging a word. Shelvocke
named his prize the Happy Beturn. Clipperton sailed for China in
May, 1721, and sold the Success at Macao on account of the owners,
returning home with his crew in June, 1722. Shelvocke captured
a rich prize called the Concepcioji, with 108,636 dollars on board, and
then steered for California, anchoring in Puerto Seguro, near Cape
San Lucas, for which port he gives some sailing directions. Having
left California for China in August, 1721, Shelvocke states that on
the 21st he sighted an island one hundred and ten leagues from
Cape San Lucas, at a distance of two leagues. This he judged to be
seven or eight leagues in circumference. It was named Shelvocke
Island. Burney thinks that it is the Boca Partida seen by Villa-
lobos, and afterwards by Spilbergen in about 20° N. When the
present writer was serving as a midshipman on board the flagship of
Sir George Francis Seymour in the Pacific, the Collingioood sailed
over the position of Shelvocke Island on the old chart ; and we had
orders to enter the visibility of distant objects in the log at each bell,
so as to judge the space our eyes covered on either side of our track.
But no Shelvocke's Island was ever seen. That worthy made the
best of his way across the Pacific to China, where he sold his
318 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1714-1762. [1719.
ship. He reached England in July, 17'2"2, and was prosecuted for
piracy and other misdemeanours ; but the evidence was insufficient.
Shelvocke pubHshed his account of the voyage in 1726, and two years
afterwards his "captain of marines," WilHam Betagh, pubhshed a
refutation of Shelvocke's statements. The unfortunate Enghsh-
men who were left by Shelvocke at Juan Fernandez were captured
by a certain Captain Salavarria, who was given the command of a
ship fitted out by two wealthy Lima merchants in consequence of
the arrival of Clipperton and Shelvocke on the coast. Their fate is
unknown.
The British vessels which cruised in the Pacific Ocean during
the forty years from 1680 to 1720 were all employed either for
piratical or for warlike purposes. Yet they are properly noticed in
a chapter on discovery and exploration, because they made the west
coast of South America and the Pacific Ocean known to English
seamen, and familiarised them with the navigation. Surveys were
executed, especially of the Galapagos and Bashee Islands, and some
few discoveries were made. Above all, they kept alive that spirit of
maritime enterprise which has ever been the mainstay of our Navy.
The Arctic voyages to Hudson's Bay were of practical importance,
for they led to the formation of a company to trade for furs and skins,
with a charter, granted in 1669, which conferred rights and privileges
over all the lands in that direction. In the previous year one
Gillam, in the Nonsuch, had been sent on a voyage of discovery, and
had reached a latitude of 75° up Davis Strait, then passing through
Hudson's Strait, and wintering in the southern extreme of Hudson's
Bay. Gillam had there formed a settlement called Fort Charles.
The French were at Fort Bourbon, on the western side of the bay,
from 1697 to 1714 ; but after the peace of Utrecht they departed and
their settlement became Fort York on the Hayes Eiver. The
Company's most northern fort was on the Churchill Piver. Ships
were sent out every year, returning with valuable cargoes of furs
and skins ; but a strict monopoly was maintained, and discovery
was discouraged. Nevertheless, it could not be altogether sup-
pressed, especially as a general belief prevailed that the north-west
passage was to be discovered by following up the opening named
Sir Thomas Eoe's Welcome by Button.
In 1719 two vessels named the Alhcuuj and Discoveri/ sailed from
the Thames, under masters Barlow and Vaughan, to discover a
passage, but they never returned. A man named Scroggs, in a ship
1719-1745.] MIDDLE TON AND THE NORTH-WEST PASSAGE. 319
called the Whalebone, was sent from Fort Churchill in search of them
in 1722. He went up the " Welcome " as far as 64° 15', heard news
from the Eskimos of a very rich copper mine, and named a point of
land after his ship — Whalebone Point. Then followed an expedition,
the despatch of which was due to the representations of Mr. Arthur
Dobbs, who had studied the subject with great care. He spoke to
Sir Eobert Walpole, and eventually he induced Admiral Sir Charles
Wager, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to supply two vessels for
the discovery of the north-west passage, the Furnace, sloop, and
Discovery, pink. Christopher Middleton, who had commanded ships
of the Hudson's Bay Company, was induced by Mr. Dobbs to take
command, and he had good officers under him, but a rascally crew,
consisting of the sweepings of the jails. There were not three
seamen amongst them.
Middleton did his work well. Starting from England late in
the season of 1741, it was necessary to winter at the Churchill
Eiver. In 1742 Middleton left Churchill on the 1st of July,
and proceeded up Sir Thomas Eoe's Welcome. He reached a
headland in 65" 10' N., which he named Cape Dobbs, and on the
northern side of which there was a wide opening. But, after a
careful examination, Middleton came to the conclusion that it was
merely an estuary, and gave it the name of the AVager Eiver, after
the First Lord of the Admiralty. Pressing onwards he came to
another headland, which he named Cape Hope, anticipating that
the passage was on the other side of it. But there was again
disappointment. Eepulse Bay showed no opening. The Frozen
Strait then turns south-east. As there was much scurvy on board
the ship, Middleton resolved to return. In the circumstances he
had done excellently, but Mr. Dobbs was so bitterly disappointed
that he made a violent and unjustifiable attack on the commander
of the expedition. The Admiralty called upon Middleton for a
detailed reply to the accusations against him ; and he made it to
the satisfaction of their lordships.
In 1745 an Act was passed for giving " a public reward of
£20,000 to such person or persons as shall discover a north-west
passage through Hudson's Strait to the western and southern
ocean of America." Subscribers came forward to fit out an
expedition. A sum of £10,000 was raised, and a North-West
Committee was formed, and purchased the Dobbs, galley, of
100 tons, and the Caliofrnia of 160 tons. They were well equipped,
320 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 17U-1762. [1740.
William Moor commanding the Dohhs and Francis White the
California. Mr. Henry Ellis, an able and experienced seaman, also
went out as the Committee's agent, with instructions to make charts,
to record bearings, distances, soundings, and variations, to collect
specimens, and to keep a journal. The expedition left Gravesend
on May 20th, 1746, was off Cape Digges on August '2nd, and
wintered at York Factory. On June 24th, 1747, it left its
winter quarters, entered the Welcome, and sent northward a boat,
which rounded Cape Dobbs. The conclusion of Ellis was in
agreement with that of Middleton, that the Wager Kiver was not
a strait ; but that the passage would probably be found through
Frozen Strait. Ellis returned home in October ; and this con-
cluded the attempts to find a passage by Hudson's Bay during
the eighteenth century. But William Coats, a master in the
Hudson's Bay Company's service, who had made many voyages,
acquired an intimate knowledge of the great inland sea, and wrote
in 1750 " The Geography of Hudson's Bay," a very useful treatise,
which was first printed for the Hakluyt Society in 1852,
The expedition of Commodore George Anson was despatched
for belligerent purposes when the war with Spain broke out in
1739. It is, however, properly looked upon as a voyage of discovery,
so far as the Navy is concerned, because Anson's was the first naval
expedition which ever crossed the Pacific Ocean. Anson received
his orders in June, 1740 ; but the ships were manned with great
difficulty, and at last the complement was made up by five hundred
superannuated invalids, out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, who
all died during the voyage. The Commodore was on board the
Centurion, 60 ; and the other vessels were the Gloucester, 50, Captain
Kichard Norris ; the Severn, 50, Captain the Hon. Edward Legge ; the
Pearl, 40, Captain Matthew Michell ; the Wager, 28, Captain Dandy
Kidd ; the Tryal, sloop, Commander the Honoiu^able George
Murray; and two store ships, the Anna and Industrij. Anson's
expedition finally sailed from St. Helen's on September 18th, 1740.
At Madeira the captain of the Gloucester was invalided, and was
succeeded by Captain Michell, whose place in the Pearl was given
to Captain Kidd ; and Lieutenant David Cheap, of the Centurion,
received command of the Trijal. At Port St. Julian, the captain
of the Pearl having died, the Honourable Captain Murray succeeded
him, and Captain Cheap was given the Wager, and Lieutenant
Charles Saunders, the Trijal. Running through the Strait of Le
1741.] ANSON'S VOYAGE. 321
Maire in March, 1741, the squadron encountered a succession of
furious gales off the Horn, and the Pearl and Severn returned
home. The scurvy broke out in a most mahgnant form, so that
the Cent'itrion alone buried forty-three men, the mortality in the
other ships being equally serious. Driven down to 60^ 5' S., the
remaining ships were dispersed.
The Centurion did not reach Juan Fernandez until June
10th, 1741, having one hundred and thirty men in the sick-list,
and having buried two hundred during the voyage. She was
anchored in Cumberland Bay ; and the Trijal arrived on the
same afternoon. On the 21st, the Gloucester came in sight, having
lost two-thirds of her crew from scurvy. The sick were landed
and placed in tents, twelve dying while they were being carried
from the ship to the shore. The fresh vegetables of the island,
and the healthier surroundings, soon began to restore the survivors.
A prize named the Monte Gar7nelo was captured, and equipped as a
cruiser; and, in September, the Centurion, Tryal, and prize, the last
commanded by Lieutenant Philip de Saumarez, sailed for the South
American coast. The Gloucester, not being ready, was to join them
at Payta. Soon afterwards another fine prize was captured ; and,
the Tryal having become unseaworthy, her crew was turned over
to the new vessel, which was armed and received the name of the
Tryal's Prize. After cruising along the coasts of Chile and Peru,
and capturing some other prizes, Commodore Anson anchored
on November 13th in Payta Bay and surprised the town. The
plunder amounted in value to £32,000, besides stores of wine and
brandy, fresh provisions, and live stock. The town was set on
fire, and six vessels in the bay were sunk. Two days after leaving
Payta the Gloucester joined, with prizes containing specie and plate
worth £18,000 ; and in December the squadron arrived safely off the
island of Quibo.
Meanwhile misfortune had attended the voyage of the remaining
vessel. The Wager, commanded by Captain David Cheap, had parted
company with the Commodore in a gale off Cape Horn on April 23rd,
1741. Out of one hundred and thirty men on board, only thirteen
officers and men were fit for duty. The rest were down with scurvy,
and the captain had dislocated his shoulder. Being off the southern
coast of Chile, on May 15th, the ship struck on a rock ; and
she was wrecked within musket-shot of the land. Captain Cheap
was navigating by Narbrough's chart, which had been supplemented
VOL. III. T
322 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1714-1762. [1741-42.
from faulty Spanish surveys. In reality this part of the coast of
Patagonia was unknown. The Wager was deeply embayed in the
Gulf of Peiias, and was lost off the south coast of the peninsula
of Tres Montes. Masts were cut away, boats were got out, and
the sick were landed. The land was precipitous, but well wooded.
The men declared that as soon as the ship was lost their pay ceased,
and that they were no longer amenable to naval discipline. A few,
however, remained loyal, provisions were landed, and a guard was
placed over them. The captain shot a midshipman named Cozens,
who was in open mutiny ; but this increased the discontent, and an
insubordinate feeling was aroused. The long boat was lengthened
and rigged as a schooner. The mutineers insisted upon being
taken back to England by Magellan's Strait ; and, when Captain
Cheap refused, they surprised him at night, tied his hands, and
deposed him, as they said, for having killed Cozens. They then
prepared to depart in the long boat, barge, and cutter, altogether
eighty-one men, leaving the Captain behind. Lieutenant Hamilton,
of the Marines, and the surgeon, with seven men, remained faithful,
the mutineers leaving the yawl and some provisions for them.
Soon after the departure of the boats the barge returned with
two midshipmen, the Honourable John Byron and Alexander
Campbell, and eight more men, who were also true to the Captain.
On December 15th, the forlorn party embarked in the barge
and yawl. After enduring fearful hardships and sufferings, they
were obliged to give up the voyage, and, in February, 1742, they
returned to the place where the Wager was wrecked, which had
been called " Cheap's Bay." At last some natives arrived in two
canoes, and undertook to pilot the fourteen survivors in the barge
to the Island of Chiloe. They started ; but, soon afterwards, the
men deserted with the barge and were never heard of again, leaving
behind Captain Cheap, Lieutenant Hamilton, the surgeon, and
the two midshipmen. The surgeon died, and the rest were taken
by the natives in canoes. After the most terrible privations they
reached Chiloe, and were kindly received by the Spanish governor,
who sent them as prisoners of war to Valparaiso. They were
eventually embarked on board a French ship, arrived in France,
and were released in April, 1746. Campbell and Byron both
wrote narratives of their wonderful adventures. The mutineers
made their way through Magellan's Strait to the Portuguese settle-
ment of Eio Grande, whence they got passages to Lisbon.
1742-43.] ANSON'S VOYAGE. 323
The Commodore had, of course, given the Wager up as lost.
Leaving Quibo, he cruised off Acapulco to intercept the return
galleon from that port to Manilla. The squadron consisted of
the Centurion, Gloucester, and three armed prizes. Anson released
all his prisoners, giving them the prizes, and made sail for China,
with the Gloucester in company, on May 5th, 1742. In August
it was found necessary to abandon the Gloucester, owing to her
leaky condition. She was set on fire, and her officers and crew were
taken on board the Centurion. During the voyage the scurvy
broke out afresh, and for a long time several men died every day.
On August 27th, the Centurion anchored in Tinian Eoad, in
one of the Ladrone Islands, after an unusually prolonged voyage.
The sick were landed to the number of one hundred and twenty-
eight, and placed in a large thatched building on shore. Live-stock
and vegetables were obtained in abundance. About thirty of the
sick died, but the rest rapidly recovered, and were soon convalescent.
The ship was repaired, and on October 21st Commodore Anson
sailed for China, anchoring off Macao in November. There the
Centurion wintered ; and on April 29th, 1743, Anson put to sea,
announcing to his people that he intended to make another attempt to
intercept the Manilla galleon. Although officers and men had been
so long away, and had gone through such fearful sufferings, they all
cheerfully concurred. On May 5th, they sighted the Bashee Islands
of Dampier, and for a month Anson cruised off the island of Samar
without sighting any vessel. At length, on June 20th, a midshipman
named Charles Proby ^ shouted from his station at the top-masthead,
" A sail to windward ! " She was soon seen from the deck,
coming down before the wind towards the Centu7-ion. It was the
long-sought galleon, N. S. de Cavadonga. Both ships cleared for
the action, which lasted an hour and twenty minutes, at the end of
which the Spaniard struck her colours. Anson lost only two men
killed and seventeen wounded ; but the loss of the Spaniards was
sixty-seven killed and eighty -four wounded. The cargo of the galleon
included $1,313,843, besides 35,682 ounces of silver, and merchandise.
The prize was commissioned and entrusted to the command of
Lieutenant Philip de Saumarez. Next day they again made the
Bashee Islands, and on July 10th they entered the river of Canton.
In December the prize was sold at Macao, and the Centurion
^ Brother of the first Lord Carysfort. Afterwards Commissioner at Chatham
Dockyard.
Y 2
324 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1714-1762.
was homeward bound on December 15tli, 1743. She anchored at
Spithead, after an absence of nearly fom: years, on Jmie 15th, 1744.
Commodore George Anson's expedition is correctly looked upon
as an exploring expedition, although with warlike objects. It
was the first purely naval exploring expedition of modern times ;
and it is memorable for having been — quite as much, if not
more, than those which succeeded it — a most successful nursery of
valuable naval officers. Many of the best men in the Navy, during
the Seven Years' War, had learnt their first lessons, and gained
invaluable experience, during their hard service in Anson's exploring
squadron. There were Piercy Brett (1),^ and John Campbell, -
who was Lord Hawke's flag-captain at the battle of Quiberon
Bay ; there were Charles Saunders,^ Charles Proby, de Keppel,*
Philip de Saumarez,^ Peter Denis, *^ the Hon. John Byron, ^ and
Hyde Parker (1). No doubt, the voyage of Anson, remarkable
as it was for its early misfortunes, for the thrilling stories of
suffering and shipwTeck connected with it, and yet notable for the
way in which the patience and resolution of its commander were
rewarded with final success, was the incentive for the despatch of
the expeditions which, in due time, followed in its wake. It is still
more noteworthy that Anson's expedition was, perhaps, the best
example of a naval exploring voyage, forming a splendid and
prolific nursery for training the best and most valuable class of
naval officers.
^ Lieutenant in the Centurion. ^ A petty officer in the Centurion.
* First lieutenant of the Cert^wz'oji. ^ Midshipman in the Ce«/i('/io«.
^ Third lieutenant of the Centurion. " Lieutenant in the Centurion.
^ Midshipman in the Wager.
( 325 )
CHAPTEE XXX.
THE CIVIL HISTORY OF THE EOYAL NAVY, 1763-1792.
Administration of the Navy — First Lords — Secretaries of the Admiraltj^ — ^^'^'Y Board
officials, etc. — Naval p]xpenditure — Seamen and Marines- Strength of the Fleet —
Rigging of a First-Rate — New classes of men-of-war — The carronade — EstabHsh-
ments of guns — Gun-locks — Typical ships of the period — Condition of the
Dockyards — Ships in ordinary — Coppering — Pumps — Distillation of water —
Sanitation — Lighting and buoying — Lightning conductors — The longitude —
Harrison's time-keepers — The Nautical Almanac — Desertion — Discontent —
Mutiny — Bounties to seamen — Officers' halfpay — Officers in peace-time — Prize-
money — The Marine Society — The Hibernian Marine Society — The Marine School
at Hull — Dockyard artificers — The King and the Navy — Promotion to the flag —
Superannuation — Naval uniform — Naval law — Coffin's case — The right of search
—The right of the flag — International courtesies.
N'
"0 changes of great importance were
made in the administrative machinery
of the Navy during the compara-
tively short period which is covered by
the present chapter. Even the lessons
Signature of Richard, ,. ,i ttt x- a • t t t
Eakl Howe, Admiral oi the War ot American Independence
OF THE Fleet. produced few reforms, save in the manage-
ment of the Dockyards. The succession of the more important
administrative othcers was as follows : —
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.
George Grenville.
John, Earl of Egmont.
John, Earl of Sandwich.
John, Earl of Egmont.
Sir Charles Saunders, K.B., Vice-Admiral.
Sir Edward Hawke, K.B., Admiral.
John, Earl of Sandwich.
Hon. Augustus Keppel, Admiral.
Richard, Viscount Howe, Admiral.
Augustus, Viscount Keppel, Admiral.
Richard, Viscount Howe, Admiral.
July 1788. John, Earl of Chatham.
Apr.
10,
1763.
Apr.
23,
1763.
Sept.
10,
1763.
Sept.
16,
1766.
Dec.
1766.
Jan.
12,
177L
Mar.
30,
1782.
Jan.
30,
1783.
Apr.
10,
1783.
Dec.
31,
1783.
326 CIVIL HISTOBY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
Tkeasurer of the Xavy.
William "Wildmau, Vis-
count Barrington.
1665. Richard, Viscount Howe,
Captain, K.N.
1670. Sir Gilbert Elliot, Bart.,
later Lord Minto.
1777. Welbore Kllis.
Apr. 1782. Isaac Barre.
Jul}- 1782. Henry Dundas.
Apr. 5, 1783. Charles Townsend.
Dec. 30, 1783. Henry Dundas.i
Controller of the Xavy.
Georue Cockburne, Cap-
tain, R.X.
1770. Hugh Palliser, Captain,
E.N.
1775. Maurice Suckling, Cap-
tain, R.N.
1778. Sir Charles Middleton,
Captain and Rear-
Admiral.^
1790. Sir Henry Martin (2),
Bart., Captain, R.N.
Surveyor of the Nav\%
I Thomas Slade.
\ William Batelej\
-.-p- ("Sir Thomas Slade, Kt.
l.Tohn Williams.
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
John Clevland.
1763. Philip Stephens (later, Sir P. Stephens, Bart.).
1785. (As Assistant) John Ibbetson.
Controller of the Victualling
Accounts.
Aug.
Apr.
July
Mar.
June
Mar.
July
1771. Sir John Williams, Kt.
-,r-~^ fSir John Williams, Kt.
I Edward Hunt.
, -or (Edward Hunt.
Ijohn Henslow.
Clerk of the Acts.
Edward Mason.
1773. Georsie Marsh.
Controller of the Treasurer's
Accounts.
Timothy Brett.
1782. George Rogers.
Robert Osborne.
June 1771. Charles Proby, Captain,
R.N.
Oct. 1771. Thomas Hanway, Ca])-
tain, R.N.
Oct. 1772. George Marsh.
July 1773. James Gambler (1), Cap-
tain, R.N.
Aug. 1773. William Palmer.
Controller of the Storekeeper's
Accounts.
Hon. William Bateman,
Captain, R.N.
1783. William Campbell.
Jan. 1790. William Belliugham.
Extra Commissioners.
Sir Richard Temple.
Sir John Bentley, Kt.,
Captain, R.N. (till
1763).
Jan. 1778. Edward Le Cras, Cap-
tain, R.N. (till 1783).
Oct. 1782. Samuel Wallis, Captain,
R.N. (till 1783).
1787. Samuel Wallis, Captain,
R.N. (again).
Commissioners at H.M. Docky^ards, etc
Chatham.
Thomas Hanway, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Oct. 1771. Charles Proby, Captain,
R.N.
Portsmouth.
Richard Hughes (2), Cap-
tain, R.N. (Bart. 1773).
Aug. 1773. James Gambler (1), Ca]i-
ttiin, R.N.
Jan. 1778. Sir Samuel Hood, Bart..
Captain, R.N."
Created Viscount Melville, isoL'.
^ Created Lord Barham, 1805.
^ Created Lord Hood, 1782.
1763-92.]
Oct.
Mar.
EXPENDITURE ON THE NAVY.
32^
1780. Heury Martin (2), Cai3tain,
K.X. (later a Baronet).
17U1. Sir Charles Saxton, Kt.,
Captain, E.N. (a Bart.
1794).
Plymoxith.
Frederick Eogers, Cap-
tain, R.N. (a Baronet,
1773).
Jan. 1775. Paul Henry Ourry, Cap-
tain, E.N.
1783. Edward Le Cras, Cap-
tain, E.N.
Apr. 1784. John Laforey, Captain,
E.N.
1789. Eobert Fanshawe (1),
Captain, E.N.
Gibraltar and Minorca.
Charles Colby, Captain,
E.N. (retired, 1763).
Halifax, Nova Scotia.
July 1775. Marriot Arbuthnot, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Feb. 1778. Sir Eichard Hughes (2),
Bart., Captain, E.N.
Oct. 1780. Sir Andrew Snape Ha-
mond, Bart., Captain,
E.N.
1784, Henry Duncan (1), Caj)-
tain, E.N.
Leeward Islands,
Sept. 1779. John Laforey, Captain,
E.N. (till 1783).
Apr. 1784. John Moutray, Captain,
E.N. (till 1785).
Jamaica.
1782. Robert Alexander Lam-
bert, Captain, E.N.
(till 1784).
The " extra " and " ordinary " expenditure, as voted by Par-
liament from year to year, and the number of seamen and Marines
authorised, are shown below in a table which is a continuation of
the one on p. 5 of the present volume : —
No. of Sea-
No. of Sea-
Year.
" Extra."
" Ordinary."
men and
Marines. 1
Year.
"Extra."
"Ordinary."
men and
Marines. I
£
£
£
£
1763
100,000
380,661
30,000
1778
488,695
389,200
60,000
1764
200,000
398,568
16,000
1779
579,187
369,882
70,000
1765
200,000
407,734
16,000
1780
697,903
385,381
85,000
1766
277,300
412,983
16,000
1781
670,016
286,261
90,000
1767
328,144
409,177
16,000
1782
953,519
409,766
100,000
1768
274,954
416,403
16,000
1783
311, 843 2
451,989
110,000
1769
282,413
410,255
16,000
1784
1,100,000
701,869
26,000
1770
283,687
406,380
16,000 !
1785
940,000
675,307
18,000
1771
423,747
378,752
40,000
1786
800,000
692,326
18,000
1772
375,939
394,725
25,000
1787
650,000
700,000
18,000
1773
421,554
424,019
20,000
1788
600,000
700,000
18,000
1774
420,729
444,188
20,000
1789
575,570
713,000
20,000
1775
297,379
444,680
18,000
1790
490,360
703,276
20,000
1776
339,151
426,904
28,000
1791
506,010
689,395
24,000
1777
465,500
400,805
45,000 f
1792
350,000 3
672,482
16,000
' The cost of tliese was in addition to the sums specified in the " Extra " and " Ordinary " columns.
• This was £1,000,000 short of the estimated expense : but it was considered that the deficiency would be
balanced by the number cjf men to be discharged owing to the peace.
3 For work in the Royal Yards only. No money was voted for work in private yards, the estimate for which,
with fittings and stores for the ships, was £81,820.
The fluctuations in the strength of the fleet are indicated in the
328 CIVIL HI^TOBY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
appended table, which, though it goes into less detail, and omits to
notice vessels possessed of no distinct fighting value, is, in effect, a
continuation of the table on p. 7.
Abstract of the Fighting Ships of the Koyal Navy at Four Different
Dates, 1762-1792.
(From Derrick, ]i]i. 148-197, with corrections.)
Nov. 3rd, 1T62.
.Jau. 1st, 1(75.
Jau. 20tli. 1783.
Dec. 1st, 1792.
Rate.
Class of Ship.
(End of AVar.)
(End of Peace.)
(End of War.)
(End of Peace.)
Guus.
No.
No.
No.
No.
First 1
100
5
4
5
5
i^econd
98 and 90
15
16
19
16
55
84
1
1
1
Third
80
7
3
4
1
55
76
, ,
1
1
5}
74
37
57
81
66
55
70
11
7
4
55
68 and 66
3
, ,
2
55
64
30
32
49
39
Fourtli
no
32
11
8
1
Total of the Lime: —
141^'
131
1743
129*
Fourth
56
2
55
52
1
1
• 5
50
24
12
20
16
Fifth
44
21
4
28
21
55
40
, ,
, ,
2
1
55
38
O
• •
7
7
55
36
4
3
17
14
55
34
. .
1
)1
32
32
35
59
47
30
1
, ,
1
?j
24
1
)9
22
. .
1
Sixth
30
1
, ,
55
28
22
24
33
28
59
26
• •
, ,
1
• •
59
24
21
11
6
55
22 and 20
13
13
14
1
Sloojjs
18 to 8
57
38
85
42
Bombs
14
2
4
2
Fireships
••
U
1
17
9
riKNKi:.
\L Total .
365
270
468
330 s
1 It having been suggested, in tlie course of the progress of this work, that some description of the rigging o
a man-of-war in tlie heroic age of the British Navy would be useful to the reader, a plate, showing the rigging,
etc., ol a first-rate in 1775 is here inserted. Explanatory references to it will be found on the page opposite.
2 Besides 7 prizes which, though taken, had not then been purchased for the Navy.
3 Besides 4 prizes which, though taken, had not then been purchased for the Navy.
* Including 47 needing repair.
5 Besides 18 building or ordered.
The 50-gun ship had ceased about the year 1756 to rank as of
the line. Another class of ship ranking between the ship of the hne
( 329 )
REFERENCES TO THE PLATE,
Showing the Rigging, etc., of a First-rate of 1775.
1 BOWSPRIT.
68
Crosstrees.
2 Yard auil sail.
69
Cap.
.3 Gammoning.
4 Horse.
70 FORE TOPGALLANT -
5 Bobstay.
MAST.
6 Spritsail sheets.
71
Shrouds and lanyards.
7 Peudants.
72
Yard and sail.
8 Braces and pendants.
73
Backstays.
9 Haliards.
74
Stay.
10 Lifts.
75
Lifts.
1 1 Clewlines.
76
Clewlines.
12 Spritsail liorses.
77
Braces and pendants.
1.3 Bnutlines.
7«
Bowlines and bridles.
1-t Standing lifts.
79
Flag staff.
15 Spritsail top.
80
Truck.
16 Flying jib-boom.
Kl
Flag staif stay.
17 Flying jib stay and sails.
S2
Flag of Lord High Ad-
18 Haliards.
miral.
19 Sheets.
20 Horses.
83 MAIN MAST.
84 Shrouds.
21 SPRITSAIL TOPMASr.
85
Lanyards.
22 Shrouds.
86
Runner and tackle.
23 Yard and sail.
87
Pendant of the gomet.
24 Sheets.
88
Guv of diito.
25 Lifts.
89
Fail of ditto.
2ii Braces and pendants.
90
Stay.
27 Cap.
91
Preventer stay.
28 Jack staff.
92
Stay tackle.
29 Truck.
93
AVoolding of the mast.
30 Jack flag.
94
Jeers.
95
Yard tackles.
31 FORE MAST.
96
Lifts.
32 Runner and tackle.
97
Braces and pendants.
33 Shrouds.
98
Horses.
34 Lanyards.
99
Sheets.
35 Stay and lanyard.
100
Tacks.
36 Preventer stay and lanyard.
101
Bowlines and bridles.
37 Wooldiugs of the mast.
102
Crowfoot.
a8 Yard and sail.
10.i
Top-rope.
39 Horses.
101
Top.
40 'lop.
105
Buutlines.
41 Crowfoot.
106
Leechliues.
42 Jeers.
107
Yard and sail.
43 Yard tackles.
44 Lifts.
108 :\IAIN TOPMAST.
45 Braces and pendants.
109 Shrouds and lanyards.
46 Sheets.
110
Yard and sail.
47 Fore tacks.
111
Futtock shrouds.
48 Bowlines and bridles.
112
Backstays.
49 Fore buutlines.
113
Stay.
50 Fore leecUline-i.
114
.Staysail ;inii stay aud
51 Fore top-rope.
haliard.
52 Futtock shrouds.
115
Rmmers.
116
Haliards.
53 FORE TOPMAST.
117
Lifts.
54 Shrouds and lanyards.
118
Clewlines.
55 Yard and sail.
119
Braces and pendants.
56 Stay and sail.
120
Horses.
57 Runner.
121
Sheets.
.is Backstays.
122
Bowlines and bridles.
59 Haliards.
123
Buutlines.
60 Lifts.
124
Reef-tackles.
til Braces and pendants.
125
Crosstrees.
62 Horses.
126
Cap.
63 Clewlines.
64 Bowlines aud bridles.
65 Reef-tackles.
66 Sheets.
67 Buutlines.
127 MAIN TOPGALLANT
MAST.
128 Shrouds and lanyards.
129 Yard and sail.
130 Backstays.
131 Stay.
132 Stay sail and haliards.
133 Lifts.
134 Braces and pendants.
135 Bowlines and bridles.
136 Clewlines.
137 Flagstaff.
138 Truck.
139 Flagsfciff stay.
140 Royal Standard.
141 MIZEN MAST.
142 Shrouds aud lanyards.
143 Peudants and burtons.
144 Yard aud sail.
145 Crowfoot.
146 Sheet.
147 Pendant lines.
148 Peakbrails.
149 Staysail.
150 Stay.
151 Derrick aud span.
152 Top.
153 Crossjack yard.
154 Crossjack lifts.
155 Crossjack braces.
156 Crossjack sliugs.
157 MIZEN TOPMAST.
l-'i8 Shrouds and Kuiyards.
159 Yard aud sail.
160 Backstays.
161 Stay.
162 Haliards.
163 Lifts.
164 Braces and pendauts.
165 Bowlines aud bridles.
166 Sheets.
167 Clewlines.
168 Staysail.
169 Crosstrees.
170 Cap.
171 Flagstaff.
172 Flagstaff stay.
173 Truck.
174 Union Flag.
175 Ensign staff.
176 TiTicdc.
177 Eusign.
178 Poop ladder.
179 Bower cable.
HULL.
A Cat head.
H Fore channels.
C Main channels.
1) Mizeu channels.
E Entering port.
F Hawse holes.
G Poop lanterns.
H Chesstree.
1 Head.
K Stem.
330 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
and the frigate proper was the two-decked 44-gun class. When
these vessels had nearly all died out, a new class, the 38-gun frigate,
appeared in 1780. Of this class the Minerva, launched on June 3rd,
1780, was the first. She originally carried, on her main deck,
twenty-eight 18-pounders, and on her quarterdeck and forecastle ten
9-pounders, eight 18-pounder carronades and fourteen swivels ; but
slight modifications were afterwards made and the swivels were
omitted. In 1780, also, the 36-gun frigate was revived, with, how-
ever, 18 and 9-pounders in lieu of the 12 and 6-pounders of the older
ships of the same class. In 1775 a new so-called 24-gun class was
introduced, carrying twenty-two 9-pounders on the main deck and
four 3-pounders, later two 6-pounders, on the quarterdeck. Thence-
forward there were no proper frigates of less than 24 guns, though
post ships of 22 and even 20 guns continued to be commissioned.
These corresponded roughly with the vessels which, in the French
navy, were called corvettes. Below them came the sloops, which,
with bombs, fireships, armed ships and store ships, were commanded
by Masters and Commanders.^ Below these again came cutters,
schooners, brigs, armed vessels, armed transports, armed store-ships
and surveying sloops, which were commanded by Lieutenants. All
yachts were commanded by Post Captains, and the larger of them
were sometimes entrusted to Captains of long standing who, in
consideration of the honour, either temporarily or permanently
surrendered their right co promotion to flag-rank, when it fell to
them in the ordinary course of seniority.^
The introduction of the carronade was by far the most important
development of naval ordnance during the period under review.
" So long," says Mr. William James, " as that species of ordnance, called gun by the
English and canon by the French, continued in exclusive possession of the decks of a
fighting ship, no difference existed between the number of carriage pieces she actualh'
mounted and the number which stood as a sign of her class in the published lists. In
process of time, however, the nominal, or rated, and the real force of a ship lost their
synonymous signification, and that in a manner, and to an extent, too important, in
every point of view, to be slightly passed over.
" In the early part of 1779, a piece of carriage ordnance, the invention, by all
accounts, of the late scientific General Robert Melville, was cast, for the first time, at
the ironworks of the Carron Company, situated on the banks of the river Carron, in
^ The " Master-and-Commander " was equivalent to the modern Commander, and
is, in fact, usually called Commander in these pages, for the sake of brevity.
^ E.rj,, Captain Sir Alexander Schomberg, Kt., who, posted in 1757, would, in the
ordinary course, have obtained his flag in 1787, but who, accepting in 1771 the
command of the Irish Viceroy's yacht, retained it until Ids death in 180-1.
1779.J
mTBODUCTION OF THE CARRONADE.
331
Scotland. Although shorter than the navj' 4-pouuder, and lighter, by a trifle, than the
navy 12-pounder, this gun equalled, in its cylinder, the 8-inch howitzer. Its
destructive effects, when tried against timber, induced its ingenious inventor to give it
the name of smasher.
" As the smasher was calculated chiefly, if not wholly, for a ship-gun, the Carron
Company made early apj^lication to have it employed in the British Navy, but, owing
to some not well-explained cause, were unsuccessful. Upon the supposition that the
size and weight of the smasher, particularly of its shot, would operate against its
general employment as a sea-service gun, the proprietors of the foundry ordered the
casting of several smaller pieces, corresponding in their calibre with the 24, 18, and
12-pounder guns in use, or rather, being of a trifle less bore, on account of the reduced
windage very judiciously adopted in carronades, and which might be extended to long
guns with considerable advantage. These new pieces became readily disposed of among
the captains and others, employed in fitting out private armed ships to cruise against
America, and were introduced, about the same time, on board a few frigates and smaller
vessels belonging to the Eoyal Navy.
" The new gun had now taken the name of carronadf, and its several varieties
became distinguished, like those of the old gun, by the weight of their respective shot.
This occasioni-d the smasher to be called, irrevocably, a 68-pounder, whereas, repeated
experiments had shown that a hollow, or cored shot, weighing 50 or even 40 lbs.,
would range further in the first graze, or that at which the shot first strikes the
surface of the water, and the only range worth attending to in naval gunnery. The
hollow shot would, also, owing to its diminished velocity in passing through a ship's
side, and the consequent enlargement of the hole and increased splintering of the
timbers, j^roduce more destructive effects than the shot in its solid form, one of the
principal objections against which, was, and still continues to be, its being so cumbrous
to handle.
" Before half the expiration of the year in which the first carronade had been cast,
a scale was drawn up by the Navy Board and sanctioned by the Lords of the Ad-
miralty,' for arming the different rates in the service with the 18 and 12-pounder
' Carronades assigned to each class of ship in the l!oyal Navy, by Admiralty Order
of July 13th, 1779 :—
Rate.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Sloops '
Class of
Ship.
Guns.
Quarterdeck.
Forecastle.
Poop.
Actual number
of carriage guns
1
No.
Prs.
No.
Prs.
No.
rrs.
mounted.
2
12
8
12
110
4
12
, 6
12
108
4
12
6
12
100
2
12
G
12
82
2
12
6
12
72
2
24
2
24
6
12
60
8
18
2
18
54
6
18
4
18
48
4
18
4
18
44
6
18
2
18
40
4
18
2
18
34
6
12
4
12
34
6
12
2
12
28
6
12
2
12
26
6
12
2
12
24
r.
12
2
12
22
Ship-rigged.
832 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ^AVY, 1763-1792. [1779.
calibres. In consequence of the first, second, and third-rate ships having their quarter-
decks as fully supplied with guns as there was room for ports on each side, no
additional pieces could be placed there ; but it was found that the forecastle would
generally admit the opening of a pair of extra ports, and that the poop, which for
nearly a century past had served chiefly as a roof to the captain's cabin, would if
limbered up on each side, afford space for three pairs of ports, making, in the whole, eight
additional ports for the reception of carronades. The 50-guu ship was found to have
room for a pair of additional ports on her quarterdeck, besides a pair on her forecastle,
and three pairs on her poop, when the latter was barricaded, making altogether ten
ports. The 4-1-gun ship had no poop, and no armament on the quarterdeck. By
furnishing the latter with a barricade, and cutting through it four pairs of ports,
besides an extra pair on the forecastle, this ship might mount the same additional
number of pieces as the 50. The three remaining classes of the fifth, and the first two
classes of the sixth rate, would also admit of additional ports being cut through the
sides of their forecastles and quarterdecks. The third class of the sixth rate, and the
quarterdecked ship-sloop class, being, in respect to their quarterdecks and forecastles,
in a similar state to the 44, would require to be similarly built up before they could
mount the eight carronades assigned to them.^
" Several captains complained of the carronade ; some, of its upsetting after being
heated by successive discharges ; others, that, owing to its shortness, its fire scarcely
jjassed clear of the ship's side, and that its range was too confined to be useful. The
captains of some of the 32-gun frigates, in particular, represented that one pair of their
quarterdeck carronades was so much in the way of the rigging as to endanger the
lanyards of the shrouds, and begged to have their established number reduced from six
to four. As the principal objection to carronades appeared to have arisen from defects
in the manner of mounting them, some additional instructions on that head were
prepared and forwarded by Mr. Gascoigne, the chief proprietor of the Carrou foundry.
Some alterations were also made in the piece itself.^ Still the Board of Ordnance, in
repeated conferences with the Navy Board, maintained the superiority of the old gun,
resting their arguments chiefly on the comparative length of its range ; while the Navy
Board urged that a vessel, able to carry 4~pounders of the common construction,
might, with equal ease, bear 18-pounders of the new ; that its shot was far more
formidable and destructive ; and that its range was quite sufficient for the jiurpose
required. . . .
"According to an oflicial list, dated on the 9th of January, 1781, there were then
429 ships in the Navy mounting carronades, among which the 32-pounder carronade
appears, and was the first of that calibre which had been used. The total of the
carronades employed was (504, namely, eight 32-pounders, four 24-poimders, three
hundred and six 18-pounders, and two hundred and eighty-six 12-pounders. In
December of this year, a recommendation to use 68-pounder carronades on the fore-
castle of large ships, and 42 and 32-pounders on the same deck of some of the smaller
rates, induced the Navy Board to order the old Rainbow, 44, to be fitted, by way of
experiment, wholly with carronades of the largest description. Sir John Dalrymple
proposed the casting of some that should carry a ball of 100 or 130 lbs. weight;
but the Board resolved to confine themselves to the heaviest of the pieces already cast,
the 68-pounder.
" The necessary carronades were ordered from the foundry, and some of the
foremen belonging to the works attended to see them properly fitted. It was not,
however, until February or March, 1782, that the Rainbow could be completed in her
1 Establishment of 1762.
^ E.g., increasing its length by two calibres.
1782.]
CABEONADE V. LONG GUN.
333
equipment. What additional force she acquired by this change in her armament the
following table will show : —
OIJ Armament.
First deck
Second deck .
Quarterdeck .
Forecastle .
Long Guns.
No.
20
22
44
Prs.
Broailside weight
of metal. i
18
12
6
l.bs.
a 18
Xew Armament.
Carronades.
No.
Prs.
20
68
N
22
42
4
32
2
32
1
48
[ Uroadside weight
of metal.
Lbs.
1238
" In the beginning of April, the Rainhoio, thus armed, and commanded by
Captain . . . Henry Trollope, who, with Captain Keith Elphinstone (the late Admiral
Lord Keith) and the late Eear- Admiral Macbride, was among the earliest patrons of the
carronade, sailed on a cruise. All the well-known skill and enterprise of her captain
failed, however, to bring him within gunshot of a foe worth contending with until the
4th of the succeeding September, when, being off Isle de Bas, he came suddenly upon
a large French frigate. Owing to the latter's peculiar bearing, one of the Bainhoid's
forecastle 32-pounders was first discharged at her. Several of the shot fell on board,
and discovered their size. The French captain, rationally concluding that, if such
large shot came from the forecastle of the enemy's ship, much larger ones would follow
from her lower batteries, tired his broadside ' pour I'bonneur du pavilion,' and sur-
rendered to the Rainhoiv. . . .
'• In the course of 1782, a few of the larger sorts of the carronade were mounted on
board some of the receiving ships in order that the seamen of such vessels as were in port
refitting might be exercised at handling and firing this, to them, novel piece of ordnance.
As one proof of many that carronades were gaining ground in the Navy, the captains of
the few 38 and 36-gun frigates in commission applied for and obtained 24-pounder
caiTonades, in lieu of the 18s with which their ships had been established. The
termination of the war in January, 1783, put a stop to any further experiments with
the carronade ; but its merits were now too generally acknowledged to admit a doubt of
its becoming a permanent favourite : in the British Navy, at least, where a short range
is ever the chosen distance."
It does not, however, appear that foreign powers adopted the
carronade until after 1783.^
The estabhshment of long guns underwent various modifications,
the most important of which may be shown thus : —
^ Nor is it quite certain that the innovation was altogether beneficial. Mr. Henry
Carey Baird, of Philadelphia, has laid before the author reasons for attributing some at
least of the British failures during the War of 1812-15 to an excessive confidence in
the value of the carronade.
334 CIVIL HISTORY OF TEE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
E.sTABLisHiiEXT OF GuNH (other than Carronades in 1792, aud half-pouuder Swivels
in 1762) CARRIED by some of the principal classes of ships of the Koyal
Navy in 1762 and 1792 respectively : —
Lower Deck. Middle Deck. Upper Deck.
Quarter-
deck.
Forecastle.
Classes of Shins.
Date.
1
No.
i
Prs. X
0. Prs.
No.
Prs.
No.
Prs.
No.
Prs.
100 guns
(large)
1762
30
42 2
8
24
30
12
10
6
2
6
100 „
)?
1792
30
32 or 42 1 28
24
30
18
10
12
2
12
100 „
(smaller) .
1762
28
42 ' 28
24
28
12
12
6
4
6
100 „
jj
1792
28
32 or 42 28
24
28
12
12
12
4
12
90 „
1762
26
32 2
6
18
26
12
10
6
2
6
90 „
1792
26
32 2
6
18
26
12
10
12
2
12
80 „
(3-decker).
1762
26
32 26
18
24
9
4
6
..
..
80 „
(2-decker) .
1792
30
32
i •
. 1 32
24
14
12
'4
12
74 „
(larger) .
1762
28
32
•
. 30
24
12
9
4
9
"4 „
>?
1792
28
32
• 1 •
. 30
24
14
9
2
9
^■i „
(smaller) .
1762
28
32
•
28
18
14
9
4
9
T4 „
)»
1792
28
32
.
30
18
12
9
4
9
64 „
1762
26
24
• 1
26
18
10
9
2
9
64 „
1792
26
24
26
18
10
9
2
9
50 „
1762
22
24
^
22
12
4
6
2
6
50 „
1792
22
24
22
12
4
6
2
6
44 „
1762
20
18
22
9
• •
2
6
44 „
1792
20
18
•
22
12
• •
, ,
2
6
36 „
.
1762
26
12
8
6
2
6
36 „
1792
'. ! 26
18
8
9
2
12
32 „
1762
26
12
4
6
2
6
32 „
1792
26
18
4
6
2
6
28 „
1762
1 .
24
9
4
3
28 „
1792
24
9
4
6
24 „
1762
2
9
20
9
2
3
24 „
1792
22
9
2
6
20 „
1762
1 .
20
9
..
20 „
1792
•
20
9
..
..
14-gun s
oops
1762
. 14
6
, ,
14-gun
JJ
1792
_
14
6
••
Gun-locks and tin firing-tubes had been used in a few ships
during the latter part of the Seven Years' War; but, the general
feehng of the service being against them, the old match was
reverted to until after 1780, when the flint lock, with an improved
tube, became common, though the match-tub was retained for use
in case of breakdown.
As in Chap. XXVI., particulars of some typical ships of war of
the period under review are given : —
1763-92.]
SOME TYPICAL MEN-OF-WAR.
335
Typical British Ships of War, 1763-92, including both Prizes asd
T'ritish-built Vessels ; —
Ship.
Victory 100
Ville de Paris
Queen Charlotte
Hiirjleur .
Gibraltar (ex F,
Ca;sar .
Hamillies .
Ramillies .
Brunswick
Augusta
Protee .
Prince William
Argonaut .
Warioick .
Hoehuck
Princess Caruline
Prudente .
Minerva .
Hebe . .
Oiseau . .
Thalia .
.Velampus .
Glory . .
Iris (later Hancoc.
Clinton (ex Bspen
Heroine
Castor .
Hussar
Sartine.
Virginia
Hose
Amphitrite
.Squirrel
Ariadne
Charleston
Boston')
Cygnet .
Zebra .
Brisk .
Swift .
Sernent.
Childers, brig .
Ferret, cutter .
Cockatrice, cutter
Alecto, firesbip
^Etna, bomb .
Augusta, yaclit
nix)
k)
•ance)
(exi
104
100
98
80
80
74
74
74
64
64
64
64
50
44
44
38
38
38
36
36
36
32
32
32
32
32
28
28
28
28
24
24
20
20
18
18
16
14
14
14
6
10
12
8
*1782
1789
1768
*1780
1793
1763
1785
1790
1763
*1780
*1780
*1782
1765
1774
*1781
*1779
1780
*1782
*1779
1782
1786
1763
*1777
*1780
1783
1786
1763
*1778
*1778
1785
1776
1785
1776
Length of
Gun
Deck.
Keel.
Ft. in. !Ft. in.
1765 186 0 151 3i
185
190
177
178
181
168
170
176
159
164
153
1 163
:i51
[140
129
136
!l41
150
146
137
141
125
137
134
130
126
114
132
132
120
114
119
;108
7il53
0 156
8 144
lOJ 144
0 ,148
6 138
0 140
2i 145
0 13U
1 140
•2i 130
0 136
0 122
0 116
1 107
0 118
0 117
1^^125
3 ,126
1 113
3 |117
0 103
1 116
0 113
11^107
0 104
4 1 102
6 1118
6 108
Beam.
Ft. io.
52
53
52
50
53
*1780 114
1776
1780
1774
1763
1789
1778
1763
1781
1781
1776
reblt.
1770
110
98
101
91
100
78
50
69
108
91
Iso
0
5
0*
6
3i 51
2 I 46
li 47
3 , 48
6^; 44
0| 44
3f! 44
0 I 45
11
Oi
4
6
0
7
0
4
9
9*
6
99
94
9
41
5
11
31
H
9f
3i
Of
4
6
0
10»
0
Hi
0
0
6
3*1
99
0
89
8
94
3*
90
9i
80
0
83
4
74
Sk
82
H
60
8
39
0
52
0
90
61
74
5
64
11?
40
37
38
37
38
39
34
38
38
35
34
35
36
35
33
35
34
33
32
32
30
32 0
0
8*
4
5
3*
3
llf
2
9
H
7
1
4
2
lot
10
9*
10
11
1
3
10
2
3i
0
Oi
0
10|
9
6
6
0
5
0
28
27
27
26
27
25
20
25
29
27
23
3i
5i
7
2i
0
0
0
7
n
Depth.
Ft. in.
21 6
22
22
21
22
22
19
19
19
18
19
19
18
18
16
15
10
13
12
9
13
13
11
10
13
13
12
11
15
10
11
10
10
9
10
9
13
12
13
13
11
7
10
9
12
2
4
0
4
4
9
11
6
10
0
9i
1
3
4
6
10
9
10
lot
3
9
0*
11
9
3
2
0
3
7
0
3*
3
0
4
10
3i
0
0
10
9
0
1
li 10 11
a c
a
Whei'e, and by whom Built.
2162
2347
2279
1947
2184
1991
1619
1669
1836
1381
1480
1346
1521
1053
886
862
897
940
1062
783
881
939
679
730
736
779
678
627
802
802
594
513
553
429
514
385
320
337
271
321
202
83
181
423
303
/Chatham, E. Allen, after Sir
I T. Slade.
*Taken from the French.
Chatham.
Chatham, J. Harris.
*Taken from the Spaniards.
Plymouth.
Chatham, E. AUeu.
Thames, Randall & Co.
Deptford, M. Ware.
Thames, Wells & Co.
*Taken from the French.
*Takeu from the Spauiards.
*Taken from the French.
Portsmouth, J. Buckuall.
Chatham.
*Taken from the Dutch.
*Taken from the French.
Woolwich, J. Jenner,
*Taken from the French.
*Taken from the French.
Bursledon, H. Parsons.
Bristol.
Hull, J. Hodgson.
*Takeu from the Americans.
*Taken from the French.
Bucklershard.
Harwich.
Thames, R. Inwood.
*Taken from the French.
*Taken from the Americans.
Sandgate.
Deptford, A. Hayes.
Liverpool.
Chatham, J. Powuall.
*Taken from the Americans.
Gravesend, Cleverh
Sandgate.
Thames, H. Bird.
Plymouth.
Thames.
Chatham, E.
Dover.
Dover.
Thames.
Allen.
184 Deptford.
During the peace which preceded the war with the American
Colonies, the condition of the dockyards, and of the ships in ordinary,
was much neglected; and when, in 1771, the First Lord of the
Admiralty had occasion to demand of the Surveyor of the Navy a
return of the number of vessels fit for service, he received a reply
which, he presently found, conveyed an entirely misleading impres-
sion. The store of oak timber was also discovered to be at a
dangerously low ebb. Upon this, it was ordered in Council that for
the future His Majesty's Navy and Yards throughout the kingdom
should be inspected by the Board of Admiralty every two years. A
336 CIVIL HISTOBY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
little later, in 1775, the practice of paying by piece-work was intro-
duced in the dockyards. After the war, the Admiralty, on July 10th,
1783, appointed twenty-four Masters ^ from the half-pay list to
superintend the ships in ordinary ; eight at Portsmouth , six at
Plymouth, eight at Chatham and Sheerness, and two at Woolwich.
To each Master a division of ships was entrusted ; and to every ship
was assigned a proportion of men, besides warrant officers and
servants, as follows : ships of 100 guns and upwards, 36 men ; ships
of 90 or 98 guns, 32 men ; ships of 70 or 74 guns, 26 men ; ships of
64 guns, 20 men ; ships of 50 guns, 14 men ; ships of 44 guns,
12 men ; ships of 28 or 38 guns, 10 men ; ships of 24 guns, 8 men ;
sloops, 6 men ; and cutters, 4 men.
Ships fit for service were ordered to have their lower masts in ;
their bowsprits, lower yards, topmasts and topsail yards on board ;
and a roof over their upper decks to protect them from the weather.
In 1784, revised rules were issued for the appropriation and laying
aside of gear and stores for ships under construction, with a view to
ensuring that the former should be ready as soon as the latter ;
and better arrangements were made for the accumulation of reserve
and spare stores at the dockyards and the naval stations abroad.
It has been mentioned in a previous chapter that the first
British man-of-war to be coppered was the Alarm, 32. This was
in 1761. A second ship was not similarly treated till 1764, when
the Dolpliin, 24, was coppered. Then followed the Jason, 32, and
in 1776, the Daphne, 20. Between that time and 1784 or 1785
nearly every vessel in the Navy was dealt with in the same way. It
was still asserted that the ships in ordinary deteriorated very rapidly
in consequence of the action set up between the copper on their
bottoms and the iron on their bolts. An inquiry into the matter
was instituted in 1786 ; but it did not result in the condemnation of
the practice of laying up ships with their copper on. An improved
method of copper fastening had been, however, introduced a little
before that time ; ^ and this, doubtless, had the effect of diminishing,
if not of altogether preventing, the galvanic action which had been
complained of.
About the year 1764 some improvements in ships' pumps were
^ The Master, it need scarcely be explained, was then only a warrant officer,
although he was nearly equivalent to the Navigating Lieutenant of a later date.
He was totally distinct from the commissioned Master-and-Coinmander, — the Com-
mander of to-day.
^ In November, 1783.
1763-92.] PROVISION OF FRESH WATER. 337
introduced by a Mr. Coles ; and in that year the Admiralty ordered
a 60-gun ship to be experimentally fitted with pumps of Mr. Coles's
pattern. In the following year a similar pump was fitted on board
the Seaford, 20, at Portsmouth ; and it was then found that,
whereas the old pump required seven men to pump out a ton of
water in 76 seconds, the new pump, with but four men, would pump
out a ton of water in 43^ seconds ; and that, whereas two men could
not move the old pump at all, two men could with the new pump
pump out a ton of water in 55 seconds. It was also found that,
when choked with single ballast, the new pump could be cleared in
four minutes, while the old could not be cleared at all so long as
water remained in the ship's hold. Experiments continued ; and it
would appear that, for some years, Coles's pump was largely used in
the Navy ; but it was from time to time improved, notably in 1787,
and, in 1791, by a Mr. Hill, a carpenter B.N., who was also the
inventor of a machine for drawing bolts out of ships' sides, and of
an apparatus for stopping shot-holes below the water-line.
The distillation of fresh water from salt was not usually practised
on shipboard during the period ; but it was carried out occasionally.
In 1772 the Admiralty directed all ships of war to be fitted with a
still and other necessary apparatus. The process appears to have
been the invention of one Dr. Lynn ; but a Frenchman, M. de
St. Poissonniere, devised a somewhat similar process at about the
same time. It was, however, impossible in those days to distil
sufticient water for the whole ordinary consumption of a ship's crew.
At best only relatively small quantities could be prepared ; and,
looking to the invariable foulness of shore water after it has been for
some time in a ship's casks or tanks, it is astonishing that it was
ever possible for even the most careful captains to keep their crews
in fair health during long voyages. Yet some at least of them
certainly managed to do so. In the course of Cook's second voyage,
with the Besolutioji and Adventure, between April, 1772, and July,
1774, only four men, exclusive of a boat's crew who were murdered
in New Zealand by the natives, died ; and of these but one died of
sickness. In Cook's last voyage the Resolution lost but five by
sickness, three of these having been in ill-health when they left
England ; and the Adventure lost not so much as a single man in
the four years and two months during which she was absent from
home.
Progress, but not very rapid progress, was made between 1763
VOL. III. z
338 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE BOYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
and 1792 in lighting and buoying the coasts of the United Kingdom.
The Smalls Rock light was first shown from a wooden structure
which was built by Mr. Henry Whiteside in 1778, and which was
not removed until 1861. The Needles' and St. Catherine's light-
houses were estabHshed in 1780. The Longships' lighthouse, off
Land's End, was begun in September, 1791. A 21-inch aperture
facet reflector, used at Liverpool in 1763 ; a facet parabolic reflector,
used in the Scots lighthouses about the year 1787 ; and a plano-
convex lens, used at Portland in 1789, were shown at the Eoyal
Naval Exhibition, 1891.
Lightning conductors were, at Anson's instance, supplied to
ships soon after that ofiicer's death in 1762 ; but they were not
permanently fitted, and were merely directed to be set up when a
storm threatened. In consequence, they were often not used at all,
and many accidents resulted.
Efforts to arrive at some satisfactory method of discovering the
longitude at sea continued to be made. In 1764, Mr. William
Harrison, with one of his timekeepers, was received on board the
Tartar, 28, Captain John Lindsay. She sailed from Spithead on
March 28th, and arrived at Madeira on April 19th. Captain
Lindsay made Porto Santo exactly as he had been led to believe
that he would make it by Mr. Harrison, who had taken two alti-
tudes of the sun on the 18th. The ship proceeded ; and on May 12th,
Harrison was able accurately to discover her distance from Barbados,
which was sighted on the 13th. Harrison returned to England in a
merchantman, arriving in London on July 18th. The timekeeper
was then only fifteen seconds slow, allowing for the variations of the
thermometer, as chronicled in the inventor's journal. In 1765 the
Board of Longitude approved a scheme of marine tables, designed
by Mr. Witchell, for finding the longitude at sea by the lunar
method ; and it awarded the inventor £1000 to enable him to carry
out his plans. In consequence, with Mr. Isaac Lyons, junior,
Mr. Wales, of Greenwich, and Mr. Mapson, Mr. Witchell became
responsible, under the direction of the Astronomer Royal, Neville
Maskelyne, for the compilation of a nautical ephemeris for the use
of navigators and astronomers. This was the origin of the ' Nautical
Almanac,' a publication which has since remained at the head of all
works of the kind.
In the course of the war which ended in 1763 the number of
seamen and Marines employed in the Navy \vas 184,893. Of these
1763-92.] MORTALITY AND DESERTION. 339
only 1512 were returned as having been killed in action or by
accident : yet, at the conclusion of the war, no more than 49,673
remained on the books of the Navy Office. The number, therefore,
of those who had died by sickness or were missing reached the
extraordinarily large total of 133,708. These figures incline one to
believe that there must have been an enormous amount of desertion.
Another return, issued in 1780, shows the number of men raised
for H.M. Navy between September 29th, 1774, and September 29th,
1780, and the number killed in action, and who died or deserted,
between January 1st, 1776, and September 29th, 1780. This casts
much light upon the discontent which in those days must have
prevailed upon the lower deck of the Navy. The number of men
raised in the six years was 175,990. Of these, in the four years
covered by the second part of the return, only 1243 had been killed,
and no more than 18,541 had perished from sickness or disease ; but
as many as 42,069 had run. The discontent thus indicated did not
lead during the period, as it did later, to any general outbreak, but it
produced several isolated disturbances. For instance, at the peace
in 1783, when the Channel fleet was ordered into port to be reduced
and paid ofl', the men in many ships became riotous and even
mutinous, owing to their intolerance of delay in liberating them.
On that occasion the discontent in the Baisonnable, 64, was quashed
by the captain. Lord Hervey, who, having appealed in vain to his
crew to behave themselves, went forward armed, with his officers,
and, having seized the ringleaders, soon compelled the rest to obey.
When the ship arrived at Sheerness several men were tried by
court-martial, and four of them were condemned to death. Three
of them were executed on August 11th, on board the Carnatic,
Scipio, and Dictator respectively. The fourth, who was to have
suffered on board the Thetis, was reprieved immediately before the
moment fixed for his execution. The mutiny of the Bounty is
described elsewhere. There were also mutinous outbreaks in the
Narcissus, 20, Captain Edward Edwards, in 1782, and, at different
times, in other vessels.
During this period it was on several occasions found necessary
to offer government bounties to seamen ; and, as often, special
bounties were also offered to them by corporations and cities.
In 1770, at the time of the Falkland Islands' scare, the King,
by proclamation, offered a bounty of 30,s". to every able seaman ; and
the following cities offered additional bounties : i.e., London, 40s. to
z 2
340 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROTAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
every able seaman ; Bristol, 20s. to every able seaman ; Montrose
and Edinburgh, each 2 guineas to every able, and 1 guinea to every
ordinary seaman ; Aberdeen, 1 guinea to every able, and 15.5. to
every ordinary seaman ; and Lynn, 1 guinea to every able seaman.
In 1773, again, the King offered to every able seaman £'d, to every
ordinary seaman ij2, and to every landsman £1. In 1779 the East
India Company, besides building at its own expense three 74-gun
ships, the Ganges, Carnatic, and Bombay Castle, provided the
necessary bounty for the raising of 6000 seamen. In 1791 bounties
w^ere offered on the same scale as in 1773.
The position of the seamen of the Navy was but little improved,
and the failure of the authorities to care sufficiently for the lower
deck led a little later to mutinies which, at one time, threatened to
be extremely serious. The status of many of the ofticers was,
however, from time to time considerablj" bettered. For example,
in 1773, in consequence of a petition presented to Parliament by
Lord Howe, Captains were granted an addition of Is. a day to their
half-pay, so that, thereafter, the first thirty Captains on the hst
received lOs., the next 8s., and the rest 6s. per day. In the same
year the number of Surgeons entitled to half-pay was increased from
fifty to a hundred, half to receive 2s. 6r7. and half 2s. The number
of Masters entitled to half-pay was increased to the same extent, the
half-pay being the same as in the case of the Surgeons. In 1779 the
twenty senior Masters, if qualified for first or second-rate ships, were
given half -pay at the rate of 3s. 6*:/. a day, and the next seventy-five
at the rate of 3s. a day. In 1781, the list of Surgeons entitled to
half-pay was increased to one hundred and twenty-five, they being
Surgeons of not less than five years' actual service. The first fifty
on the hst received 2s. M., and the next seventy-five 2s. a day.
But the attractions of the Navy in peace time were never great
enough to induce anything like the whole body of ofiicers to rest
content with their position, which was indeed then a very unsatis-
factory one. In 1771, Admiral Sir Charles Knowles solicited and
obtained the King's permission to enter the Russian navy, in which
he remained until 1774, when, upon his return to England, he was
reinstated in his rank. During the next peace many officers of
inferior position also lent their services to Russia ; and in the battles
of 1788-90, between the Russians and the Swedes, British captains,
some of whom had been only lieutenants or masters in their own
service, commanded ships on both sides. Indeed, Admiral Samuel
1781.] THE STATUS OF CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET. 341
Grieg/ who was at one time commander-in-chief of the Russian
fleet, was a Scot. Among the captains, Trevenen,^ Denison, and
Marshall, who were killed, and Elphinstone,^ Miller, and Aiken,
deserve to be remembered. Sir William Sidney Smith, then a
captain, E.N., served as a volunteer with the Swedes. In wartime,
adventures and the prospect of prize-money seem to have satisfied
British naval officers as a body : and there was very little agitation
in favour of increased pay, although the pay, all things considered,
was miserably small. But in peace, many officers either found work
for their swords in the service of foreign states, or accepted employ-
ment in command of merchant vessels.*
It may be mentioned in connection with the subject of prize-
money that in 1781 an old dispute between Vice-Admiral John
Campbell, who had been Keppel's Captain of the Fleet in 1778, and
Sir Hugh Palliser, who had been Keppel's third in command, was
decided. Campbell claimed a flag-officer's share of the prize-money
arising from captures made by the fleet : Palliser resisted the claim ;
and the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator decided
against Campbell, and, incidentally, against Kempenfelt, upon whose
behalf there was a similar claim ; and this in spite of the fact that
as early as 1672 an order of the Duke of York had directed that the
First Captain to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet should rank as
a flag-officer. But, although the decision was thus adverse, the King,
on January 9th, 1782, by proclamation, ordered that for the future
the First Captain to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet or to any
flag-officer commanding twenty ships in the line of battle, whether
British only, or British and their allies, should rank as a flag-officer,
and should be entitled to share prize-money on the same scale as
the junior flag-officer in the fleet. It was at the same time ordered
that the Physician of the Fleet should share prize-money on the
same scale as the lieutenants. A seaman's share of prize-money
^ Samuel Grieg, born, 1736 ; served with the British fleet at Q.uiberon, 1759 ; joined
the Russian navy, 1764. Mainly responsible for the victory off Tchesme, July, 1770.
Commanded in the action off Gogland. Died, 1788. A Russian man-of-war still bears
his name.
^ Had been a midshipman and lieutenant in the Resolution in Cook's last voyage.
Mortally wounded at Wyborg, 1789.
^ Samuel Williams Elphinstone, second sou of Captain John Elphinstone (1), R.N.,
who entered the Russian service iu 1769, and became an admiral. He returned to
active service iu the British Xavy in 1775, and died in 1785. Captain S. W. Elphin-
stone married a daughter of Admiral Cruse, a Scotsman in the Russian service.
■* Among those who commanded merchant ships was Sir Home Riggs Popham.
312 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROTAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
was of course alwaj's very small ; but a slight concession to the
lower deck was made in 1771, when an Act of Parliament authoi^ised
Greenwich Hospital, in certain specified cases, to refund unclaimed
shares of prize-money or bounty-money within a limited time after
payment of such into the funds of the hospital.
Indirectly, something more was done for the seamen by the
action of the Marine Society, which, in 1763, immediately after the
peace, resolved to receive, and make provision for, all boys under
sixteen years of age, who had been, or might be, discharged from
the service, by putting them as apprentices into the mercantile
marine, on their presenting certificates of good behaviour from their
former officers, or by apprenticing them into some trade. Thus 295
boys were at once benefited. Again, in 1775 the Hibernian Marine
Society in Dublin was incorporated under letters patent, for the
maintenance, education, and apprenticing of orphans and children
of decayed mariners ; and in 1787 a Marine School at Hull was
opened by the Corporation of Trinity House, for the education and
clothing of boys intended for the sea service.
A little more was done for the artificers in the Dockyards. In
1764 one man out of every fifty of those who had served with good
character for thirty years, was made entitled to a pension of i02O per
year. In 1771 this privilege was extended to one in forty, instead
of one in fifty ; and the men, for pension purposes, were divided into
three classes, i.e., joiners, shipwrights,^ blockmakers, plumbers,
braziers, blacksmiths, and armourers, £20 a year ; house carpenters,
sailmakers, smiths, and bricklayers, £15 ; pitch-heaters, bricklayers'
labourers, riggers, and riggers' labourers, £10 a year. When the
King was at Portsmouth in 1773 he, moreover, ordered £1500 to
^ Number of shipwrights borne in H.M. Dockyards on January 14th of each veai-,
1763-1792 :—
Year.
No.
Year.
No.
\<.-M.
No.
1763
2941
1773
3195
' 1783
3260
1764
2723
1774
3260
1784
3141
1765
3060
1775
3236
1785
3130
1766
3143
1776
3145
1786
3125
1767
3155
1777
3140
1787
3082
1768
3003
1778
3126
1788
3059
17G9
2974
1779
3246
1789
3023
1770
2928
1780
3200
1790
2965
1771
3383
1781
3290
1791
3082
1772
3202
1782
3248
1792
3060
1763-92.] NAVAL REVIEWS. 343
be distributed among the artificers, workmen, and labourers of the
Dockyard, Victualling Office, and Gunwharf.
The King's visit on that occasion took place in order that His
Majesty might review the fleet then lying at Spithead. On June
22nd, the King went on board the Barfleur, flagship of Vice-Admiral
Thomas Pye, dined there, and, in the evening, knighted the Vice-
Admiral, Eear- Admiral Kichard Spry, Captain Joseph Knight, senior
captain in the fleet, Captain Edward Vernon (2), of the Barfleur, and
Captain Richard Bickerton, of the Augusta, yacht. He also con-
ferred baronetcies on Captain Hugh Palliser, Controller of the
Navy, and Captain Eichard Hughes (2), Commissioner of the Dock-
yard. He directed the promotion of such commanders of sloops,
first lieutenants of flagships, and lieutenants commanding cutters,
as were present, as well as of the lieutenant of the Augusta, yacht,
and of two midshipmen from each of certain ships. He further
gave £350 to the crews of the Barfleur, of the Augusta, yacht, and
of the royal barge.
This was not the only time when George III. visited his Navy
in the earlier part of his reign. In 1781 he reviewed Vice-Admiral
Sir Hyde Parker's fleet at the Nore, after its return from the battle
of the Doggersbank, and went on board the Fortitude. In 1789,
the King and Queen, with some of the princes, reviewed such
ships as were in Portland Eoad ; and, during their residence at
Weymouth, they went for several short sea cruises in the South-
ampton, 32, Captain Andrew Snape Hamond, and the Magnifi-
cent, 74, Captain Eichard Onslow. Later in the same summer
they proceeded to Plymouth and visited the Impregjiable, 90,
Eear-Admiral Sir Eichard Bickerton. Indeed, King George III.
always took a great personal interest in the Navy, in which served
two of his brothers ^ and one of his sons.^
The subject of promotion to the flag, which had for some time
previously been a little unsystematic, attracted much attention in
1787. Early in the eighteenth century it had been the custom
for the Crown to promote to the flag by selection, tempered
by seniority. In the middle of the century, seniority gradually
strengthened its claim ; and soon after the conclusion of the
American War, when a captain, upon reaching the top of the
captains' list, instead of being given a flag was put upon the list
^ Edward Augustus, Duke of York, and Henry Frederick, Duke of Cumberland.
^ William Henry, Duke of Clarence, afterwards William I"\'.
344 CIVIL HISTOBY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1787.
of Superannuated Rear- Admirals, or was altogether passed over, he
thought himself aggrieved. Things came to a crisis in 1787. On
March 5th of that year, Sir Matthew White Eidley moved in the
House of Commons an address to the King on behalf of Captain
David Brodie,^ who had been several times passed over. The
motion, being strongly opposed by the Ministry, was defeated by
a majority of seventeen in a house of one hundred and eighty-
three. But the subject was not left there. On February 20th,
1788, Lord Rawdon took up the matter in the House of Lords.
It should be explained that by an Order in Council, dated in
1718 and addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, it
was directed that their Lordships, in the advancement of officers to
the rank of rear-admiral, should promote according to the seniority
of the captains on the list, regard only being had to the officers
being qualified for the rank to which they were otherwise eligible
for promotion. By a subsequent order of 1747, the Lords of the
Admiralty were authorised to superannuate such captains of long
and meritorious service as, in their Lordships' opinion, should be
disqualified by age or infirmity from serving as flag-officers, and that
such officers should have the title of Superannuated Rear- Admirals.
In the vulgar speech of the day these were usually called " Yellow
Admirals." In a promotion made by the Board of Admiralty on
September 24th, 1787, sixteen captains had been advanced to the
flag, while upwards of forty had been passed over. The greater
number of these last had been offered transfer to the superannuated
list ; but, believing themselves fully competent to serve as active
flag-officers ; and believing, also, that their past services fully entitled
them to promotion on the active list, they refused the retirement
that was offered them, and sought to be reinstated in the line
of active promotion. The policy which had been pursued by the
Admiralty occasioned great dissatisfaction amongst naval officers,
who discovered with misgiving that their expectations of rank, as
a reward for long and meritorious service, might be altogether
dependent upon the caprice of a First Lord of the Admiralty. It
was for this reason that Lord Rawdon brought the case before
the House of Lords.
He moved " that a humble address be presented to His Majesty,
' A captain of March 9th, 1748, who, in the ordinary course, would have become
a Kear-Adniiral in 1778 or 1779 ; yet, though he had lost an arm in action, he was
neither promoted nor superannuated. He appears to have died in 1788.
1787.] PROMOTION TO FLAG-RANK. 345
praying that he will be graciously pleased to take into his royal
consideration the services of snch captains of His Majesty's Navy
as were passed over in the last promotion of admirals." Lord
Howe, as First Lord, rose at once to oppose the motion, and to justify
his own action. He pointed out that there were several reasons,
which might reasonably excuse an othcial in his position for passing
over a number of captains. Those who were likely to be entrusted
with the care of our fleets ought to be men sound in mind and
body, and capable of enduring the hard service which would lie
before them in war time. It did not necessarily follow that an
officer, who had served ably and meritoriously in a subordinate
position, was fit to be entrusted with the care of a fleet. A sergeant
of grenadiers, though an able and excellent soldier, might not be
qualified to command a body of troops on a forlorn hope. The
First Lord was responsible for the good conduct and well-being
of the service ; and, having such responsibility, he was necessarily
justified in exercising his judgment and discretion in the appoint-
ment of officers by whom the fleet was to be led. At the same
time he could not, in any public assembly, state the particular
reasons which had influenced his judgment in coming to a con-
clusion on each case. He could only say that he had acted with
the strictest impartiality. Had the officers who had been passed
over been advanced, as was suggested, and had they been called
into active service, as would probably have been the case, they
must have gone on being promoted from time to time, subject only
to the contingency of death ; and they might thus have stood in
the way of many officers from whose services the country would
have derived the highest degree of advantage. Finally, he pointed
out that the principles which had governed the late promotion were
not without precedent.^
The Earl of Sandwich also opposed the motion. It had been
found, he said, at different periods extremely inconvenient and
detrimental to the service that promotions to the flag should be
governed merely by seniority. In the year 1747 a promotion had
been necessary ; and those then on the Board of Admiralty had
been aware that there were then on the list of captains several
officers who were in an eminent degree qualified for the command
of fleets ; but they had not, at first, known how to get at them
without loading the public with unjustifiable expense. They had
^ Instancing a promotion made in 1770, when Lord Hawke had been First Lord.
346 CIVIL IIISTOBY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1787.
therefore planned the superannuation list, the object of which was
to provide an income for such captains as the Board of Admiralty,
not meaning to call them out for further service, omitted to appoint
to the flag in the rota of seniority. At the time of instituting the
establishment the object was to make eight flag-ofiicers only : and, in
order to do that, nineteen captains were passed over. Yet the
matter had not been taken notice of in the House of Commons,
nor had there been any complaint of injustice or partiality. Those
captains who had been put upon the superannuation list were not
in any wise disgraced nor even stigmatised ; they merely entered
what was an honourable retirement from service.
Lord Eawdon's motion was negatived without a division. But
on April 12th the subject was again brought forward in the House
of Commons by Mr. Bastard, who particularly devoted himself to
the cases of Captains Balfour ^ and Thompson, '-^ who, although
they had received the thanks of the House for their behaviour
on April l'2th, 1782, had, when they reached the top of the
captains' list, been passed over. Naval opinion in the House was
divided. Captain Sir George Colher and Captain John Macbride
contending that such a . principle as had been followed by Lord
Howe in 1787 must inevitably lead to the ruin of the service, and
Captain Lord Mulgrave and Vice-Admiral Lord Hood being of
opinion that any interference on the part of the House might
eventually prove more detrimental than advantageous to the Navy.
At the same time it seemed to be admitted on all sides that several
officers who had been passed over did not appear to be in any
respect disqualified for the rank to which, in the ordinary course
of advancement, they were entitled. Finding, however, that the
wording of his motion did not meet with favour, Mr. Bastard
withdrew it, promising to bring forward the subject later in some
other shape.
Accordingly, on April 18th he moved " that the House resolve
itself into a committee of the whole House to inquire into the
conduct of the Board of Admiralty touching the late promotion
to the flag." In support of his motion Mr. Bastard cited the
cases not only of Captains Balfour and Thompson, but also those
' George Balfour, Captain, July 26tli, 1758 ; superanncl. Rear- Admiral, 1787 ; died,
June 28th, 17!i4.
^ Samuel Thompson, Captain, November 4th, 1700; sui)eruund. Kear-Admiral,
1788; died, August 13th, 1813.
O^,-,
..^^W^^i^ //i/t 2^%i?^i^^*<^ ^ cy,,j7>,cJ^f^uwi, ^^^ .^>&<%i; ,
,,^^<>:^»&t<»e. -^i^-zi^ ,y^,^j<^-^i>^^ ..o/Pi^
-^ , _^^»^«2^=i^'
1787.] SENIORITY v. SELECTION. 347
of Captains Samuel Uvedale, Thomas Shirley, John Bray, and
John Laforey, most of whom had served with distinction in war ;
and he pointed out that, although it might be alleged that Captain
Bray had not been promoted because, during the last war, he
had been employed on shore in the impress service, and that
Captain Laforey ^ had been set aside because he had previously
accepted the post of Commissioner of the Navy at Antigua, and,
later, at Plymouth, Sir Charles Middleton, even while actually
serving in a civil capacity,^ had been promoted, apparently, as
a matter of course. Both Pitt and Fox took part in the debate.
The latter, who supported the motion, urged that the rank of
flag-officer ought to be considered from two points of view. The
principal view was undoubtedly prospective, and looked to future
service ; and, from that point of view, selection was proper and
justifiable. But the rank might also be looked upon as an honour
and reward for past services ; and, from that point of view, the
promotion of 1787 could not be defended for a moment, and was
most scandalously partial and unjust. And, he said, as proof that
the Admiralty, at least in some cases, considered promotion as a
reward for past services, he might cite the advancement of Sir
John Lindsay, who, though an officer of first-rate reputation, was
well known to be in so bad a state of health that there was no
hope of his ever being able to resume an active career.^ Upon
the question being put, the House divided, and the motion was
lost by sixteen votes in a House of two hundred and eighty-
four.
The smallness of the majority encouraged Mr. Bastard to make
a third attempt; and on April 29th he moved "that it is highly
injurious to the service, and unjust, to set aside from promotion
to the flag meritorious officers of approved services, who are not
precluded by the orders of His Majesty in Council." On that
occasion the motion was defeated by a majority of fifty-one in a
House of three hundred and eighty-nine.
The institution of a naval uniform for certain officers has been
noticed in a previous chapter. As early as 1767, within twenty
^ Laforey was eventually promoted, his commission as a flag-officer being ante-dated
so as not to deprive him of any seniority.
^ i.e., as Controller. Sir Charles was afterwards created Lord Barham.
^ In point of fact, he died on June 4th, 1788, having been promoted only cm
September 24th, 1787.
348 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1702. [1763-92.
years of that institution, alterations were made by an Admiralty
order of July 18th of that year, worded as follows : —
It is His ^lajesty's pleasure that the embroidHred uniform clothing of flag officers,
and the full dress uniibrm of Captains, Commanders, aud Lieutenants of His Majesty's
tleet, bo discontinued, and that the frock uniform clothing of the said officers be likcAvise
altered and worn as follows : The Admiral's frock to have narrow lappels down to the
waist ; small boot cuffs ; a single lace instead of treble lace dtjwa to the skirts — a plain
musquetaire lace ; but in all other respects the same as now worn. The Captains' and
Commanders' frocks to have narrow lappels down to the waisf, and in all other respects
as they are now worn. The Lieutei]ants' frocks to have narrow lajipels down to the
waist, flash cuffs like the commanders', without lace, instead of roll cuffs, and in all
other respects as now worn.
Another modification was made in January, 1768, when the
King signified his pleasure that the lappels and cuffs of the military
uniform frocks appointed to be worn by the Lieutenants should be
thenceforth of white, instead of blue cloth, and the waistcoat, etc.^
of plain white cloth, with gilt buttons of the pattern previously
worn, without any lace. In 1774 another alteration was made in
the uniform of Captains and Commanders ; and it was directed that
the uniforms so altered should be considered as full dress, and
that a blue frock with embroidered button-holes, conformable to
a pattern lodged at the Navy Office, might be worn upon common
occasions. The altered uniform was thus described : —
The lace on the coat to return round the pockets and sleeves; the lappels and
cuffs to be two inches and a lialf Uroad ; the lace upon the upper part of the lappels to
run even with the bottom lace of the collar; the buttons to be flat, with an anchor
and cable engraved thereon, according to the pattern lodged at the Navy Office ; the
waistcoat to be plain instead of laced ; the breeches to be of the same colour as the
waistcoat, instead of blue, and both to have buttons of the same pattern as those on
the coat. The undress uniform was to have blue frock lappels, aud collar and cuffs of
the same ; but the collar w^as to button on to the lappels aud lap over behind ; the
lining to be of white shalloon ; the buttons to be the same as on the dress coat, and the
buttonholes to be gold embroidered according to the following scheme : for Cairtains
who had taken j)Ost three years or upwards, twelve holes in the lappels, by threes,
three on the flaps, and three on the sleeves ; for Post Captains of less than three years'
standing, twelve holes in the laj^pels, by twos, four holes on the flaps, and three on the
sleeves ; and for Commanders, twelve holes in the lappels disposed regularly, with three
holes on the flaps and three on the sleeves ; and waistcoat and breeches to be the same
as for the dress uniform.
In 1783 there was another alteration, the uniforms then being —
For Admirals, blue cloth coat, with white cuffs, white waistcoat and l)reeclies. The
coat and waistcoat to be embroidered with gold, in pattern and description the same as
that worn by generals in the army, with three rows of embroidery on the cufts. For
Vice-Adnurals the same, but witli embroidery the same as worn by lieutenant-generals
in the army, and witii two rows of embroidery on the cuffs. For llear-Admirals the
1763-92.] NAVAL UNIFORMS. 349
same, but with embroidery similar to that worn by major-generals in the army, and
with one row of embroidery on the cuffs. The buttons were to remain as before.
The above were the full dress uniforms. The undress uniforms
were —
For Admirals, a blue cloth frock with blue cuffs and blue lappels ; embroidered
buttonholes, like those previovisly in use, from the top to the bottom of the lappels,
and three holes on the cuffs ; for Vice- Admirals, the same, with buttonholes arranged
three and three ; for Eear-Admirals, the same, with buttonholes arranged two and two.
All to wear plain white waistcoat and breeches.
On November 17th, 1787, more extensive changes were made,
in accordance with the following instructions : —
Admirals' frocks ; blue cloth, with blue lappels and cuffs ; gold-lace holes, three,
pointing at the end, with the same distinction in the disposition for the different ranks
as before ; stand-up collar, with one hole on each side ; three holes in the flaps, three
on the outside cuffs, and three behind ; white lining, and new anchor buttons with
laurel.
Post Captains of three years' standing ; full dress : blue cloth coat with white lappels
and cuffs, laced with gold lace; the pockets double laced; round cuffs with two laces;
three buttons to the pockets and cuffs ; blue stand-up collar, double laced ; white
lining; new buttons with anchor in an oval; white cloth waistcoat, and breeches
plain. Frocks : blue cloth coat with blue lappels and round cuffs ; fall-down collar ;
^old laced holes square at both ends, regular in the lappels ; two to the pockets and two
to the cuffs ; none behind ; white lining ; buttons the same as in full dress ; white cloth
waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Post Captains of under three years' standing ; full dress : blue coat with white
lappels and cuffs, laced with gold lace ; pockets with one lace ; round cuffs with one
lace ; three buttons to the pockets and cuffs ; blue stand-up collar double laced ; white
lining; buttons as before-mentioned; white cloth waistcoat, and breeches jilaiu.
Frocks : blue cloth coat ; blue lappels ; blue round cuffs ; fall-down collar ; gold laced
holes square at both ends ; nine holes in the lappel by threes, two to the pockets, and
two to the cuffs ; none behind ; white lining ; buttons the same as in full dress ; white
cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Masters and Connnanders ; full dress : blue cloth coat with blue lappels and round
cuffs, laced with gold lace; the pockets once laced, with one lace on the cuffs ; three
buttons CO each ; stand-up collar, double laced ; white lining ; buttons as before ;
white cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain. Frocks : blue coat, with blue lappels ;
round cuffs, and fall-down collar ; gold laced holes, square at each end ; ten holes in
•the lappels by two and two ; two to the pockets, and two to the cuffs ; none behind ;
white lining ; buttons as before ; white cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Lieutenants ; full dress : blue cloth coat, with white lappels ; blue round cuffs ;
holes regular in the lappels; three buttons to the pockets, and three to the cuffs;
stand-up collar ; white lining ; buttons as for the Captains ; white cloth waistcoat, and
breeches plain. Undress : blue cloth coat, edged with white cloth ; blue lappels, and
blue round cuffs ; three buttons to the pockets and cuffs; stand-up collar; buttons as
above ; white cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Warrant ofdcers : blue cloth coat, with blue lappels and round cuffs ; fall-down
collar; three buttons to the pockets and cuffs; white lining, but not edged with white;
buttons wdth an anchor, like the buttons previously worn by Captains ; white cloth
waistcoat and breeches.
350 CIVIL mSTOBY OF TEE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1781-88.
Masters' Mates : blue cloth coat, edged with white ; no iappels ; blue rouud cuffs,
with three buttons ; three to the pockets ; fall-down collar ; white lining ; buttons as
for the warrant officers ; white cloth waistcoat and breeches.
Midshipmen : blue cloth coat ; no Iappels ; blue round cuffs, witli three buttons,
and three to the pockets ; stand-up collar, with small white turn back as before ; white
lining, but not edged ; buttons as for the warrant officers; wiiite clotli waistcoat and
breeches.
The expedition of Commodore Johnstone in 1781 led up to
some interesting problems in naval law. Johnstone caused Captain
Evelyn Sutton, of the Isis, to be tried by court-martial on a charge
of misconduct during the action in Porto Praya Bay. Sutton, being
honourably acquitted, brought a civil action for damages against
Johnstone in the Court of Exchequer, and obtained a verdict for
£5000. A new trial was demanded and Sutton thereupon secured
a verdict for £6000. Johnstone procured a reversal of the judgment
on a writ of error ; and Sutton ultimately took the case to the
House of Lords, which, in May, 1787, afhrmed the reversal of
the judgment. Lord Howe declaring that to establish the verdict
would be to subvert the good order and disciphne of the Navy.
Sutton in consequence lost his case.
Another problem, arising out of the captures made by Johnstone
in Saldanha Bay, was determined in June, 1786, when, on an appeal
from the Court of Admiralty to the Lords of the Council, it was
decided that, since the destination of Johnstone's force had been
the Cape of Good Hope, and, seeing that a considerable land force,
under General Meadows, had been on board and had shared in the
action, the capture did not come under the provisions of the Prize
Act. The whole of the property was claimed by, and would go
to, the Crown ; and the captors must relinquish all hope of prize-
money in respect of it, and look merely to the royal bounty for any
compensation which they might eventually obtain.
Yet another interesting and rather celebrated point in naval
law was threshed out in 1788. In May of that year Captain Isaac
Coftin, of the Thisbe, had been tried by court-martial at Halifax, N.S.,
on a charge of making false musters, in that he had kept on his
ship's books one of his own nephews and two sons of Lord Dor-
chester, who had, it appeared, not been actually on board, conform-
ably with the rules of the Navy. The charge had been proved ;
but as it had seemed to the court that it had been brought forward
mainly in consequence of private pique and resentment, and that
the accused ofticer had not intended to defraud His Majesty, Coffin
1788.] ADMIRALTY REVISION OF SENTENCES. 351
had been sentenced only to be dismissed from the command of the
Thishe. When the officer arrived in England, Earl Howe, who
was then First Lord of the Admiralty, so strongly disapproved of
the sentence, which he believed to be not in accordance with the
spirit of the 31st Article of "War, that he induced the Board to
strike Coffin's name off the list of post captains. The Article in
question declared, "Every officer, or other person in the fleet,
who shall knowingly make or sign a false muster, or muster-book,
etc., upon proof of any such offence being made before a court-
martial, shall be cashiered and rendered incapable of further employ-
ment in his Majesty's naval service." Coffin laid his case before
the King, w!io, with the assent of the Privy Council, directed the
twelve judges to give their opinion as to whether the Admiralty
had the power to set aside the judgment of the court-martial. The
judges decided that the Admiralty's sentence was not legal, and that
the punishment directed to be inflicted by the Act of 22 George II.,
cap. 33, upon persons convicted of the offence set forth in the 31st
Article of War established by the said Act, could not be inflicted,
nor judgment thereon be pronounced or supplied, by any other
authority than that of the court-martial which tried the offender.
Coffin was thereupon reinstated in his rank, and after having served
as Commissioner in Corsica, at Sheerness, etc., died an Admiral and
a Baronet in 1839, in his eighty-first year.
Questions concerning the right of search and the honour of the
flag cropped up as in previous periods. In 1780, a squadron
which, under Captain Charles Feilding (1), had been despatched
for the purpose, intercepted, west of the Isle of Wight, a Dutch
convoy escorted by two sail of the line and two frigates, under Bear-
Admiral Count Lodewijk van Bylandt. Feilding demanded to
examine the merchantmen , which were suspected of having on board
naval stores for France. Van Bylandt resisted, and fired at some
boats which had been sent to board the convoy. Feilding thereupon
fired a shot ahead of the Dutch rear-admiral, who replied by dis-
charging a broadside at the Namur, and, when it was returned,
struck. Seven of the merchantmen were detained.
In 1791, Commodore the Hon. William Cornwallis, having
received intelligence that some neutral ships under French colours
were expected on the Malabar coast, with supplies for Tippoo Sultan,
found two of them in Mahe Eoad. They refused to be examined,
pleading in particular that they were then in their own port ; but
352 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1703-1792. [1763-92.
Commander Edward James Foote, of the Atalanta, 14, sent a party,
which broke open the hatchways. The examination, however, seems
to have been considered by the Commodore to be inconchisive ; and,
a Httle later, when the two French vessels sailed in company with
the French frigate Besolu, 32, they were followed by the Phcenix, 36,
and Perseverance, 36. The former got up with the French frigate
off Mangalore, and was hailed to know what she wanted. Captain
Sir Kichard John Strachan replied that he had orders to board the
merchantmen. While his boats were occupied on that service
they were fired at by the Besolu, which presently also discharged
a broadside at the Phcenix. An action resulted ; and in twenty-
five minutes the Frenchman struck, having lost 25 killed and
40 wounded. The Phaniix lost only 6 killed and 11 wounded. A
renewed examination of the merchantmen showed that they had no
contraband of war on board ; and they were suffered to proceed on
their voyage.
A noteworthy case of the insistance of the right of the flag
happened in 1769, when a Fiench frigate anchored in the Downs
and neglected to pay the usual compliment. Captain John Hollwell
sent a lieutenant to demand the salute. The French captain refused
compliance, whereupon Hollwell ordered the Hawke, 10, to fire two
shots over her. This induced her to concede the point without
further dispute.
Though the British Navy was thus jealous of its privileges, the
relations between it and other countries upon the high seas were in
some respects courteous and pleasant. In 1779, the French court
chivalrously issued orders that the British circumnavigators, James
Cook and Charles Clark, were on no account to be molested,
although a state of war existed at the time. In 1785, when La
Perouse ^ set out from Brest on his great voyage of discovery, the
Admiralty and Koyal Society furnished him with copies of all such
observations and charts as could be of use to him, and gave him also
Cook's timekeeper and azimuth compass.
* Jean Francois de Galaup, Conite tie La Perouse. Burn, 1741. Attacked Britisli
settlements in Hudson's Bay, 1782. Perished off Yanicoro Island, 1788. His fate was
not ascertained until 1827, by Dumont d'Urville.
CHAPTER XXXI.
MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1762-1783.*
Decisive Influence of Control of the Water in the American Revolution — The Lake
Campaign of 1776 — Attack upon Charleston, S. C. — Combined Military and Naval
Operations about New York and Philadelphia, 1776-1778 — Howe and d'Estaing,
1778 — Battle of Ushant, July, 1778 — Barrington at St. Lucia, December, 1778
— Byron off Grenada, July, 1779^Franco-Spanish Fleet in the Channel, 1779 —
Rodney and Langara, January, 1780 — Rodney at Gibraltar, and in the West
Indies, 1780 — Combined Naval and Military Operations in Soiitheni States,
1779-1781 — Arbuthnot and des Touches off the Chesapeake, March, 1781 — Hood
and de Grasse off ^lartinique, April, 1781 — Graves and de Grasse oft' the Chesa-
peake, September, 1781, and Capitulation of Yorktown — Relief of Gibraltar, and
Allied Fleet in the Channel, 1781 — Hyde Parker's Action with the Dutch Fleet,
August, 1781 — Kempenfelt and de Guichen, December-, 1781 — Hood and de
Grasse at St. Kitts, January, 1782 — Rodney's Victory over de Grasse, April,
1782 — Howe's Relief of Gibraltar, October, 1782 — Military and Naval Operations
in India, 1778-1783 — Suffren's Campaign in India, and Actions with Johnstone
and Hughes, 1781-1783.
A
COMMEMOEATIVE MEDAL OF KEPPEL d ACTION OFF
USHANT, IT'S.
{From an original lent hij Capt. H. S. H. Prince Louis
of Battenberg, R. N.)
T the time when hostilities
egan between Great
Britain and her American
Colonies, the fact was realised
generally, being evident to
reason and taught by experi-
ence, that control of the water,
both ocean and inland, would
have a preponderant effect
upon the contest. It was clear to reason, for there was a long
seaboard with numerous interior navigable watercourses, and at the
same time scanty and indifferent communications by land. Critical
portions of the territory involved were yet an unimproved wilderness.
Experience, the rude but efficient schoolmaster of that large portion
of mankind which gains knowledge only by hard knocks, had con-
firmed through the preceding French wars the inferences of the
thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great superiority of the
* Copyright, 1S98, By A. T. Maiian.
vol.. Ill —23
354 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1775.
British Navy, which, however, had not then attained the unchal-
lenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders early sought
the alliance of the Bourhon kingdoms, tlie hereditary enemies of
Great Britain. There alone could be found the counterpoise to a
power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail.
Nearly three years elapsed before the Colonists accomplished this
object, by giving a demonstration of their strength in the enforced
surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This event has merited
the epithet " decisive," because, and only because, it decided the in-
tervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation, that
it was at once the result of naval force, and the cause that naval
force, entering further into the contest, transformed it from a local
to a universal war, and assured the independence of the Colonies.
That the Americans were strong enough to impose the capitula-
tion of Saratoga, was due to the invaluable year of delay, secured
to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created l\y the
indomitable energy, and handled with the indomitable courage, of
the traitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America
to Europe, from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay
of Biscay to the Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the ^lissis-
sippi, and ultimately involved the waters of the remote peninsula of
Hindostan. is traceable, through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla whicli
in 1776 anticipated its enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain.
The events which thus culminated merit therefore a clearer under-
standing, and a fuller treatment, than their intrinsic importance and
petty scale would justify otherwise.
In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the expulsion of the
French from the North American continent. The concentration of
their power, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Law-
rence, had given direction to the local conflict, and had impressed
upon men's minds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tribu-
tary Lake George, and of the Hudson River, as forming a consecu-
tive, though not continuous, water line of communications from the
St. Lawrence to New York. The strength of Canada against attack
by land lay in its remoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed be-
fore it was reached, and in the strength of the line of the St. \a\\\-
rence, with the fortified posts of Montreal and Quebec on its northern
bank. Tlie wilderness, it is true, interposed its passive resistance to
attacks from Canada, as well as to attacks upon it ; but when it had
been traversed, there were to the southward no such strong natural
1775.]
THE MILITARY CONDITIONS OF TEE NORTH.
355
positions confronting the assail-
ant. Attacks from the south
fell upon the front, or at best
upon the flank, of the line of
the St. Lawrence. Attacks from
Canada took New York and its
dependencies in the rear.
These elements of natural
strength, in the military con-
ditions of the North, were im-
pressed upon the minds of the
Americans by the prolonged re-
sistance of Canada to the greatly
superior numbers of the British
Colonists in the previous wars.
Regarded, therefore, as a base
for attacks, of a kind with which
they were painfully familiar, but
to be undergone now under
disadvantages of numbers and
power never before experienced,
it was desirable to gain posses-
sion of the St. Lawrence and its
posts before they were strength-
ened and garrisoned. At this
outset of hostilities, the Ameri-
can insurgents, knowing clearly
their own minds, possessed the
advantage of the initiative over
the British government, which
still hesitated to use against
those whom it styled rebels the
preventive measures it would
have taken at once against a
recognised enemy.
Under these circumstances,
in May, 1775, a body of two hun-
dred and seventy Americans, led
by Ethan Allen and Benedict
Arnold, seized the posts of Ti-
<
1-5
S
<
o
«
<!
356 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 176-2-1783. [1775.
conderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequately garrisoned.
These are on the npjDer waters of Lake Champlain, where it is les&
than a third of a mile wide ; Ticonderoga being on a peninsula
formed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point
on a promontory twelve miles lower down. They were recognised
positions of importance, and advanced posts of the British in pre-
vious wars. A schooner, being found there, Arnold, who had been
a seaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake.
The wind failed him Avhen still thirty miles from St. John's, another
fortified post on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers-
down to the Richelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable
to advance otherwise, Arnold took to his boats with thirt}- men, pulled
tln-oughout the night, and at six o'clock on the following morning
surprised the post, in which were only a sergeant and a dozen men.
He reaped the rewards of celerity. Tlie prisoners informed him that
a considerable body of troops was expected from Canada, on its way
to Ticonderoga ; and this force in fact reached St. John's on the
next day. When it arrived, Arnold was gone, having carried off a
sloop which he found there and destroyed everything else that could
float. ]>y such trifling means two active officers had secured the
temporary control of the lake and of its southern approaches. There
being no roads, the British, debarred from the water line, were unable
to advance. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in
Canada, strengthened the works at St. John's, and built a schooner;
l)ut liis force was inadequate to meet that of the Americans.
The seizure of the two posts, being an act of offensive war, was
not at once pleasing to the American Congress, which still clung
to the hope of reconciliation ; but events were marching rapidly,
and ere summer was over the invasion of Canada was ordered. On
September 4th, General Montgomery, appointed to that enterprise,
embarked at Crown Point with two thousand men, and soon after-
wards appeared before St. John's, which, after prolonged operations,
capitulated on the 3rd of November. On the 13th Montgomery en-
tered Montreal, and thence pressed down the St. Lawrence to Pointe
aux Trembles, twenty miles above Quebec. There he joined Arnold,
who in the month of October had crossed the northern wilderness,
between the head waters of the Kennebec River and the St. Law-
rence. On the way he had endured immense privations, losing five
liiindred men of the twelve hundred with whom he started; and
upon arriving opposite Quebec, on the lOlh of November, three
1776.] THE BLOCKADE OF QUEBEC. 357
days had been unavoidably spent in collecting boats to pass the
river. Crossing on the night of the 13th, this adventurous soldier
and his little command climbed the Heights of Abraham by the
same path that had served Wolfe so well sixteen years before.
With characteristic audacity he summoned the place. The demand
of course was refused ; but that Carleton did not fall at once upon
the little band of seven hundred that bearded him shows by how
feeble a tenure Great Britain then held Canada. Immediately after
the junction Montgomery advanced on Quebec, where he appeared
on the 5th of December. Winter having already begun, and neither
his numbers nor his equipments being adequate to regular siege
operations, he very properly decided to try the desperate chance of
an assault upon the strongest fortress in America. This was made
on the night of December 31st, 1775. Whatever possibility of suc-
cess there may have been, vanished with the death of Montgomery,
who fell at the head of his men.
The American army retired three miles up the river, went into
winter-quarters, and established a land blockade of Quebec, which
was cut off from the sea by the ice. " For five months," wrote
Carleton to the Secretary for War, on the 14th of May, 1776, "this
town has been closely invested by the rebels." From this unpleasant
position it was relieved on the 6th of May, when signals were ex-
changed between it and the Sicrprise, the advance ship of a squadron
under Captain Charles Douglas,^ which had sailed from England on
the 11th of March. Arriving off the mouth of the St. Lawrence,
on the morning of April 12th, Douglas found ice extending nearly
twenty miles to sea, and packed too closely to admit of working
through it by dexterous steering. The urgency of the case not ad-
mitting delay, he ran his ship, the Isis, 50, with a speed of five knots,
against a large piece of ice about ten or twelve feet thick, to test the
effect. The ice, probably softened by salt water and salt air, went
to pieces. " Encouraged by this experiment," continues Douglas,
somewhat magnificently, " we thought it an enterprise worthy an
English ship of the line in our King and country's sacred cause, and
an effort due to the gallant defenders of Quebec, to make the attempt
of pressing her by force of sail, through the thick, broad, and closely
connected fields of ice, to which we saw no bounds towards the west-
ern part of our horizon. Before night (when blowing a snow-storm,
1 Father of the late Sir Howard Douglas. He died a Rear-Admii'al and
Baronet in 1789.
358 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
we brought-to, or rather stopped), we had penetrated about eight
leagues into it, describing our path all the way with bits of the
sheathing of the ship's bottom, and sometimes pieces of the cutwater,
but none of the oak plank ; and it was pleasant enough at times,
when we stuck fast, to see Lord Petersham exercising his troops on
the crusted surface of that fluid through which the ship had so
recently sailed." It took nine daj^s of this work to reach Anticosti
Island, after which the ice seems to have given no more trouble ;
but further delay was occasioned by fogs, calms, and head winds.
Upon the arrival of the ships of war the Americans at once
retreated. During the winter, though reinforcements must have
been received from time to time, they had wasted from exposure,
and from small-pox, which ravaged the camp. On the 1st of May
the returns showed nineteen hundred men present, of whom only a
thousand were fit for duty. There were then on hand but three
days' provisions, and none other nearer than St. John's. The in-
habitants would of course render no further assistance to the Ameri-
cans after the ships arrived. The Navy had again decided the fate
of Canada, and was soon also to determine that of Lake Champlain.
When two hundred troops had landed from the ships, Carleton
marched out, " to see," he said, " what these mighty boasters were
about." The sneer was unworthy a man of his generous character^
for the boasters had endured much for faint chances of success ; and
the smallness of the reinforcement which encouraged him to act
shows either an extreme prudence on his part, or the narrow margin
by which Quebec escaped. He found the enemy busy with prepara-
tions for retreat, and upon his appearance thej* abandoned their
camp. Their forces on the two sides of the river being now sepa-
rated by the enemy's shipping, the Americans retired first to Sorel,
where the Richelieu enters the St. Lawrence, and thence continued
to fall back by gradual stages. It was not until June 15th that
Arnold quitted Montreal ; and at the end of June the united force
was still on the Canadian side of the present border line. On the 3rd
of July it reached Crown Point, in a pitiable state from small-pox
and destitution.
Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon Lake
Champlain. The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept the
superiority obtained for them by Arnold's promptitude a year before.
On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding
the Northern Dei:)artment, wrote : " We have happily such a naval
1770.] THE LAKE CAMPAIGN. 359
superiority on Lake Champlain, that I have a confident hope the
enemy will not appear upon it this campaign, especially as our force
is increasing by the addition of gondolas, two nearly finished. Arnold,
however," — whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted
with the naval preparations, — " says that 300 carpenters should be
employed and a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc., be built,
twenty or thirty at least. There is great difficulty in getting the
carpenters needed." Arnold's ideas were indeed on a scale worthy
of the momentous issues at stake. " To augment our navy on the
lake appears to me of the utmost importance. There is water be-
tween Crown Point and Pointe au Fer for vessels of the largest size.
I am of opinion that row-galleys are the best construction and cheap-
est for this lake. Perhaps it may be well to have one frigate of 36
guns. She may carry 18-pounders on the Lake, and be superior to
any vessel that can be built or floated from St. John's."
Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and
means were far inferior to those of their opponents, who were able
eventually to carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold's
idea of a sailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in
inland waters. Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of
somewhat similar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was
afloat, reversing all the conditions. To place and equip her, however,
required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold's two schooners
exercised control. " If we could have begun our expedition four
weeks earlier," wrote Baron Riedesel, the commander of the German
contingent with Carleton, after examining the American position at
Ticonderoga, " I am satisfied that everything would have been ended
this year (1776) ; but, not having shelter nor other necessary things,
we were unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Champlain."
So delay favours the defence, and changes issues. What would have
been the effect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the
loss of New York, August 20th-September 15th, had come the news
that Ticonderoga, whose repute for strength stood high, had also
fallen ? Nor was this all ; for in that event, the plan which was
wrecked in 1777 by Sir William Howe's ill-conceived expedition to
the Chesapeake, would doubtless have been carried out in 1776. In
a contemporary English paper occurs the following significant item :
" London, September 26th, 1776. Advices have been received here
from Canada, dated August 12th, that General Burgoyne's army has
found it impracticable to get across the lakes this season. The naval
360 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
force of the Provincials is too great for them to contend with at
present. They must buikl hirger vessels for this purpose, and these
cannot be ready before next summer. The design was ^ that the two
armies commanded by Generals Howe and Burgoyne should co-
operate ; that they should both be on the Hudson River at the same
time ; that they should join about Albany, and thereby cut oif all
communication between tlie northern and southern Colonies." -
As Arnold's more ambitious scheme could not be realised, he had
to content himself with gondolas and galleys, for the force he was
to command as well as to build. The precise difference between the
two kinds of rowing vessels thus distinguished by name, the writer
has not been able to ascertain. The gondola was a flat-bottomed boat,
and inferior in nautical qualities — speed, handiness, and seaworthi-
ness — to the galleys, which probably were keeled. The latter cer-
tainly carried sails, and may have been capable of beating to windward.
Arnold preferred them, and stopped the building of gondolas. " The
galleys," he wrote, " are quick moving, which will give us a great
advantage in the open lake." The complements of the galleys were
eighty men, of the gondolas forty-five ; from which, and from their
batteries, it may be inferred that the latter were between one third
and one half the size of the former. The armaments of the two were
alike in character, but those of the gondolas much lighter. American
accounts agree with Captain Douglas's report of one galley captured
by the British. In the bows, an 18 and a 12-pounder ; in the stern,
2 nines ; in Ijroadside, from 4 to 6 sixes. There is in this a some-
what droll reminder of the disputed merits of bow, stern, and
broadside fire, in a modern iron-clad; and the practical conclusion
is much the same. The gondolas had one 12-pounder and 2 sixes.
All the vessels of both parties carried a number of swivel guns.
Amid the many difficulties which lack of resources imposed upon
all American undertakings, Arnold succeeded in getting afloat with
three schooners, a sloop, and five gondolas, on the 20th of August.
He cruised at the upper end of Champlain till the 1st of September,
when he moved rapidly north, and on the 3rd anchored in the lower
narrows, twenty-five miles above St. John's, stretching his line from
sliore to shore. Scouts had ke])t him informed of the progress of
tlie British naval preparations, so that he knew that there was no
immediate danger ; while an advanced position, maintained with a
bold fidiit, would certainly prevent reconnoissances by water, and
^ Author's italics. 2 Remembrancer, iv. 291.
1776. J THE LAKE CJMFAIGN. 361
possibly might impose somewhat upon the enemy. The latter, how-
ever, erected batteries on each side of the anchorage, compelling
Arnold to fall back to the broader Lake. He then had soundings
taken about Yalcour Island, and between it and the western shore ;
that being the position in which he intended to make a stand. He
retired thither on the 23rd of September.
The British on their side had contended with no less obstacles
than their adversaries, though of a somewhat different character.
To get carpenters and materials to build, and seamen to man, were
the chief difficulties of the Americans, the necessities of the sea-
board conceding but partially the demands made upon it ; but their
vessels were built upon the shores of the Lake, and launched into
navigable waters. A large fleet of transports and ships of war in
the St. I^awrence supplied the British witli adequate resources, which
were utilised judiciously and energetically by Captain Douglas ; but
to get these to the Lake was a long and arduous task. A great
part of the Richelieu River was shoal, and obstructed by rapids.
The point where Lake navigation began was at St. John's, to which
the nearest approach, by a hundred-ton schooner, from the St. Law-
rence, was Chambly, ten miles below. Flat-boats and long-boats
could be dragged up stream, but vessels of any size had to be trans-
ported by land ; and the engineers found the roadbed too soft in
places to bear the weight of a hundred tons. Under Douglas's direc-
tions, the planking and frames of two schooners were taken down
at Chambly, and carried round by road to St. John's, where they
were again put together. At Quebec he found building a new hull,
of one hundred and eighty tons. This he took apart nearly to the
keel, shipping the frames in thirty long-boats, which the transport
captains consented to surrender, together with their carpenters, for
service on the Lake. Drafts from the ships of war, and volunteers
from the transports, furnished a body of seven hundred seamen for
the same employment, — a force to which the Americans could op-
pose nothing equal, commanded as it was by regular naval officers.
The largest vessel was ship-rigged, and had a battery of eighteen
12-pounders ; slie was called the Inflexible^ and was commanded l)y
Lieutenant John Schanck. The two schooners, Maria^ Lieutenant
Starke, and Carleton^ Lieutenant James Richard Dacres, carried re-
spectively fourteen and twelve 6-pounders. These were the backbone
of the British flotilla. There were also a radeau, the Thunderci', and
a large gondola, the Loyal Convert, both heavily armed; but, being
362 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
equally heavy of movement, they do not appear to have played any im-
portant part. Besides these, when the expedition started, there were
twenty gunboats, each carrying one fieldpiece, from twenty-fours to
9-pounders ; or, in some cases, howitzers.^
" By all these means," wrote Douglas on July 21st, "our acquir-
ing an absolute dominion over Lake Champlain is not doubted of."
The expectation was perfectly sound. With a working breeze, the
Infiexible alone could sweep the Lake clear of all that floated on it.
But the element of time remained. From the day of this writing
till that on which he saw the Infiexible leave St. John's, October
4th, was over ten weeks ; and it was not until the 9th that Carleton
was ready to advance with the squadron. By that time the Ameri-
can troops at the head of the Lake had increased to eight or ten
thousand. The British land force is reported ^ as thirteen thousand,
of which six thousand were in garrison at St. John's and else-
where.
Arnold's last reinforcements reached him at Valcour on the 6th
of October. On that day, and in the action of the 11th, he had with
him all the American vessels on the Lake, except one schooner and
one galley. His force, thus, was two schooners and a slooj), broad-
side vessels, besides four galleys and eight gondolas, which may be
assumed reasonably to have depended on their bow guns ; there, at
least, was their heaviest fire. Thus reckoned, his flotilla, disposed to
the best advantage, could bring into action at one time, 2 eighteens,
13 twelves, 1 nine, 2 sixes, 12 fours, and 2 2-pounders, independent
of swivels ; total, 32 guns, out of eighty-four that were mounted in
fifteen vessels. To this the British had to oppose, in three broadside
vessels, 9 twelves and 13 sixes, and in twenty gunboats, 20 other
brass guns, " from twenty-fours to nines, some with howitzers ; " ^
total, 42 guns. In this statement the radeau and gondola have not
been included, because of their unmanageableness. Included as
broadside vessels, they would raise the British armament — by 3
twenty -fours, 3 twelves, 4 nines, and a howitzer — to a total of 53
guns. Actually, they could be brought into action only under ex-
ceptional circumstances, and are more properly omitted.
^ The radeau had six 24-poanders, six 12's, and two howitzers; the gondok,
seven D-pounders. The particuhxrs of armament are from Douglas's letters.
2 By American reports. Bcatson gives the force sent out, in the spring of 177G,
as 13,357. ('Mil. and Nav. Memoirs,' vi. 44.)
^ Douglas's letters.
1776.] THE LAKE CAMPAIGN. 363
These minutiae are necessary for the proper appreciation of what
Captain Douglas justly called " a momentous event." It was a strife
of pigmies for the prize of a continent, and the leaders are entitled
to full credit both for their antecedent energy and for their dispo-
sitions in the contest ; not least the unhappy man who, having done
so much to save his country, afterwards blasted his name by a trea-
son unsurpassed in modern war. Energy and audacity had so far
preserved the Lake to the Americans; Arnold determined to have
one more try of the chances. He did not know the full force of
the enemy, but he expected that " it would be ver}^ formidable, if
not equal to ours." ^ The season, however, was so near its end that
a severe check would equal a defeat, and would postpone Carleton's
further advance to the next spring. Besides, what was the worth of
such a force as the American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticon-
deroga, the Lake being lost? It was eminently a case for taking
chances, even if the detachment should be sacrificed, as it was.
Arnold's original purpose had been to fight under way ; and it
was from this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of
their mobility. It is uncertain when he first learned of the rig and
battery of the Inflexible ; ^ but a good look-out was kept, and the
British squadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the nar-
rows. It may have been seen even earlier ; for Carleton had been
informed, erroneously, that the Americans were near Grand Island,
which led him to incline to that side, and so open out Valcour
sooner. The British anchored for the night of October 10th, be-
tween Grand and Long^ Islands. Getting under way next morning,
they stood up the Lake with a strong north-east wind, keeping along
Grand Island, upon which their attention doubtless was fastened by
the intelligence which they had received ; but it was a singular negli-
gence thus to run to leeward with a fair wind, without thorough
scouting on both hands. The consequence was that the American
flotilla was not discovered until Valcour Island, which is from one
hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty feet high through-
out its two miles of length, was so far passed that the attack had
to be made from the south, — from leeward.
* Douglas thought that the appearance of the Inflexible was a complete surprise;
but Arnold had been informed that a third vessel, larger than the schooners, was
being set up. With a man of his character, it is impossible to be sure, from his
letters to his superior, how much he knew, or what he withheld.
2 Now called North Hero.
:]^J- MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
When the British were first made out, Arnold's second in com-
mand, Waterbury, urged tliat in view of the enemy's superiority the
flotilla should get under Avay at once, and fight them " on a retreat
in the main Lake ; " the harbor being disadvantageous " to fight a
number so much superior, and the enemy being able to surround us
on every side, we lying between an island and the main." With
sounder judgment, Arnold decided to hold on. A retreat before
square-rigged sailing vessels having a fair wind, by a heterogeneous
force like his own, of unequal speeds and batteries, could result
only in disaster. Concerted fire and successful escape were alike
improbable ; and besides, escape, if feasible, was but tlu^owing up the
game. Better trust to a stead}^, well-ordered position, developing
the utmost fire. If the enemy discovered him, and came in by the
northern entrance, there was a five-foot knoll in mid-cliannel which
might fetch the biggest of them up; if, as proved to be the case,
the island should be passed, and the attack should be made from
leeward, it probably would be partial and in disorder, as also hap-
jjened. The correctness of Arnold's decision not to chance a retreat
was shown in the retreat of two days later.
A'alcour is on the west side of the Lake, about three quarters
of a mile from the main ; but a peninsula projecting from the island
at mid-length narrows this interval to a half-mile. From the ac-
counts, it is clear that the American flotilla lay south of this penin-
sula. Arnold had, therefore, a reasonable hope that it ndglit be
passed undetected. Writing to Gates, the commander-in-chief at
Ticonderoga, he said : " There is a good harbor, and if the enemy
venture up the Lake it will be impossible for them to take advan-
tage of our situation. If we succeed in our attack upon them, it
will be impossible for any to escape. If we are worsted, our retreat
is open and free. In case of wind, which generally blows fresh at
this season, our craft ^^•ill make good weather, while theirs cannot
keep the Lake." It is apparent from this, written three weeks be-
fore the battle, that lie tlien was not expecting a force materially
different from his own. Later, he describes liis position as being
*' in a small bay on the west side of the island, as near together as
possible, and in such a form that few vessels can attack us at the
same time, and those will be exposed to the fire of the whole
fleet." Though he unfortunately gives no details, he evidently had
sound tactical idens. The formation of the anchored vessels is de-
scribed by the I)ritish officers as a half-moon.
1776.] THE LAKE CAMPAIGN. 365
When the British discovered the enemy, they hauled up for
them. Arnold ordered one of his schooners, the Royal Savage, and
the four galleys, to get under way; the two other schooners and
the eight gondolas remaining at their anchors. The Royal Savage^
dropping to leeward, — by bad management, Arnold says, — came,
apparently unsupported, under the distant fire of the Inflexible, as
she drew under the lee of Valcour at 11 a.m., followed by the
Carleton, and at greater distance by the Maria and the gunboats.
Three shots from the ship's 12-pounders struck the Royal Savage,.
which then ran ashore on the southern point of the island. The
Inflexible, followed closely by the Carleton, continued on, but fired
only occasionally ; showing that Arnold was keeping his galleys in
hand, at long bowls, — as small vessels with one eighteen should be
kept, when confronted with a broadside of nine guns. Between
the island and the main the north-east wind doubtless drew more
northerl}', adverse to the ships' approach ; but, a flaw off the cliff's
taking the fore and aft sails of the Oarleton, she fetched " nearly into
the middle of the rebel half-moon, where Lieutenant J. R. Dacres in-
trepidly anchored with a spring on her cable." The Maria, on board
which was Carleton, together with Commander Thomas Pringle,
commanding the flotilla, was to leeward when the chase began, and
could not get into close action that day. By this time, seventeen
of the twenty gunboats had come up, and, after silencing the Royal
Savage, pulled up to within point-blank range of the American flotilla.
" The cannonade was tremendous," wrote Baron Riedesel. Lieutenant
Edward Longcroft, of the radeau TJiunderer, not being able to get his
raft into action, went with a boat's crew on board the Royal Savage,
and for a time turned her guns upon her former friends ; but the fire
of the latter forced him again to abandon her ; and it seemed so likel}'
that she might be retaken that she was set on fire by Lieutenant
Starke of the Maria, when already " two rebel boats were very near
her. She soon after blew up." The American guns converging on
the Carleton in her central position, she suffered severely. Her com-
mander, Lieutenant Dacres, was knocked senseless ; another officer
lost an arm ; only Mr. Edward Pellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth,
remained fit for duty. The spring being shot away, she swung bows
on to the enemy, and her fire was thus silenced. Captain Pringle
signalled to her to withdraw ; but she was unable to obey. To pay
her head off the right way, Pellew himself had to get out on the
bowsprit under a heavy fire of musketry, to bear the jib over to
366 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
windward ; but to make sail seems to have been impossible. Two
artillery boats were sent to lier assistance, "which towed her off
through a very thick fire, until out of farther reach, much to the
honour of Mr. John Curling and Mr. Patrick Carnegy, master's mate
and midshipman of the /sis, who conducted them ; and of INIr.
Edward Pellew, mate of the Blonde^ who threw the tow-rope from
the Carletoii's bowsprit." ^ Tliis service on board the Carleton started
Pellew on his road to fortune ; but, singularly enough, the lieutenancy
promised him in consequence, by both the First Lord and Lord Howe,
was delayed by the fact that he stayed at the front, instead of going
to the rear, where he would have been " within their jurisdiction." ^
The Carleton had two feet of water in the hold, and had lost eight
killed and six wounded, — about half her crew, — when she anchored
out of fire. In this small but stirring business, the Americans, in
addition to the Royal Savage^ had lost one gondola. Besides the
injuries to the Carleton, a British artillery boat, commanded by a
German lieutenant, was sunk. Towards evening the Infiexihle got
within point-blank shot of the Americans, "• when five broadsides,"
wrote Douglas, " silenced their whole line." One fresh ship, with
scantling for sea-going, and a concentrated battery, has an unques-
tioned advantage over a dozen light-built craft, carrying one or two
guns each, and already several hours engaged.
At nightfall the Infiexihle dropped out of range, and the British
squadron anchored in line of battle across the southern end of the
passage between the island and the main ; some vessels were ex-
tended also to the eastward, into the open Lake. " The best part
of my intelligence," wrote Burgoyne next day from St. John's, to
Douglas at Quebec, " is that our whole fleet was formed in line
above the enemy, and consequently they must have surrendered this
morning, or given us battle on our own terms. The Indians and
light troops are abreast with the fleet ; they cannot, therefore, escape
by land." The British squadron sharing this confidence, a proper
look-out was not kept. The American leader immediately held a
conference with his officers, and decided to attempt a retreat, " which
was done with such secrecy," • -whites Waterburj^, " that we went
through them entirely undiscovered." The movement began at
7 P.M., a galley leading, the gondolas and schooners following, and
Arnold and liis second bringing up the rear in the two heaviest gal-
leys. This delicate operation was favoured by a heavy fog, which
^ Douglas's letter. '^ Sandwich to Pellew.
1776.] THE LAKE CAMPAIGN. 367
did not clear till next morning at eight. As the Americans stole
by, they could not see any of the hostile ships. By daylight they
were out of sight of the British. Riedesel, speaking of this event,
says, " The ships anchored, secure of the enemy, who stole off
during the night, and sailing round the left wing, aided by a
favourable Avind, escaped under darkness." The astonishment next
morning, he continues, was great, as was Carleton's rage. The lat-
ter started to pursue in such a hurry that he forgot to leave orders
for the troops which had been landed ; but, failing to discover the
fugitives, he returned and remained at Valcour till nightfall, when
scouts brought word that the enemy were at Schuyler's Island, eight
miles above.
The retreat of the Americans had been embarrassed by their
injuries, and by the wind coming out ahead. They were obliged to
anchor on the 12th to repair damages, both hulls and sails having
suffered severely. Arnold took the precaution to write to Crown
Point for bateaux, to tow in case of a southerly wind ; but time was
not allowed for these to arrive. Two gondolas had to be sunk on
account of their injuries, making three of that class so far lost. The
retreat was resumed at 2 p.m., but the breeze was fresh from the
southward, and the gondolas made very little way. At evening the
British chased again. That night the wind moderated, and at day-
break the American flotilla was twenty-eight miles from Crown
Point, — fourteen from Valcour, — having still five miles' start.
Later, however, by Arnold's report, " the wind again breezed up to
the southward, so that we gained very little either by beating or row-
ing. At the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze from north-
east, and, by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside of
us." The galleys of Arnold and Waterbury, the Congress and the
Washington, had throughout kept in the rear, and now received the
brunt of the attack, made by the Inflexible and the two schooners,
which had entirely distanced their sluggish consorts. This fight was
in the upper narrows, where the Lake is from one to three miles
wide ; and it lasted, by Arnold's report, for five glasses (two hours
and a half),i the Americans continually retreating, until about ten
miles from Crown Point. There, the Washington having struck
some time before, and final escape being impossible, Arnold ran his
own galley and four gondolas ashore in a small creek on the east
side ; pulling to windward, v/ith the cool judgment that had marked
^ Beatson, ' Nav. and Mil. Memoirs,' says two hours.
368 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
all his conduct, so that the enemy could not follow him — except in
small boats with which he could deal. There he set his vessels ou
lire, and stood by them until assured that they would blow^ up with
their flags flying. He then retreated to Crowai Point through the
woods, " despite the savages ; " a phrase which concludes this singu-
lar aquatic contest with a quaint touch of local colour.
In three days of fighting and retreating the Americans had lost
one schooner, two galleys, and seven gondolas, — in all, ten vessels
out of fifteen. The killed and wounded amounted to over eighty,
twenty odd of whom w^ere in Arnold's galley. The original force,
jiumbering seven hundred, had been decimated. Considering its raw-
material and the recency of its organisation, words can scarcely exag-
gerate the heroism of the resistance, which undoubtedly depended
chiefly upon the personal military qualities of the leader. The Brit-
ish loss in killed and wounded did not exceed forty.
The little American navy on Champlain was w-iped out; but
never had any force, big or small, lived to better purpose or died
more gloriously ; for it had saved the Lake for that year. Whatever
deductions may be made for blunders, and for circumstances of every
character, which made the British campaign of 1777 abortive and
disastrous, and so led directly to the American alliance wath France
in 1778, the delay, with all that it invoh-cd, was obtained by the
Lake campaign of 1776. On October 15th, two days after Arnold's
final defeat, Carleton dated a letter to Douglas IVoni before Crown
Point, whence the American garrison was withdrawn. A week later '
Riedesel arrived, and wrote that, " were our whole army here it
would be an easy matter to drive the enemy from their entrench-
ments," at Ticonderoga, and — as has l)een (j noted already — four
wrecks sooner would have insured its fall. It is Imt a coincidence
that just four weeks had been required to set up the Inflexible at St.
John's ; but it typifies the whole story. Save for Arnold's flotilla,
the two British schooners would have settled the business. " Upon
the whole, Sir," wrote Douglas in his final letter from Quebec before
sailing for England, " I scruple not to say, that had not General Car-
leton authorised me to take the extraordinary measure of sending up
the Inflcxihle from Quebec, things could not tliis year have been
brought to so glorious a conclusion on Lake Champlain.'' Douglas
further showed the importance attached to tliis success by nien of
that day, by sending a special message to tlie British ambassador at
^ladrid, "presuming that the early knowledge of this great event
1776.] THE LAKE CAMPAIGN. 369
in the southern parts of Europe may be of advantage to His Majes-
ty's service." That the opinion of the government was similar may
be inferred from the numerous rewards bestowed. Carleton was
made a Knight of the Bath, and Doughis a baronet.
In no case where the British and the Americans have met upon
the water, has a serious charge of personal misconduct been proved
against any individual ; and the gallantry shown upon occasion by
both sides upon Lake Champlain in 1776, is evident from the fore-
going narrative. With regard to the direction of movements, — the
skill of the two leaders, — the same equal credit cannot be assigned.
It was a very serious blunder, on October lltli, to run to leeward,
passing a concealed enemy, undetected, upon waters so perfectly well
known as those of Champlain were ; it having been the scene of fre-
quent British operations in previous wars. Owing to this, " the
Maria, because of her distant situation (from which the InfiexiUe
and Carleton had chased by signal) when the rebels were first dis-
covered, and baffling winds, could not get into close action." ^ For
the same reason the Infiexihle could not support the Carleton. The
Americans, in the aggregate distinctly inferior, were thus permitted
a concentration of superior force upon part of their enemies. It is
needless to enlarge upon the mortifying incident of Arnold's escape
that evening. To liken small things to great, — always profitable
in military analysis, — it resembled Hood's slipping away from de
Grasse at St. Kitts.
In conduct and courage, Arnold's behaviour was excellent through-
out. Without enlarging upon the energy Avhich created the flotilla,,
and the breadth of view which suggested preparations that he could
not enforce, admiration is due to his recognition of the fact — im-
plicit in deed, if unexpressed in word — that the one use of the
navy was to contest the control of the water ; to impose delay, even
if it could not secure ultimate victory. No words could say more
clearly than do his actions that, under the existing conditions, the
navy was useless, except as it contributed to that end ; valueless, if
buried in port. Upon this rests the merit of his bold advance into
the lower narrows ; upon this his choice of the strong defensive
position of Valcour ; upon this his refusal to retreat, as urged by
Waterburv, when the full force of the enemv was disclosed, — a
^ Douglas's letters. The sentence is awkward, but carefully compared with the
copy in the author's hands. Douglas says, of the details he gives, that " they have
been collected with the most scrupulous circumspection."
vol. Ill — 24
370 MAJOR OPERJllOXS. 1702-178:3. [1776,
decision justified, or rather, illustrated, by the advantages which the
accidents of the day threw into his hands. His personal gallantry
was consj)icuous there as at all times of his life. " His countrymen,"
said a generous enemy of that day, " chiefly gloried in the dangerous
attention which he paid to a nice point of honour, in keeping his flag
flying, and not quitting his galley till she was in flames, lest the
enemy should have boarded, and struck it."' It is not the least of
the injuries done to his nation in after years, that he should have
silenced this boast and effaced this glorious record by so black an
infamy.
With the destruction of the flotilla ends the naval story of the
Lakes during the War of the American Revolution. Satisfied that
it was too late to proceed against Ticonderoga that year, Carleton
\\ith(h'ew to St. John's and went into winter-quarters. The follow-
ing year the enterprise was resumed under General Burgoyne ; but
Sir William Howe, instead of co-operating by an advance up the
Hudson, which was the plan of 1776, carried his army to Chesapeake
Bay, to act thence against Philadelphia. Burgoyne took Ticonde-
roga and forced his way as far as Saratoga, sixty miles from Ticon-
deroga and thirty from Albany, where Howe should have met him.
There he was brought to a stand by the army which the Americans
had collected, found himself unable to advance or to retreat, and was
forced to lay down his arms on October 17th, 1777. The garrisons left
by him at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retired to Canada, and the
posts were re-occupied by the Americans. No further contest took
place on the Lake, though the British vessels remained in control of
it, and showed themselves from time to time up to 1781. With the
outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, in 1778, tlie scene
of interest shifted to salt water, and there remained till the end.
The opening conflict between Great Britain and her North Ameri-
can Colonies teaches clearly the necessity, too rarely recognised in
practice, that when a state has decided to use force, the force pro-
vided should be adequate from the first. It is better to be much too
strong than a little too weak. Seeing the evident temper of the
Massachusetts Colonists, force would be needed to execute the Boston
Port Bill and its companion measures of 1774 ; for the Port Bill
especially, naval force. The supplies for 1775 granted only 18,000
seamen, — 2,000 less than for the previous year. For 177G, 28,000
seamen were voted, and the total appropriations rose from £5,556,000
1776.] THE EVACUATION OF BOSTON. 371
to £10,154,000 ; but it was then too late. Boston was evacuated by
the British army, 8,000 strong, on the 17th of March, 1776 ; but
ah'eady, for more than half a year, the spreading spirit of revolt in
the thirteen Colonies had been encouraged by the sight of the British
army cooped up in the town, suffering from want of necessaries, while
the colonial army blockading it was able to maintain its position,
because ships laden with stores for the one were captured, and the
cargoes diverted to the use of the other. To secure free and ample
communications for one's self, and to interrupt those of the opponent,
are among the first requirements of war. To carry out the measures
of the British government a naval force was needed, which should not
only protect the approach of its own transports to Boston Bay, but
should prevent access to all coast ports whence supplies could be
carried to the blockading army. So far from this, the squadron was
not equal, in either number or quality, to the work to be done about
Boston ; and it was not until October, 1775, that the Admiral was
authorised to capture colonial merchant vessels, which therefore went
and came unmolested, outside of Boston, carrying often provisions
which found their way to Washington's army.
After evacuating Boston, General Howe retired to Halifax, there
to await the coming of reinforcements, both military and naval, and
of his brother Vice-Admiral Lord Howe, appointed to command the
North American Station. General Howe was commander-in-chief of
the forces throughout the territory extending from Nova Scotia to
West Florida ; from Halifax to Pensacola. The first operation of
the campaign was to be the reduction of New York.
The British government, however, had several objects in view,
and permitted itself to be distracted from the single-minded prosecu-
tion of one great undertaking to other subsidiary, and not always
concentric, operations. Whether the control of the line of the Hud-
son and Lake Champlain ouglit to have been sought through opera-
tions beginning at both ends, is open to argument ; the facts that the
Americans were back in Crown Point in the beginning of July, and
that Carleton's 13,000 men got no farther than St. John's tliat year,
suggest that the greater part of the latter force would have been
better employed in New York and New Jersey than about Cham-
plain. However that may be, the diversion of a third body, respect-
able in point of numbers, to the Carolinas, is scarcely to be defended
on military grounds. The government was induced to it by the
expectation of local support from royalists. That there were con-
372 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
jsiclerable numbers of these in both Colonies is certain ; but while
military operations must take account of political conditions, the
latter should not be allowed to overbalance elementary principles
of the military art. It is said that General Howe disapproved of
this ex-centric movement.
The force destined for the Southern coasts assembled at Cork
towards the end of 1775, and sailed thence in January, 1776. The
troops were commanded by Lord Cornwallis, the squadron by Nel-
son's early patron. Commodore Sir Peter Parker, whose broad pen-
nant was hoisted on board the Bristol^ 50, Captain John Morris.
After a boisterous passage, the expedition arrived in May off Cape
Fear in North Carolina, where it was joined by 2,000 men under Sir
Henry Clinton, Cornwallis's senior, whom Howe had detached to the
southward in January, by the government's orders. Upon his appear-
ance, the royalists in North Carolina had risen, headed by the hus-
band of Flora Macdonald, whose name thirty years before had been
associated romantically with the escape of the young Pretender, but
who had afterwards emigrated to America. The rising, however,
had been put down, and Clinton had not thought it expedient to try
a serious invasion, in face of the large force assembled to resist him.
Upon Parker's coming, it was decided to ]nake an attempt upon
Charleston, South Carolina. The fleet therefore sailed from Cape
Fear on the 1st of June, and on the 4th anchored off Charleston Bar.
Charleston Harbour opens between two of the Sea-Islands which
fringe the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia. On the north is
Sullivan's Island, on the south James Island. The bar of the main
entrance was not abreast the mouth of the port, but some distance
south of it. Inside the bar, the channel turned to the northward,
and tlience led near Sullivan's Island, the southern end of which
was therefore chosen as the site of the rude fort hastily thrown up
to meet this attack, and afterwards called Fort Moultrie, from the
name of the commander. From these conditions, a southerly wind
was needed to bring ships into action. After sounding and buoying
the bar, the transports and frigates crossed on the 7tli and anchored
inside ; but as it was necessary to remove some of the Brisfors guns,
she could not follow until the 10th. On the 9th Clinton had landed
in person with live IiuihIiimI men, and by tlie 15th all the troops had
disembarked u})on Long Island, next north of Sullivan's. It was
understood that the inlet between the two was fordable, allowing the
troojjs to co-operate with the naval attack, by diversion or otherwise ;
1776.] THE ATTACK UPON CHARLESTON, S. C. 373
but this proved to be a mistake. The passage was seven feet deep
at low water, and there were no means for crossing ; consequently a
small American detachment in the scrub wood of the island was suf-
ficient to check any movement in that quarter. The lighting there-
fore was confined to the cannonading of the fort by the ships.
Circumstances not fully explained caused the attack to be fixed
for the 23rd ; an inopportune delay, during which the Americans
were strengthening their still very imperfect defences. On the 23rd
the wind was unfavourable. On the 25th the Experiment., 50, Cap-
tain Alexander Scott, arrived, crossed the bar, and, after taking in
her guns again, was ready to join in the assault. On the 27th, at
10 A.M., the ships got under way with a south-east breeze, but this
shifted soon afterwards to north-west, and they had to anchor again,
about a mile nearer to Sullivan's Island. On the following day the
wind served, and the attack was made.
In plan. Fort Moultrie was square, with a bastion at each angle.
In construction, the sides were palmetto logs, dovetailed and bolted
together, laid in parallel rows, sixteen feet apart, and the interspace
filled with sand. At the time of the engagement, the south and west
fronts were finished ; the other fronts were only seven feet high, but
surmounted by thick planks, to be tenable against escalade. Thirty-
one guns were in place, eighteen and nine pounders, of which twenty-
one were on the south face, commanding the channel. Within was
a traverse running east and west, protecting the gunners from shots
from the rear ; but there was no such cover against enfilading fire,
in case an enemy's ship passed the fort and anchored above it. " The
general opinion before the action," Moultrie says, " and especially
among sailors, was that two frigates would be sufficient to knock the
town about our ears, notwithstanding our batteries." Parker may
have shared this impression, and it may account for his leisure-
liness. When the action began, the garrison had but twenty-eight
rounds for twenty-six cannon, but this deficiency was unknown to
the British.
Parker's plan was that the two 50's, Bristol and Experiment, and
two 28-gun frigates, the Active, Captain AVilliam Williams, and the
Soleiay, Captain Thomas Symonds, accompanied by a bomb-vessel, the
Thunder, 8, Captain James Reid, should engage the main front;
while two frigates of the same class, the Actceon, Captain Christopher
Atkins, and the Syren, Captain Christopher Furneaux, with a 20-gun
corvette, the Sphinx, Captain Anthony Hunt, should pass the fort,
q
74 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
anchoring to the westward, up-channel, to protect the heavy vessels.
against fire-ships, as well as to enfilade the main batter^-. The order
to weigh was given at 10.30 a.m., when the flood-tide had fairly
made ; and at 11.15 the Active^ Bristol, and Experiment, anchored in
line ahead, in the order named, the Active to the eastward. The
Solebay lay outside the others, abreast the interval between the 50's.
The ships seem to have taken their places skilfully and without con-
fusion, and their fire, which opened at once, was rapid, well-sustained,
and well-directed ; but their disposition suffered under the radical
defect that, whether from actual lack of water, or only from fear of
grounding, they were too far from the works to use grape effectively.
The sides of ships being much weaker than those of shore works,
while their guns were much more numerous, the secret of success
was to get near enough to beat down the hostile fire by a multitude
of projectiles. The bomb-vessel Thunder anchored ahead, and out-
side, of the Active, south-east by south from the east bastion of the
engaged front. Her shells, though well aimed, were ineffective.
" Most of them fell within the fort," INIoultrie reported, '^ but we had
a morass in the middle, wliich swallowed them instantly, and those
that fell in the sand were immediately buried." During the action,
the mortar bed broke, disabling the piece.
Owing to the scarcity of powder, the garrison had positive orders
not to engage at ranges exceeding four hundred yards. Four or five
shots were thrown at the Active, while still under sail, but \vith this
exception the fort kept silence until the ships anchored, at a distance
estimated by the Americans to be 350 yards. The word was then
passed along the platform, " ]\Iind the Commodore ; mind the two-
50-gun ships," — an order which was strictly obeyed, as the losses
show. The protection of the work proved to be almost perfect, — a
fact which doubtless contributed to the coolness and precision of fire
vitally essential with such deficient resources. The texture of the
palmetto wood suffered the balls to sink smoothly into it without
splintering, so that the facing of the work held well. At times,
when three or four broadsides struck together, the merlons shook so
that Moultrie feared they would come bodily in ; but they withstood,.
and the small loss inflicted was chiefly through the embrasures. The
flagstaff was shot away, falling outside into the ditch, but a young
sergeant, named Jas[)er, distinguished himself by jumping after it,
fetching back and rehoisting the colours under a heavy fire.
In the squadron an equal gallantry was shown under circum-
1776.]
FORT MOULTRIE.
Zll
376 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3. [1770.
stances which made severe demands upon endurance. Whatever
Parker's estimate of the worth of the defences, no trace of vain-con-
fidence appears in liis dispositions, which were thorough and careful,
as the execution of the main attack was skilful and vigorous. But
the ships' companies had expected an easy victory, and they found
themselves confronted Avith a resistance and a punishment as severe
as were endured hy the leaders at Trafalgar, and far more prolonged.
Such conditions impose upon men's tenacity the additional test of
surprise and discomfiture. The Exj^erimcnt^ though very small for
a ship of the line, lost 23 killed and 56 wounded, out of a total prob-
ably not much exceeding 300, while the Bristol., having the spring
shot away, swung with her head to the southward and her stern to
the fort, undergoing for a long time a raking fire to which she could
make little reply. Three several attempts to replace the spring
were made by ]Mr. James Saumarez, — afterwards the distinguished
admiral, then a midshipman, — before the ship was relieved from this
grave disadvantage. Her loss was 40 killed and 71 wounded ; not a,
man escaping of those stationed on the quarter-deck at the beginning
of the action. Among the injured was the Commodore himself,
whose cool heroism must liave been singularly conspicuous, from the
notice it attracted in a service where such bearing was not rare. At
one time when the quarter-deck was cleared and he stood alone u[)on
the poop-ladder, Saumarez suggested to him to come down ; but he
replied, smiling, '• You want to get rid of me, do you ? " and refused
to move. The captain of the ship, John Morris, was mortally
wounded. "With commendable modesty Parker only reported him-
self as slightly bruised ; but deserters stated that for some days he
needed the assistance of two men to walk, and that his trousers had
been torn off him by shot or splinters. The loss in the other ships
was only one killed, 14 wounded. The Americans had 37 killed and
wounded.
The three vessels assigned to enfilade the main front of the fort
did not get into position. They ran on the middle ground, owing,
Parker reported, to the ignorance of the pilots. T'wo had fouled
each other before striking. Having taken the bottom on a rising
tide, two floated in a few hours, and retreated ; but the third, the
Actccon, 28, sticking fast, was set on fire and abandoned by her offi-
cers. Before she blew up, the Americans boarded her, securing lier
colours, bell, and some other trophies. " Had these sliips effected
their purpose," ]\Ii»ultrie reported, "they would have driven us fi'om
our CT'ins."
1776.]
NORTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES.
Til
pA/^r or North America &. The North Atlantic
^The. Welst Indieis
Siz^ScicfiS
PART OF NORTH AMERICA AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND THE WEST INDIES.
378 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
The main division held its ground until long after nightfall,
firing much of the time, but stopping at intervals. After two hours
it had been noted that the fort replied very slowly, which was attrib-
uted to its being overborne, instead of to the real cause, the neces-
sity for sparing ammunition. For the same reason it was entirely
silent from 3.30 i>.3i. to G, when fire was resumed from only two or
three guns, whence Parker surmised that the rest had been dis-
mounted. The Americans were restrained throughout the engage-
ment by the fear of exhausting entirely their scanty store.
" About 9 P.M.," Parker reported, " being very dark, great part
of our ammunition expended, the people fatigued, the tide of ebb
almost done, no prospect from the eastward (that is, from the army),
and no possibility of our being of any further service, I ordered the
ships to withdraw to their former moorings." Besides the casualties
among the crew, and severe damage to the hull, the Bristol's main-
mast, with nine cannon-balls in it, had to be shortened, while the
mizzen-mast was condemned. The loss of the frigates was imma-
terial, owing to the garrison's neglecting them.
The fight in Charleston Harbour, the first serious contest in
which ships took pari in this war, resembles generically the battle of
Bunker's Hill, with which the regular land warfare had opened a
year before. Both illustrate the difficulty and danger of a front
attack, without cover, upon a fortified position, and the advantage
conferred even upon untrained men, if naturally cool, resolute, and
intelligent, not only by the protection of a work, but also, it may be
urged, by the recognition of a tangible line up to which to hold, and
to abandon which means defeat, dishonour, and disaster. It is much
for untried men to recognise in their surroundings something which
gives the unity of a common purpose, and thus the coherence which
discipline imparts. Although there was in Parker's dispositions
nothing open to serious criticism, — nothing that can be ascribed to
undervaluing his opponent, — and although, also, he had good reason
to expect from the army active co-operation which he <lid not get, it
is probable that he was very much surprised, not only at the tenacity
of the Americans' resistance, but at the efficacy of their fire. He
felt, doubtless, tlie traditional and natural distrust — and, for the
most part, the justified distrust — with which experience and prac-
tice regard inexperience. Some seamen of American birth, who had
been serving in the Bristol^ deserted after the fight. Her crew,
they reported, said, " We were told the Yankees would not stand
1776.] THE OCCUPATION OF NEW YORK HARBOUR. 379
two tires, but we never saw better fellows;" and when the fire of
the fort slackened and some cried, " They have done fighting," others
replied, " By God, we are glad of it, for we never had such a drub-
bing in our lives." " All the common men of the fleet spoke loudly
in praise of the garrison," — a note of admiration so frequent in
generous enemies that we may be assured that it was echoed on the
quarter-deck also. They could afford it well, for beyond the natural
mortification of defeat, there was no stain upon their own record, no
flinching under the severity of their losses, although a number of
their own men were comparatively raw, volunteers from the trans-
ports, whose crews had come forward almost as one man when they
knew that the complements of the ships were short through sickness.
Burke, a friend to both sides, was justified in saying that " never did
British valour shine more conspicuously, nor did our ships in an
engagement of the same nature experience so serious an encounter."
There were several death-vacancies for lieutenants ; and, as the battle
of Lake Champlain gave Pellew his first commission, so did that of
Charleston Harbour give his to Saumarez, who was made lieutenant
of the Bristol by Parker. Two years later, wdien the ship had gone
to Jamaica, he was followed on her quarter-deck by Nelson and Col-
lingwood, who also received promotion in her from the same hand.
The attack on Fort Moultrie was not resumed. After necessary
repairs, the ships of war with the troops went to New York, where
they arrived on the 4th of August, and took part in the operations
for the reduction of that place under the direction of the two Howes.
The occupation of New York Harbour, and the capture of the
city were the most conspicuous British successes of the summer and
fall of 1776. While Parker and Clinton were meeting with defeat
at Charleston, and Arnold was hurrying the preparation of his flotilla
on Champlain, the two brothers, General Howe and the Admiral,
were arriving in New York Bay, invested not only with the powers
proper to the commanders of great fleets and armies, but also with
authority as peace commissioners, to negotiate an amicable arrange-
ment with the revolted Colonies.
General Howe had awaited for some time at Halifax the arrival
of the expected reinforcements, but wearying at last he sailed thence
on the 10th 'of June, 1776, with the army then in hand. On the
25th he himself reached Sandy Hook, the entrance to New York
Bay, having preceded the transports in a frigate. On the 29th, the
380 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
day after Parker's repulse at Fort Moultrie, the troops arrived ; and
on July 3rd, the date on which the Americans, retreating from Can-
ada, reached Crown Point, the British landed on Staten Island, which
is on the west side of the lower Bay. On the 12th of July the Eagle,
64, came in, carrj^ing the flag of Admiral Lord Howe. This officer
was much esteemed by the Americans for his own personal qualities,
and for his attitude towards them in the present dispute, as well as
for the memory of his brother, who had endeared himself greatly to
them in the campaign of 1758, when he had fallen near Lake Cham-
plain ; but the decisive step of declaring their independence had
been taken already, on July 4th, eight days before the Admiral's
arrival. A month was spent in fruitless attempts to negotiate with
the new government, without recognising any official character in its
representatives. During that time, however, while abstaining from
decisive operations, cruisers were kept at sea to intercept American
traders, and the Admiral, immediately upon arriving, sent four ves-
sels of war twenty-five miles up the Hudson River, as far as Tarry-
town. This squadron was commanded by Hyde Parker, afterwards,
in 1801, Nelson's commander-in-chief at Copenhagen. The service
was performed under a tremendous cannonade from all the batteries
on both shores, from the lower Bay to far above the city, but the ships
could not be stopped. Towards the middle of August it was evident
that the Americans would not accept any terms in the power of the
Howes to offer, and it became necessary to attempt coercion by arms.
In the reduction of New York in 1776, the part played by the
British Navy, owing to the nature of the campaign in general and of
the enemy's force in particular, was of that inconspicuous character
which obscures the fact that without the Navy the operations could
not have been undertaken at all, and that the Navy played to them
the part of the base of operations and line of communications. Like
the foundations of a building, these lie outside the range of super-
ficial attention, and therefore are less generally appreciated than the
brilliant fighting that goes on at the front, to the maintenance of
which they are indispensable. Consequent!}', whatever of interest
may attach to an}-, or to all, of the minor affairs, which in the aggre-
gate constitute the action of the naval force in such circumstances,
the historian of tlie major operations is confined perforce to indi-
cating the broad general effect of naval power upon the issue. This
will be done best by tracing in outline the scene of action, the com-
bined movements, and tlie Navy's influence in both.
1776.]
NEir YORK HARBOUR AND NEIGEBOURROOL.
381
382 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [5776.
The harbour of New York divides into two parts — the upper
and lower Baj-s — connected by a passage called the Narrows, between
Long and Staten Islands, upon the latter of which the British troops
were encamped. Long Lsland, which forms the eastern shore of the
Narrows, extends to the east-north-east a hundred and ten miles,
enclosing between itself and the continent a broad sheet of water
called Long Island Sound, that reaches nearly to Narragansett Bay.
The latter, being a fine anchorage, entered also into the present plan
of operations, as an essential feature in a coastwise maritime cam-
paign. Long Island Sound and the upper Bay of New York are
connected by a passage, known as the East River, eight or ten miles
in length, and at that time nearly a mile wide ^ abreast the city of
New York. At the point where the East Kiver joins New York Bay,
the Hudson River, an estuary there nearly two miles wide, also enters
from the north, — a circumstance which has procured for it the alter-
native name of the North River. Near their confluence, and half a
mile below the town, is Governor's Island, centrally situated to com-
mand the entrances to both. Between the East and North rivers,
with their general directions from north and east-north-east, is em-
braced a long strip of land gradually narrowing to the southward.
The end of this peninsula, as it would otherwise be, is converted
into an island, of a mean length of about eight miles, by the Harlem
River, — a nan-ow and partially navigable stream connecting the East
and North rivers. To the southern extreme of this island, called
Manhattan, the city of New York was then confined.
As both the East and North rivers were navigable for large
ships, the former throughout, the latter for over a hundred miles
above its mouth, it was evident that control of the water must
play a large part in warlike operations throughout the district
described. With the limited force at Washington's disposal, he had
been unable to push tlie defences of the city as far to the front as
was desirable, llie lower Bay was held by the British Navy, and
Staten Island had been abandoned, necessarily, without resistance,
thus surrendering the strong defensive position of the Narrows.
The lines were contracted thus to the immediate neighbom^hood of
New York itself. Small detached works skirted the shores of ]Man-
hattan Island, and a line of redoubts extended across it, following
the course of a small stream which then partly divided it, a mile
from the southern end. Governor's Island was also occupied as an
^ At tlie present clay reductid by reclaimed land.
1770.] THE OPERATIONS ABOUT NEW YORK. 383
outpost. Of more intrinsic strength, but not at first concerned,
strong works had been thrown up on either side of the Nortli River,
upon commanding heights eight miles above New York, to dispute
the passage of ships.
The crucial weakness in this scheme of defence was that the
shore of Long Island opposite the city was much higher than that
of Manhattan. If this height were seized, the city, and all below it,
became untenable. Here, therefore, was the key of the position and
the chief station for the American troops. For its protection a line
of works was thrown up, the flanks of which rested upon Wallabout
Bay and Gowanus Cove, two indentations in the shores of Long
Island. These Washington manned with 9,000 of the 18,000 men
under his command. By the arrival of three divisions of Hessian
troops, Howe's army now numbered over 34,000 men, to which
Clinton brought 3,000 more from before Charleston.^
On the 22nd of August the British crossed from Staten Island to
Gravesend Bay, on the Long Island shore of the Narrows. The
Navy covered the landing, and the transportation of the troops was
under the charge of Commodore William Hotham, who, nineteen
years later, was Nelson's commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean.
By noon 15,000 men and forty field-guns had been carried over and
placed on shore. The force of the Americans permitted little oppo-
sition to the British advance ; but General Howe was cautious and
easy-going, and it was not till the 27th that the army, now increased
to 25,000, was fairly in front of the American lines, having killed,
wounded, and taken about 1,500 men. Hoping that Howe would be
tempted to storm the position, Washington replaced these with 2,000
drawn from his meagre numbers ; but his opponent held back his
troops, who were eager for the assault. The Americans now stood
with their backs to a swift river, nearly a mile wide, with only a
feeble line of works interposing between them and an enemy more
than double their number.
On the morning of the 27th, Sir Peter Parker, with a 64, two
50's, and two frigates, attempted to work up to New York, with a
view of supporting the left flank of the army; but the wind came
out from the north, and, the ebb-tide making, the ships got no nearer
than three miles from the city. Fortunately for the Americans, they
either could not or would not go farther on the following two days.
1 Beatson's ' Military and Naval Memoirs,' vi. 44, give 34,614 as the strength of
Howe's armv. Clinton's division is not included in this. vi. 45.
384 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
After dark of the 28tli, Howe broke ground for regular approaches.
AVashington, seeing this, and knowing that there could be but one
result to a siege under his condition of inferiority, resolved to with-
draw. During the night of the 29th ten thousand men silently
quitted their positions, embarked, and crossed to Manhattan Island,
carrying with them all their belongings, arms, and ammunition. The
enemy's trenches were but six hundred yards distant, yet no suspicion
was aroused, nor did a single deserter give treacherous warning.
The night was clear and moonlit, although a heavy fog towards day-
break prolonged the period of secrecy which shrouded the retreat.
When the fog rose, the last detachment was discovered crossing, but
a few ineffectual cannon shot at it were the only harassment experi-
enced in the course of this rapid and dexterous retirement. The
garrison of Governor's Island was withdrawn at the same time.
The unmolested use of the water, and the nautical skill of the
fishermen who composed one of the American regiments, were essen-
t ial to this escape ; for admirable as the movement was in conception
and execution, no word less strong than escape applies to it. By it
Washington rescued over half his army from sure destruction, and,
not improbably, the cause of his people from immediate collapse.
An opportunity thus seized implies necessarily an opportunity lost on
the other side. For that failure both army and Navy must bear their
share of the blame. It is obvious that when an enemy is cornered,
his line of retreat should be watched. This was the business of both
commanders-in-chief, the execution of it being primarily the duty of
the Navy, as retreat from the American position could be only by
v.'ater. It was a simple question of look-out, of detection, of molesta-
tion by that means ; not of arresting the retreat. To the latter, sail-
ing ships were inadequate, for they could not have remained at anchor
under the gmis of Manhattan Island, either by day or night ; but a
few boats with muffled oars could have watched, could have given the
alarm, precipitating a British attack, and such a movement inter-
rupted in mid-course brings irretrievable disaster.
Washington now withdi-ew the bulk of his army to the line of
the Harlem. On his right, south of that river and commanding the
Hudson, was a fort called by his name ; opposite to it on the Jersey
shore was Fort Lee. A garrison of four thousand men occupied
^e\y York. After amusing himself with some further peace nego-
tiations, Howe determined to possess the city. As a diversion from
the main effort, and to cover the crossing of tlic troops, two detach-
1776.] FORT WASHINGTON EVACUATED. 385
ments of ships were ordered to pass the batteries on the Hudson and
East rivers. This was done on the 13th and the 15th of September,
the North River division commanded by Captain Francis Banks, the
East River by Captain Hyde Parker. The Latter suffered severely,
especially in spars and rigging ; i but the success of both, following
upon that of Hyde Parker a few weeks earlier, in his expedition to
Tarrytown, confirmed Washington in the opinion which he expressed
five years later to de Grasse, 'that batteries alone could not stop ships
having a fair wind. This is now a commonplace of naval warfare.
On the 15th Howe's army crossed under cover of Parker's ships,
Hotham again superintending the boat work. The garrison of New
York slipped along the west shore of the island and joined the main
body on the Harlem ; favoured again, apparently, in this flank move-
ment a mile from the enemy's front, by Howe's inertness, and fond-
ness for a good meal, to which a shrewd American woman invited
him at the critical moment.
Despite these various losses of position, important as they were,
the American army continued to elude the British general, who
apparently did not hold very strongly the opinion that the most
decisive factor in war is the enemy's organised force. As control of
the valley of the Hudson, in connection with Lake Champlain, was,
very properly, the chief object of the British government, Howe's
next aim was to loosen Washington's grip on the peninsula north of
the Harlem. The position seeming to liim too strong for a front
attack, he decided to strike for its left flank and rear by way of Long
Island Sound. In this, which involved the passage of the tortuous
and dangerous channel called Hell Gate, with its swift conflicting
currents, the Navy again bore an essential part. The movement
began on October 12th, the day after Arnold was defeated at Yal-
cour. So far as its leading object went it was successful, Washington
feeling obliged to let go the line of the Harlem, and change front to
the left. As the result of the various movements and encounters of
the two armies, he fell back across the Hudson into New Jersej^,
ordering the evacuation of Fort Washington, and deciding to rest his
control of the Hudson Valley upon West Point, fifty miles above
New York, a position of peculiar natural strength, on the west bank
of the river. To these decisions he was compelled by his inferiority
in numbers, and also by the very isolated and hazardous situation
in which he was operating, between two navigable waters, al)So-
1 Admiral James's .Journal, \). 30. (Navy Records Society.)
VOL. III. — 25
38G MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [177G.
lutely controlled by the enemy's shipping. This conclusion was.
further forced upon him by another successful passage before the
guns of Forts Washington and Lee by Hyde Parker, with three
ships, the Fhcenix, 44, Hoebuck, 44, and Taj^tar, 28, on the 9th of
October. On this occasion the vessels, two of which were frigates,
of the heaviest class, suffered very severely, losing nine killed and
eighteen wounded; but the menace to the communications of the
Americans, whose supplies came mostly from the west of the Hud-
son, could not be disregarded.
It was early in November that Washington crossed into New
Jersey with five thousand men ; and soon afterwards he directed the
remainder of his force to follow. At that moment the blunder of
one subordinate, and the disobedience of another, brought upon him
two serious blows. Fort Washington not being evacuated when
ordered, How^e carried it by storm, capturing not only it but its
garrison of 2,700 men, a very heavy loss to the Americans. ( )n the
other hand, tlie most explicit orders failed to bring the officer left
in command on the east of the Hudson to rejoin the commander-
in-chief. This criminal perverseness left Washington with only 6,000
men in New Jersey, 7,000 being in New York. Under these condi-
tions nothing remained but to put the Delaware also between himself
and the enemy. He therefore retreated rapidly through New Jersey,
and on the 8th of December crossed into Pennsylvania with an army
reduced to 3,000 by expiry of enlistments. The detachment beyond
the Hudson, diminishing daily by the same cause, gradually worked
its way to him, its commander luckil}^ being captured on the road.
At the time it joined, a few battalions also arrived from Ticonderoga,
released by Carleton's retirement to the foot of Champlain. Wash-
inwton's force on the west bank of the Delaware was thus increased
to 6,000 men.
In this series of operations, e-itending from August 22nd to De-
cember 14th, when Howe went into Avinter-quarters in New Jersey,
the British had met Avitli no serious mishaps, beyond the inevitable
losses undergone by the assailants of well-chosen positions. Never-
theless, having in view the superiority of numbers, of equipment, and
of discipline, and the command of the water, the mere existence of
tlu- enemy's army as an organised body, its mere escape, deprives the
campaign of the claim to be considered successful. The red ribbon
of the Bath probably never was earned more cheaply than l)y Sir
William Howe that year. Had he displayed anything like the energy
1770.] THE EVACUATION OF RHODE ISLAND. 387
of his two elder brothers, Washington, Avith all his vigilance, firmness,
and enterprise, could scarcely have brought off the force, vastly
diminished but still a living organism, around which American resist-
ance again crystallised and hardened. As it was, within a month he
took the offensive, and recovered a great part of New Jersey.
Whatever verdict may be passed upon the merit of the military
conduct of affairs, there is no doubt of the value, or of the unflag-
ging energy, of the naval support given. General Howe alludes to it
frequently, both in general and specifically ; while the Admiral sums
up his always guarded and often cumbrous expressions of opinion in
these words : " It is incumbent upon me to represent to your Lord-
ships, and I cannot too pointedly express, the unabating perseverance
and alacrity Avith which the several classes of officers and seamen
have supported a long attendance and unusual degree of fatigue,
consequent of these different movements of the army."
The final achievement of the campaign, and a very important-
one, was the occupation of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay by a
combined expedition, which left Xew York on the 1st of December,
and on the 8th landed at Newport without opposition. The naval
force, consisting of five 50-gun ships, — the Chatham (broad pennant).
Captain Toby Caulfield ; Preston (Commodore W. Hotham), Captain
Samuel Uppleby ; Centurion, C?ii)t'Aii\ Richard Brathwaite; RenoivHy
Captain Francis Banks ; and Experiment, Captain James Wallace,
and eight smaller vessels, — was commanded by Sir Peter Parker ; th3
troops, seven thousand in number, by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
Clinton. The immediate effect was to close a haven of privateers,
which centred in great numbers around an anchorage that flanked
the route of all vessels bound from Europe to New York. The jdos-
session of the bay facilitated the control of the neighbouring waters
by British ships of war, besides giving them a base, central for coast-
wise operations, and independent of tidal considerations for entrance
or exit. The position was aljandoned somewhat precipitately three
years later, and Rodney then deplored its loss in the following
terms : " The evacuating Rhode Island was the most fatal measure
that could possibly have been adopted. It gave up the best and
noblest harbour in America, capable of containing the whole Navy of
Britain, and where they could in all seasons lie in perfect security ;
and from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could blockade the
three capital cities of America; namely, Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia."
388 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1777.
At the end of 1776 began the series of British reverses which
characterised the year 1777, and made it the decisive period of the
war, because of the effect thus produced upon general public opinion
abroad, and especially upon the governments of France and Spain.
On the 20th of December, Howe, announcing to the Ministry that
he had gone into winter-quarters, wrote : " The chain, I own, is
rather too extensive, but I was induced to occupy Burlington to
cover the county of Monmouth ; and trusting to the loyalty of the
inhabitants, and the strength of the corps placed in the advanced
posts, I conclude the troops will be in perfect security." Of this
unwarranted security Washington took prompt advantage. On
Christmas night a sudden descent, in a blinding snow-storm, upon
a British outpost at Trenton, swept off a thousand prisoners ; and
although for the moment the American leader again retired behind
the Delaw^are, it w^as but to resume the offensive four daj's later.
Cornwallis, who was in New York on the point of sailing for Eng-
land, hurried back to the front, but in vain. A series of quick and
well-directed movements recovered the State of New Jersey ; and by
the 5th of January the American headquarters, and main body of the
army, were established at Morristown in the Jersey hills, the left
resting upon the Hudson, thus recovering touch with the strategic
centre of interest. This menacing position of the Americans, upon
the flank of the line of communications from New York to the Dela-
ware, compelled Howe to contract abruptly the lines he had extended
so lightly ; and the campaign he w^as forced thus reluctantly to reopen
closed under a gloom of retreat and disaster, which profoundly and
justly impressed not only the opinion of the public, but that of mili-
tary critics as well. " Of all the great conquests which his ^lajesty's
troops had made in the Jersies," writes Beatson, " Brunswick and
Amboy w^ere the only two places of any note wdiich they retained ;
and however brilliant their successes had been in the beginning of
the campaign, they reaped little advantage from them when the
winter advanced, and the contiguity of so vigilant an enemy forced
them to perform the severest duty." With deliberate or unconscious
humour lie then immediately concludes the chronicle of the year
with this announcement : " His Majesty was so well pleased with
the abilities and activity which General Howe had displayed this
campaign, that on the 25th of October he conferred upon him the
Most Honourable Order of the Bath.''
1777.] BURGOYNE REACHES FORT EDWARD. 389
The leading purpose of the British government in the campaign
of 1777 was the same as that with which it had begun in 1776, — the
control of the line of the Hudson and Lake Cham plain, to be mastered
by two expeditions, one starting from each end, and both working
towards a common centre at Albany, near the head of naviaration of
the River. Preliminary difficulties had been cleared away in the
previous year, by the destruction of the American flotilla on the Lake,
and by the reduction of New York. To both these objects the Navy
had contributed conspicuously. It remained to complete the work
by resuming the advance from the two bases of operations secured.
In 1777 the fortifications on the Hudson were inadequate to stop the
progress of a combined naval and military expedition, as was shown
in the course of the campaign.
The northern enterprise was intrusted to General Burgoyne, The
impossibility of creating a naval force able to contend with that put
afloat by Carleton had prevented the Americans from further building.
Burgoyne therefore crossed the Lake without opposition to Ticon-
deroga, before which he appeared on the 2nd of July. A position
commanding the works was discovered, and this the Americans had
neglected to occupy. It being seized, and a battery established, the
fort had to be evacuated. The retreat being made by water, the British
Lake Navy, under Captain Skeffington Lutwidge, with whom Nelson
had served a few years before in the Arctic seas, had a conspicuous
part in the pursuit ; severing the boom blockading the river, and join-
ing impetuously in an attack upon the floating material, the flat-boat
transports, and the few relics of Arnold's flotilla which had escaped
the destruction of the previous year. This affair took place on the
6th of July. From that time forward the progress of the army was
mainly by land. The Navy, however, found occupation ujDon Lake
George, where Burgoyne established a depot of supplies, although he
did not utilise its waterway for the march of the army. A party of
seamen under Edward Pellew, still a midshipman, accomjDanied the
advance, and shared the misfortunes of the expedition. It is told
that Burgoyne used afterwards to chaff the young naval officer witli
being the cause of their disaster, because he and his men, by rebuild-
ing a bridge at a critical moment, had made it possible to cross the
Hudson. Impeded in its progress by immense difficulties, both
natural and imposed by the enemy, the army took twenty days to
make twenty miles. On the 30th of July it reached Fort Edward,
forty miles from Albany, and there was compelled to stay till the
middle of September.
S90 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1777.
Owing to neglect at the War Office, the peremptory orders to Sir
AVilliam Howe, to move up the Hudson and make a junction with
Burgoyne, were not sent forward. Consequently, Howe, acting upon
the discretionary powers which he possessed already, and swayed
by political reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, determined
to renew his attempt upon Philadelphia. A tentative advance into
New Jersey, and the consequent manoeuvres of Washington, satisfied
him that the enterprise by this route was too hazardous. He therefore
embarked 14,000 men, leaving 8,000 with Sir Henry Clinton to hold
New York and make diversions in favour of Burgoyne ; and on the
23rd of July sailed from Sandy Hook, escorted by five 64-gun ships,
a 50, and ten smaller vessels, under Lord Howe's immediate command.
The entire expedition numbered about 280 sail. Elaborate pains were
taken to deceive Washington as to the desthiation of the armament ;
but little was needed to prevent a competent soldier from supposing
a design so contrary to sound military principle, having regard to
Burgoyne's movements and to the well-understood general purpose
of the British ministry. " Howe 's in a manner abandoning Burgoyne
is so unaccountable a matter," wrote the American general, "•that
till I am fully assured of it, I cannot help casting my eyes continually
behind me." He suspected an intention to return upon New York.
On the 31st of July, just as Burgoyne reached Fort Edward, where
he stuck fast for six weeks, Howe's armament was off the Capes of
the Delaware. The prevailing summer wind on the American coast
is south-south-west, fair for ascending the river ; but information was
received that tlie enemy had obstructed the channel, which, for some
distance below Philadelphia, lends itself to such defences. Therefore,
although the free navigation of the river, to the sea, was essential to
maintaining a position at Philadelphia, — for trial had shown that the
whole army could not assure communications by land with New York,
the other sea base, — Howe decided to prosecute his enterprise by way
•of the Chesapeake, the ascent of which, under all the conditions, could
not be seriously impeded. A fortnight more was consumed in contend-
ing against the south-west winds and calms, before the fleet anchored
on the 15th of August within the Capes of the Chesapeake ; and yet
another Aveek passed before the head of the Bay was reached. On the
2oth the troops landed. Washington, though so long in doubt, was
on hand to dispute the road, but in inferior force ; and Howe had no
great difficulty in fighting his way to Philadelphia, which was occupied
■on the 26th of September. A week earlier Burgoyne had reached
1777.] HOWE ADVANCES TOWARDS PHILADELPHIA. 391
■Stillwater, on the west bank of the Hudson, the utmost point of his
progress, where he was still twenty miles from Albany. Three weeks
later, surrounded by overwhelming numbers, he was forced to capitu-
late at Saratoga, whither he had retreated.
Lord Howe held on at the head of the Chesapeake until satisfied
that his brother no longer needed him. On the 14th of September he
•started down the Bay with the squadron and convoy, sending ahead to
the Delaware a small division, under Captain Andrew Snape Hamond,
to aid the army, if necessary. The winds holding southerly, ten days
were required to get to sea ; and outside further delay was caused by
very heavy weather. The Admiral there quitted the convoy and
hastened up river. On the 6th of October he w^as off Chester, ten
miles below Philadelphia. Hamond had already been at work for a
week, clearing away obstructions, of which there were two lines, both
commanded by batteries on the farther, or Jersey, shore of the Dela-
ware. The lower battery had been carried by troops; and when
Howe arrived, Hamond, though meeting lively opposition from the
American galleys and fire-rafts, had freed the channel for large ships
to approach the upper obstructions. These were defended not only
by a w^ork at Red Bank on the Jersey shore, but also, on the other
side of the stream, by a fort called Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island.^
As the channel at this point, for a distance of half a mile, was only
two hundred yards wide, and troops could not reach the island,
the position was very strong, and it detained the Britisli for six
weeks. Fort Mifflin was supported by two floating batteries and a
.number of galleys. The latter not only fought, offensively and
defensively, Imt maintained the supplies and ammunition of the
garrison.
On the 22nd of October, a concerted attack, by the army on the
works at Red Bank, and by the Navy on Fort Mifflin, resulted dis-
astrously. The former was repulsed wdth considerable loss, the
officer commanding being killed. The squadron, consisting of a
64, the Augusta^ Captain Francis Reynolds, later Earl of Ducie,
three frigates, and a sloop, the Merlin, 16, Commander Samuel
Reeve, went into action with INIud Island at the same time ; but,
the channel having shifted, owing possibly to the obstructions, the
Augusta and the sloop grounded, and could not be floated that
day. On the 23rd the Americans concentrated upon the two their
batteries, galleys, and fire-rafts ; but, in the midst of the preparations
- Sometimes called Fort Island ; it -was just be]o\v the mouth of the Schuylkill.
392 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1777. '
for lightening her, the Augusta took fire and blew up. The Merlin
was then set on fii-e and abandoned.
So long as this obstacle remained, all supplies for the army had to
be carried by boats to the shore, and transported considerable dis-
tances by land. As direct attacks had proved unavailing, more
deliberate measures were adopted. The army built batteries, and the
Navy sent ashore guns to mount in them ; but the decisive blow to
^lud Island was given by a small armed ship, the Vigilcoit, 20,
Lieutenant Hugh Cloberry Christian, which was successfully
piloted through a channel on the west side of the river, and
reached the rear of the work, towing with her a floating battery
with three 24-pounders. This was on the 15th of November. That
same nioht the Americans abandoned Fort Mifflin. Their loss,
Beatson says, amounted to near 400 killed and wounded; that of
the British to 43. If this be correct, it should have established
the invincibility of men who under such prodigious disparity of
suffering could maintain their position so tenaciously. After the
loss of ]Mud Island, Red Bank could not be held to advantage,
and it was evacuated on the 21st, when an attack was imminent.
Tlie American vessels retreated up the river; but they were cor-
nered, and of course ultimately were destroyed. The obstructions
were thus removed, and the British communications by the line
of the Delaware were established.
While these things were passing, Howe's triumph was marred
by the news of Burgoyne's surrender on the ITtli of October.
For this he could not but feel that the home government must
consider him largely responsible ; for in the Chesapeake, too late
to retrieve his false step, he had received a letter from the Minister,
saying that, whatever else he undertook, support to Burgoyne was
the great object to be kept in view.
During the operations round Philadelphia, Sir Henry Clinton
in New York had done enough to sliow what strong probabilities
of success would have attended an advance up the Hudson, by the
20,000 men whom Howe could have taken with him. Starting
on the 3rd of October with 3,000 troops, accompanied by a small
naval division of frigates, Clinton in a week had reached West
Point, fifty miles up the river. The American fortifications along
the way were captured, defences levelled, stores and shipping burned ;
while an insignificant detachment, with the light vessels, went
fifty milt's further up, and llierc destroyed more military stores
1777.] NEW YORK AND PHILADELPHIA. 395
without encountering any resistance worth mentioning. Certainly,
liacl Howe taken the same Hne of operations, he would have had
to reckon with Washington's ten thousand men which confronted
him on the march to Philadelphia ; but his flank would have been
covered, up to Albany, by a navigable stream, on either side of
which he could operate by that flying bridge which the presence
and control of the Navy continually constituted. Save the fortifi-
cations, which Clinton easily carried, there was no threat to his com-
munications or to his flank, such as the hill country of New Jersey
had offered and Washington had skilfully utilised.
The campaign of 1777 thus ended for the British with a conspicu-
ous disaster, and with an apparent success which was as disastrous,
as a failure. At its close they held Narragansett Bay, the city and
harbour of New York, and the city of Philadelphia. The first was
an admirable naval base, especially for sailing ships, for the reasons
given by Rodney. The second was then, as it is now, the greatest
military position on the Atlantic coast of the United States ; and
although the two could not communicate by land, they did support
each other as naval stati(^ns in a war essentially dependent upon
maritime power. Philadelphia served no purpose but to divide and
distract British enterprise. Absolutely dependent for maintenance
upon the sea, the forces in it and in New York could not co-operate ;
they could not even unite except by sea. When Clinton relieved
Howe as commander-in-chief, though less than a hundred miles away
by land, he had to take a voyage of over two hundred miles, half of
it up a difiicult river, to reach his station ; and troops were trans-
ferred by the same tedious process. In consequence of these condi-
tions, the place had to be abandoned the instant that war with
France made control of the sea even doubtful. The British held
it for less than nine months.
During 1777 a number of raids were made by combined British
land and sea forces, for the purpose of destroying American depots
and other resources. Taken together, such operations are subsidiary
to, and aid, the great object of interrupting or harassing the commu-
nications of an enemy. In so far, they have a standing place among
the major operations of war ; but taken singly they cannot be so
reckoned, and the fact, therefoi'e, is simply noted, without going into
details. It may be remarked, however, that in them, although the
scale was smaller, the Navy played the same part that it now does in
the many expeditions and small wars undertaken by Great Britain in
394 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
various jjarts of the world ; the same that it did in the Peninsular
"War. The land force depended upon the water, and the water was
controlled by the Navy.
The events of 1777 satisfied the French government that the
Americans had strength and skill sufficient seriously to embarrass
Great Britain, and that the moment, therefore, was opportune for
taking steps which scarcely could fail to cause war. On tlie 6th of
February, 1778, France concluded with the United States an open
treaty of amity and commerce ; and at the same time a second secret
treaty, acknowledging the independence of the late Colonies, and
contracting with them a defensive alliance. On the 13th of ]March,
the French Ambassador in London communicated the open treaty to
the British government, with the remark that " the United States
were in full possession of the independence proclaimed by their
declaration of July 4th, 1776." Great Britain at once recalled her
Ambassador, and both countries prepared for war, although no decla-
ration was issued. On the 13th of April, a French fleet of twelve
ships of the line and five frigates, under the command of the Count
d'Estaing,! sailed from Toulon for the American coast. It was
destined to Delaware Ba}-, hojoing to intercept Howe's squadron.
D'Estaing was directed to begin hostilities when forty leagues west
of Gibraltar.
The British ministry was not insensible of the danger, the im-
minence of which had been felt during the previous year ; but it
Jiad not got ready betimes, owing possibly to confident expectations
of success from the campaign of 1777. The ships, in point of num-
bers and equipment, were not as far forward as the Admiralty liad
represented ; and difficulty, amounting for the moment to impos-
sibility, was experienced in manning them. The vessels of the
Channel fleet had to be robbed of both crews and stores to compose
a proper reinforcement for America. Moreover, the destination of
the Toulon squadron was unknown, the French government having
given out that it was bound to Brest, where over twenty other ships
of the line were in an advanced state of preparation. Not until the
5th of June, when d'Estaing was already eight weeks out, was cer-
tain news brought by a frigate, which had watched his fleet after it
1 Charles H., Comte d'Estaing. Born, 1729. Served in India under Lally Tullen-
ilal, 1758. After having been taken prisoner at Madras in 1759, exchanged into the
navy. Commanded in North America, 1778-80. Guillotined, 1794.
1778.] BYRON'S FLEET. 395
had passed Gibraltar, and which had accompanied it into the Athintic
ninety leagues west of the Straits. The reinforcemeait for America
was then permitted to depart. On the 9th of June, thirteen ships of
the line sailed for New York under the command of Vice-Admiral
the Hon. John Byron.i
These delays occasioned a singular and striking illustration of
the ill effects upon commerce of inadequate preparation for manning
the fleet. A considerable number of West India ships, with stores
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the islands, waited at
Portsmouth for convoy for upwards of three months, while the
whole fleet, of eighty sail, was detained for five weeks after it had
assembled; "and, although the wind came fair on the 19th of May,
it did not sail till the 26th, owing to the convoying ships, the Boyne
and the Ruhy^ not being ready." Forty-five owners and masters
signed a letter to the Admiralty, stating these facts. " The convoy,"
they said, "was appointed to sail April 10th," Many ships had
been ready as early as Februar}^ " Is not this shameful usage, my
Lords, thus to deceive the public in general ? There are two hun-
dred ships loaded with j^ro visions, etc., waiting at Spithead these
three months. The average expense of each ship amounts to £150
monthly, so that the expense of the whole West India fleet since^
February amounts to X 90,000."
The West Indies before the war had depended chiefly upon their
fellow Colonies on the American continent for provisions, as well as
^ List of the fleet sent to North America under Vice-Admiral Byron: —
Princess Royal 90 \ Vice- Admiral the Hon. J. Byron (B.).
( Captain "William Blair.
Royal Oak 74 \ Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker (B.).
(. Captain Henry Francis Evans.
5 Commodore John Evans.
( Captain Anthony Parrey.
Captain Edmund Affleck.
Captain George Bowyer.
Captain Thomas Graves.
Captain Timothy Edwards.
Captain George Balfour.
Captain Stephen Colby.
Captain Thomas Wilkinson.
Captain Francis Samuel Drake.
Captain John Wheelock.
Captain Thomas Collingwood.
Captain Hugh Robinson.
Beatson, vi. 106 (corrected). "W. L. C.
Invincible
74
Bedford
74
Albion
74
Conqueror
74
Cormvall
74
Culloden
74
Fame
74
Grafton
74
Russell
74
Sultan
74
Monmouth
64
Guadaloupe
28
396
MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 17G2-17S3.
[1778.
for other prime necessaries. Not only Avere these cut off as an inci-
dent of the war, entailing great embarrassment and suffering, which
elicited vehement appeals from the planter community to the home
government, but the American privateers preyed heavily upon the
commerce of the islands, whose industries were thus smitten root
and branch, import and export. In 1776, salt food for whites and
negroes had risen from 50 to 100 per cent, and corn, the chief sup-
port of the slaves, — the labouring class, — by 400 per cent. At the
same time sugar had fallen from 25 to 40 per cent in price, rum over
37 per cent. The words " starvation " and '• famine " were freely
used in these representations, which were repeated in 1778. Insur-
ance rose to 23 per cent ; and this, with actual losses by capture,^
and by cessation of American trade, with consequent fall of prices,
was estimated to give a total loss of £66 upon every £100 earned
before the war. Yet, with all this, the outward West India fleet-
in 1778 waited six weeks, April lOth-May 26th, for convoy. Imme-
diately after it got away, a rigorous embargo was laid upon all ship-
ping in British ports, that their crews might be impressed to man the
Channel fleet. J\Iarket-boats, even, were not allowed to pass be-
tween Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight.
Three days after Byron had sailed, Admiral the Hon. Augustus
KejDpel also put to sea with twenty-one ships of the line, to cruise
off Brest. His instructions were to prevent the junction of the
^ The Secretary of Lloyd's, for the purposes of this work, has been so good as to
cause to be specially compiled a summary of the losses and captures during the period
1775-1783. This, so far as it deals with merchantmen and privateers, gives tlie fol-
lowing results.
British
Vessels.
i
Enemy's
Vessels.
Merchantmen.
Privateers.
Merchantmen.
Privateers.
Taken.*
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
Taken.*
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
Taken.*
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
Taken.*
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
i77r. . .
—
1776. .
229
51
—
—
19
—
6
—
1777 . .
3.31
52
—
—
51
1
18
—
1778 . .
359
87
5
—
232
5
16
—
1779. .
487
106
29
5
238
5
31
—
1780 . .•
581
260
15
2
203
3
34
1
1781 . .
587
211
38
6
277
10
40
—
1782 . .
415
99
1
—
104
1
68
—
178^ . .
98
13
1
1
11
•2
3
—
Including those re-taken or ransomed.
W. L. C.
1778.] BYRON ARRIVES AT HALIFAX. 397
Toulon and Brest divisions, attacking either that he might meet.
On the 17th of June, two French frigates were sighted. In order
that they might not report his force or his movements, the British
Admiral sent two of his own frigates, with the request that they
would speak him. One, the Belle Puule, 36, refused ; and an engage-
ment followed between her and the British ship, the Arethusa, 32,
Captain Samuel Marshall. ^ Although both Keppel's and d'Estaing's
orders prescribed acts of hostility, no formal war yet existed. The
King of France subsequently declared that this occurrence fixed
the date of the war's beginning.
Byron had a very tempestuous passage, wath adverse winds, by
which his vessels were scattered and damaged. On the 18th of
August, sixty-seven days from Plymouth, the flagship arrived off the
south coast of Long Island, ninety miles east of New York, without
one of the fleet in company. There twelve ships were seen at anchor
to leeward (north), nine or ten miles distant, having jury masts, and
showing other signs of disability. The British vessel approached
near enough to recognise them as French. They were d'Estaing"s
-squadron, crippled by a very heavy gale, in which Howe's force had
also suffered, though to a less extent. As he was alone, and ignorant
of existing conditions, Byron thought it inexpedient to continue on
for either New York or Narragansett Bay. The wind being south-
erly, he steered for Halifax, which he reached August 26th. Some
of his ships also entered there. A very few had already succeeded
in joining Howe in New York, being fortunate enough to escape the
enemy.
So far as help from England went. Lord Howe would have been
crushed long before this. He owed his safety partly to his own celer-
ity, partly to the delays of his opponent. Early in May he received
advices from home, which convinced him that a sudden and rapid
abandonment of Philadelphia and of Delaware Bay might become
necessary. He therefore concentrated his ships of tlie line from New
York and Narragansett at the mouth of the Bay, while the transports
embarked all stores, except those needed for a fortnight's supply of
the army in a hostile countr3^ The threatening contingency of a
superior enemy's appearing off the coast might, and did, make it
imperative not to risk the troops at sea, but to choose instead the
alternative of a ninety-mile march through New Jersey, which a year
before had been rejected as too hazardous for an even larger force.
^ For an account of the single-sliip actions of the Avar, see Chap. XXXII.
398 MAJOR OPEIiATIOXS. 1762-1783. [1778..
Thus prepared, no time was lost when the evacuation became neces-
sary. Sir William Howe, who had been relieved on the 24th of May
by Sir Ileniy Clinton, escaped the humiliation of giving up his
dearly bought conquest. On the 18th of June the British troops,
12,000 in number, were ferried across the Delaware, under the super-
vision of the Navy, and began their hazardous march to New York.
The next day the transports began to move down the river ; but,
owing to the difficult navigation, head winds, and calms, they did not
get to sea until the 28th of June. On the 8th of July, ten days too
late, d'Estaing anchored in the mouth of the Delaware. " Had a
passage of even ordinary length taken place," . wrote Washington,
" Lord Howe with the British ships of war and all the transports in
the river Dela^^'are must inevitably have fallen ; and Sir Henry
Clinton must have had better luck than is commonly dispensed to
men of his profession nnder such circumstances, if he and his troops
had not shared at least the fate of Burgoyne."
Had Hu\\'e"s fleet been intercepted, there would have been no
naval defence for New York ; the French fleet would have sui-
raounted the difficulties of the harbour bar at its ease ; and Clinton,
caught between it and the American army, must have surrendered.
Howe's arrival obviated this immediate danger ; but much still
needed to be done, or the end would be postponed onl}-, not averted.
A fair wind carried the fleet and the whole convoy from the Dela-
ware to Sandy Hook in forty-eight hours. On the morning of the
29th, as Howe was approaching his port, he spoke a packet from
England, which not only brought definite news of d'Estaing's sailing,
but also reported that she herself had fallen in with him to the south-
ward, not very far from the American coast, and had been chased by
his ships. His appearance off New York, therefore, was imminent.
Howe's measures were prompt and thorough, as became his great
reputation. To watch for d'Estaing's approach, a body of cruisers
was despatched, numerous enough for some to bring frequent word
of his movements, while others kept touch with him. The ships at
New York were ordered down to Sandy Hook, where the defence of
the entrance was to be made. Clinton, who had been hard pressed
by AVashington throughout his march, arrived on the 30th of June —
the day after Howe himself — on the heights of Navesink, on the sea-
coast, just south of Sandy Hook. During the previous winter the
sea hud made a breach between the heights and the Hook, convert-
ing the latter into an island. Across this inlet the Navy threw a.
1778.] D'ESTJING OFF SANDY HOOK. 39^
bridge of boats, by which the army on the 5th of July passed to the
Hook, and thence was conveyed to the city.
On the same day the French fleet was sighted off the coast of
Virginia l)y a cruiser, which reached Howe on the 7th ; and two days
later another brought word that the enemy had anchored on the Sth
off the Delaware. There d'Estaing again tarried for two days, which
were diligently improved by the British Admiral, who at the same
time sent off despatches to warn Byron, of whose coming he now had
heard. Despite all his energy, his preparations still were far from
complete, when on the morning of the 11th a third vessel arrived,,
announcing that the French were approaching. That evening they
anchored outside, four miles south of Sandy Hook. Howe, who
during all those days was indefatigable, not only in planning but also-
in personal supervision of details, hastened at once to place his ves-
sels according to the disposition which he had determined, and which
he had carefully explained to his captains, thus insuring an intel-
ligent co-operation on their part.
The narrow arm of land called Sandy Hook projects in a nor-
therl}- direction from the New Jersey coast, and covers the lower bay
of New York on the south side. The main ship-channel, then as
now, ran nearly east and west, at right angles to the Hook and close
to its northern end. Beyond the channel, to the north, there was no
solid ground for fortification within the cannon range of that day.
Therefore such guns as could be mounted on shore, five in number,,
were placed in battery at the end of the Hook. These formed the
right flank of the defence, which was continued thence to the west-
ward by a line of seven ships, skirting the southern edge of the
channel. As the approach of the French, if they attacked, must be
with an easterly wind and a rising tide, the ships were placed with
that expectation ; and in such wise that, riding with their heads to
the eastward, each successive one, from van to rear, lay a little out-
side — north — of her next ahead. The object of this indented for-
mation was that each ship might bring her broadside to bear east, and
3-et fire clear of those to the east of her. In order to effect this con-
centration of all the batteries in an easterly direction, which would
rake the approach of the enemy, a spring was run from the outer, or
port quarter of every .ship, except the leader. ^ These springs were
1 The leader, the Leviathan, Commander Joseph Tathvvell, was excepted, evidently
because she lay under the Hook, and her guns could not bear down channel. She
was not a fighting ship of the scLuadron, but an armed storeship^ although originally-
400 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3. [1778.
not taken to the bow cable or anchor, as was often done, but to
anchors of their own, placed broad off the port bows. If, then, the
enemy attacked, the ships, by simply keeping fast the springs and
veering the cables, would swing with their broadsides to the east. If
the enemy, which had no bow fire, survived his punishment, and suc-
•ceeded in advancing abreast the line, it was necessary only to keep
fast the cables and let go the springs ; the ships would swing head
again to the east, and the broadsides would once more bear across
the channel, instead of along it. These careful arrangements were
subject, of course, to the mischance of shot cutting away cables or
springs; but this was more than offset by the probable injury to
the enemy's spars and rigging, before he could use his batteries at all.
Such was the main defence arranged by Howe ; with which New
York stood or fell. In the line were five sixty-fours, one fifty, and
an armed storeship. An advanced line, of one fifty with two smaller
vessels, was placed just inside the bar — two or three miles outside
the Hook — to rake the enemy as he crossed, retiring as he ap-
proached ; and four galleys, forming a second line, were also stationed
for the same purpose, across the channel, abreast of the Hook. The
retreat of these was secure into the shoal water, where they could not
be followed. One sixty-four and some frigates were held as a reserve,
inside the main line, to act as occasion might require. The total
available force was, six sixty-fours,^ three fifties, and six frigates. D'Es-
taing's fleet, in detail, consisted of one ninety-gun ship, one eighty,
six seventy-fours, three sixty-fours, and one fifty. Great as was this
discrepancy between the opponents, it was counterbalanced largely
by Howe's skilful dispositions, which his enemy could not circum-
a sliip of war, and therefore Ly lier thickness of side better fitted for defence than an
ordinarj' niercliant vessel. Placing her seems to have been an afterthought, to close
the gap in the line, and prevent even the possibility of the enemy's ships turning in
there and doubling on the van. Thus Howe avoided the fatal oversight made bv
Brueys twenty years later, in Aboukir Bay.
^ These were : —
c Vice-Admiral Lord Howe (R-)'
Eagle 64 -; Captain Henry Duncan (1st).
(Captain Roger Curtis (2nd).
Conunodore John Elliot.
Captain Anthonj'- James Pye MoUoy.
Captain George Ourry.
Captain Walter Griffith.
Captain George Keppel.
Captain Richard Onslow.
V/. L. C.
Trident 64
Somerset
64
Nonsuch
64
Ardent
64
St. Albans
64
1778.1 HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 401
vent. If the latter once got alongside, there was little hope for the
British ; but it was impossible to evade the primary necessity of
undergoing a raking fire, without reply, from the extreme raiige of
their cannon up to the moment of closing. The stake, however, was
great, and the apparent odds stirred to the bottom the fighting blood
of the British seamen. The ships of war being short-handed, Howe
called for volunteers from the transports. Such numbers came forward
that the agents of the vessels scarcely could keep a watch on board ;
and many whose names were not on the lists concealed themselves in
the boats which carried their companions to the fighting ships. The
masters and mates of merchantmen in the harbour in like manner
offered their services, taking their stations at the guns. Others
cruised off the coast in small boats, to warn off approaching vessels ;
many of which nevertheless fell into the enemy's hands.
Meanwhile d'Estaing was in communication with Washington,
one of whose aides-de-camp visited his flagship. A number of New
York pilots also were sent. When these learned the draught of the
heavier French ships, they declared that it was impossible to take
them in ; that there was on the bar only twenty-three feet at high-
water. Had that been really the case, Howe would not have needed
to make the preparations for defence that were visible to thousands
of eyes on sea and on shore ; but d'Estaing, though personally brave
as a lion, was timid in his profession, which he had entered very late
and without serving in the lower grades. The assurances of the
pilots were accepted after an examination by a lieutenant of the
flagship, who could find nothing deeper than twenty-two feet.^ For-
tune's favours are thrown away, as though in mockery, on the incom-
petent or the irresolute. On the 22nd of July a fresh north-east
wind concurred with a spring tide to give the highest possible water
on the bar.
" At eight o'clock," wrote an eye-witness in the British fleet, " d'Estaing with
all his squadron appeared under way. He kept working to windward, as if to gain
a proper position for crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind
could not be more favourable for such a design ; it blew from the exact point from
which he could attack us to the greatest advantage. The spring tides were at the
highest, and that afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected the
hottest day that had ever been fought between the two nations. On our side ail
was at stake. Had the men-of-war been defeated, the fleet of transports and
^ A letter to the Admiralty, dated October 8th, 1779, from Vice- Admiral Harriot
Arbuthnot, then commander-in-chief at New York, states that " at spring tides there
is general!}' thirty feet of water on the bar at high water."
VOL. HI— 26
402 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-17S3. [1778.
victuallers must have been destroyed, and the armj', of course, have fallen with us.
D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk ; at three o'clock we saw him
bear off to the southward, and in a few hours he was out of sight."
Four days later, Howe, reporting these occurrences, wrote : " The
weather having- been favourable the last three clays for forcing- en-
trance to this port, I conclude the French commander has desisted."
It is clear that the experienced British admiral did not recognise the
impossibility of success for the enemy.
After the demonstration of the 22nd, d'Estaing stood to the
southward, with the wind at east. The British advice-boats brought
back word that they had kept company with him as far south as the
Capes of the Delaware, and there had left him ninety miles from
land. When their departure freed him from observation, he turned,
and made for Narragansett Bay, an attack on which, in support of an
American land force, had been concerted between him and Washing-
ton. On the 29th he anchored three miles south of Rhode Island,
and there awaited a suitable moment for forcing the entrance.
Narragansett Bay contains several islands. The two largest,
near the sea, are Rhode Island and Gonanicut, the latter being the
more westerly. Their general direction, as that of the Bay itself,
is north and south ; and by them the entrance is divided into three
passages. Of these, the eastern, called Seakonnet, is not navigable
above Rhode Island. The central, which is the main channel, is
joined by the western above Gonanicut, and thus the two lead to the
upper Bay. The town of Newport is on the west side of Rhode
Island, four miles from the main entrance.
On the 30th of Julj^, the day after the French fleet had arrived,
two of its ships of the line, under command of the afterwards cele-
brated Suffren, went up the western channel, anchoring within it
near the south end of Gonanicut. One of them, as she passed, was
hulled twice b}' the British batteries. At the same time, two frig-
ates and a corvette entered Seakonnet ; whereupon the British
abandoned and burned a sloop of war, the Kingfisher, 16, and some
galleys there stationed. The British general. Sir Robert Pigot, now
withdrew his detachments from Gonanicut, disabling the guns, and
concentrated the l)nlk of his force in the southern jmrt of Rhode
Island and about Newport. Goat Island, which covers tlie inner
harbour of the town, was still occupied, the main channel being
connnanded l)y its batteries, as well as by. those to the nortli and
south of it upon Rhode Island. On the 5tli of August, Suffren's
1778/J HOJFE AND UESTAIXG. 403
two shij)s got under way, sailed through the Avestern passage, and
anchored in the main channel, north of Conanicut; their former
positions being taken by two other ships of the line.^ The senior
British naval officer, Captain John Brisbane, seeing retreat cut off
in both directions, now destroyed those ships of war ^ which could
not enter the inner harbour, sinking two between Goat and Rhode
Islands, to prevent any enemy passing there. Five transports also
were sunk north of Goat Island, between it and Coaster's Harbour,
to protect the inside anchorage in that direction. These preliminary
operations thus cost the British five frigates and two sloops, besides
some galleys. Guns and ammunition taken from them went to
increase the defences ; and their officers and crews, over a thousand
in number, served in the fortifications.
On the 8th of August the eight remaining French ships of the
line ran the batteries on Rhode and Goat Islands, anchoring above
the latter, between it and Conanicut, and were rejoined there by
the four previously detached to the western passage. Ten thousand
American troops having by this time crossed from the mainland to
the northern part of Rhode Island, d'Estaing immediately landed
four thousand soldiers and seamen from the fleet upon Conanicut,
for a preliminary organisation ; after which they also were to pass to
Rhode Island and join in the operations. For the moment, there-
fore, the British garrison, numbering probably six thousand men,^
was hemmed in by vastly superior forces, by land and by Avater.
Its embarrassment, however, did not last long. On the following-
morning Lord Howe appeared, and anchored off Point Judith, seven
miles from the entrance to the Bay, and twelve from the position
then occupied by the French fleet. He brought a stronger force
than he had been able to gather for the defence of New York, having*
now one seventy-four, seven sixty-fours, and five fifties, besides
several smaller vessels ; but he still was greatly inferior to his
opponent, by any rational mode of naval reckoning.
Howe's energies in New York had not been confined to prepara-
tions for resisting the entrance of the enemy, nor did they cease
with the latter's departure. When he first arrived there from Phila-
^ These four ships were among the smallest of the fleet, being one 74, two 6-1's,
and a 50. D'Estaing very properly reserved his lieaviest ships to force the main
channel.
2 Flora, 32 ; Juno, 32 ; Larli, 32; Orpheus, 32; Falcon, 16.
3 I have not been able to find an exact statement of the number ; Beatson gives
eight resiiments, witli a reinforcement of five battalions.
404 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
delphia, he had hastened to get his ships ready for sea, a pre-
occupation which somewhat, but not unduly, delayed their taking
their positions at Sandy Hook. Two, for instance, had been at the
watering-place when the approach of the French was signalled.
Owing to this diligence, no time was lost by his fault when the new
destination of the enemy was made known to him, on the 28th or
29th of July, by the arrival of the Baisonnable, 64,^ Captain Thomas
Fitzherbert, from Halifax. This ship narrowly escaped the French
fleet, having passed it on the evening of the 27th, steering for Rhode
Island. The Renoioiu 50, Captain George Dawson (Act'g), which on
the 26th had reached New York from the West Indies, had a
similar close shave, having passed unnoticed through the rear of the
enemy the night before. Besides these two, Howe was joined also
by the Centurion, 50, Captain Richard Brathwaite, from Halifax,
and by the Cornwall, 74, Captain Timothy Edwards ; the latter,
which crossed the bar on the 30th. being the first of Byron's fleet to
reach New York. The three others belonged to Howe's own
squadron. For the two Halifax ships which helped to make this
most welcome reinforcement, the Admiral was indebted to the dili-
gence of the officer there commanding, who hurried them away as
soon as he learned of d'Estaing's appearance on the coast. The
opportuneness of their arrival attracted notice. " Had they appeared
a few days sooner," says a contemporary narrative, " either they
must have been prevented from forming a junction with our squad-
ron, and forced asfain to sea, or we should have had the mortifica-
tion to see them increase the triumph of our enemy."
On the 1st of August, forty-eight hours after the Cornwall had
come in from a stormy passage of fifty-two days, the squadron was
ready for sea, and Howe attempted to sail ; but the wind hauled foul
immediately after the signal to weigh had been made. It did not
become fair at the hour of high water, when alone heavy ships could
cross the bar, until tlio morning of the 6th. " Rhode Island was of
such importance," says the narrator already quoted, " and the fate of
so large a portion of the British army as formed the garrison was of
such infinite consequence to the general cause, that it was imagined the
Admiral would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their
relief." He had learned of the detachments made from the French
fleet, and hoped that some advantage might be taken of this division.
' It may be interesting to recall that this was the ship on the books of which
Nelson's name first was borne in the navy, in 1771.
1778.] HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 405
In short, he went, as was proper and incumbent on him in such
critical circumstances, to take a great risk, in hope of a favourable
chance offering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anchored off Point
Judith, and opened communications with the garrison, from which
he learned the events that had so far occurred, and also that the
enemy was well provided with craft of all kinds to make a descent
upon any part of the Island.
As de Grasse at Yorktown, when rumour announced the ap-
proach of a British fleet, was deterred only by the most urgent ajjpeals
of Washington from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake,
essential to the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narra-
gansett Bay, was unwilling to keep his place, in face of Howe's
greatly inferior squadron.^ The influence exerted upon these two
admirals by the mere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive
advantages depended upon their holding their ground, may be
cited plausibly in support of the most extreme view of the effect of
a " fleet in being ; " but the instances also, when the conditions are
analysed, will suggest the question : Is such effect always legitimate,
inherent in the existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend
often upon the characteristics of the man affected? The contem-
porary British narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after
reciting the various obstacles and the inferiority of the British
squadron, says : " The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion
that the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack ; and it appears by
his Lordship's public letter that this was also his own opinion :
under such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford
the General any essential relief." In both these instances, the
admirals concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain
capture, not of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's
organised forces, by the mere contingency of action, the moral effect,
of a fleet greatly inferior to their own, and which in neither case
would have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove ?
Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who
had landed the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships.
The next morning, at 7 a.m., the wind came out strong at north-
east, which is exceptional at that season. D'Estaing at once put to
sea, cutting the cables in his haste. In two hours he was outside,
1 Ti'oucle attributes d'Estaing's sortie to a sense of the insecurity of his position ;
Lape3'rouse Bonfils, to a desire for contest. Chevalier dwells upon the exposure
of the situation.
406
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3.
[1778.
steering for the enemy. Howe, of course, retired at once ; his
inferiority ^ did not permit an engagement except on his own terms.
To insure these, he needed the weather-gage, the offensive position
of that day, which he expected, by keeping south, to gain, when the
usual wind from that quarter shoukl set in. The French Admiral
had the same object, hoping to crush his agile opponent ; and, as the
sea breeze did not make that day, he succeeded in keeping the
advantage with which he had started, despite Howe's skill. At
nightfall, and during the night, both fleets steered to the southward,
^ Howe's fleet consisted of : —
Ships.
Earjle ....
Trident . . .
Preston . .
Cornwall . .
Nonsuch .
Raisonnahle
Somerset . . .
St. Albans . .
Anient . . ,
Centurion
Experiment . .
Isis . . . .
Penoicn . .
Phoenix . . .
Roebuck . . .
Venus . . .
Richmond . .
Pearl ....
Apollo . . .
Sphinx .
Nautilus
Vigilant (a. s.)
Strombolo (f. s.)
Sulphur (f. s.) .
Volcano (f. s.) .
Thunder (bnib.)
Carcass (bmb.) .
Philadelphia* .
Hussar * . .
Ferret* .
Ciirinrnll if<*
Guns.
64
64
50
74
C4
64
64
64
64
50
50
50
50
44
44
36
so
20
1(5
20
]\Il:n.
Commanders.
522
517
367
600
500
500
500
500
500
350
350
350
350
280
280
240
220
220
220
160
125
150
45
45
45
SO
80
t Yice-Adni. Lord Howe (K.).
s C;i[)t; Heiny Duncan (1st).
' Capt. Itoger Curtis (2nd).
j Com. John Elliot.
' Capt. Anthonj- James Pye ]MoiIoy.
|i Coni. William Hotham.
( Ca])t. Samuel Uppleby
Capt. Timotliy Edwards.
Capt. Walter Griffith.
Capt. Thomas Fitzherbert.
Capt. George Oui'ry.
Capt. Richard Onslow.
Capt. George Kejipel.
Capt. Richard Brathwaite.
Capt. Sir James Wallace.
Capt. John Rayner.
Capt. George Dawson (Act'g).
Capt. Hyde Parker (2).
Capt. Andrew Siiape Hainond.
Capt. William Peere AVilliams.
Capt. John Lewis Gidoin.
Cajit. John Linzee.
Capt. Philemon Pownall.
Capt. Alexander Graime.
Com. John Peclier.
Com. Hugh Clobeny Christian.
Com. Peter Aplin.
Com. James Watt.
Com. William Henry King O'Hara.
( 'om. James Gambler (2).
Lieut. Edward Edwards. (Act'g).
Lieut. Paterson.
Lieut. Sir James Barclay, Bart.
Lieut. Edward (?) O'Brycn.
Lieut. ^pry.
* Galleys.
/^/-/^i^a-/ fj/Z/^r- ,_J^i^/, aif^a^ S^n^ar/ e?)^t.'Wa4^^.^^ .
_-i^%;^ ^.^^^^<!«^2%«- a^j^ ZXi^»ifia-pi^U' jz! „ _
1778.]
HOJVE AND UESTAING.
407
on the port tack, with the wind variable at east. At daybreak of
the 11th they occupied nearly the same relative positions, — the
French north-east to north from the British, but somewhat more
distant than the night before, having apparently kept closer to the
wind, which by this had steadied at east-north-east. (See Plan : aa,
aa.)
Howe now shifted his flag from the Eagle^ 64, to the Apollo^ 32,
and placed himself between the two fleets, the better to decide the
movements of his own. Finding it impossible to gain the weather-
gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn too far from Rhode
Island, he formed his line on the other tack, heads to the northward.
-c»DadC>Cj'^^<^<*^^ ^ ifr
a
9.
Apollo
p
i>
/
.c?/ ■
>rK •-::^
^A^:::2r'^
-.,2?
-^
Manoeuvres of Howe and DEstainc.
//T" /loc /77d.
MAXCEUVRES OF HOWE AND D'ESTAIXG.
The French continued on the port tack, under short canvas, heading
to the southward and eastward, so that their bearing changed from
east-north-east — directly to windward — at 6 a.m., to south-south-east
at 4 P.M., which would be nearly astern of the British. (.See Plan :
bb, bb.) At this time their van was estimated b}^ Howe to be two
or three miles from the British rear, and, according to his reading of
408 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
their manoeuvres, d'Estaing began to form his line for the same tack
as the British, with a view of " engaging the British squadron to
leeward," whereby he would obtain over it the advantage of using
the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become much heavier.
As the French admiral, in this new disposition, had put his heaviest
ships in the van, and his line was nearly in the wake of the British,
Howe inferred an attack upon his rear. (See Plan : bb.) He there-
fore ordered his heaviest- ship, the Corjnvall, 74, to go there from the
centre, exchanging places with the Centurion., 50, and at the same
time signalled the fleet to close to the centre., — a detail worth remem-
bering in view of Rodney's frustrated manoeuvre of April 17th, 1780.
It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when the
French should have covered the intervening ground, and brought
to action so much of his rear as d'Estaing saw fit to engage ; the
conditions of the sea favouring the speed of the bulkier ships that
composed the hostile fleet. The latter, however, soon abandoned
the attempt, and " bore away to the southward, apparently from the
state of the weather, which, by the wind freshening much, with
frequent rain, was now rendered very unfavourable for engaging."
It may be added that the hour was very late for beginning an
action. At sundown the British were under close-reefed topsails,
and the sea such that Howe was unable to return to the Eagle.
The wind now increased to great violence, and a severe storm
raged on the coast until the evening of the 13th, throwing the two
fleets into confusion, scattering the ships, and causing numerous
disasters. The Apollo lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast,
on the niglit of the 12th. The next day only two ships of the line and
three smaller vessels were in sight of the Admiral. The latter,
when the weather moderated, went on board the Phoenix., 44, and
thence to the Centurion., 50, with which he " proceeded to the south-
ward, and on the 15th discovered ten sail of the French squad-
ron, some at anchor in the sea, about twenty-five leagues east from
Cape May." ^ Leaving there the Centurion., to direct to New York
any of Byron's ships that might come on the coast, he departed
thither himself also, and on the evening of the 17th rejoined the
squadron off Sandy Hook, the appointed rendezvous. Many injuries
had been received T)y the various ships, but they were mostly of a
minor character; and on the 22nd the fleet again put to sea in
search of the enemy.
^ At the mouth of Delaware Bay.
1778.] HOWE AND TfESTAING. 409
The Frencli had suffered much more severely. The flagship
Languedoc^ 90, had carried away her bowsprit, all her lower masts
followed it overboard, and her tiller also was broken, rendering the
rudder unserviceable. The Marscillais, 74, lost her foremast and
bowsprit. In the dispersal of the two fleets that followed the gale,
each of these crippled vessels, on the evening of the 13th, encoun-
tered singly a British 50-gun ship ; the Laiujuedoc being attacked by
the Renown^ Captain George Dawson (Act'g), and the Marseillais by
the Preston^ Commodore W. Hotham, Captain Samuel Uppleby,
The conditions in each instance were distinctly favourable to the
smaller combatant; but both unfortunately withdrew at nightfall,
making the mistake of postponing to the morrow a chance which
they had no certainty would exist after to-day. When morning
dawned, other French ships appeared, and the opportunity passed away.
The Isis^ 50, Captain John Rayner, also was chased and overtaken
T)y the Cesai\ 74. In the action which ensued, the French ship's
Avheel was shot away, and she retired ; — two other British vessels,
one of the line, being in sight. The latter are not mentioned in the
British accounts, and both sides claimed the advantage in this drawn
action. The French captain lost an arm.
After making temporary repairs, at the anchorage where Howe
saw them on the 15th of August, the French fleet had proceeded
again towards Newport. It was in the course of this passage that
they were seen by Byron's flagship ^ on the 18th, to the southward
of Long Island. The Experiment^ 50, Captain Sir James Wallace,
which Howe had sent to reconnoitre Narragansett Bay, was chased
by them into Long Island Sound, and only reached New York 1)y
the East River ; being the fu-st ship of the line or 50-gun ship that
ever passed through Hell Gate. On the 20th d'Estaing communi-
cated with General Sullivan, the commander of the American land
forces on Rhode Island ; but it was only to tell him that in his own
opinion, and in that of a council of war, the condition of the squad-
ron necessitated going to Boston to refit. Whatever may be thought
of the propriety of this decision, its seriousness can be best under-
stood from the report sent by Pigot to Howe. " The rebels had
advanced their batteries within fifteen hmidred yards of the British
works. He was under no apprehensions from any of their attempts
in front ; but, should the French fleet come in, it would make an
alarming change. Troops might be landed and advanced in liis
^ Ante, p. 397.
410 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 176-2-178;3. [1778.
rear ; and in that case he could not answer for the consequences."
Disregarding- Sullivan's entreaties that he would remain, d'Estaing
sailed next day for Boston, and reached it on August 28th. On the
31st the indefatigable Howe came in sight; but the French had
worked actively in the three days. Forty-nine guns, 18 and 24-
pounders, with six mortars, were already in position covering the
anchorage ; and " the French squadron, far from fearing an attack,
desired it eagerly." ^ The withdrawal of the fleet was followed b}'
that of the American troops before Newport.
Howe had quitted New York the instant he heard of d'Estaing's
reappearance off Rhode Island. He took with him the same number
of vessels as before, — thirteen of the line, — the Monmouth, 64,
Captain Thomas Collingwood, of Byron's squadron, having arrived
and taken the place of the Isis, crippled in her late action. Before
reaching Newport, he learned that the French had started for Boston.
He hoped that they would find it necessary to go outside George's
Bank, and that he might intercept them by following the shorter
road inside. In this he was disappointed, as has been seen, and the
enem3^'s position was now too strong for attack. The French retreat
to Boston closed the naval campaign of 1778 in North American
waters.
The inability or unwillingness of d'Estaing to renew the enter-
prise against Rhode Island accords the indisputable triumph in this
campaign to Howe, — an honor he must share, and doubtless gladly
would have shared, with his supporters in general. That the British
fleet, for the most part two years from home, in a country without
dockyards, should have l)een able to take the sea within ten days
after the gale, while their opponents, just from France, yet with three
months' sea practice, were so damaged that they had to abandon the
field and all the splendid prospects of Rhode Island, — as the}' already
had allowed to slip the chance at New York, — shows a decisive
superiority in the officers and crews of the former. The incontest-
able merits of the rank and file, however, must not be permitted to
divert attention from the great qualities of the leader, but for
which the best material would have been unavailing. The condi-
tions were such as to elicit to the utmost Howe's strongest qualities,
— firmness, endurance, uninterrupted persistence rather than celerity,
great professional skill, ripened by constant reflection and ready at
an instant's call. Not brilliant, perliaps, but absolutely clear, and
^ Chevalier : ' Marine Franc;aiso,' 1778.
1778.] HOWE AND D'ESTAING. 411
with mind replete with expedients to meet every probable con-
tingency, Howe exhibited an equable, unflagging energy, which was
his greatest characteiistic, and which eminently fitted him for the
task of checkmating an enemy's every inove — for a purely defensive
■ campaign. He was always on hand and always ready; for he never
wearied, and he knew his business. To great combinations he was
perhaps unequal. At all events, such are not associated with his
name. The distant scene he did not see ; but step by step he saw
liis way with absolute precision, and followed it with unhesitating
resolution. With a force inferior throughout, to have saved, in one
campaign, the British fleet. New York, and Rhode Island, with the
entire British army, which was divided between those two stations
and dependent upon the sea, is an achievement unsurpassed in the
annals of naval defensive warfare.
Howe's squadron had been constituted in 1776 with reference to
the colonial struggle only, and to shallow water, and therefore was
composed, very properly, of cruisers, and of ships of the line of the
smaller classes ; there being several fifties, and nothing larger than
a sixty-four. When war with France threatened, the Ministry, hav-
ing long warning, committed an unpardonable fault in allowing such
a force to be confronted by one so superior as that wdiich sailed from
Toulon, in April, 1778. This should have been stopped on its way,
or, failing that, its arrival in America sliould have been preceded
by a British reinforcement. As it was, the government was saved
from a tremendous disaster only by the efficiency of its Admiral. As
is not too uncommon, gratitude was swamped by the instinct of self-
preservation from the national wrath, excited by this, and b}- other
simultaneous evidences of neglect. An attempt was made to dis-
parage Howe's conduct, and to prove that his force was even supe-
rior to tliat of the French, by adding together the guns in all his
ships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of his small
vessels against d'Estaing's larger units. The instrument of the
attack Avas a naval officer, of some rank but slender professional
credit, who at this most opportune moment underwent a political
conversion, which earned him employment on the one hand, and the
charge of apostasy on the other. For this kind of professional aritli-
metic, Howe felt and expressed just and utter contempt. Two and
two make four in a primer, but in the field they may make three, or
they may make five. Not to speak of the greater defensive power
of heavy ships, nor of the concentration of their lire, the unity of
412 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
direction under one captain possesses here also that importance
which has caused unity of command and of effort to be recognised
as the prime element in military efficiency, from the greatest things
to the smallest. Taken together, the three elements — greater defen-
sive power, concentration of fire, and unity of direction — constitute
a decisive and permanent argument in favour of big ships, in Howe's
days as in our own. Doubtless, now, as then, there is a limit ; most
arguments can be pushed to an ahsurdum, intellectual or practical.
To draw a line is always hard ; but, if we cannot tell just where the
line has been passed, we can recognise that one ship is much too big,
while another certainly is not ; and between the two we can make
an approximation to an exact result.
On his return to New York on September 11th, Howe found there
Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker ^ with six ships of the line of Byron's
squadron. Considering his task now accomplished, Howe decided
to return to England, in virtue of a permission granted some time
before at his own request. The duty against the Americans, lately
his fellow-countrymen, had been always distasteful to him, although
he did not absolutely refuse to undertake it, as did Admiral Keppel.
The entrance of France into the quarrel, and the coming of d'Estaing,
refreshed the spirits of the veteran, who moreover scorned to
abandon his command in the face of such odds. Now, with the
British positions secure, and superiority of force insured for the time
being, he gladly turned over his charge and sailed for home, burn-
ing against the Admiraltv with a wrath common to most of the
distinguished seamen of that wnv. He was not emplo3'ed afloat again
until a change of ^Ministry took place, in 1782.
During the same two months that saw the contest between
d'Estaing and Howe in America, the only encounter between nearly
equal fleets in 1778 took place in European waters. Admiral the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, having returned to Spithead after the affair
between the Belle Poule and the Arethtisa, again put to sea on the
9tli of July, with a force now increased to thirty ships of the line.
He had been mortified by the necessity of avoiding action, and of
even retiring into port, with the inadequate numbers before under
^ Later Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, Bart., who perished in the Cato in 1783.
lie was father of that Admiral Sir Tlyde Parker, who, in 1801, was Nelson's com-
mander-in-chief at Copenhagen, and who in 1778 commanded the Pho:mx, 44, in
Howe's fleet.
1778.] THE BATTLE OF US HA NT. 413
his command, and his mind was fixed now to compel an engagement,
if he met the French.
The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under the
command of Admiral the Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-
two ships of the line. Of these, tlu'ee — a sixty-four, a sixty, and a
fifty — were not considered fit for the line of battle, which was thus
reduced to twenty-nine sail, carrying 2,098 guns. To these the
British opposed an aggregate of 2,278 ; but comparison by tliis means
only is very rough. Not only the sizes of the guns, but the classes
and weight of the vessels need to be considered. In the particular
instance the matter is of little importance ; the action being inde-
cisive, and credit depending upon manoeuvres rather than upon
fio-htino-.
The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions,
reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that he must avoid action,
unless under very favour-able circumstances. At the moment of
sailing he wrote : " Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I
will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless by positive orders, until
I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions, and
known to all the captains. Till then I will not fly before Admiral
Keppel, whatever his strength ; only, if I know him to be too
superior, I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can ; but
if the enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to ohun."
These words explain his conduct throughout the next few days.
On the afternoon of July 23rd the two fleets sighted each other,
about a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to
leeward. Towards sunset, the latter were standing south-west, with
the wind at west-north-west, and bore north-east from the British,
who were lying-to, heads to the northward. The latter remaining
nearly motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting,
d'Orvilliers availed himself of the conditions to press to windward,
and in the morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent.-^
Their relative positions satisfied for the moment both admirals ;
for Keppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French,
while d'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open
retreat to his port, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage,
to fulfil his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of
^ Testimony of Captains Hood, Robinson, and Macbride, and of Rear-Adniiral
Campbell, captain of the fleet to Keppel.
414 MAJOR OPEBATIONS. 1762-1788. [1778.
his ships, however, the Due de Bourgogne^ 80, and a seventy-four,
were still to leeward, not onh' of their own main body, but also of
the British. Keppel sent chasers after theni, for the expressed jnir-
pose of compelling d'Orvilliers to action in their support,^ and it was
believed by the British that they were forced to return to Brest, to
avoid being cut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, whicli was
thus reduced to twentj^-seven effective sail. From this time until
JiUy 27th the wind continued to the westward, and the wariness of
the French admiral baffled all Keppel's efforts to get within range.
The latter, having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pur-
sued vigorousl}-, watching his chance.
On the morning of the 27th the two fleets were from six to ten
miles apart, wind west-south-west, both on the port tack, steering
north-west, the French dead to windward. Tlie latter were in line
ahead, the British in bow-and-quarter line ; that is, nearly abreast
each other, but so ranged that, if they went about together, they
should have been in line ahead. Both fleets were irregularly formed,
the British especially so ; for Keppel rightly considered that he
would not accomplisli his purpose, if he were pedantic concerning
the order of his going. He had therefore signalled a " General
Chase," which. In' permitting much individual freedom of movement,
facilitated the progress of the whole. At daylight, the division com-
manded by Sir Hugli Palliser — the right wing, as then heading —
had dropped astern ; and at 5.30 A. m. the signal was made to seven
of its fastest sailers to chase to windward, the object being so to
place them, relatively to the main body, as to support the latter, if
an opportunity for action should offer.
At 9 A. isr. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy
and to see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession. — to
countermarch. As the van shi[)s went round under this signal, they
had to steer off the wind, parallel to their former line, on which
those following them still were, until they reached the rear ship,
when they could again haul to tlie wind. This caused a loss of
ground to leeward, liut not more tlian d'Orvilliers could afford, as
things stood. Just after he had fairly committed himself to tlie
niano'uvre, the wind liaulcd to the southward two points,^ wliicli
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the
enemy. Keppel tlicrefore continued on the port tack, until all the
Frencli were on the starboard, and at 10,15, being nearty in their
^ See note on preceding pai^'c. " Twenty-two degrees.
1778.]
THE BATTLE OF USHANT.
415
List of the Britisli and French Fleets in the action off Ushant, July 27th, 1778, chielly
from Beatson, vi. 129-132, and Guerin, v. 24, 25 ; corrected from the Navy List, the Gazette
de France, tlie dispatches of d'Orvilliers to Sartine (Arch, de la Marine), and the Proceedings
of the C. M., 7 Jan. to 11 Feb., 1779, and April 12 to May 5, 1779. — W. L. C.
SHIPS.
■Si
O
74
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
COMMANDERS.
Monarch.
Capt. Joshua Rowley.
rLieut.-Gen. Comte Duchaf-
Hector.
74
Capt. Sir Jolui Hamilton, Bart.
Couronne.
80
J fault.
' Capt. Baron de Kermadec.
Centaur.
74
Capt. Pliillips Cosby.
Exeter.
G4
Capt. John Neale Pleydell Nott.
Due de Bourgogne.
80
Vicomte de Rochechouart (chef
Duke.
90
Capt. William Brereton.
d'esc).
•<
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Har-
Glorieux.
74
Capt. de Beauues (chef d'esc).
>
Queen.
90
1 land (R.).
Palmier.
74
Capt. de Reals.
( Capt. Isaac Prescott.
Bien-Aime.
74
Cajit. d'Aubenton.
Shreicshurij.
74
Capt. Sir John Lockliart Ross,
Dauphin Boyal.
70
Capt. de Nieuil.
Bart.
Vengeur.
(14
Capt. d'Amblimout.
Cwmlierland.
74
Capt. Joseph Peyton (1).
Alexandre.
CA
Capt. de Tremigon (1).
Berwick:
74
Capt. the Hon. Keith Stewart.
Indien.
04
Capt. de la Grandiere.
Stirling Castle.
64
Capt. Sir Charles Douglas, Bart.
Saint Michel.
Amphion.
GO
50
Capt. Mithon de GenouiUi.
Capt. de Trobriand.
Couraffeitx.
74
Capt. Lord Mulgrave.
1 Lieut.-Gen. Comte d'Orvil-
Thunderer.
74
Capt. the Hon. Robert Boyle
Walsinghara.
Bretagne.
110
\ liers.
^ Capt. Duplessis Perseault.
Sandwich.
90
Capt. Richard Edwards (2).
Ville de Paris.
100
Comte deGuichen (chef d'esc).
Valiant.
74
Capt. the Hon. John Leveson
L' Orient.
74
Capt. Hector (chef d'esc).
Gower.
Pendant.
74
Capt. de Vaudreuil.
Bienfaisant.
64
Capt. John Macbride.
Magnifiqtie.
74
Capt. de Brach.
H
/ Adm. the Hon. A. Keppel (B).
Rear-Admiral John Campbell
A (1st Capt.).
Aclif.
74
Capt. Thomas d'Orves.
a
Eeflechi.
64
Capt. Cillart de Suville.
Victory.
100
Ereille.
64
Capt. de Bot-Deru.
u
Capt. Jonathan Faulkuor (1)
Artesien.
04
Oapt. des Touches.
*- (2nd).
Actionnaire.
64
Capt. de Proissi.
Foudroyaiit.
SO
Capt. John Jervis.
Prince (ieorye.
90
Capt. Sir John Lindsay, K. B.
Vigilant.
G4
Capt. Robert Kingsmill.
Terrible.
74
Capt. Sir Richard Bickerton,
Bart.
Vengeance.
74
Capt. Michael Clements.
Wortciter.
04 Capt. Mark Robinson (1).
( Lieut-Genl. Due de Chartres.
Elizabeth.
74
Capt. the Hon. Fredk. Lewis
Maitland.
Saint Esjjrit.
80
1 Capt. La Motte-Picquet (1st).
' Capt. de Monperoux.
Robust.
74
Capt. Alexander Arthur Hood.
llobuste.
74
Capt. de Grasse-Tilli (chef d'esc. )
Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palli-
Conqueranl.
74
Capt. de Monteil (chef d'esc).
pj
Formidable.
90
; ser(B).
Intrepide.
74
Capt. de Beaumier.
<
Capt. John Bazely (1).
Zodiaque.
74
Capt. de la Porte-Vezins.
PC?
Ocean.
90
Capt. John Laforey.
Diademe.
74
Capt. de la Cardomiie.
America.
G4
Capt. Lord Longford.
Solitaire.
64
Capt. de Bricqueville.
Defiance.
(-.4
Capt. Samuel Granston Goodall.
Poland.
64
Capt. de I'Archantel.
Egmont.
74
Capt. John Carter Allen.
Sphinx.
64
Capt. de Soulanges.
Ramillies.
74 Capt. Robert Digby.
Triton.
64
Capt. de Ligondes.
Fier.
50
Capt. de Turpin.
Arethiisa
32
Capt. Samuel Marshall.
Sensible.
32
Pro.ierjyine.
28
Capt. Evelyn Sutton.
Andromaque.
32
Milford.
28
Capt. Sir William Burnaby, Bt.
Sincere.
32
Capt. de la Clocheterie.
Fox.
28
Capt. the Hon. Thos. Windsor.
Junon.
32
Andromeda.
28
Capt. Henry Bryne.
Iphigenie.
32
Capt. Comte de Kersaint (2).
w
Lively.
20
Capt. Robert Biggs.
Xyiiiphc.
32
aT
Pluto (f. s.).
S
Com. James Bradby (1).
Survelllatde.
10
2
Vulcan (f. s.)
8
Com. • Lloyd.
Perle.
10
Alert (cutter).
12
Com. William George Fairfax.
Ecureuil.
14
S
f^
Hirondelle.
Serin
Curieuse.
Lunette.
Favorite.
16
14
10
4
10
Capt. de la Perouse.
416 MAJOR OPEBATIOXS. 176-2-1783. [1778.
wake, he ordered his own ships to tack together. At this moment a
thick rain-squall came up, concealing the fleets one from another for
three quarters of an hour. With the squall the wind shifted back,
favouring the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and en-
abling them to lay up for the enemy's rear. When the weather cleared,
at 11, the French were seen to have gone about again, and were still
in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre. Their admiral had
doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and from the direction
of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter could not be
avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the van of the
pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be misun-
derstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of them
as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position. Tlierefore he had ordered his
ships to go about, all at the same time ; thus forming column again
rapidly, but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.
Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did
lie now. Recognising from the four days' chase that his enemy w^as
avoiding action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at
some risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade.
Besides, thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to
chase, these, forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he
was advancing, were now well to windward, able therefore to sup-
port their comrades, if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In
short, practically the whole force was coming into action, although
much less regularly than might have been desired. What was to
follow was a rough-and-ready fight, but it was all that could be had,
and better than nothing. Keppel therefore simply made the signal
for battle, and that just as the firing began. The collision was so
sudden that the ships at first had not their colours flying.
The French also, although their manreuvres had been more
methodical, were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of
thirty ships, of varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement
in a fortnight of sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated
r.n action, which one admiral had been seeking, and the other shun-
ning ; but each had to meet it with such shift as he could. The
British being close-hauled, the French, advancing on a parallel line,
were four points ^ off the wdnd. Most of their ships, therefore, could
^ Furtv-five decrees.
1778.] THE BATTLE OF USHANT. 417
have gone clear to windward of their opponents, but the fact that
the latter could reach some of the leaders compelled the others to
support them. As d'Orvilliers had said, it was liard to avoid an
enemy resolute to fight. The leading three French vessels ^ hauled
their wind, in obedience to the admiral's signal to form the line of
battle, which means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to
draw them gradually away from the British, and, if imitated by their
followers, to render the affair a mere touch at a single point — inde-
cisive. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire soon
after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under
short canvas, firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much
handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy,
and caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside.
" The distance between the Formidable, 90, and the Egmont, 74, was
so short," testified Captain John Laforey, whose three-decker, the
Ocean, 90, was abreast and outside this interval, " that it was with
difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage, without firing upon
them, and I was once very near on board the FJginonty The Formid-
able, Palliser's flagship, kept her mizzen topsail aback much of the
time, to dejiden her way, to make room for the Ocean, and to allow
the ships behind her to close. " At a quarter past one," testified
Captain Maitland of the Elizabeth, 74, " we were very close behind
the Formidable, and a midshipman upon the poop called out that there
was a ship coming on board on the weather bow. I put the helm
up, . . . and found, when the smoke cleared away, I was shot up
under the FormidabW s lee. She was then eno^ao'ed with the two
last ships in the French fleet, and, as I could not fire at them without
firing through the Formidable, I was obliged to shoot on." ^ Captain
Bazely, of the Formidable, says of the same incident, " The Formid-
able did at the time of action bear up to one of the enemy's ships, to
avoid being aboard of her, whose jib boom nearly touched the main
topsail weather leech of the Formidable. I thought we could not
avoid being on board."
Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in
killed and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of
^ Chevalier says, p. 89, " The English passed out of range " of these ships. As
these ships had the wind, they had the choice of range, barring signals from their
own admiral. In trutli, the}- were obeying his order.
^ This evidence of the captains of the Ocean and the Elizabeth contradicts Palliser's
charge that his ship was not adequately supported.
VOL. in — 27
418
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1778.
the other two.^ This was due to the morning signal to chase to
windward, which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As
soon as the British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its
commander, Vice-Admiral Sir llobert Harland, anticipating Keppel's
wishes, signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 1, Y).
As the French column was running free, these ships, when about,
fetched to windward of its wake. As the Victory drew out of the
fire, at 1 p.m., Keppel made a similar signal, and attempted to wear,
ADMIRAL AUGUSTUS, VISCOUNT KF.rPEL.
{From Ridley'' s engraving, after the portrait by G. Romney.)
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking ; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following sliips, and it
was not till 2 p.m., that the Victory was about on the other tack,
heading after the French. At this time, 2 p.:m., just before or just
after wearino", the siernal for l)attle was hauled down, and that for
1 It Avas actually quite equal, but this was due to au accidental explosion on
board tlii' Fornvdcihle.
1778. J THE BATTLE OF USHANT. 419
the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter was to
re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly because no
longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict the urgent
call for a re-formation.^
At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the
weather bow of the Victory, to windward (westward), but a little
ahead, and standing like her after the French ; all on the port tack
(Fig. 1). None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flag-
ship at once (Fig. 1, C). At 2.30 Palliser's ship, the Formidable,
Battle, or Ushamt-
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BATTLE OF USHANT.
on the starboard tack passed her to leeward, the last of the fleet
apparently out of action (Fig. 1, R). A half-hour after this the
Victory had been joined by three of the centre, wliich were following
her in close order, the van remaining in the same relative position.
Astern of these two groups were a number of other ships in various
degrees of confusion, — some going about, some trying to come up,
1 Naval officers will observe the strong analogy to the speculative naval tactics of
to-day, — a charge through (or by), and a re-forniation afterwards.
420 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
others completely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-
east, therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or live British vessels,
evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.
This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral,
scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the
British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through
the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated
in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a
military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped.
The French, starting from a better formation, had come out in Ijetter
shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the dis-
advantage of a policy essentially defensive ; and d'Orvilliers' next
order, thouo-h well conceived, was resultless. At 1 p.]m. ^ he sicr-
nailed his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle on
the starboard tack (Fig. 1, F). This signal was not seen by the
leading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior
French admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went
about, and spoke the Bretagne^ to know what was the commander-
in-chief's desire. D'Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along
the enemy's fleet from end to end, to leeward, because in its dis-
ordered state there was a fair promise of advantage, and by going
to leeward — presenting his weather side to the enemy — he could
use the weather lower-deck guns, whereas, in the then state of the
sea, the lee ports could not be opened. Thus explained, the move-
ment was executed, but the favourable moment had passed. It was
not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre was evident to the British.
As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore
the Victory again, a few minutes after 3 r..M., and stood slowly
down, on the starboard tack off the ivind, towards his crippled ships
in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of battle,
Avhich commanded every manageable ship to get to her station (Fig.
2, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy, Palli-
ser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight, — a preposter-
ous extravagancy. Harland ])ut his division about at once and joined
the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the Victory, but
in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell iu behind her, to
cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair damage and take
their places. At 4 p.m. Ilarland's division was in the linr. Palli-
ser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves in rear
* Chevalier. Probably later by the other times used in this account.
1778.]
THE BATTLE OF USE ANT,
421
of the Formidable, their captains considering, as they testified, tliat
they took station from their divisional commander, and not from
the ship of tlie commander-in-chief. There was formed tlius, on the
weather quarter of tlie Victory, and a mile or two distant, a separate
line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of the fleet,
and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig. 2, R). At
5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten into
the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the
=]■
Battle, or Ushamt A*^*^
Fig. II.
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BATTLE OF U.SHANT.
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not at-
tacked, as they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee
of the British, their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same
time Harland was directed to move to his proper position in the van,
which he at once did (Fig. 2, V). Palliser made no movement, and
Keppel with extraordinary — if not culpable — forbearance, refrained
from summoning the rear ships into line by their individual pennants.
This he at last did about 7 p.m., signalling specifically to each of the
vessels then grouped with Palliser (except the Formidahle), to leave
422 MAJOR OFERATIOXS. 17G2-1783. [1778.
the latter and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly
done, but it was thought then to be too late to renew the action.
At daylight the next morning, only three French sliips were in sight
from the decks ; but the main body could be seen in the south-east
from some of the mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to
twenty miles distant.
Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish ;
the British loss being' 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the
French 161 killed and 513 wounded. The general result would
appear to indicate that the French, in accordance with their usual
policy, had fired to cripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the
motive-power. This would be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed
purpose (.f avoiding action except under favourable circumstances.
As the smoke thickened and confusion increased, the fleets had got
closer together, and, whatever the intention, many shot found their
way to the British hulls. Nevertheless, as the returns show, the
French hit were to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand,
it is certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the
action was greater than that of the British.
Botli sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of
honour, or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither.
Keppel had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his
will ; d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superi-
ority of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next
signal been promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the
British fleet, in fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concen-
trated his fire on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the
delay, it was distinctly in his power to renew the fight ; and that
he did not do so forfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of
tlie Ijetter condition of the French ships, Keppel, by running off
the wind, had given his opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet
and to attack. Instead of so doing-, d'Orvilliers drew up under the
Britisli lee, out of range, and offered battle ; a gallant defiance, but
to a crippled foe.
Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficiently
to bear down again. This the French admiral should not have per-
mitted. He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated ;
to windward, or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the
conditions, it was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and
to await liis pleasure. Keppel, on tlie otlier hand, being granted
1778.] PALLISEKS CHARGES AGAINST KEPPEL. 423
tliis chance, should have renewed the fight ; and here arose the con-
troversy which set all England by the ears, and may be said to have
immortalised this otherwise trivial incident. Palliser's division was
to windward from 4 to 7 p.m., while the signals were flying to form
line of battle, and to bear down in the Admiral's wake ; and Keppel
alleged that, had these been obeyed by 6 p.m., he would have re-
newed the battle, having still over two hours of daylight. It has
been stated already that, besides the signals, a frigate brought Palli-
ser word that the Admiral was waiting only for him.
The immediate dispute is of slight present interest, except as an
historical link in the fighting development of the British Navy ; and
only this historical significance justifies more than a passing mention.
In 1778 men's minds were still full of Byng's execution in 1757, and
of the Mathews and Lestock affair in 1744, which had materially in-
fluenced Byng's action off Minorca. Keppel repeatedly spoke of him-
self as on trial for his life ; and he had been a member of Byng's
court-martial. The gist of the charges against him, preferred by
Palliser, was that he attacked in the first instance without properly
forming his line, for which Mathews had been cashiered ; and, sec-
ondly, that by not renewing the action after the first pass-by, and by
wearing away from the French fleet, he had not done his utmost to
" take, sink, burn, and destroy " — the latter, the charge on which
Byng was shot. Keppel, besides his justifying reasons for his course
in general, alleged and proved his full intention to attack again, had
not Palliser failed to come into line, a delinquency the same as that
of Lestock, which caused Mathews's ruin.
In other words, men's minds were breaking away from, but had
not throAvn off completely, the tyranny of the Order of Battle, — one
of the worst of tyrannies, because founded on truth. Absolute error,
like a whole lie, is open to speedy detection ; half-truths are trouble-
some. The Order of Battle was an admirable servant and a most
objectionable despot. Mathews, in despair over a recalcitrant second,
cast off the yoke, engaged with part of his force, was ill supported,
and cashiered ; Lestock escaping. Byng, considering this, and being
a pedant by nature, would not break his line ; the enemy slipped
away, Minorca surrendered, and he was shot. In Keppel's court-
martial, twenty-eight out of the thirty captains who had been in
the line were summoned as witnesses. Most or them swore that if
Keppel had chased in line of battle that day, there could have been
no action, and the majority of them cordially approved ; but there
424 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
was evidently an undercurrent still of dissent, and esjjecially in the
rear ships, where there had been some of the straggling inevitable in
such movements, and whose commanders therefore had uncomfortable
experience of the lack of mutual support, which the line of battle was
meant to insure.
Another indication of still surviving pedantry was the obligation
felt in the rear ships to take post behind their own admiral, and to
remain there when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down
in the admiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to
whatever cause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him ; but it
appears to the A\riter that Keppel was seriously remiss in not sum-
moning those ships by tlieir own pennants, as soon as he began to
distrust the purposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing
so till 7 P. M., as he did. It is a curious picture presented to us by
the evidence. The Commander-in-Chief, with his staff and the cap-
tain of the ship, fretting and fuming on the Victory'' s quarter-deck ;
the signals flying which have been mentioned ; Harland's division
getting into line ahead ; and four points on the weather quarter, only
two miles distant, so that " every gun and port could be counted," a
group of seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in com-
mand, apparently indifferent spectators. The Formidable^ s only sign
of disability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours, — a delay which,
being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife then
throughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left tlie Board
of Admiralty to take his command. Keppel was so strong a Whig
that he would not serve against the Americans; and he evidently
feared that he was to be betrayed to his ruin.
Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points : (1), that the
signal for the line of battle was not seen on board the FormidaUe ;
(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated by
himself ; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and, moreover, found to
be in such bad condition that he feared to carry sail on it. As le-
gards the first, the signal was seen on board the Ocean., next astern
of and " not far from " ^ the Formidable ; for the second, the Admiral
should have been informed of a disability by which a single ship was
neutralising a division. The frigate that brought Keppel's message
cotild have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damaging feature to
Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming out from under
fire, be wore at once towards the enemy ; afterwards he wore back
^ Evidence of Captain J(jlni Laforey,. of the Ocean.
1778.] KEPPEL ACQUITTED. 425
again. A ship that thus wore twice before tlu^ee o'clock, might have
displayed zeal and efficiency enough to run two miles, off the wind,^
at five, to support a fight. Deliberate treachery is impossible. To the
writer the Vice-Admiral's behaviour seems that of a man in a sulk,
who will do only that which he can find no excuses for neglecting.
In such cases of sailing close, men generally slip over the line into
grievous wrong.
Keppel was cleared of all the charges preferred against him ; the
accuser had not thought best to embody among them the delay to
recall the ships which he himself was detaining. Against Palliser
no specific charge was preferred, but the Admiralty directed a gen-
eral inquiry into his course on the 27th of July. The court found
his conduct " in many instances highly exemplary and meritorious,"
— he had fought well, — " but reprehensible in not having acquainted
the Commander-in-Chief of his distress, which he might have done
either by the Fox, or other means which he had in his power."
Public opinion running strongly for Keppel, his acquittal was cele-
brated with bonfires and illuminations in London; the mob got
drunk, smashed the windows of Palliser's friends, wrecked Palliser's
own house, and came near to killing Palliser himself. The Admiralty,
in 1780, made him Governor of Greenwich Hospital.
On the 28th of July, the British and French being no longer in
sight of each other, Keppel, considering his fleet too injured aloft to
cruise near the French coast, kept away for Plymouth, where he
arrived on the 31st. Before putting to sea again, he provided against
a recurrence of the misdemeanour of the 27th by a general order, that
" in future the Line is always to be taken from the Centre." Had
this been in force before, Palliser's captains would have taken station
by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Formidable would have been left
to windward by herself. At the same time Howe was closing his
squadron upon the centre in America ; and Rodney, two years later,
experienced the ill-effects of distance taken from the next ahead, when
the leading ship of a fleet disregarded an order.
Although privately censuring Palliser's conduct, the Commander-
in-Chief made no official complaint, and it was not until the matter got
into the papers, through the talk of the fleet, that the difficulty began
which resulted in the trial of both officers, early in the following year.
1 " I do not recollect how many points I went from the wind ; 1 must have bore
down a pretty large course." Testimony of Captain J. Laforey, of the Ocean, on this
point.
426 MAJOR OPEEATIOXS. 1762-17S3. [1778.
After this, Keppel, being dissatisfied witli tlie Admiralty's treatment,
intimated his wisli to give up tlie command. The order to strike Iiis
flag was dated ]March 18th, 1779. He was not employed afloat again,
but upon the change of administration in 1782 he became First Lord
of the Admiralty, and so remained, with a brief intermission, until
December, 1783.
It is perhaps necessary to mention tliat both British and French
asserted, and assert to this day, that tlie other party abandoned the
field. ^ The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, to warrant
further discussion of an episode whose historical interest is very
slight, though its professional lessons are valuable. The British case
has the advantage — through the courts-martial — of the sworn testi-
mony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that the Britisli kept
on the same tack under short sail throughout the night, and that
in the morning only three French ships were visible. As far as
known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usual
reports.
Conditions of weather exerted great influence upon the time and
place of hostilities during the maritime war of 1778, the opening
scenes of which, in Europe and in North America, have just been
narrated. In European seas it was realised that naval enterprises by
fleets, requiring evolutions by masses of large vessels, were possible
only in summer. Winter gales scattered ships and impeded ma-
noeuvres. The same consideration prevailed to limit activity in North
American waters to the summer; and complementary to this was the
fact that in the West Indies hurricanes of excessive violence occurred
from July to October. The practice therefore was to transfer effort
from one quarter to the other in the Western Hemisphere, according
to the season.
In the recent treaty with the United States, the King of France
had formally renounced all claim to acquire for himself any part of
the American continent then in possession of Great Britain. On the
other hand, he had reserved the express riglit to conquer any of her
islands south of Bermuda. The West Indies were then, in tlie value
of their products, the richest commercial region on the globe ; and
^ " Durin.L,' the night (of the 27th) Admiral Keppel kept away (^Jit route) for
Portsmouth." Chevalier, ' Marine Franc^ai.se,' p. 90. Paris, 1877. Oddly enough, he
adds that " on the evening of the 2Sth the French squadron, carried eastward by the
currents, sighted Ushant."
1778.]
DOMINICA SEIZED BY THE FRENCH.
427
France wished not only to increase lier already large possessions
there, but also to establish more solidly her political and military
tenure.
In Septemlier, 1778, the British Island of Dominica was seized by
an expedition from the adjacent French colony of Martinique. The
affair was a surprise, and possesses no special military interest ; but
it is instructive to observe that Great Britain was unprepared, in the
West Indies as elsewhere, when the war began, A change had been
ADMIRAL THE HON. SAMUEL BARKINGTOX
{From the lithograph hy Ridley, after the portrait by J. S. Copley, R. A.)
made shortly before in the command of the Leeward Islands Station,
as it was called, which extended from Antigua southward over the
Lesser Antilles with headquarters at Barbados. Rear-Admiral the
Hon. Samuel Barrington, the new-comer, leaving home before war
had been declared, had orders not to quit Barbados till further
instructions should arrive. These had not reached him when he
learned of the loss of Dominica. Tlie French had received their
428 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
orders on the ITtli of August. The blow was intrinsically somewhat
serious, so far as the mere capture of a position can be, for the forti-
fications were strong, though they had been inadequately garrisoned.
It is a mistake to build works and not man tliem, for their fall trans-
fers to the enemy streno^th which he otherwise would need time to
create. To the French the conquest was useful beyond its commer-
cial value, because it closed a gap in their possessions. They now
Iield four consecutive islands, from north to south, Guadeloupe,
Dominica, Martinique, and St. Lucia.
Harrington had two ships of the line, his flagshiii, the Prince of
Wales, 74, Captain Benjamin Hill, and the Boijne, 70, Captain Herbert
Sawyer, which, had he been cruising, would probably have deterred
the French. Upon receiving the news, he put to sea, going as far as
Antigua ; but he did not ventm-e to stay away because his expected
instructions had not come yet, and, like Keppel, he feared an ungener-
ous construction of his actions. He remained in Barbados, patiently
watching for an opportunity to act.
The departure of Howe and the approach of winter determined
the transference of British troops and ships to the Leeward Islands,
lleinforcements had given tlie British fleet a numerical superiority,
which for the time imposed a check upon d'Estaing; but Byron,
proverbially unlucky in weather, was driven crippled to Ne^^qDort,
leaving the French free to quit Boston. The difficulty of provision-
ing so large a force as twelve ships of the line at first threatened to
prevent the movement, supplies being then extremely scarce in the
port ; l)ut at the critical moment American privateers brought in large
numbers oi; prizes, laden with provisions from Europe for the British
army. Thus d'Estaing was enabled to sail for Martinique on the 4th
of November. On the same day there left New York for Barbados
a British squadron, ^ — 2 sixty-fours, 3 fifties, and three smaller craft,
— under the command of Commodore William Hotham, convoying
.5,000 troops for service in the West Indies.
niiudoru William Hotham.
'aptaiu Samuel Upplebv.
Captain Richard Onslow.
Captain "Waltei- Griffith.
Captain John Rayner.
C.'iptain Richard Brathwaite.
Cajttain James Ferguson.
Captain Alexander Graeme.
Commander Edward Eil wards.
Beatson. vi. 116. — \V. L. C
1 Preston
50
St. Albans
64
Nonsuch
64
Isis
50
Centurion
50
Venus
30
Pearl
32
Carcass (bomb)
8
( Conin
( Capta
1778.] BARRINGTON AT ST. LUCIA. 429
Being bound for nearly the same point, the two hostile bodies
steered parallel courses, each ignorant of the other's nearness. In
the latitude of Bermuda both suffered from a violent gale, but the
French most; the flagship Languedoc losing her main and mizzen
topmasts. On the 25th of November one ^ of Hotham's convoy fell
into the hands of d'Estaing, who then first learned of the British
sailing. Doubtful whether their destination was Barbados or
Antigua, — their two chief stations, — he decided for the latter.
Arriving off it on the 6th of December, he cruised for forty-eight
hours, and then bore away for Fort Royal, Martinique, the principal
French ddpot in the West Indies, where he anchored on the 9th. On
the 10th Hotham joined Barrington at Barbados.
Barrington knew already what he wanted to do, and therefore
lost not a moment in deliberation. The troops were kept on board,
Hotham's convoy arrangements being left as they were ; and on the
morning of December 12th the entire force sailed again, the main
change being in the chief command, and in the addition of Barrington's
two ships of the line. In the afternoon of the 13th the shipping
anchored in the Grand Cul de Sac, an inlet on the west side of St.
Lucia, which is seventy miles east-north-east from Barbados. Part
of the troops landed at once, and seized the batteries and heights
on the north side of the bay. The remainder were put on shore the
next morning. The French forces were inadequate to defend their
works • but it is to be observed that they were driven with unremit-
ting energy, and that to this promptness the British owed their
ability to hold the position.
Three miles north of the Cul de Sac is a bay then called the
Cardnage ; now Port Castries. At its northern extremity is a pre-
cipitous promontory. La Vigie, then fortified, upon the tenure of
which depended not only control of that anchorage, but also access
to the rear of the works which commanded the Cul de Sac. If
those works fell, the squadron must abandon its position and put to
sea, where d'Estaing's fleet would be in waiting. On the other hand,
if the squadron were crushed at its anchors, the troops were isolated
and must ultimately capitulate. Therefore La Vigie and the squad-
ron were the two keys to the situation, and the loss of either would
be decisive.
By the evening of the 14th the British held the shore line from
La Vigie to the southern point of the Cul de Sac, as well as Morne
^ The French accounts say three.
430
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1778.
Fortund (Fort Charlotte), the capital of the island. The feeble
French garrison retired to the interior, leaving its guns unspiked,
and its ammunition and stores untouched, — another instance of the
danger of works turning to one's own disadvantage. It was Bar-
rino'ton's purpose now to remove the transports to the Carenage, as
a more commodious harbour, probably also better defended ; but he
was prevented by the arrival of d'Estaing that afternoon. " Just as
all the important stations were secured, the French colours struck,
THK NORTHERN PAKT OF THE ISLAND OF ST. LCCIA.
and General Grant's headquarters established at the Governor's
house, the Ariadne frigate came in sight with the signal abroad for
the approach of an enemy." ^ The French fleet was seen soon after-
wards from the heights above the squadron.
The British had gained much so far by celerity, but they still
spared no time to take breath. The night was passed by the soldiers
in strengthening their positions, and by the Rear-Admiral in rectify-
ing his order to meet the expected attack. The transport's, between
' Bfixtson : ' Military and Naval Memoirs,' iv. 390.
1778.] D'ESTAING ARRIVES AT ST. LUCIA. 431
fifty and sixty in number, were warped inside the ships of war, and
the hxtter were most carefully disposed across the mouth of the bay.
At the northern (windward) end was placed the Isis, 50, Captain
John Rayner, well under the point to prevent anj'thing from passing-
round her ; but for further security she was supported by three
frigates ; the Venus, 36, Captain William Peere Williams, the Ariadne,
20, Captain Thomas Pringie, and the Aurora, 28, Captain James
Cumming, anchored abreast of the interval between her and the shore.
From the Isis the line extended to the southward, inclining slightly
outward ; the Prince of Wales, 74, Barrington's flagship, taking the
southern flank, as the most exposed position. Between her and the
Isis were five other ships, — the Boyne, 70, Nonsuch, 64, St. Albans, 64,
Preston, 50, and Centurion, 50. The works left by the French at the
north and south points of the bay may have been used to support
the flanks, but Barrington in his report does not say so.
D'Estaing had twelve ships of the line, and was able to land, two
days after this, 7,000 troops. With such a superiority it is evident
that, had he arrived twenty-four hours sooner, the British would
have been stopped in the midst of their operation. To gain time,
Barrington had sought to prevent intelligence reaching Fort Roj-al,
less than fifty miles distant, by sending cruisers in advance of his
squadron, to cover the approaches to St. Lucia ; but, despite his care,
d'Estaing had the news on the 14th. He sailed at once, and, as has
been said, was off St. Lucia that evening. At daybreak of the 15th
he stood in for the Cardnage ; but when he came within range,
a lively cannonade told him that the enemy were already in posses-
sion. He decided therefore to attack the squadron, and at 11.30
the French passed along it from north to south, firing, but without
effect. A second attempt was made in the afternoon, directed upon
the lee flank, but it was equally unavailing. The British had three
men killed ; the French loss is not given, but is said to have been
slight. It is stated that the sea breeze did not penetrate far enough
into the bay, that day, to admit closing. This frequently happens,
but it does not alter the fact that the squadron was the proper point
of attack, and that, especially in the winter season, an opportunity
to close must offer soon. D'Estaing, governed probably by the sol-
dierly bias he more than once betrayed, decided now to assault the
works on shore. Anchoring in a small bay north of the Cardnage,
he landed seven thousand men, and on the 18th attempted to storm
the British lines at La Visfie. The neck of land connecting the
432 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778,1779.
promontoiy w-itli the island is very flat, and the French therefore
laboured under great disadvantage from the commanding position of
their enemy. It was a repetition of Bunker Hill, and of many other
ill-judged and precipitate attacks. After three gallant but ineffectual
charges, led by d'Estaing in person, the assailants retired, with the
loss of 41 officers and 800 rank and file, killed and wounded.
D'Estaing re-embarked his men, and stood ready again to attack
Barrington, a frigate being stationed off the Cul de Sac, to give
notice when the wind should serve. On the 24:th she signalled, and
the fleet weighed ; but Barrington, who had taken a very great risk
for an adequate object, ran no unnecessary risks through presump-
tion. He had employed his respite to warp' the ships of war farther
in, where the breeze reached less certainly, and where narrower
waters gave better support to the flanks. He had strengthened the
latter also by new works, in which he had placed heavy guns
from the ships, manned by seamen. For these or other reasons
d'Estaing did not attack. On the 29th he quitted the island, and
on the 30th the French governor, the Chev. de Micoud, formally
capitulated.
This achievement of Barrington, and of Major-General James
Grant, who was associated with him, was greeted at the time with an
ai)[)lause which will be echoed by the military judgment of a later
age. There is a particular pleasure in finding the willingness to
incur a great danger, conjoined with a care that chances nothing
against which the utmost diligence and skill can provide. The
celerity, forethought, wariness, and daring of the Hon. Samuel
Barrington have inscribed upon the records of the British Navy a
success whose distinction should be measured, not by the greatness
of the scale, but by the perfection of the workmanship, and by the
energy of the execution in the face of great odds.
St. Lucia remained in the hands of the British throughout the
war. It was an important acquisition, because at its north-west
extremity was a good and defensible anchorage, Gros Ilet Bay, only
thirty miles from Fort Royal. In it the British fleet could lie,
when desirable to close-watch the enemy, yet not be worried for its
safety when away ; for it was but an outpost, not a base of opera-
tions, as Fort Royal was. It was thus used continually, and from
it Rodney issued for his great victory in April, 1782.
During the first six months of 1779 no important incident
occurred in the West Indies. On the 6th of January, Vice-Admiral
1779.]
D'ESTAING TAKES ST. VINCENT.
433
tlie Hon. John Byron, with ten ships of the line from Narragansett
Bay, reached St. Lucia, and relieved Barrington of the chief com-
mand. Both the British and the French fleets were reinforced in
the course of the spring, but the relative strength remained nearly
as before, until the 27th of June, when the arrival of a division
from Brest made the French numbers somewhat superior.
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR HYDE PARKER (1), BART.
{From a lithograph by H. R. Cook, after the portrait by J. Xorthcote, R. A.)
Shortly before this, Byron had been constrained by one of the
commercial exigencies that constantly embarrassed the military
action of the British admirals. A large convoy of trading ships,
bound to England, was collecting at St. Kitts, and he thought
necessary to accompany it part of the homeward way, until well
clear of the enemy's West India cruisers. For this purpose he left
St. Lucia earl}^ in June. As soon as the coast Avas clear, d'Estaing,
informed of his object, sent a small combined expedition against
St. Vincent, which was surrendered on the 18th of the month. On
the 30th the French admiral himself quitted Fort Royal with his
VOL. III. — 28
434
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1779.
whole fleet, — twenty-five ships of the line and several frigates, —
directino- his course for the British Island of Grenada, before which
he anchored on the 2nd of July. With commendable promptitude,
he landed liis troops that evening, and on the 4th the island capitu-
lated. Except as represented by one small armed sloop, the YorJc,
12, Lieutenant Daniel Dobree, which was taken, the British Navy
had no part in this transaction. Thirty richly laden merchant ships
were captured in the port.
At daybreak of July 6th, Byron appeared with twenty-one sail of
the Ihie, one frigate,^ and a convoy of twenty-eiglit vessels, carrying
troops and equipments. He had returned to St. Lucia on the 1st,
and there had heard of the loss of St, Vincent, with a rumour that
the French had gone against Grenada. He consequently had put
to sea on the 3rd, with the force mentioned.
1 List of the British Fleet in the action off Grenada, July 6th, 1779.
Beatson, vi. 160 (corrected). — W. L. C.
From
COMMANDERS.
LOSSES.
SHIPS.
t3
!5
t
O
O
S
W
^
Suffolk ....
74
617
\ Eear-Adin. Joshua Rowley. )
( Ciipt. Hugh Clohen-y Christian. J
7
25
Boyne ....
70
520
Capt. Herbert Sawyer.
12
30
Royal Oak . . .
74
600
Capt. Thomas Fitzherbert.
4
12
Prince of Wales .
74
600
Vice-Admival the Hon. Samuel Barrington. )
Capt. Benjamin Hill.
26
46
Magnificent . .
74
600
Capt. John Elphinstone.
8
11
Trident ....
64
500
Capt. Anthony James Pye MoUoy.
3
6
Mcclway . . .
60
420
Capt. AVilHam Allleek.
—
4
Fame ....
74
600
Capt. John Butchart.
4
9
Nonsuch . . .
64
500
Capt. Walter Griffith.
—
—
Sultan ....
74
600
Capt. Alan Gardner.
I Yice-Adm. the Hon. John Byron. )
( Capt. William Blair. S
16
39
Priiicess Royal
00
770
3
6
Albion ....
74
600
Capt. George Bowyer.
—
2
Stirling Castle
64
500
Cajrt. Eobert Carkett.
2
6
Elizabeth . . .
74
600
Capt. William Truscott.
1
2
Yarmouth . . .
64
500
Capt. K'athaniel Bateman.
—
—
Lio7i
64
500
Capt. the Hon William Cornwallis.
21
30
Vigilant . . .
64
500
Capt. Sir Digby Dent, Kt.
( Rear-Adm. Hyde Parker (1).
( Capt. Harry Harmood.
—
—
Conqueror . . .
74
617
Comivall . . .
74
600
Capt. Timothy pAlwards.
16
27
Monmouth .
64
500
Capt. Robert Fanshawe.
25
28
Grafton ....
74
600
Capt. Thomas Collingwood.
35
63
Ari'i'liii'
20
160
Ca]it. 'i'lioiiias Pihiglr.
1
—
1779.] BYRON OFF GRENADA. 435
The British approach was reported to d'Estaing during the night
of the 5th. Most of his fleet was then lying at anchor off George-
town, at the south-west of the island ; some vessels, which had been
under way on look-out duty, had fallen to leeward.^ At 4 a.m. the
French began to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle
on the starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as
possible without regard to usual stations. When daylight had fully
made, the British fleet was seen standing down from the northward,
close inshore, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by
east. It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the ships
nearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have been
in the rear on the then tack. For this condition there is no evident
excuse ; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowly
that the war-ships can keep reasonable order for mutual support.
Moreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency,
or when no enemy can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so
when the probability of an imminent meeting exists. The worst
results of the day are to be attributed to this fault. Being short of
frigates, Byron assigned three ships of the line (a), under Rear-
Admiral Rowley, to the convoy, which of course was on the off hand
from the enemy, and somewhat in the rear. It was understood,
however, that these would be called into the line, if needful.
When the French were first perceived by Bjo-on, their line was
forming; the long thin column lengthening out gradually to the
north-north-west, from the confused cluster '^ still to be seen at the
anchorage (A). Hoping to profit by their disorder, he signalled "a
general chase in that quarter,^ as well as for Rear-Admiral Rowley
to leave the convoy; and as not more than fourteen or fifteen of
the enemy's ships appeared to be in line, the signal was made for
the ships to engage, and form as they could get w^." ^ It is clear
from this not only that the ships were not in order, but also that
1 To the westward. These islands lie in the trade-winds, which are constant in
general direction from north-east.
2 Admiral Keppel, in his evidence before the Palliser Court, gave an interesting
description of a similar scene, although the present writer is persuaded that he was
narrating things as they seemed, rather than — as at Grenada — as they were. " The
French were forming their line exactly in the manner M. Conflans did when
attacked by Admiral Ilawke." (Keppel had been in that action.) " It is a manner
peculiar to themselves, and to those who do not understand it, it appears like con-
fusion ; they draw out ship by ship from a cluster."
'^ That is, towards the ships at anchor, — the enemy's rear as matters then were.
* Byron's Report. The italics are the author's.
436
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1779.
they were to form under fire. Three ships, the Sultan^ 74, the
Prince of Wales, 74, and the Boyne. 70, in the order named, — the
second carrying the flag of Barrington, now a Vice-Admiral, — were
well ahead of the fleet (b). The direction prescribed for the attack,
that of the clustered sliips in the French rear, carried the British
V
.
nl
Byron's AcTiots off Crcnada
J-
1
6 ^."s/ui.^^.- /?'/'9
^
c
/>ryv<r/^ C5 2S 3m/p^. (i
~^
Sf>/-r,sn • 2/ ■SMf/'S. \
2
\M^
' fH Conviyr J
a oof / \
f
•
.••--•■• .
) "^
• ;
^ A :
^ t
A ^^^i^
r
\^'^
y
G
«►.
X
c"
. . . _
^
— ^
BYRON S ACTION OFF GRENADA.
down on a south-south-west, or south by west, course ; and as the
enemy's van and centre Avere drawing out to the north-north-west,
the two lines at that time resembled the legs of a " V," the point of
which was the anchorage off Georgetown. Barrington's three
ships therefore neared the French order gradually, and had to
receive its fire for some time before they could reply, unless, by
hauling to the wind, they diverged from the set course. This, and
their isolation, made their loss very heavy. When they reached the
rear of the French, the latter's column was tolerably formed, and
Barrington's ships wore in succession, — just as Harland's had
done in Keppel's action, — to follow on the other tack. In doing
this, the Sultan kept away under the stern of the enemy's rearmost
1779.] THE ACTION OFF GRENADA. ' 437
ship, to rake her; to avoid which the hitter bore up. The Sultan
thus lost time and ground, and Barrington took the lead, standing
along the French line, from rear to van, and to windward.
Meanwhile, the forming of the enemy had revealed to Byron for
the first time, and to his dismay, that he had been deceived in think-
ing the French force inferior to his own. "However, the general
chase Avas continued, and the signal made for close engagement." ^
The remainder of the ships stood down on the port tack, as the first
three had done, and wore in the wake of the latter, whom they fol-
lowed ; but before reaching the point of wearing, three ships (c),
" the Grafton, 74, the Cornwall., 74, and the Lion, 64, happening to he
■to leeward,^ sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as it passed
on the starboard tack." It seems clear that, having had the wind,
during the night and now, and being in search of an enemy, it should
not have " happened " that any ships should have been so far to lee-
ward as to be unsupported. Captain Thomas White, R.N., writing
as an advocate of Byron, saj^s,^ " while the van was wearing . . . the
sternmost ships were coming up under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker.
. . . Among these ships, the Cornwall and Zio7i, from being nearer
the enemy than those about them (for the rear division had not then
formed into line)., drew upon themselves almost the whole of the
enemy's fire." No words can show more clearly the disastrous, pre-
cipitate disorder in which this attack was conducted. The Grafton,
White says, was similarly situated. In consequence, these three were
so crippled, besides a tremendous loss in men, that they dropped far
to leeward and astern on the other tack.
When the British ships in general had got round, and were in
line ahead on the starboard tack, — the same as the French, — ran-
ging from rear to van of the enemy (B), Byron signalled for the eight
leading ships to close together, for mutual support, and to engage
close. This, which should have been done — not with finikin preci-
sion, but with military adequacy — before engaging, was less easy
now, in the din of battle and with crippled ships. A quick-eyed
subordinate, however, did something to remedy the error of his chief.
Rear-Admiral Rowley had been left considerably astern, having to
make up the distance between the convoy and the fleet. As he fol-
lowed the latter, he saw Barrington's three ships unduly separated,
and doubtless visibly much mauled. Instead, therefore, of blindly
1 Byron's Report. Autlior's italics.
2 ' Naval Researches.' Loudon, 1830. p. 22.
438 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1779.
following his leader, he cut straight across (a a') to the head of the
column to support the van, — an act almost absolutely identical with
that wliich won Nelson renown at Cape St. Vincent. In this he was
followed by the Monmouth^ 64, the brilliancy of whose bearing was so
conspicuous to the two fleets that it is said the French officers after
the battle toasted " the little black ship." She and the Suffolk., 74,
Rowley's flagship, also suffered severely in this gallant feat.
It was imperative with Byron now to keep his van well up with
the enemy, lest he should uncover the convoy, broad on the weather
bow of the two fleets. " They seemed much inclined to cut off the
convoy, and had it much in their power by means of their large
frigates, independent of ships of the line." ^ On the other hand, the
Cormoall, Grafton, and Zio7i^ though they got their heads round, could
not keep up with the fleet (c'), and were dropping also to leeward —
towards the enemy. At noon, or soon after, d'Estaing bore up with
the body of bis force to join some of his vessels that had fallen to
leeward. Byron very properly — under his conditions of inferiority
— kept his wind ; and the separation of the two fleets, thus produced,
caused firing to cease at 1 p.m.
The enemies were now ranged on parallel lines, some distance
apart ; still on the starboard tack, heading north-north-west. Between
the two, but far astern, the Cornwall, Grafton, Lion, and a fourth
British ship, the Fame, were toiling along, greatly crippled. At 3 p.m.,
the French, now in good order, tacked together, which caused them
to head towards these disabled vessels. Byron at once imitated the
movement, and the eyes of all in the two fleets anxiously watched
the result. Captain Cornwallis of the Lion, measuring the situation
accurately, saw that, if he continued ahead, he would be in the midst
of the French by the time he got abreast them. Having only his
foremast standing, he put his helm up, and stood broad off before
the \vind (c"), across the enemy's bows, for Jamaica. He was not
pursued. The other three, unable to tack and afraid to wear, which
would put them also in the enemy's power, stood on, passed to wind-
ward of the latter, receiving several broadsides, and so escaped to the
northward. The Monmouth was equally maltreated ; in fact, she had
not been al)le to tack to the southward with the fleet. Continuing
north (a'), she was now much separated. D'Estaing afterwards re-
formed his fleet on its leewardmost ship (BC).
Byron's action off Grenada was the most disastrous, viewed as an
^ Byron's Keport.
1779.] BYRON'S DISASTER. 439
isolated event, that the British Navy had encountered since Beachy
Head, in 1G90. Tliat the Cornwall^ Grafton^ and Lion were not cap-
tured was due simply to the strained and cautious inaptitude of the
French admiral. This Byron virtually admitted. "To my great
surprise no ship of the enemy was detached after the Lion. The
Grafton and Cormvall might have been weathered by the French, if
they had kept their wind, . . . but they persevered so strictly in de-
clining every chance of close action that they contented themselves
with firing upon these ships when passing barely within gunshot,
and suffered them to rejoin the squadron, without one eiTort to cut
them off." Suffren,! who led the French on the starboard tack, and
whose ship, the Fantasque, 64, lost 22 killed and 43 wounded, wrote :
" Had our admiral's seamanship equalled his courage, we would not
have allowed four dismasted ships to escape." That the Monmouth
and Fame could also have been secured is extremely probable ; and
had Byron, in order to save them, borne down to renew the action,
the disaster might have become a catastrophe.
That nothing resulted to the French from their great advantage is
a matter for French naval history, not for British. It is otherwise as
regards the causes of such a grave calamity, when twenty ships met
twenty-four,^ — -a sensible but not overwhelming superiority. These
facts have been shown sufficiently. Byron's disaster was due to attack-
ing with needless precipitation, and in needless disorder. He had the
weather-gage, it was early morning, and the east wind, already a
working breeze, must freshen as the day advanced. The French were
tied to their new conquest, which they could not abandon without
humiliation, not to speak of their troops ashore ; but even had they
wished to retreat, they could not have done so before a general chase,
unless prepared to sacrifice their slower sliips. If twenty-four ships
could reconcile themselves to running from twenty, it was scarcely
possible but that the fastest of these would overtake the slowest of
those. There were time for fighting, an opportunity for forcing action
1 Pierre A. de Suffren de Saint Tropez, a Bailli of the Order of Knights of Malta.
Born 1726. Present at two naval actions before he was twenty. Participated in
1750 in the attack on Port Mahon, and in 1759 in the action off Lagos. Chef
d'escadre in 1779. Dispatched to the East Indies. Fought a British sf^uadron in
the Bay of Praya, and a succession of brilliant actions with Sir Edward Hughes.
Vice- Admiral, 1783. Killed in a duel, 1788. One of the greatest of French naval
officers. — W. L. C.
^ Troude says that one French seventy-four, having touched in leaving port, was
not in the engagement.
440 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1770.
which couhl not be evaded, and time also for the British to form in
reasonable order.
It is important to consider this, because, while Keppel must be
approved for attacking in partial disorder, Bjron must be blamed for
attacking in utter disorder. Keppel had to snatch opportunity from
an unwilling foe. Having himself the lee-gage, he could not pick and
choose, nor yet manoeuvre ; yet he brought his fleet into action, giving
mutual support throughout nearly, if not quite, the whole line. What
Byron did has been set forth ; the sting is that his bungling tactics can
find no extenuation in an}- urgency of the case.
The loss of the two fleets, as given by the authorities of either
nation, Avere : British, 183 killed, 346 wounded ; French, 190 killed,
759 wounded. Of the British total, 126 killed and 235 wounded, or
two thirds, fell to the two groups of three ships each, Avhich by the
Vice-Admiral's mismanagement were successively exposed to be cut
up in detail by the concentrated fire of the enemy. The British loss
in spars and sails — in motive-power — also exceeded greatly that of
the French.
After the action d'Estaing returned quietly to Grenada. Byron
went to St. Kitts to refit ; but repairs were most diflicult, owing to the
dearth of stores in which the Admiralty had left the West Indies.
With all the skill of the seamen of that day in making good damages,
the ships remained long unserviceable, causing great apprehension for
the other islands. This state of things d'Estaing left unimproved,
as he had his advantage in the battle. He did, indeed, i)arade his
superior force before Byron's fleet as it lay at anchor ; but, beyond
the humiliation naturally felt by a Navy which prided itself on ruling
the sea, no further injury was done.
In August Byron sailed for England. Vice-Admiral Barrington
had already gone home, wounded. The station therefore was left in
command of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker (1), and so remained until
the following JNIareh, when Admiral Sir George Brydges Rodney,
K. B., arrived as Commander-in-Chief on the Leeward Islands Station.
The North American Station was given to Vice-Admiral Marriot
Arbuthnot, who liad under him a luilf-dozen ships of the line, with
headquarters at New York. His command was general!}- indepen-
dent of Rodney's, but the latter had no liesitation in going to New
York on emergency and taking charge there ; in doing which he had
the approval of the Admiralty.
The approach of winter in 1778 had determined the cessation of
1779.]
THE BRITISH AT SAVANNAH,
441
operations, both naval and military, in the northern part of the Ameri-
can continent, and had led to the transfer of 5,000 troops to the West
Indies, already noted. At the same time, an unjustifiable extension
of British effort, having regard to the disposable means, was undertaken
in the Southern States of Georsria and South Carolina. On the 27th
of November a small detachment of troops under Lieutenant-Colonel
Archibald Campbell, sailed from Sandy Hook, convoyed by a division
ADMIRAL MAKKIOT ARBUTHNOT. .
{From a lithograph by H. R. Cook, after the jwrirait by Rising.)
of frigates commanded by Captain Hyde Parker (2),i in the Phcenix,
44. It entered the Sava.nnah River four weeks later, and soon after-
wards occupied the city of the same name. Simultaneously with this,
by Clinton's orders, General Prevost moved from Florida, then a
British colony, with all the men he could spare from the defence of
St. Augustine. Upon his arrival in Savannah, he took command of
the whole force thus assembled.
1 Sir Hyde Parker, Kt. Born, 1739. Captain, 1763. Rear-Admiral, 1793. Vice-
Admiral, 1794. Admiral, 1799. Died, 1807. Nelson's chief at Copenhagen, in 1801.
442 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17C2-17S3. [1779.
These operations, which during 1779 extended as far as the
neighbourhood of Charleston, depended upon the control of the
water, and are a conspicuous example of misapplication of power to
the point of ultimate self-destruction. They were in 1778-79 essen-
tially of a minor character, especially the maritime part, and aaIU
therefore be dismissed with the remark that the Navy, by small ves-
sels, accompanied every movement in a country cut up in all direc-
tions by water-courses, large and small. " The defence of this
province," wrote Parker, "must greatly depend on the naval force
upon the different inland creeks. I am therefore forming some gal-
leys covered from musketry, which I believe will have a good effect."
These were precursors of the " tin-clads " of the American Civil War,
a century later. Not even an armoured ship is a new thing under
the sun.
In the Southern States, from Georgia to Virginia, the part of the
Navy from first to last was subsidiary, though imjjortant. It is there-
fore unnecessary to go into details, but most necessary to note that
here, by misdirection of effort and abuse of means, was initiated the
fatal movement which henceforth divided the small British army in
North America into two sections, wholly out of mutual support.
Here was reproduced on a larger, and therefore more fatal, scale,
Howe's error of 1777. This led directly, by the inevitable logic of
a false position, to Cornwallis's march through North Carolina
into Virginia, to Yorktown in 1781, and to the signal demonstra-
tion of sea power off Chesapeake Bay, which accomplished with a
crash the independence of the United States. No hostile strategist
could have severed the British army more hopelessly than did
the British government ; no fate could have been more inexorable
than was its own perverse will. The personal alienation and
official quarrel between Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis,
their divided counsels and divergent action, were but the natural
result, and the reflection, of a situation essentially self-contradictory
and exasperating.
As the hurricane season of 1779 advanced, d'Estaing, who had
orders to bring back to France the ships of the line with which he
had sailed from Toulon in 1778, resolved to go first upon the Ameri-
can coast, off South Carolina or Georgia. Arriving with his whole
fleet at the mouth of the Savannah, August 31st, he decided to
attempt to wrest the city of Savannah from the British. This would
have been of real service to the latter, had it nipped in the bud
1779.] SPAIN DECLARES WAR AGAINST ENGLAND. 443
their ex-centric undertaking ; but, after tlu^ee weeks of opened trenches,
an assault upon the phice failed. D'Estaing then sailed for Europe
with the ships designated to accompany him, the others returning to
the West Indies in two squadrons, under De Grasse and La Motte-
Picquet. Though fruitless in its main object, this enterprise of
d'Estaiug had the important indirect effect of causing the British to
abandon Narragansett Bay. Upon the news of his appearance, Sir
Henry Clinton had felt that, with his greatly diminished arni}^, he
could not hold both Rhode Island and New York. He therefore
ordered the evacuation of the former, thus surrendering, to use again
Rodney's words, " the best and noblest harbour in America." The
following summer it was occupied in force by the French.
D'Estaing was succeeded in the chief command, in the West
Indies and North America, by Rear-Admiral de Guichen,i who ar-
rived on the station in March, 1780, almost at the same moment as
Rodney.
In June, 1779, the maritime situation of Great Britain had be-
come much more serious by Spain's declaring war. At the same
moment that d'Estaing with twenty-five ships of the line had con-
fronted Byron's twenty-one, the Channel fleet of forty sail had seen
gathering against it a host of sixty-six. Of this great number thirty-
six were Spanish.
The open declaration of Spain had been preceded by a secret alli-
ance with France, signed on the 12tli of April. Fearing that the
British government would take betimes the reasonable and proper
step of blockading the Brest fleet of thirty with the Channel forty,
thus assuming a central position with reference to its enemies and
anticipating the policy of Lord St. Vincent, the French Ministry
hurried its ships to sea on the 4th of June ; Admiral d'Orvilliers,
Keppel's opponent, still in command. His orders were to cruise off
the island of Cizarga, where the Spaniards were to join. On the
11th he was at his station, but not till the 23rd of July did the bulk
of the Spanish force appear. During this time, the French, insuffi-
ciently equipped from the first, owing to the haste of their departure,
were consuming provisions and water, not to speak of wasting pleas-
ant summer weather. Their ships also were ravaged by an epidemic
1 Louis Urbain de Bouenic, Comte de Guichen. Born, 1712. Entered the navy,
1730. Commanded the Illustre with success in North America in 1756. Second in
command in the action off Ushant in 1778. Thrice fought Rodney in the West Indies
iu 1780. Fought Kempenfelt off the Azores in 1781. Died, 1790. — W. L. C.
444 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1779.
fever. Upon the junction, d'Orvilliers found that the Spaniards had
not been furnished A\ith the French system of signals, although by
the treaty the French admiral was to be in chief command. The
rectification of this oversight caused further delay, but on the 11th
•of August the combined fleet sighted Ushant, and on the 14th was
off the Lizard. On the 16th it appeared before Plymouth, and there
on the 17th captured the Ardent., 64, Captain Philip Boteler.
ADMIIIAL Sill CIIAIILES HAKDY (2), KT.
{From (he lithogruph bij II. II. Cook, after the portrait by G. Romney.)
Thirty-five ships of the Channel fleet had gone to sea on the
16th of June, and were now cruising outside, under the command
of Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2).^ His station was from ten to
1 Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2), Kt. Son of Vice- Admiral Sir Charles Hardy
(1), who died in 1744. Born about 171(5. Entered the Navy, 1731. Lieutenant,
1737. Commander, 1741. Captain, 1711. Knighted, and Governor of New York,
175.5. Rear-Admiral, 175(5. Employed under Boscawen and Ilawke. Vice-Admiral,
17(52. Admiral, 1770. Governor of Greenwich Hospital, 1771. Commander-in-
Chief in the Channel, 1779. Died, 1780. — W. L. C.
1779.] FRANCO-SPANISH FLEET IN THE CHANNEL. 445
twenty leagues south-west of Scilly ; consequently he had not been
seen by the enemy, who from Ushant had stood up the Channel.
The allies, however, now nearly double the numbers of the British,
were between them and their ports, — a serious situation doubtless,
but by no means desperate ; not so dangerous for sailing ships as it
probably will be for steamers to have an enemy between them and
their coal.
The alarm in England was very great, and especially in the south.
On the 9th of July a royal proclamation had commanded all horses
and cattle to be driven from the coasts, in case of invasion. Booms
had been placed across the entrance to Plymouth Harbour, and orders
were sent from the Admiralty to sink vessels across the harbour's
mouth. Many who had the means withdrew into the interior, which
increased the panic. Great merchant fleets were then on the sea^
homeward bound. If d'Orvilliers were gone to cruise in the ap-
proaches to the Channel, instead of to the Spanish coast, these might
be taken ; and for some time his whereabouts were unknown. As it
was, the Jamaica convoy, over two hundred sail, got in a few days
before the allies appeared, and the Leeward Islands fleet had similar
good fortune. Eight homeward bound East Indiamen were less
lucky, but, being warned of their danger, took refuge in the Shannon,
and there remained till the trouble blew over. On the other hand,
the stock market stood firm. Nevertheless, it was justly felt that
such a state of things as a vastly superior hostile fleet in the Channel
should not have been. " What a humiliating state is our country
reduced to ! " wrote Jervis, who was with the fleet, to his sister ; but
he added that he laughed at the idea of invasion.
The French had placed a force of fifty thousand men at Le Havre
and St. Malo, and collected four hundred vessels for their transport.
Their plans were not certainly known, but enough had transpired to
cause reasonable anxiety ; and the crisis, on its face, was very serious.
Not their own preparations, but the inefficiency of their enemies, in
counsel and in preparation, saved the British Islands from invasion.
What the results of this would have been is another question, — a
question of land warfare. The original scheme of the French Min-
istry was to seize the Isle of Wight, securing Spithead as an anchor-
age for the fleet, and to prosecute their enterprise from this near and
reasonably secure base. Referring to this first project, d'Orvilliers
wrote : " We will seek the enemy at St. Helen's, and then, if I find
that roadstead unoccupied, or make myself master of it, I will send
446 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1779.
word to Marshiil De Vaux, at Le Havre, and inform liim of the
measures I will take to insure his passage, which [measures] will
depend upon the position of the English main fleet [d^pendront
des forces supdrieures des Anglais]. That is to say, I myself will
lead the combined fleet on that side, to contain the enemy, and
I will send, on the other side, a light scj^uadron, with a sufficient
number of ships of the line and frigates ; or I will propose to M. de
Cordova to take this latter station, in order that the passage of the
army may be free and sure. I assume that then, either by the
engagement I shall have fought with the enemy, or hy their retreat
into their ports., I shall be certain of their situation and of the success
of the operation." ^ It will be observed that d'Orvilliers, accounted
then and now one of the best officers of his day in the French navy,
takes here into full account the British "fleet in being-." ^ The main
body of the allies, fifty ships, was to hold this in check, while a
smaller force — Cordova had command of a special " squadron of
observation," of sixteen ships of the line — was to convoy the
crossing.
These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a
change of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August,
before Plymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of
Wight, but the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene
of landing. The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any
anchorage, — a resource necessary even to steamers, and far more
to sailing vessels aiming to remain in a position. As a point to
begin shore operations, too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote
corner of the country to be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly
represented all this, but could not stay where lie was long enough to
get a rei)ly. An easterly gale came on, which blew hard for several
days and drove the allies out of the Channel. On the 25th of August
word was received that the British fleet was near Scilly. A council
of war was then held, which decided that, in view of the terrible
increase of disease in the shipping, and of the shortness of provisions,
it was expedient not to re-enter the Channel, but to seek the enemy,
and bring him to battle. This was done. On the 29tli Hardy was
sighted, being then on his return up Channel. With the disparity
of force he could not Ijut avoid action, and the allies were unable to
' Chevalier, ' Marine Frangaise,' 1778. p. 165. Author's italics.
2 But it was not merely a " fleet in being." It -was also, in all senses, a " potential
fleet." — W.L. C.
1779.] THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR. 447
compel it. On the 3rd of September lie reaclied Spithead. D'Or-
villiers soon afterwards received orders to return to Brest, and on
the 14th the combined fleet anchored there.
The criticism to be passed on the conduct of this summer cam-
paign by the British Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was
not ready, according to the reasonable standard of the day, which
recognised in the probable co-operation of the two Bourbon king-
doms, France and Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force
permissible to Great Britain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the
war had been foreseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore,
it was essential to prevent a junction, — to take an interior position.
The Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French
sailed. After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the
contention of the Opposition, that they should have been followed,
and attacked, off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they
waited there, they were inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here
must be made, however, for the inability of a representative govern-
ment to disregard popular outcry, and uncover the main approach to
its own ports. This, indeed, does but magnify the error made in not
w^atching Brest betimes, for a fleet before Brest covered also the
Channel.
With regard to the objects of the war in which they had become
partners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but one point, —
the desirability of injuring Great Britain. Each had its own special
aim for its own advantage. This necessarily introduced divergence
of effort ; but France, having first embarked in the contest and then
sought the aid of an ally, the particular objects of the latter naturally
obtained from the beginning a certain precedence. Until near the
close of the war, it may be said that the chief ambitions of France
were in the West Indies ; those of Spain, in Europe, — to regain
Minorca and Gibraltar.
In this way Gibraltar became a leading factor in the contest, and
affected, directly or indirectly, the major operations throughout the
world, by the amount of force absorbed in attacking and preserving
it. After the futile effort in the Channel, in 1779, Spain recalled
her vessels from Brest. " The project of a descent upon England
was abandoned provisionally. To blockade Gibraltar, to have in
America and Asia force sufficient to hold the British in check,
and to take the offensive in the West Indies, — such," wrote the
French government to its ambassador in Madrid, " was the plan of
448 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783. [1780.
campaign adopted for 1780." Immediately upon the declaration of
war, intercourse betAveen Gibraltar and the Spanish mainland was
stopped ; and soon afterwards a blockade by sea was instituted,
fifteen cruisers being stationed at the entrance of the Bay, where
they seized and sent into Spanish ports all vessels, neutral or British,
bound to the Rock. This blockade was effectively supported from
Cathz, but a Spanish force of some ships of the line and many small
vessels also maintained it more directly from Algeciras, on the opposite
side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The British Mediterranean squadron,
then consisting only of one GO-gun ship, tlu'ee frigates, and a sloop,
was wholly unable to afford relief. At the close of the year 1779,
flour was fourteen guineas the barrel, and other provisions in propor-
tion. It became therefore imminently necessary to throw in supplies
of all kinds, as well as to reinforce the garrison. To this service
Rodney was assigned ; and with it he began the brilliant career, the
chief scene of which was to be in the West Indies.
Rodney was appointed to command the Leeward Islands Station
on the 1st of October, 1779. He was to be accompanied there imme-
diately by only four or five ships of the line ; but advantage was
taken of his sailing, to place under the charge of an officer of his
a[)proved reputation a great force, composed of his small division
and a large fraction of the Channel fleet, to convoy supplies and
reinforcements to Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 29th of December
the whole body, after many delays in getting down Channel, put to
sea from Plymouth : twenty-two ships of tlie line, fourteen frigates
and smaller vessels, besides a huge collection of storeships, victuallers,
ordnance vessels, troop-ships, and merchantmen, — the " trade " for
the West Indies and Portugal.
On the 7th of January, a hundred leagues west of Cape Finisterre,
the West India ships parted, under convoy of a ship of the line and
three frigates. At daylight on the 8th, twenty-two sail were seen to
the north-east, the squadron apparently having passed them in the
night. Chase was at once given, and the whole were taken in a few
hours. Seven ^ were ships of war, chiefly frigates ; the remainder
merchant vessels, laden with naval stores and provisions for the
Spanish fleet at Cadiz. The provision ships, twelve in number, were
diverted at once to the relief of Gibraltar, under charge of the Si)i\n-
1 Guipuscoana, G4 (added to the Royal Navy as Prince JFilliam) ; Smi Carlos,
32; San Rafael, 30; San Bruno, 2G; Santa Teresa, 24; SanFcrmin, IG; San Vincente,
14. Steel's ' Navy List': Beatson, vi. 233. — W. L. C.
1780.] RODNEY AT GIBRALTAR. 449
ish sixty-four, which had been one of their convoy before capture,
and had now received a Britisli crew. Continuing on, intelligence
was received from time to time by passing vessels that a Spanish
squadron was cruising off Cape St. Vincent. Thus forewarned, orders
were given to all captains to be prepared for battle as the Cape was
neared. On the 16th it was passed, and at 1 p.m. sails in the south-
east were signalled. These were a Spanish squadron of eleven ships
of the line, and two 26-gun frigates. Rodney at once bore down for
them under a press of canvas, making signal for the line abreast.
Seeing, however, that the enemy was trying to form line of battle
on the starboard tack, which with a westerly wind was vnth. heads to
the southward, towards Cadiz, a hundred miles to the south-east, he
changed the orders to a " General Chase," the ships to engage as
they came up ; " to leeward," so as to get between the enemy and
his post, and "in rotation," by which probably was meant that the
leading British vessel should attack the sternmost of the Spaniards,
and that her followers should pass her to leeward, successively en-
gaging from the enemy's rear towards the van.
At 4 P.M. the signal for battle was made, and a few minutes
later the four headmost of the pursuers got into action. At 4.40
one of the Spanish ships, the Santo Domingo, 70, blew up with all on
board, and at 6 another struck. By this hour, it being January,
darkness had set in. A night action therefore followed, which
lasted until 2 a.m., when the headmost of the enemy surrendered,
and all firing ceased. Of the eleven hostile ships of the line, only
four escaped. Besides the one blown up, six were taken. These
were the Fenix, 80, flag of the Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Lan-
gara, the Monarca, 70, the Frincesa, 70, the Diligente, 70, the San
Julian, 70, and the San Eugenio, 70. The two latter drove ashore
and were lost.^ The remaining four were brought into Gibraltar,
and were ultimately added to the Navy. All retained their old
names, save the Fenix, which w^as re-named Gibraltar. " The
weather during the night," by Rodney's report, " was at times very
tempestuous, with a great sea. It continued very bad weather the
next day, when the Royal George, 100, Frince George, 90, Sandivich,
90 (Rodney's flagship), and several other ships were in great danger,
and under the necessity of making sail to avoid the shoals of San
Lucar, nor did they get into deep water till the next morning."
^ Eodney's Report. Chevalier says that one of them was retaken by her crew
and carried into Cadiz.
VOL. III. — 29
450 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1783. [1780.
It was in this danger from a lee shore, which was deliberately
though promptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of
Rodney's consists. The enemy's squadi'on, being only eleven ships
of the line, was but half the force of the British, and it was taken
by surprise ; which, to be sure, is no excuse for a body of war-ships
in war-time. Caught unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too
late. It was Rodney's merit, and no slight one under the conditions
of weather and navigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve
their mistake. His action left nothing to be desired in resolution
or reacUness. It is true that Rodney discussed the matter with his
flag-captain, Walter Young, and that rumour attributed the merit
of the decision to the latter; but this sort of detraction is of too
common occurrence to affect opinion. Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician
to the Fleet, gives the following account : " When it was close
upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should be con-
tinued. After some discussion between the Admiral and Captain,
at which I was present, the Admiral being confined with the gout,
it was decided to persist in the same course, with the signal to
engage to leeward." Rodney at that time was nearly sixty-two,
and a constant martyr to gout in both feet and hands.
The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal
character to the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorely
in need of some good news. The arrival of much-needed supplies
from home was itself a matter of rejoicing ; but it was more inspirit-
ing still to see following in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile
ships of the line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-
Chief, and to hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or
destroyed. The exultation in England was even greater, and es-
pecially at the Admiralty, Avhich was labouring under the just
indignation of the people for the unpreparedness of the Navy.
"You have taken more line-of-battle ships," wrote the First Lord
to Rodney, " than had been captured in any one action in either of
the two last preceding wars."
It should be remembered, too, as an element in the triumph, that
this advantage over an exposed detachment had been snatched, as
it were, in the teeth of a main fleet superior to Rodney's own ; for
twenty Spanish and four French ships of the line, under Admiral de
Cordova, were lying then in Cadiz Bay. During the eighteen days
wlien the British remained in and near the Straits, no attempt was
made by Cordova to take revenge for the disaster, or to reap the
1780.] RODNEY SAILS FOR THE WEST INDIES. 451
benefit of superior force. The inaction was due, probably, to tlie
poor condition of tlie Spanish ships in point of efficiency and equip-
ment, and largely to their having uncoppered bottoms. This ele-
ment of inferiority in the Spanish navy should be kept in mind as
a factor in the general war, although Spanish fleets did not come
much into battle. A French Commodore, then with the Spanish
fleet in Ferrol, wrote as follows : " Their ships all sail so badly that
they can neither overtake an enemy nor escape from one. The
Glorieux is a bad sailer in the French navy, but better than the
best among the Spaniards." He adds: "The vessels of Langara's
squadron were surprised at immense distances one from the other.
Thus they always sail, and their negligence and security on this
point are incredible."
On approaching Gibraltar, the continuance of bad weather, and
the strong easterly current of the Straits, set many of Rodney's
ships and convoy to leeward, to the back of the Rock, and it was
not till the 26th that the flagship herself anchored. The storeships
for Minorca were sent on at once, under charge of three coppered
ships of the line. The practice of coppering, though then fully
adopted, had not yet extended to all vessels. As an element of
speed, it was an important factor on an occasion like this, when
time pressed to get to the West Indies ; as it also was in an engage-
ment. The action on the 16th had been opened by the coppered
ships of the line, which first overtook the retreating enemy and
brought his rear to battle. In the French navy at the time, Suffren
was urging the adoption upon an apparently reluctant Minister.
It would seem to have been more general among the British, going
far to compensate for the otherwise inferior qualities of their ships.
" The Spanish men-of-war we have taken," wrote Rodney to his
wife concerning these prizes, " are much superior to ours." It may
be remembered that Nelson, thirteen years later, said the same.
"I perceive you cry out loudly for coppered ships," wrote the First
Lord to Rodney after this action ; " and I am therefore determined
to stop your mouth. You shall have copper enough."
Upon the return of the ships from Minorca, Rodney put to sea
again on the 13th of February, for the West Indies. The detach-
ment from the Channel fleet accompanied him three days' sail on his
way, and then parted for England with the prizes. On this return
voyage it fell in mth fifteen French supply vessels, convoyed by two
«ixty-fours, bound for the He de France, in the Indian Ocean. One
452 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1783. [1730.
of the ships of Avar, the Protee, and three of the storeships were taken.
Though trivial, the incident illustrates the effect of operations in
Europe upon war in India. It may be mentioned here as indicative
of the government's dilemmas, that Kodney was censured for hav-
ing left one ship of the line at the Rock. " It has given us the
trouble and risk of sending a frigate on purpose to order her home
immediately ; and if 3^ou wdll look into your original instructions, you
will find that there was no point more strongly guarded against than
that of your leaving any line-of-battle ship behind you." These
words clearly show the exigency and peril of the general situation,
owing to the inadequate development of the naval force as compared
with its foes. Such isolated ships ran the gauntlet of the fleets flank-
ing their routes in Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest.
When Rodney arrived at St. Lucia with his four ships of the line,
on the 27tli of JNIarch, he found there a force of sixteen others, com-
posed in about equal proportions of ships that had left England Avith
Byron in the summer of 1778, and of a reinforcement brought by
Rear-Admiral Rowley in the spring of 1779.
During the temporary command of Rear-Admiral Hj^de Parker,
a smart affair had taken place between a detachment of the squadron
and one from the French division, under La Motte-Picquet, then
lying in Fort Royal.
On the 18th of December, 1779, between 8 and 9 a.m., the British
look-out ship, the Preston, 50, between Martinique and St. Lucia,
made signal for a fleet to windward, whicli proved to be a body of
French supply ships, twenty-six in number, under convoy of a frigate.
Both the British and the French squadrons were in disarray, sails
unbent, ships on the heel or partially disarmed, crews ashore for
wood and water. In both, signals flew at once for certain ships to
get under way, and in both the orders were executed with a rapidity
gratifying to the two commanders, who also went out in person.
The British, however, were outside firet, with five sail of the line
and a 50-gun ship. Nine of the merchant vessels were captured
by them, and four forced ashore. The French Rear-Admiral had
by this time got out of Fort Royal with three ships of the line, — the
Annibal, 74, Vengcur, 64, and RcJlccM, 64, — and, l)eing to windward,
covered the entrance of the remainder of the convoy. As the two
hostile divisions were now near eacli other, with a fine working
breeze, the British tried to beat u}) to the enemy ; the Conqueror, 74,
Captain Walter Griffith, being ahead and to windward of her consorts.
1780.] RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN. 453
Coming within range at 5, firing began between her and the French
flagship, Annibal, 74, and subsequently between her and all the three
vessels of the enemy. Towards sunset, the Albion^ 74, had got close
up with the Conqueror^ and the other ships were within distant range ;
" but as they had worked not only well within the dangers of the
shoals of the bay (Fort Royal), but within reach of the batteries, I
called them off by night signal at a quarter before seven." ^ In this
chivalrous skirmish, — for it was little more, although the injury
to the French in the loss of the convoy was notable, — Parker was
equally delighted with his own squadron and with his enemy. " The
steadiness and coolness with which on every tack the Conqueror
received the fire of these three ships, and returned her own, work-
ing his ship with as much exactness as if he had been turning into
Spithead, and on every board gaining on the enemy, gave me infi-
nite pleasure. It was with inexpressible concern," he added, " that
I heard that Captain Walter Griffith, of the Conqueror^ was killed by
the last broadside." ^ Having occasion, a few days later, to exchange
a flag of truce with the French Rear-Admiral, he wrote to him:
" The conduct of your Excellency in the affair of the 18th of this
month fully justifies the reputation which you enjoy among us, and
I assure you that I could not witness without envy the skill you
showed on that occasion. Our enmity is transient, depending upon
our masters ; but your merit has stamped upon my heart the greatest
admiration for yourself." This was the officer who was commonly
known in his time as "Vinegar" Parker; but these letters show
that the epithet fitted the rind rather than the kernel.
Shortly after de Guichen took command, he arranged with the
Marquis de Bouille, Governor of jMartinique, to make a combined
attack upon some one of the British West India Islands. For this
purpose 3,000 troops were embarked in the fleet, which sailed on the
night of the 13th of April, 1780, intending first to accompany a
convoy for Santo Domingo, until it was safely out of reach of the
British. Rodney, who was informed at once of the French departure,
put to sea in chase with all his ships, twenty of the line, two of which
were of 90 guns, and on the 16th came in sight of the enemy to lee-
ward of Martinique, beating up against the north-east trade- winds,
and intending to pass through the channel between that island and
Dominica. " A general chase to the north-west followed, and at five
^ Parker's Report.
454
MAJOR OPEBATIOXS. 1762-1783.
[1780.
in the evening -we plainly discovered that they consisted of t\yenty-
tliree sail of the line, and one lifty-gun ship." i
As it fell dark Rodney formed his line of battle,^ standing still
to the north-west, therefore on the starboard tack ; and he was atten-
tive to keep to windward of the enemy, whom his frigates watched
thligently during the night. " Their manoeuvres," he wrote, " indi-
cated a wish to avoid battle," and he therefore was careful to coun-
1 Rodney's Report. The French authorities give tlieir line of battle as twenty-
two ships of the line. There was no 90-gun ship among them — no three-decker ;
but there were two of 80 guns, of which also the British had none.
2 British line of battle on April 17th, 1780. The Stirling Castle to lead with
the starboard, and the Marjnificent with the larboard tacks on board. From Beatson^
vi.. 217, 218. with additions and corrections. — W. L. C.
SHIPS.
i
!5
COMMANDERS.
•6
g
8
o
H
s
M
O
Stirling Castle . .
64
500
Capt. Robert Carkett.
4
34
Ajax
74
600
Capt. Samuel Uvedale.
4
13
!2
Elizabeth ....
74
600
Capt. Hon. Fredk. Lewis Maitland.
9
15
>
Princess Eoyal . .
90
770
\ Rear- Admiral Hyde Parker (E). )
( Capt. Harry Harmood. )
5
14
Albion
74
600
Capt. George Bowyer.
3
2
Terrible ....
74
600
Capt. John Douglas.
—
—
Trident ....
64
500
Capt. Anthony James Pye Molloy.
14
26
Greyhound, 28 .
Capt. William Dickson.
—
—
Grafton ....
74
600
< Commod. Thomas CoUingwood. ]
\ Capt. Thomas Newnham, )
2
30
Yarmouth
64
500
Capt. Nathaniel Bateman.
5
15
Co7-nwall ....
74
600
Capt. Timothy Edwards.
21
49
Sandwich ....
90
752
1 Adiii. Sir George Brydges Rodney (W). \
\ Capt. Walter Young. )
18
51
Ed
Suffolk ....
74
600
Capt. Abraham Crespin.
—
12
O
Boync
70
520
Capt. Charles Cotton.
2
—
Vigilant ....
64
500
Capt. Sir George Home, Bart.
—
2
Venus, 36 . .
Capt. John Fergusson.
—
—
Pcrjasus, 28 . .
Capt. John Bazcdy (1).
—
—
Deal Castle, 24
Capt. William Fooks,
—
—
Vengeance. . . .
74
617
\ Commod. William Hotliaiii. )
I Capt. John Holloway. S
4
6
Medway ....
60
420
Capt. William Allleck.
2
Montagu ....
74
600
Cai)t. John Houlton.
9
26
<
Conqueror ....
74
617
( Rear-Adnural Joshua Rowley (R). )
\ Capt. Thomas Watson. S
13
36
Intrepid ....
64
500
Capt. the Hon. Henry St. John.
7
10
Magnificent . . .
74
600
Capt. John Elphinstono.
1
10
Andromeda, 28
Capt. Henry Bryne.
—
—
Cmturinn* '>0
Capt. Richard Brathwaite.
—
—
Ti^ a.s.si.'it tlii^ Rear in case of iiteU.
1780.] RODNEY AND BE GUICHEN. 455
teract them. At daylight of the 17th, they were seen forming line
of battle, on the port tack, four or five leagues to leeward, — that is,
to the westward. The wind being east, or east by north, the French
would be heading south-south-east (Fig. 1, aa). The British order
now was rectified by signal from the irregularities of darkness,
the ships being directed to keep two cables' ^ lengths apart, and
steering as before to the northward and westward (a). At 7 A.M.,
a R0DNE.V AND De.Cuiche:n
b Fic I .
i . . . ; ', \ \ \ \ '* ^•■^ 3/^*r/^^ ^» /'a £. MC M
^ \ \
c
a
,-^^r^
^. ,^- ,-. , -^
f, c>,<=>--"=^
EODNEY AND BE GUICHEN.
considering this line too extended, the Admiral closed the intervals
to one cable. The two fleets thus were passing on nearly parallel
lines, but in opposite directions, which tended to bring the whole
force of Rodney, whose line was better and more compact than the
enemy's, abreast the latter's rear, upon which he intended to concen-
trate. At 8 A.M. he made general signal that this was his purpose •
and at 8.30, to execute it, he signalled for the ships to form line
abreast, bearing from each other south by east and north by west,
and stood down at once upon the enemy (Fig. 1, bb). The object
^ A cable was then assumed to have a length of 120 fathoms, — 720 feet.
456 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
of the British being evident, cle Guichen made his fleet wear together
to the starboard tac^i (bb). The French rear thus became the van,
and their former van, which was stretched too far for prompt assist-
ance to the threatened rear, now headed to support it.
Rodney, baulked in his first spring, hauled at once to the wind
on the port tack (Fig. 1, cc), again contrary to the French, standing
thus once more along their line, for their new rear. The intervals
were opened out again to two cables. The fleets thus were passing
once more on parallel lines, each having reversed its order ; Ijut the
British still retained the advantage, on whatever course, that they
were much more compact than the French, whose line, by Rodney's
estimate, extended four leagues in length. ^ Tlie wariness of the two
combatants, both trained in the school of the eighteenth century, with
its reverence for the line of battle, will appear to the careful reader.
Rodney, although struggling through this chrysalis stage to the later
vigour, and seriously bent on a deadly blow, still was constrained
by the traditions of watchful fencing. Nor was liis caution extrava-
gant; conditions did not justify yet the apparent recklessness of
Nelson's tactics. " The different movements of the enemy," he wrote,
"■ obliged me to be very attentive, and watch every opportunity that
offered of attacking them to advantage."
The two fleets continued to stand on opposite parallel courses —
the French north by west, the British south by east — until the flag-
sliip Sandwich., 90, was abreast the Couronne, 80, the flagship of de
Guichen. Then, at 10.10 A.M., the signal was made to wear together,
forming on the same tack as the enemy. There being some dela}^ in
execution, this had to be repeated, and further enforced by the pen-
nant of tlie Stirlinf) Castle., which, as the rear shij), should begin the
evolution. At half-past ten, apparently, the fleet was about (Fig. 2,
aa), for an order was then given for rectifying tlie line, still at two
caljles. At 11 A.^r. the Admiral made the signal to prepare for
battle, " to convince the whole fleet I was determined to bring the
enemy to an engagement," ^ and to this succeeded shortly the order
to alter the course to port (bb), towards the enemy.^ Why he
thought that any of the fleet should have required such assurance
1 A properly formed line of twenty ships, at two cables' interval, would Ije about
five miles long. Rodney seems to have been satisfied that this was about the con-
dition of his fleet at this inoment.
2 Rodney's Report.
" Testimony of the signal officer at the court-martial on Captain Bateman.
1780.] ROBNEY AND BE QUICKEN. 457
cannot certainly be said. Possibly, altbougli lie bad so recently
joined, he bad already detected tbe ill-will, or tbe slackness, of wbicb
be afterwards complained; possibly be feared tbat tbe wariness of
bis tactics misfbt lead men to believe tbat be did not mean to exceed
tbe lukewarm and indecisive action of days scarce yet passed away,
wbicb bad led Suffren to stigmatise tactics as a mere veil, bebind
wbicb timidity tbinks to bide its nakedness.
^^
Rodney and De. Cuicme-n
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RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN.
At 11.50 A.M. tbe decisive signal was made "for every sbip to
bear down, and steer for ber opposite in tbe enemy's line, agreeable
to tbe 21st article of tbe Additional Figbting Instructions." Five
minutes later, w^ben tbe sbips, presumably, bad altered tbeir course
for tbe enemy, tbe signal for battle was made, followed by tbe mes-
sage tbat tbe Admiral's intention was to engage closely ; be expect-
ing, naturally, tbat every sbip would follow tbe example be purposed
to set. Tbe captain of tbe leading sbip, npon wbose action depended
tbat of tbose near ber, unfortunately understood tbe Admiral's signal
to mean tbat be was to attack tbe enemy's leader, not tbe sbip oppo-
458 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [17S0.
site to liini at the moment of bearing away. This ship, therefore,
diverged markedly from the Admiral's course, drawing after him
many of the van. A few minutes before 1 I'.^i., one of the headmost
ships began to engage at long range ; but it was not till some time
after 1 p.m. that the Sandivich, having received several broadsides,
came into close action with the second vessel astern from the French
Admiral, the Actionnaire^ 64. The latter Avas soon beat out of the
line by the superiority of the Sanchvich's battery, and the same lot
befell the ship astern of her, — probably the Intrejnde^ 74, — Avhich
came up to close the gap. Towards 2.30 p.:*r., the Sandwich, either
by her own efforts to close, or by her immediate opponents' keej)ing
away, was found to be to leeward of the enemy's line, the Couronne
being on her w^eather bow. The fact was pointed out by Rodney to
the captain of the ship, Walter Young, who was then in the lee
gangway. Yoimg, going over to look for himself, saw that it was
so, and that the Yarmouth, 64, had hauled off to windward, where
she lay with her main and mizzen topsails aback. Signals were then
made to her, and to the Cornivall, 74, to come to closer engagement,
they both being on the weather bow of the flagship.
De Guichen, recognising this state of affairs, then or a little later,
attributed it to the deliberate purpose of the British Admiral to
break his line. It does not appear that Rodney so intended. His
tactical idea was to concentrate his whole fleet on the French rear
and centre, but there is no indication that he now aimed at breaking
the line. De Guichen so construing it, however, gave the signal to
wear together. The effect of this, in any event, would have been
to carry his fleet somewhat to leeward ; but with ships more or less
crippled, taking therefore greater room to manoeuvre, and with the
exigency of re-forming the line upon them, the tendency was exag-
gerated. The movement which the French called wearing together
was therefore differently interpreted by Rodney. " The action in
the centre continued till 4.15 r. m., when M. de Guichen, in the
Couronne, the Triom^jJumt, and the Fendant, after engaging the
Sandwich for an hour and a half, bore away. The superiority of fire
from the Sandivich, and the gallant behaviour of the officers and
men, enabled her to sustain so unequal a combat ; though Ijefore
attacked by them, she had beat three ships out of their line of
battle, had entirely broke it, and was to leeward of the Frencli
Admiral." Possibly the French accounts, if they were not so very
meagre, might dispute this prowess of the flagship; but tliere can be
1780.] RODNEY CENSURES PARKER AND ROWLEY. 459
no doubt that Rodney had set an example, which, had it been followed
by all, would have made this engagement memorable, if not decisive.
He reported that the captains, with very few exceptions, had not
placed their ships properly (cc). The Sandwich had eighty shot in
her hull, had lost her foremast and mainyard, and had fired 3,288
rounds, an average of 73 to each gun of the broadside engaged.
Three of her hits being below the water line, she was kept afloat with
difficulty during the next twenty-four hours. With the wearing of
the French the battle ceased.
In the advantage offered by the enemy, whose order was too greatly
extended, and in his own plan of attack, Rodney always considered
this action of April 17th, 1780, to have been the great opportunity of
his life ; and his wrath was bitter against tliose by whose misconduct
he conceived it had been frustrated. " The French admiral, who
appeared to me to be a brave and gallant officer, had the honour to be
nobly supported during the whole action. It is with concern inex-
pressible, mixed with indignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign
and my country obliges me to acquaint your Lordships that during the
action between the French fleet, on the 17th inst., and his Majesty's,
the British flag Avas not properly supported." Divided as the Navy
then was into factions, with their hands at each other's throats or at
tlie throat of the Admiralty, the latter thought it more discreet to
suppress this paragraph, allowing to appear only the negative stigma
of the encomium upon the French officers, unaccompanied by any on
his own. Rodney, however, did not conceal his feelings in public or
private letters ; and the censure found its way to the ears of those
concerned. Subsequently, three montlis after the action, in a public
letter, he bore testimony to the excellent conduct of five captains,
Walter Young of the flagship, George Bowyer of the Albion, John
Douglas of the Terrible, John Houlton of the Montagu, and A. J. P.
Molloy 1 of the Trident. " To them I have given certificates, under
my hand," "free and unsolicited." Beyond these, "no considera-
tion in life would induce " him to go ; and the two junior flag-officers
were implicitly condemned in the words, " to inattention to signals,
both in the van and rear divisions, is to be attributed the loss of that
glorious opportunity (perhaps never to be recovered) of terminating
the naval contest in these seas." These junior admirals were Hyde
^ Singularly enough, this officer was afterwards court-niartialled for mishehaviour,
on the 1st of June, 1794, of ^jrecisely the same character as that from all share in
which Rodney now cleared him.
4G0 MAJOR OPEliATIONS.- 17(j2-17S3. [1780,
Parker and Rowley ; the latter the same who had behaved, not only
so gallantly, but with such unusual initiative, in Byron's engagement.
A singular incident in this case led him to a like independence of
action, which displeased Rodney. The Montagu, of his division, when
closing the French line, wore against the helm, and could onl}- be
brought into action on the wrong (port) tack. Immediately upon
this, part of the French rear also wore, and Rowley followed them of
liis own motion. Being called to account by Rodney, he stated the
facts, justifying the act by the order that " the greatest impression
was to be made on the enemy's rear." Both parties soon wore back.
Hyde Parker went home in a rage a few weeks later. The certifi-
cates of Bowyer and Douglas, certainly, and probably of MoUoy, all
of his division, bore the stinging words that these officers " meant
well, and would have done their duty had the}' been permitted." It
is stated that their ships, which were the rear of the van, were going
down to engage close, following Rodney's example, when Parker
made them a signal to keep the line. If this be so, as Parker's
courage was beyond all doubt, it was simply a recurrence of the old
superstition of the line, aggravated by a misunderstanding of Rodney's
later signals. These must be discussed, for the whole incident is part
of the liistory of the British Navy, far moi'e important than many an
indecisive though bloody encounter.
One of the captains more expressly blamed, Carkett of the Stir-
ling Castle, wrote to Rodney that he understood that his name had
been mentioned, unfavourably of course, in the public letter. Rod-
ney's reply makes perfectly apparent the point at issue, his own plan,
the ideas running in his head as he made his successive signals, the
misconceptions of the juniors, and the consequent fiasco. It must be
said, however, that, granting the facts as they seem certainly to havo
occurred, Jio misunderstanding, no technical verbal allegation, can
justify a militar}^ stupidity so great as that of which he complained.
There are occasions in which not only is literal disobedience permis-
sible, but literal obedience, flying in the face of the evident conditions,
becomes a crime.
At G.45 in the morning, Rodney had made a general signal of his
purpose to attack the enemy's rear. This, having been understood
and answered, was hauled down ; all juniors had been acquainted
with a general purpose, to which the subsequent manoeuvres were to
lead. How lie meant to carry out liis intention was evidenced by
the consecutive course of action while on that tack, — the starboard;
1780.] RODNETS LETTER TO CARKETT. 461
when the time came, the fleet bore up together, in line abreast, stand-
ing for the French rear. This attempt, being balked then bj de
Guichen's wearing, was renewed two hours later; only in place of
the sisrnal to form line abreast, was made one to alter the course to
port, — towards the enemy. As this followed immediately upon that
to prepare for battle, it indicates, almost beyond question, that Rodney
wished, for reasons of the moment, to run down at first in a slanting
direction, — not in line abreast, as before, — ships taking course and
interval from the flagship. Later again, at 11.50, the signal was
made, "agreeable to the 21st Article of the Additional Fighting
Instructions, for every ship to steer for her opposite in the enemy's
line; " and here the trouble began. Rodney meant the ship opposite
when the signal was hauled down. He had steered slanting, till he
had gained as nearly as possible the position he wanted, probably till
within long range ; then it was desirable to cover the remaining
ground as rapidly and orderly as possible, for which purpose the ship
then abreast gave each of his fleet its convenient point of direction.
He conceived that his signalled purpose to attack the enemy's rear,
never having been altered, remained imperative ; and further, that
the signal for two cables' length interval should govern all ships, and
would tie them to him, and to his movements, in the centre. Carkett
construed " opposite " to mean opposite in numerical order, British
van ship against French van ship, wherever the latter was. Rodney
states — in his letter to Carkett — that the French van was then two
leagues away. " You led to the van ship, notwithstanding you had
answered my signals signifying that it was my intention to attack the
enemy's rear ; which signal I had never altered. . . . Your leachng in
the manner you did, induced others to follow so bad an example ; and
thereby, forgetting that the signal for the line was only at two cables'
length distance from each other, the van division was led by you to
more than two leagues' distance from the centre division, which was
thereby not properly supported." ^
^ The words in Eoclney's public letter, suppressed at the time by the Admiralty,
agree with these, but are even more explicit. " I cannot conclude this letter with-
out acquainting their Lordships that had Captain Carkett, who led the van, properly
obeyed my signal for attacking the enemy, and agreeable to the 21st Article of the
Additional Fighting Instructions, bore down instantly to the ship at that time
abreast of him, instead of leading as he did to the van ship, the action had com-
menced much sooner, and the fleet engaged in a more compact manner. . . ." This
clearly implies that the Additional Fighting Instructions prescribed the direction
which Rodney expected Carkett to take. If these Additional Instructions are to be
found, their testimony would be interesting.
462 MAJOR OPEEATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
Carkett was the oldest captain in the fleet, his post commission
being dated ^larch 12th, 1758. How far he may have been excus-
able in construing as he did Fighting Instructions, which originated
in the inane conception that the supreme duty of a Commander-in-
Chief was to oppose ship to ship, and that a fleet action was only an
agglomeration of naval duels, is not very material, though histori-
cally interesting. There certainly was that in the past history of
the British Navy which extenuated the offence of a man who must
have then been well on in middle life. But since the Fighting
Instructions had been first issued, there had been the courts-martial,
also instructive, on ^Mathews, Lestock, Byng, Keppel, and Palliser,
all of which turned more or less on the constraint of the line of
battle, and the duty of supporting ships engaged, — above all, an
engaged Commander-in-Chief. Rodney perhaps underestimated the
weight of the Fighting Instructions upon a dull man ; but he was
justified in claiming that his previous signals, and the prescription of
distance, created at the least a conflict of orders, a doubt, to which
there should have been but one solution, namely : to support the ships
engaged, and to close down upon the enemy, as near as possible to
the Commander-in-Chief. And in moments of actual perplexity such
will always be the truth. It is like marching towards the sound of
guns, or, to use Nelson's words, " In case signals cannot be understood,
no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of
an enemy." The '• In Case," however, needs also to be kept in mind ;
and that it Avas Nelson who said it. Utterances of to-day, like
utterances of all time, show how few are the men who can hold both
sides of a truth firml}-, without exaggeration or defect. Judicial
impartiality can be had, and positive convictions too; but their
combination is rare. A two-sided man is apt also to be double-
minded.
The loss of men in this sharp encounter was : British, killed, 120,
wounded, 354 ; ^ French, killed, 222, wounded, 537.- This gives
three French hit for every two British, from which, and from the
much greater damage received aloft by the latter, it may be inferred
that Ijoth followed their usual custom of aiming, the British at
^ Among the killed was Captain the Hon. Henry St. John, of the Intrepid.
Amonj; the wounded were Captains John Houlton, of the Montagu, and Thomas
Newnham, of the Grafton. — W. L. C.
2 Lapeyronse Bonfils, ' Histoire de la Marine Frangaise,' iii. 132. Chevalier gives
much smaller numbers, but the former has particularised the ships.
1780. J RODNEY RETURNS TO ST. LUCIA. 463
the hull, the French at the spars. To the latter conduced also the
lee-gage, which the French had. The British, as the attacking party,
suffered likewise a raking fire as they bore down.
Rodney repaired damages at sea, and pursued, taking care to
keep between Martinique and the French. The latter going into
Guadeloupe, he reconnoitred them there under the batteries, and
then took his station off Fort lloyal. " The only chance of bringing
them to action," he wrote to the Admiralty on the 26th of April,
" was to be off that port before them, where the fleet now is, in
daily expectation of their arrival." The French represent that he
avoided them, but as they assert that they came out best on the
17th, and yet admit that he appeared off Guadeloupe, the claim is
not tenable. Rodney here showed thorough tenacity of purpose.
De Guichen's orders were "to keep the sea, so far as the force
maintained by England in the Windward Islands would permit,
without too far compromising the fleet intrusted to him." ^ With
such instructions, he naturally and consistently shrunk from decisive
engagement. After landing his Avounded and refitting in Guade-
loupe, he again put to sea, with the intention of proceeding to St.
Lucia, resuming against that island the project which both he and
De Bouille continuously entertained. The latter and his troops
remained with the fleet.
Rodney meantime had felt compelled to return momentarily to
St. Lucia. " The fleet continued before Fort Royal till the conch-
tion of many of the ships under my command, and the lee currents,^
rendered it necessary to anchor in Choque Bay, St. Lucie, in order
to put the wounded and sick men on shore, and to water and refit
the fleet, frigates having been detached both to leeward and to
windward of every island, in order to gain intelligence of the motions
of the enemy, and timely notice of their approach towards Martinique,
the only place they could refit at in these seas." In this last clause
is seen the strategic idea of the British Admiral : the French must
come back to Martinique.
From the vigilance of his frigates it resulted, that when the
look-outs of de Guichen, who passed to windward of Martinique on
the 7th of May, came in sight of Gros Ilet on the 9th, it was simply
to find the British getting under way to meet the enemy. During
the five following days both fleets were engaged in constant move-
1 Chevalier, ' Marine Frangaise,' 1778, p. 185.
2 A lee current is one that sets with the wind, in this case the trade-wind.
464 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
ments, upon the character of which the writers of each nation put
different constructions. Both are agreed, however, that the French
were to windward throughout, except for a brief hour on the 15th,
when a fleeting change of Avind gave the British tliat advantage,
only to lose it soon again. They at once used it to force action.
As the windward position carries the power to attack, and as the
French were twenty-three to the British twenty, it is probably not a
strained inference to say that the latter were chasing to windward,
and the former avoiding action, in favour, perhaps, of that ulterior
motive, the conquest of St. Lucia, for which they had sailed. Rod-
ney states in his letter that, when the two fleets parted on the 20th
of May, they were forty leagues to windward of ^Martinique, in
sight of Avhich they had been on the 10th.
Dming these days de Guichen, whose fleet sailed the better,
according to Rodney, and certainly sufficiently well to preserve the
advantage of the wind, bore down more than once, generally in the
afternoon, when the breeze is steadiest, to within distant range of
the British. Upon this movement, the French base the statement
that the British Admiral was avoichng an encounter; it is equally
open to the interpretation that he would not throw away ammunition
until sure of effective distance. Both admirals showed much skill
and mastery of their profession, great wariness also, and quickness
of eye ; but it is wholly untenable to claim that a fleet having the
weather-gage for five days, in the trade-winds, was unable to bring
its enemy to action, especiall}^ Avhen it is admitted that the latter
struck the instant the wind permitted him to close.
On the afternoon of May 15th, about the usual hour, Rodney
" made a great deal of sail upon the wind." The French, inferring
that he was trying to get off, which he meant them to do, approached
somewhat closer than on the previous days. Their van ship had
come within long range, abreast the centre of the British, Avho were
on the port tack standing to the south-south-east, with the wind at
east (a, a). Here the breeze suddenly hauled to south-south-east.
The heads of all the ships in both fleets were thus knocked off to
south-west, on the port tack, but the shift left the British rear, Avhicli
on that tack led the fleet, to windward of the French van. Piodney's
signal flew at once, to tack in succession and keep the wind of the
enemy ; the latter, unwilling to yield the advantage, wore all together,
liauling to the wind on the starl)oard tack, and, to use Rodney's
words, "fled with a crowd of sail" (a', a').
1780.]
MANCEUVRES OF THE FLEETS.
465
The British fleet tacking in succession after their leaders, the
immediate result was that both were now standing on the starboard
tack, — to the eastward, — the British having a slight advantage of
the wind, but well abaft the beam of the French (b, b). The result,
had the wind held, would have been a trial of speed and weatherli-
ness. " His Majesty's fleet," wrote Rodney, " by this manoeuvre had
gained the wind, and would have forced the enemy to battle, had it
not at once changed six points when near the enemy, and enabled
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RODNEY AND DE GTJICHEN.
them to recover that advantage." When the wind thus shifted again,
de Guichen tacked his ships together and stood across the bows of
the advancing British (c, c). The leader of the latter struck the
enemy's line behind the centre, and ran along to leeward, the British
van exchanging a close cannonade with the enemy's rear. Such an
engagement, two lines passing on opposite tacks, is usually indeci-
sive, even when the entire fleets are engaged, as at Ushant; but
where, as in this case, the engagement is but partial, the result is
naturally less. The enemy's van and centre, having passed the head
VOL. III.
.30
466 MA JOE OPERATIONS. 17G2-17S3. [1780.
of the British, diverged at that point farther and farther from the
track of the on-coming ships, which, from the centre rearwards, did
not fire. ''As the enemy were under a press of sail, none but the
Tan of our fleet could come in for any part of the action without
wasting his Majesty's powder and shot, the enemy wantonly expend-
ing- theirs at such a distance as to have no effect." Here arain the
French were evidently taking the chance of disabling the distant
enemy in his spars. The British loss in the action of jNIay 15th was
21 killed and 100 wounded.
The fleets continued their respective movements, each acting as
before, until the lUtli,^ when another encounter took place, of exactly
the same character as the last, although without the same prelimi-
nary manoeuvring. The British on that occasion lost 47 killed and
113 wounded. The result was equally indecisive, tactically consid-
ered ; but both by this time had exhausted their staying powers.
The French, having been absent from ]\Iartinique since the 13th of
April, had now but six days' provisions.^ Rodney found the Con-
queror^ CormccdU and Boyne so shattered that he sent them before
the wind to St. Lucia, while he himself with the rest of the fleet
stood for Barbados, where he arrived on the 22nd. The French
anchored on the same day at Fort Royal. " The English," says
Chevalier, "stood on upon the starboard tack, to the southward,
after the action of the 19th, and the next day were not to be seen."
" The enemy," reported Rodney, " stood to the northward with all
the sail they could possibly press, and were out of sight the 21st
inst. The condition of his ^Majesty's ships was such as not to allow
a longer pursuit."
By tlieir dexterity and vigilance each of the two admirals had
thwarted the other's aims. Rodne}', by a pronounced, if cautious,
offensive effort, had absolutely prevented the " ulterior object " of the
French, which he clearly understood to be St. Lucia. De Guichen
had been successful in avoiding decisive action, and he had momen-
tarily so crippled a few of the Biitish ships that the fleet must await
tlieir repairs before again taking the sea. The tactical gain was his,
the strategic victory rested witli liis opponent; but that his ships also
had been mucli maltreated is shown by the fact that lialf a dozen
^ Previous to Mhicli date the Triunq^h, 74, Captain Tbilip Affleck, and the Pns-
ton, 50, Cai)tain William Tniscott, bad joined Rodney. In the action of the 19th,
Captain Thomas Watson, of the Conqueror, was n)Oi'tally wounded. — W. L. C.
* Chovalier, p. 91.
178o!] SUSPICIOUS FEELING IN THE NAVY. 467
could not put to sea tlii-ee weeks later. The French admiral broke
down under the strain, to which was added the grief of losing a son,
killed in the recent engagements. He asked for his recall. " The
command of so large a fleet," he wrote, "is infinitely bej^ond my
capacity in all respects. My health cannot endure such continual
fatigue and anxiety." Certainly this seems a tacit testimony to
Rodney's skill, persistence, and offensive purpose. The latter wrote
to his wife : " For fourteen days and nights the fleets were so near
■each other that neither officers nor men could be said to sleep. Noth-
insr but the g^oodness of the weather and climate would have enabled
us to endure so continual a fatigue. Had it been in Europe, half the
jDCople must have sunk under it. For my part, it did me good."
Rodney stated also in his home letters that the action of his sub-
ordinates in the last affairs had been efficient; but he gave them
little credit for it. " As I had given public notice to all my captains,
etc., that I expected implicit obedience to every signal made, under
the certain penalty of being instantly superseded, it had an admi-
rable effect, as they were all convinced, after their late gross behaviour,
that they had nothing to expect at my hands but instant punishment
to those who neglected their duty. My eye on them had more dread
than the enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal. No regard
was paid to rank : admirals as well as captains, if out of their sta-
tion, were instantly reprimanded by signals, or messages sent by
frigates ; and, in spite of themselves, I taught them to be, what they
had never been before, — officers.'''' It will be noticed that these
words convey an implication of cowardice as well as of disaffection,
und hint not obscurely at Byng's fate. Rodney told his officers also
that he would shift his flag into a frigate, if necessary, to watch them
better. It is by no means necessary to accept these gross aspersions
<as significant of anything worse than the suspiciousness prevalent
throughout the Navy, traceable ultimately to a corrupt administra-
tion of the Admiralty. The latter, like the government of 1756,
was open to censure through political maladministration , every one
feared that blame would be shifted on to liim, as it had been on to
Byng, — who deserved it ; and not only so, but that blame would be
pushed on to ruin, as in his case. The Nav}^ was honeycombed with
distrust, falling little short of panic. In this state of apprehension
and doubt, the tradition of the line of battle, resting upon men who
did not stop to study facts or analyse impressions, and who had seen
officers censured, cashiered, and shot, for errors of judgment or of
468 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-17S3. [1780.
action, naturall}' produced hesitations and misunderstandings. An
oi-der of battle is a good thing, necessary to insure mutual support
and to develop a plan. The error of the century, not then exploded,
was to observe it in the letter rather than in the spirit ; to regard the
order as an end rather than a means ; and to seek in it not merely
efficiency, which admits broad construction in positions, but precise-
ness, which is as narrowing as a brace of handcuffs. Rodney liimself,
Tory though he was, found fault with the administration. With all
his severity and hauteur, he did not lose sight of justice, as is shown
by a sentence in his letter to Carkett. " Could I have imagined your
conduct and inattention to signals had proceeded from anything but
error in judgment, 1 had certainly superseded you, but God forbid 1
should do so for error in judgment only," — again an allusion, not
obscure, to Byng's fate.
In Barbados, Rodney received certain information that a Span-
ish squadron of twelve ships of the line, with a large convoy of
10,000 troops, had sailed from Cadiz on April 28th for the West
Indies. The vessel bringing the news had fallen in with them on
the way. Rodney spread a line of frigates " to windward, from Bar-
bados to Barbuda," to obtain timely warning, and with the fleet put
to sea on the 7tli of June, to cruise to the eastward of Martinique to
intercept the enemy. The latter had been discovered on the 5th by a
frigate, fifty leagues east of the island, steering for it ; but the Spanish
admiral, seeing that he would be rej)orted, changed his course, and
passed north of Guadeloupe. On the 9th he was joined in that neigh-
bourhood by de Guichen, who was able to bring with him only fifteen
sail. — a fact which shows that he had suffered in the late brushes quite
as severely as Rodney, who had with him seventeen of his twenty.
Having evaded the British, the allies anchored at Fort Royal;
but the Spanish admiral absolutely refused to join in any undertak-
ing against the enemy's fleet or possessions. Not only so, but he
insisted on being accompanied to leeward. The Spanish squadron
was ravaged by an epidemic, due to unsanitary conditions of the
ships and the uncleanliness of the crews, and the disease was com-
municated to their allies. \^q Guichen had already orders to leave
tliL- Windward Islands when winter approached. He decided now
to anticipate that time, and on the 5th of Jvdy sailed from Fort
Royal with tlie Spaniards. Having accompanied the latter to the
east end of Cul)a, he went to Cap Frangois, in Haiti, then a princi-
pal French station. The Spaniards continued on to Havana.
1780.] DE GUICHEN SAILS FOR EUROPE. 4G9
At Cap Francois, de Guiclien found urgent entreaties from the
French Minister to the United States, and from Lafayette, to carry
his fleet to the continent, where the clear-sighted genius of Wash-
ington had recognised already that the issue of the contest depended
upon the navies. The French admiral declined to comply, as con-
trary to his instructions, and on the 16th of August sailed for Europe,
with nineteen sail of the line, leaving ten at Cap Francjois. Sealed
orders, opened at sea, directed him to proceed to Cadiz, where he
anchored on the 2-lth of October. His arrival raised the allied force
there assembled to fifty-one sail of the line, besides the ninety-
five sugar and coffee ships which he had convoyed from Haiti.
It is significant of the weakness of Great Britain then in the
Mediterranean, that these extremely valuable merchant ships were
sent on to Toulon, only five ships of the line accompanying them
past Gibraltar. The French government had feared to trust them
to Brest, even with de Guichen's nineteen sail.
The allied operations in the Windward Islands for the season
of 1780 had thus ended in nothing, notwithstanding an incontest-
able inferiority of the British to the French alone, of which Rodney
strongly complained. It was, however, contrary to the intentions
of the Admiralty that things so happened. Orders had been sent to
Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, at New York, to detach ships
to Rodney ; but the vessel carrying them was driven by weather
to the Bahamas, and her captain neglected to notify Arbuthnot
of his whereabouts, or of his dispatches. A detachment of five
ships of the line under Commodore the Hon. Robert Boyle Walsing-
ham was detained three months in Enpiand, wind-bound. Thev
consequently did not join till July 12th. The dispositions at once
made by Rodney afford a very good illustration of the kind of duties
that a British Admiral had then to discharge. He detailed five
ships of the line to remain Avith Hotham at St. Lucia, for the protec-
tion of the Windward Islands. On the 17th, taking with him a large
merchant convo}-, he put to sea with the fleet for St. Kitts, where
the Leeward Islands " trade " was collecting for England. On the
way he received precise information as to the route and force of the
Franco-Spanish fleet under de Guichen, of the sickness on board
it, and of the dissension between the allies. From St. Kitts the
July " trade " was sent home with two ships of the line. Three
otliers, he wrote to the Admiralty, would accompany the September
fleet, " and the remainder of the ships on this station, which are iii
470 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3. [1780.
■want of great repair and are not copper-bottomed, shall proceed with,
them, or with the convoy which their Lordships have been pleased
to order shall sail from hence in October next." If these arrived
before winter, he argned, the}' would be available by spring as a,
reinforcement for the Channel fleet, and would enable the Admiralty
to send him an equivalent number for the winter work on his
station.
As de Guichen had taken from Martinique to Cap Franc^ois the
whole French homeward merchant fleet, and as the height of the
hurricane season was near, Rodney reasoned that but a small French
force would remain in Haiti, and consequently that Jamaica would
not require all the British fleet to save it from any possible attack.
He therefore sent thither ten sail of the line, notifying Vice-Admiral
Sir Peter Parker that they were not merely to defend the island,
but to enable him to send home its great trade in reasonable
security.
These things being done by July 31st, considering that the allies
had practically abandoned all enterprises in the West Indies for
that year, and that a hurricane might at any moment overtake the
fleet at its anchors, possibly making for it a lee shore, Rodney went
to sea, to cruise off Barbuda. His mind, however, was inclined
already to go to the continent, whither he reasoned, correctly but
mistakenly, that the greater part of de Guichen's fleet would go,
as it should. His purpose was confirmed by information from an
American vessel that a French squadron of seven ships of the line,
convo}dng 6,000 troops, had anchored in Narragansett Bay on the
12th of July. He started at once for the coast of South Carolina,
where he communicated Avitli the army in Charleston, and thence,
" sweeping the southern coast of America," anchored with fourteen
ships of the line at Sandy Hook, on the 14tli of September, unex-
pected and unwelcome to friends and foes alike.
Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, being junior to Rodney, showed plainly
and with insubordination his Avrath at this intrusion into liis com-
mand, which superseded his authority and divided the prize-money of
a lucrative station. This, however, was a detail. To Washington,
Rodney's coming was a death-blow to the hopes raised b}^ the arrival
of the French division at Newport, which he had expected to see
reinforced by de Guichen. Actually, the departure of the latter
made immaterial Rodney's appearance on the scene : but this Wash-
ington (lid Hot know then. As it was, Rodney's force joined to
1780.] RODNEY SAILS FOB THE WEST INDIES. 471
Arbuthnot's constituted a fleet of over twenty sail of the line, before
which, vigorously used, there can be little doubt that the French
squadron in Ne"wport must have fallen. But Rodney, though he
had shown great energy in the West Indies, and unusual resolution
in quitting his own station for a more remote service, was sixty-two»
and suffered from gout. " The sudden change of climate makes it
necessary for me to go on shore for some short time," he wrote ; and
althouo-h he added that his illness was " not of such a nature as shall
cause one moment's delay in his Majesty's service," he probably lost
a chance at Rhode Island. He did not overlook the matter, it is
true, but he decided upon the information of Arbuthnot and Sir
Henry Clinton, and did not inspect the ground himself. Nothing
of consequence came of his visit; and on the 16th of November
he sailed again for the West Indies, taking with liim only nine
sail of the line.
The arrival of de Ternay's seven ships at Newport w^as more
than offset by a British reinforcement of six ships of the line under
Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves (1),^ which entered New York on July
13th, — only one day later. Arbuthnot's force w^as thus raised to ten
of the line, one of which was of 98 guns. After Rodney had come
and gone, the French division was watched by cruisers, resting upon
Gardiner's Bay, — a commodious anchorage at the east end of Long
Island, between thirty and forty miles from Rhode Island. When a
movement of the enemy was apprehended, the squadron assembled
there, but nothing of consequence occurred during the remainder of
the year.
The year 1780 had been one of great discouragement to the
Americans, but the injury, except as the lapse of time taxed their
staying power, was more superficial than real. The successes of the
British in the Southern States, though undeniable, and seemingly
substantial, were involving them ever more deeply in a ruinously
ex-centric movement. They need here only to be summarised, as
steps in the process leading to the catastrophe of Yorktown, — a dis-
aster which, as Washington said, exemplified naval rather than
military power.
The failure of d'Estaing's attack upon Savannah in the autumn
of 1779 had left that place in the possession of the British as a base
1 Thomas, Lord Graves. Born, 1725. Commander, 1754. Captain, 1755. Rear-
Admiral, 1779. Vice-Admiral, 1787. Admiral, 1794. Raised to an Irish peerage
for his share in the victory of the Glorious First of June. Died, 1802. — AV. L. C.
472 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
for further advances in South Carolina and Georgia ; lasting success
in which was expected from the numbers of royalists in those States.
When the departure of the French fleet was ascertained, Sir Henry
Clinton put to sea from New York in December, 1779, for the Savan-
nah Kiver, escorted by Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot. The details of the
operations, which were leisurely and methodical, will not be given
here ; for, although the Navy took an active part in them, they
scarcely can be considered of major importance. On the 12th of
^lay, 1780, the city of Charleston capitulated, between six and seven
thousand prisoners being taken. Clinton then returned to New
York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command in the south. The
latter proposed to remain quiet during the hot months ; but the
activity of the American partisan troops prevented this, and in July
tlie approach of a small, but relatively formidable force, under Gen-
eral Gates, compelled him to take the field. On the 16th of August
the two little armies met at Camden, and the Americans, who were
much tlie more numerous, but largely irregulars, were routed deci-
sively. This news reached General Washington in the north nearly
at the same moment that the treason of Benedict Arnold became
known. Although the objects of his treachery were frustrated, the
sorrowful words, ''Whom now can we trust? " show the deep gloom
which for the moment shadowed the constant mind of the American
Commander-in-Chief. It was just at this period, too, that Rodney
iirrived.
Cornwallis, not content with his late success, decided to push on
into North Carolina. Thus doing, he separated himself from his
naval base in Charleston, communication Avith which by land he had
not force to maintain, and could only recover effective touch with
the sea in Chesapeake Ba}-. This conclusion was not apparent from
the first. In North Carolina, the British general, who had expected
substantial support by the inhabitants, failed to secure it, and found
himself instead in a very difficult and wild countr}', confronted by
General Greene, the second in ability of all the American leaders.
Harassed and baffled, he was compelled to order supplies to be sent by
sea to Wilmington, North Carolina, an out-of-the-way and inferior
port, to which he turned aside, arriving exhausted on the 7th of April,
1781. The question as to his future course remained to be settledc
To return to Charleston by sea was in his power, but to do so would
be an open confession of failure, — that he could not return through
the country by which he had come. To support him in his distress
1780.] THE ACTION OFF MONTE CHRISTI. 473
by a diversion, Sir Henry Clinton had sent two successive detach-
ments to ravage the valley of the James River iii Virginia. These
were still there, under the command of General Phillips ; and Corn-
wallis, in the circumstances, could see many reasons that thither was
the very scene to carry the British operations. On the 25th of April,
1781, he left Wilmington, and a month later joined the division at
Petersburg, Virginia, then commanded by Benedict Arnold ; Phillips
having died. There, in touch now with his fate, we must leave him
for the moment.
To complete the naval transactions of 1780, it is necessary to
mention briefly two incidents, trivial in themselves, but significant,
not only as associated with the greater movements of the campaign,
but as indicative of the naval policy of the states which were at
war. The two, though not otherwise connected, have a certain
unity of interest, in that the same British officer commanded on both
occasions.
It will be remembered that in Byron's action off Grenada, in
July, 1779, the 64-gun ship Lion received such injuries that her com-
mander. Captain the Hon. William Cornwallis, had been compelled
to run down before the trade-winds to Jamaica, in order to save her
from capture. Since that time she had remained there, as one of the
squadron of Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker. In March, 1780, still
commanded b}" Captain Cornwallis, she was making an ordinary
service cruise off the north side of Haiti, having in company the
Bristol^ 50, Captain Toby Caulfield, and the Janus, 41, Captain
Bonovier Glover. On the 20th of March, off Monte Christi, a num-
ber of sail were sighted to the eastward, which proved to be a Frencli
convoy, on its way from jNIartinique to Cap Frangois, protected by
La Motte-Picquet's squadron of 2 seventy-fours, 1 sixty-four, 1 fifty,
and a frigate. The French merchant ships were ordered to crowd
sail for their port, while the men-of-war chased to the north-west.
La Motte-Picquet's flagship, the Annibal., 74, got within range at
5 P.M., when a distant cannonade began, which lasted till past mid-
night, and was resumed on the following morning. From it the
Janus was the chief sufferer, losing her mizzen topmast and fore-
topgallant mast. It falling nearly calm, the Bristol and Lion got out
their boats and towed to her support. The two other French ships
of the line got up during the forenoon of the 21st, so that the action
that afternoon, though desultory, might be called general.
The two opposing commodores differ in their expressed opinions
474 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783. [1780,
as to the power of the French to make the affair more decisive.
Some of La ]Motte-Picquet's language seems to show that he felt the
responsibility of his position. " The James, being smaller and more
easily worked, lay upon our quarter and under our stern, where she
did considerable damage. A little breeze springing up enabled us
(the AnnihaV) to stand towards our own ships, which did everything
possible to come up and cover us, without -which w^e should have
been surrounded^ It is easy to see in such an expression the reflection
of the commands of the French Cabinet, to economise the ships. This
was still more evident in La Motte-Picquet's action next da}-. On
the morning of the 22nd, " at daylight we were within one and a half
cannon-shot, breeze fresh at east>north-east, and I expected to overtake
the British squadron in an hour, when w^e perceived four ships in
chase of us. At 6.30 a.m. three were seen to be men-of-war. This
superiority of force compelled me to desist, and to make signal to
haul our wind for Cap Fran^-ois." These three new-comers were
the Ruby, 64, and two frigates, the Pomona, 28, and Niger, 32. The
comparison of forces, therefore, would be : French, 2 seventy-fours,
1 sixty-four, 1 fifty, and 1 frigate, opposed to, British, 2 sixty-fours,
1 fifty, and 3 frigates. La Motte-Picquet evidently did not wait
to ascertain the size of the approaching ships. His courage w^as
beyond all dispute, and, as Hyde Parker had said, he was among the
most distinguished of French officers ; but, like his comrades, he was-
dominated by the faulty theory of his government.
The captain of the Janus died a natural death during the encoun-
ter. It may be interesting to note that the ship was given to Nelson,
who was recalled for that purpose from the San Juan expedition.
His health, liowever, prevented this command from being more than
nominal, and not long afterwards he returned to England with Corn-
wallis, in the Lion.
Three months later, Cornwallis was sent by Parker to accompany
a body of merchant ships for England as far as tlie neighbourhood of
Bermuda. This duty being fulfilled, he was returning towards his
station, having with him 2 seventy-fours, 2 sixty-fours, and 1 fifty,^
when, on the morning of June 20, a number of sail were seen from
Captain the IToii. William Connvallis.
Captain Alan Gardner.
Captain Sir John Hamilton, Bart.
Captain John Cowlinrr.
Captain Toby Caulfield.
Captain John Brown.
^ Lion
64
Sultan
74
Hector
74
Enbij
64
Bristol
50
Niger
32
1780.]
CORNIFALLIS AND BE TERNAY.
475
north-east to east ; the squadron then steering east, with the wind at
south-south-east. The strangers were a body of French transports,
carrying the 6,000 troops destined for Rhode Island, and convoyed
by a division of seven ships of the line — 1 eighty, 2 seventy-fours,
and 4 sixty-fours — under the command of Commodore de Ternay.
Two of the ships of war were with the convoy, the remainder very
properly to windward. The latter therefore stood on, across the bows
of the British, to rejoin their consorts (aa), and then all hauled their
CORNWAUUIS AND D E. "TerNAY
d.b.C,e/, S/Mtfi-T/IN £ OVS /-'o S J 7-/ O /s/ S .
Jb'.c'.c/', A'^/^x.
^
o
o
o
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Pc
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CORNWALLIS AND DE TERNAY.
wind to the south-west, standing in column towards the enemy.
Cornwallis on his pai't had kept on to reconnoitre the force opposed
to him (a) ; but one of his ships, the Ruhij^ 64, was so far to leeward
that the enemy, by keeping near the wind, could pass between her and
him (b, b, b'). She therefore went about and steered south-west, on
the port tack, close to the wind . The French, who were already head-
ing the same way, were thus brought on her weather quarter in chase.
Cornwallis then wore his division, formed line of battle on the same
tack as the others, and edged down towards the Tivlnj (c). If the
4TG
MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783.
[17S0,
French now kept their wind, either the Ruly (c') must be cut off, or
Cornwalhs, to save her, must light the Large odds against him. De
Tema}', however, cUd not keep his wind (c). " The enemy," wrote
Cornwallis, " kept edging off and forming line, though within gun-
shot. At 5.30 P.M., seeing we had pushed the French ships to lee-
ward sufficiently to enable the Euby^ on our lee bow, to join us, I
made the signal to tack." As the Britisli squadron went about to
ADMIKAL Tin: HON. SIR WILLIAM COKXWALLIS, G. C. B.
{From the lithograph by Ridley, after the portrait by I). Gardner, painted in 1775, when Cornwallis u-as a
Post-Captain, wt. 31.)
stand east again, the French, heading west-south-west, hoisted their
colours and opened lire in passing. The Ihibij kept on till she
fetched the wake of the British column, when she too tacked. The
French then tacked also, in succession, and the two columns stood on
for awhile in parallel lines, exchanging shots at long range, the British
to windward. Cornwallis very properly declined further engagement
witli so superior a force. He had already done much in saving a sliip
so greatly exposed.
1780.] CAPTURE OF A BRITISH CONVOY. 477
The account above followed is that of the British commander, but
it does not differ in essentials from the French, whose captains were
greatly incensed at the cautious action of their chief. A French com-
missaire in the squadron, who afterwards puljlished his journal, tells
that de Ternay a few days later asked the captain of one of the ships
what English admiral he thought they had engaged, and received the
reply, " We have lost our opportunity of finding out." He gives also
many details of the talk that went on in the ships, which need not be
repeated. Chevalier points out correctly, however, that de Ternay
had to consider that an equal or even a superior force might be en-
countered as Narragansett Bay was approached, and that he should
not risk crippling his squadron for such a contingency. The charge
of 6,000 troops, under the then conditions, was no light responsibility,
and at the least must silence off-hand criticism now. Comment upon
his action does not belong to British naval history, to which the firm-
ness and seamanship of Captain Cornwallis added a lasting glory.
It may be noted that fifteen years later, in the French Revolution,
the same officer, then a Vice-Admiral, again distinguished himself by
his bearing in face of great odds, bringing five ships safe off, out of
the jaws of a dozen. It illustrates how luck seems in many cases to
characterise a man's personality, much as temperament does. Corn-
wallis, familiarly known as " Billy Blue " to the seamen of his day,
never won a victory, nor had a chance of winning one ; but in com-
mand both of ships and of divisions, he repeatedly distinguished him-
self by successfully facing odds which he could not overcome.
The year was uneventful also in European waters, after Rodney's
relief of Gibraltar in January. The detachment of the Channel
Fleet which accompanied him on that mission returned safely to
England. The " Grand Fleet," as it still was styled occasionally,
cruised at sea from June 8th to August 1 8th, an imposing force of
thirty-one ships of the line, eleven of them three-deckers of 90 guns
and upwards. Admiral Francis Geary was then Commander-in-Chief,
but, his health failing, and Barrington refusing to take the position,
through professed distrust of himself and actual distrust of the
Admiralty, Vice-Admiral George Darby succeeded to it, and held it
during the j-ear 1781.
The most notable maritime event in 1780 in Europe was the cap-
ture on August 9th of a large British convoy, two or three hundred
miles west of Cape St. Vincent, by the allied fleets from Cadiz. As
out of sixty-three sail only eight escaped, and as of those taken six-
478 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783. [17S0.
teen were carrying troops and supplies necessary for the West India
garrisons, such a disaster claims mention among the greater opera-
tions of war, the success of which it could not fail to influence.
Captain John INIoutray, the officer commanding the convoy, was
brought to trial and dismissed his ship ; but there were not wanting
those who charged the misadventure to the Admiralty, and saw in
the captain a victim. It was the greatest single blow that British
commerce had received in A\ar during the memory of men then
living, and " a general inclination prevailed to lay the blame upon
some individual, who might be punished according to the magnitude
of the object, rather than in proportion to his demerit." ^
During the year 1780 was formed the League of the Baltic
Powers, known historical!}^ as the Armed Neutrality, to exact from
Great Britain the concession of certain points thought essential to
neutral interests. The accession of Holland to this combination,
together with other motives of dissatisfaction, caused Great Britain
to declare war against the United Provinces on the 20th of Decem-
ber. Orders Avere at once sent to the East and West Indies to seize
Dutch possessions and ships, but these did not issue in action until
the following year.
Towards the end of 1780 the French Government, dissatisfied
with the lack of results from the immense combined force assembled
in Cadiz during the summer months, decided to recall its ships, and
to refit them during the mnter for the more extensive and aggressive
movements planned for the campaign of 1781. D'Estaing was sent
from France for the purpose ; and under his command thirtj^-eight
ships of the line, in which were included those brought by de Guichen
from the West Indies, sailed on the 7th of November for Brest.
Extraordinary as it may seem, this fleet did not reach its j)ort until
the 3rd of January, 1781.
Rodney, returning to the West Indies from New York, reached
Barbados on December 6th, 1780. There he seems first to have
learned of the disastrous effects of the great October hurricanes of
tliat year. Not only had several ships — among them two of the
line — been wrecked, with the loss of almost all on l)oard, but the
greater part of the survivors had been dismasted, wholly or in part,
as well as injured in the hull. There were in the West Indies no
docking facilities ; under-water damage could be repaired only by
careenino- or heavinsr-down. Furthermore, as Barbados, St. Lucia, and
1 Beatson, 'Milit.ary and Naval Memoirs.'
1780.] HOOD ARRIVES AT ST. LUCIA. 479
Jamaica, all had been swept, their supplies were mainly destroyed.^
Antigua, it is true, had escaped, tlie hurricane passing south of St.
Kitts; but Rodney wrote home that no stores for refitting were
obtainable in tlie Caribbee Islands. He was hoping then that Sir
Peter Parker might supply his needs in part ; for when writing from
St. Lucia on December 10th, two months after the storm, he still was
ignorant that the Jamaica Station had suffered to the full as severely
as the eastern islands. The fact shows not merely the ordinary slow-
ness of communications in those days, but also the paralysis that fell
upon all movements in consequence of that great disaster. " The
most beautiful island in the world," he said of Barbados, '• has the
appearance of a countrj^ laid waste by fire and sword."
Hearing that the fortifications at St. Vincent had been almost
destroyed by the hurricane, Rodney, in combination with General
Vaughan, commanding the troops on the station, made an attempt to
reconquer the island, landing there on December 15th ; but the intel-
ligence proved erroneous, and the fleet returned to St. Lucia. " I have
only nine sail of the line now with me capable of going to sea," wrote
the Admiral on the 22nd, " and not one of them has spare rigging or
sails." In the course of January he was joined by a division of eight
ships of the line from England, under the command of Rear- Admiral
Sir Samuel Hood. These, with four others refitted during that
month, not improbably from stores brought in Hood's convoy of
over a hundred sail, raised the disposable force to twenty-one ships
of the line : 2 nineties, 1 eighty, 15 seventy-fours, and 3 sixty-fours.
1 List of H. M. ships lost in the hurricane in the West Indies in October, 1780,
with the names of their commanders, such of the hitter as perished being indicated
with an asterisk (*). Chiefly from Steel's ' Navy List.' — W. L. C.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
( Com. the Hon, R. B. Walsingham.*
( Capt. Robert Boyle Nicholas.*
Thunderer
74
Stirling Castle
64
Capt. Robert Carkett.*
Plicenix
44
Capt. Sir Hyde Parker (2).
Blanche
42
Capt. Samuel TJppleby.*
Laurel
28
Capt. Thomas Lloyd.*
Andromeda
28
Capt. Henry Bryne.*
Deal Castle
24
Capt. James Hawkins (afterwards Whitshed),
Scarborough
20
Capt. Samuel Hood Walker.*
Beaver'' s Prize
16
Com. John Auiiol Drunimond.*
Barbados
14
Com. Ralph Milbanke.
Chameleon
14
Com. James Johnstone.*
Endeavour
14
Lieut. Francis Wooldridge.
Victor
10
Lieut.
480
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3.
[1781.
On the 2Tth of January, an express arrived from England, direct-
ing the seizure of the Dutch possessions in the Caribbean, and
specifying, as first to be attacked, St. Eustatius and St. Martin, two
small islands lying within fifty miles north of the British St. Kitts.
St. Eustatius, a rocky patch six miles in length by three in breadth,
had been conspicuous, since the ^^■ar began, as a great trade centre,
wliere supplies of all kinds ^vere gathered under the protection of its
neutral flag, to be tUstributed afterwards in the belligerent islands
and the North American continent. The British, owing to their
extensive commerce and maritime aptitudes, derived from such an
intermediary much less benefit than their enemies ; and the island
had been jealously regarded by Rodney for some time. He asserted
that when de Guichen's fleet could not regain Fort Royal, because of
its injuries received in the action of April 17th, it was refitted to meet
him by mechanics and materials sent from St. Eustatius. (3n the. other
hand, when cordage was to be bought for the Biitish vessels after the
hurricanes of 1780, the merchants of the island, he said, alleged that
there was none there ; although, when he took the island soon after-
wards, many hundred tons were found that had been long in stock.
Rodney and Vaughan moved promptly. Three days after their
orders arrived, they sailed for St. Eustatius. There Ijeing in Fort
Royal four French ships of the line, six British were left to check
COMMEMOUATIVE IIEDAL UF TUE CAl'TUUE OF HT. EUSTATIUS UY llODXEY, 1781.
{From an original lent by Capt. H. S. H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, R. N.)
them, and on the 3rd of February the fleet reached its destination. A
peremptory summons from the commander of a dozen ships of the
line secured immediate submission. Over a hundred and fifty mer-
chant ships were taken ; and a convoy of tliirty sail, which had left
the island two days before, was pursued and brought back. The
merchandise found was valued at over £3,000',000. The neighbour-
in<T islands of St. ^lartin and Saija were seized also at this time.
1781.] RODNEY AT ST. EUSTATIUS. 481
Rodney's imagination, as is shown in his letters, was greatly im-
pressed by the inagnitude of the prize and by the defenceless condi-
tion of his capture. He alleged these as the motives for staying in
person at St. Eustatius, to settle the complicated tangle of neutral
and belligerent rights in the property involved, and to provide against
the enemy's again possessing himself of a place now so equipped for
transactions harmful to Great Britain. The storehouses and con-
veniences provided for the particular traffic, if not properly guarded,
were like fortifications insufficiently garrisoned. If they passed into
the hands of the enemy, they became sources of injur}-. The illicit
traffic could start again at once in full force, with means which else-
where would have ffi'st to be created. Tliere were a mile and a half
of storehouses in the lower town, he said, and at the least he must
leave these roofless, if not wholly demolished.
For such reasons he remained at St. Eustatius throughout Feb-
ruary, March, and April. The amount of money involved, and the
arbitrary methods pursued by him and by Vaughan, gave rise to
much scandal, which was not diminished by the King's relinquishing
all the booty to the captors, nor by the latters' professed disinterest-
edness. Men thought they did protest too much. Meanwhile, other
matters arose to claim attention. A week after the capture, a vessel
arrived from the Bay of Biscay announcing that eight or ten French
sail of the line, with a large convoy, had been seen on the 31st of
December steering for the West Indies. Rodney at once detached
Sir Samuel Hood with eleven ships of the line, directing him to
take also under his command the six left before Fort Royal, and to
cruise with them to windward of Martinique, to intercept the force
reported. Hood sailed February 12th. The particular intelligence
proved afterwards to be false, but Hood was continued on this duty.
A month later he was ordered to move from the windward to tlie lee-
ward side of the island, and to blockade Fort Royal closely. Against
this change he remonstrated, and the event showed him to be right ;
but Rodney insisted, saying that from his experience he knew that a
fleet could remain off Fort Royal for months without dropping to lee-
ward, and that there ships detached to St. Lucia, for water and
refreshments, could rejoin before an enemy's fleet, discovered to
windward, could come up. Hood thought the Admiral's object was
merely to shelter his own doings at St. Eustatius ; and he considered
the blockade of Fort Royal to be futile, if no descent upon the island
were intended. " It would doubtless have been fortunate for the
VOL. in, — 31
482 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
public," he remarked afterwards, ''had Sir George been with his
fleet, as I am conhdent he woukl have been to windward instead ol
to leeward, when de Grasse made his approach."
The preparations of the French in Brest were completed towards the
end of March, and on the 22nd of that month Rear-Admiral de Grasse
sailed, having a large convoy under the protection of twenty-six ships
of the line. A week later six of the latter parted company, five under
Suffren for the East Indies, and one for North America. Tlie remain-
ing twenty continued their course for Martinique, which was sighted
on the 28th of April. Before sunset. Hood's squadron also was dis-
covered to leeward of the island, as ordered by Rodney to cruise, and
off the southern point, — Pointe des Salines. De Grasse then hove-to
for the night, but sent an officer ashore both to give and to obtain intel-
ligence, and to reach an understanding for concerted action next day.
The French fleet consisted of one ship of 110 guns, 3 eighties, 15
seventy-fours, and 1 sixty-four, in all 20 of the line, besides tlu-ee
armed en flute., which need not be taken into account, although they
served to cover the convoy. Besides these there were the four in
Fort Royal, 1 seventy-four and 3 sixty-fours, whose junction with the
approaching enemy it was one of Hood's objects to prevent. The force
of the British was 1 ninety, 1 eighty, 12 seventy-fours, 1 seventy, and
2 sixty-fours : total, 17.^ Thus both in numbers and in rates of ships
^ List of the fleet under Rear-Adiuiral Sir S. Hood, Bart., on April 29th, 1781.
Chiefly from Beatson, vi. 264, and Steel's ' Navy List.' This includes the 64-gun
.ship, which joined from St. Lucia at 9.20 a.m. — W. L. C.
Captain "William Bayne.
Captain James Brine.
Captain Charles Thompson.
Captain Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart.
Captain Fi-ancis Reynolds (later F. R. IMoreton).
J Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, Bart. (B).
( Captain John Knight (2).
Captain James Ferguson.
Captain Sir Thomas Rich, Bart.
Captain John Symons.
Captain Lord Robert Manners.
Ca[)tain John Houlton.
j Rear-Adiiural Francis Samuel Drake (B).
( Captain Charles KnatchbuU.
Captain John Neale Pleydell Nott.
Captain Andrew Sutherland.
Captain Stair Douglas (1).
Captain John Lewis Oidoin.
Captain Anthony James Pye Molloy.
Captain Mark Robinson (1).
Lizard, 28, as repeater. Pocahontas, 14, as rej)eater.
Alfred
74
Belliqucux
64
Alcidr-
74
Invincible
74
Monarch
74
Barfleur
90
Terrible
74
Prtncesa
70
Ajax
74
Resolution
74
Montagu
74
Gibraltar
80
Centaur
74
Russell
74
Prince William
fi4
Torbaxj
74
Intrepid
64
Shrcivsburif
74
1781.]
HOOD AND BE GRASSE.
483
Hood was inferior to the main body alone of the French ; but he had
the advantage of ships all coppered, owing to Rodney's insistence
with the Admiralty. He also had no convoy to worry him ; but he
was to leeward.
Early in the morning of the 29th, de Grasse advanced to round
the southern point of the island, which was the usual course for sail-
ing ships. Hood was too far to leeward to intercept this movement,
m«. oatv
L.I.1. „»„■ ^■-,<. .i.m , III -I^Tmi
CHART OF PART OF THE WINDWARD ISLANDS.
for which he was blamed by Rodney, who claimed that the night had
not been properly utilised by beating to windward of Pointe des
Salines.^ Hood, on the other hand, said in a private letter : " I never
once lost sight of getting to windward, but it was totally impossible.
. . . Had I fortunately been there, I must have brought the enemy
to close action upon more equal terms, or they must have given up
^ Eodney said that Hood " lay-to " fov tlie night. This is antecedently incredible
of au officer of Hood's character, and is expressly contradicted by Captain Sutherland
■of the Russell. " At 6 p.m. (of the 28th) our fleet tacked to the north, and kept mov-
ing across the bay (Fort Royal) for the right {sic)^ in line of battle." Ekins, ' Naval
Battles,' p. 136. The word " right " is evidently a misprint for " night." Rodney's
criticisms seem to the author captious throughout.
484 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
tlieir transports, trade, etc." Hood's subsequent career places it be-
yond doubt that had he been to windward there would have been a
severe action, whatever the result ; but it is not possible to decide
positively between his statement and Kodney's, as to where the fault
of being to leeward lay. The writer believes that Hood would have
l)een to windward, if in any way possible. It must be added that the
British had no word that so great a force was coming. On this point
Hood and Rodney are agreed.
Under the conditions, the French passed without difficulty round
Pointe des Salines, the transports hugging the coast, and the ships of
war being outside and to leeward of them. Thus they headed up to
the northward for Fort Royal Bay (Cul de Sac Royal), Hood standing
to the southward until after 10, and being joined at 9.20 by a sixty-
four (which is counted in the list above) from St. Lucia, making his
force eighteen. At 10.35 the British tacked together to the north-
ward. The two fleets were now steering the same way, the French
van abreast of the British centre. At 11 the French opened their fire,
to which no reply was made then. At 11.20, the British van being
close in with the shore to the northward of the Bay, Hood tacked
again together, and the enemy, seeing his convoy secure, wore, also
together, which brought the two lines nearer, heading south. At this
time the four French ships in the Bay got under way and easily joined
the rear of their fleet, it having the weather-gage. The French were
thus 24 to 18. As their shot were passing over the British, the latter
now began to reply. At noon Hood, finding that he could not close
the enemy, shortened sail to topsails and hove-to, hoping by this defi-
ance to brins: them down to him. At 12.30 the French admiral was
abreast of the British flagship, and the action became general, but at
too long range. " Never, I believe," wrote Hood, " was more powder
and shot thrown away in one day before." The French continuing
to stand on. Hood filled his sails again at 1 P.M., as their van had
stretched bevond his.
As the leading ships, heading south, opened tlie channel between
St. Lucia and Martinique, they got the breeze fresher, which caused
them to draw away from the centre. Hood, therefore, at 1.34 made
the signal for a close order, and immediately afterwards ceased firing,
finding not one in ten of the enemy's shot to reach. The engage-
ment, however, continued somewhat longer between the southern
ships, where, by the account of Captain Sutherland, who was in that
part of the line, four of the British were attacked very smartly by
1781.]
MARTINIQUE.
485
O
w
•^
^
Of
$J
■^
'^
hH
H
■S
«
•c*
■<
>«
^
s
StJ
486 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [17S1..
eight of the French. The Centcnir, Bussell., Intrejnd, and Shrevjsburij
appear to have been the sliips that suffered most heavily, either in
hull, spars, or crews. They were all in the van on the southern tack.
The Ihissell, having several shot between wind and water, was with
difficulty kept afloat, the water rising over the platform of the maga-
zine. Hood sent her off at nightfall to St. Eustatius, wdiere she
arrived on the 4t]i of May, bringing Rodney the first news of the
action, and of the numbers of the French reinforcement. During the
30th Hood held his ground, still endeavouring to get to windward
of the enemj-j but failing in that attempt, and finding two of his
squadron much disabled, he decided at sunset to bear away to the
northward, because to the southward the westerly currents set so-
strong that the crippled ships could not regain St. Lucia. On the
11th of May, between St. Kitts and Antigua, he joined Rodney, who,
after hurried repairs to the Russell, had left St. Eustatius on the 5th,.
with that ship, the Sanchvicli, and the Trmmioh,
It is somewhat difficult to criticise positively the conduct of Hood
and of cle Grasse in this affair. It is clear that Hood on the first day
seriously sought action, though his force w^as but three-fourths that
of his foe. He tried first to take the offensive, and, failing that, to
induce his enemy to attack frankly and decisively. Troude is doubt-
less correct in saying that it was optional with de Grasse to bring on
a general engagement ; and the writer finds himself in agreement also
with another French authority. Captain Chevalier, that " Count de
Grasse seems to have been too much preoccupied with the safety of
his convoy on the 29th, Admiral Hood having shown himself much
less circumspect on that day than he was on the next. Notwithstand-
ing our numerical superiority, Count de Grasse kept near the land
until all the convoy were safe." He represents Hood as fencing
cautiously on the following day, keeping on the field, but avoiding a
decisive encounter. This differs somewhat from the version of Hood
himself, who mentions signalling a general chase to windward at 12.30
r. >r. of tlie BOtli. The two statements are not irreconcilable. Hood,
lla^•ing coppered ships, had the speed of the Frencli, whose vessels,
being partly coppered and partly not, sailed unevenly. The British
commander consequently could afford to take risks, and he tiierefore
played with the enemy, watching for a chance. Hood was an officer
of exceptional capacity, nmch in advance of his time. He thoroughly
understood a watching game, and tliat an opportunity might offer to
seize an advantage over part of the enemy, if the eagerness of pursuit,
1781.] DRAKE AND DE GRASSE. 487
or any mishap, caused the French to sei^arate. From any dilemma
that ensued, the reserve of speed gave him a power of withdrawal, in
relying upon which he was right. The present writer adopts here also
Chevalier's conclusion : " Admiral Hood evidently had the very great
advantage over his enemy of commanding a squadron of coppered
ships. Nevertheless, homage is due to his skill and to the conhdence
shown by him in his captains. If some of his ships had dropped
behind through injuries received, he would have had to sacrifice them,
or to fight a suijerior force." This means that Hood, for an adequate
gain ran a great risk ; that he thoroughly understood both the advan-
tages and the disadvantages of his situation ; and that he acted not
only with great skill, but warily and boldly, — a rare combination.
The British loss in this affair was 39 killed, including Captain Nott,
of the Centaur, and 162 wounded. The French loss is given by Cheva-
lier as 18 killed and 56 wounded; by Beatson, as 119 killed and 150
wounded.
Rodney, having collected his fleet, proceeded south, and on the 18th
of May put into Barbados for water. Much anxiety had been felt at
first for St. Lucia, which Hood's retreat had uncovered. As was
feared, the French had attacked it at once, their fleet, with the excep-
tion of one or two ships, going there, and 1,200 troops landing at Gros
Ilet Bay; but the batteries on Pigeon Island, wliich Rodney had
erected and manned, kept them at arms' length. The works elsewhere
being found too strong, the attempt was abandoned.
At the same time, two ships of the line and 1,300 troops had sailed
from Martinique against Tobago. When de Grasse returned from the
failure at St. Lucia, he learned that the British were at sea, apparently
bound for Barbados. Alarmed for his detachment before Tobago, he
again sailed with the fleet for that island on the 25th of May, accom-
panied by 3,000 more troops. Rodney learned at Barbados of the
attempt on Tobago, and on the 29th dispatched a squadron of six sail
of the line, under Rear-Admiral Francis Samuel Drake, to support
the defence. On the following day he heard that the French main
fleet had been seen to windward of St. Lucia, steering south, evi-
dently for Tobago. On the 30tli also Drake and de Grasse encountered
one another off the latter island, the French being to leeward, nearest
the land. Drake necessarily retired, and on the morning of June 3rd
was again off Barbados, whereupon Rodney at once sailed for Tobago
with the whole fleet. On the 4th the island was sighted, and next
morning information was received that it had capitulated on the 2nd.
488 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-17S3. [1781.
The two fleets returning north were in presence of one another on
the 9th ; but no engagement took place. Rothiey, who was to wind-
ward, having twenty sail to twenty-three,^ was unwilling to attack
unless he could get a clear sea. The strength of the currents, he
said, would throw his fleet too far to leeward, in case of reverse, into
the foul ground between St. Vincent and Grenada, thus exposing
Barbados, which had not recovered sufficiently from the hurricane
to stand alone. He put into Barbados, and de Grasse went to Mar-
tinique to prepare the expedition to the American continent, which
resulted in the surrender of Cornwallis. On the 5th of July he sailed
from Fort Royal, taking with him the " trade " for France, and on
the 2Gth anchored with it at Cap Francois, Avhere he found a division
of four ships of the line which had been left the year before by
de Guiclien. There also was a frigate, which had left Boston on
the 2')th of June, and by which he received dispatches from Wash-
ington, and from Rochambeau, the general commanding the French
troops in America. These acquainted him with the state of affairs
(in the continent, and requested that the fleet should come to either
the Chesapeake or New York, to strike a decisive blow at the British
power in one quarter or the other.
It is expedient here to resume the thread of events on the con-
tinent.
It has been said tliat, to support the operations of Cornwallis in
the Carolinas, Clinton had begun a series of diversions in the valley
of the James River. The first detachment so sent, under General
Leslie, had been transferred speedily to South Carolina, to meet the
exigencies of Cornwallis's campaign. The second, of 1,600 trooj^s
under Benedict Arnold, left New York at the end of December, and
began its work on the banks of the James at the end of January, 1781.
It advanced to Richmond, nearly a hundred miles from the sea, wast-
ing the country round about, and finding no o})position adequate to
check its freedom of movement. Returning down stream, on the
20th it occupied Portsmouth, south of the James River, near the sea,
and valuable as a naval station.
Washington urged Commodore des Touches, who by de Ternay's
death ]ia<l been left in command of the French squach'on at Newport,
to interrupt these proceedings, by dispatching a strong detachment
to Chesapeake Ba}' ; and he asked Rochambeau also to let some troops
^ One French sliip had left the fleet, disabled.
1781.] ABBUTUNOr AND DES TOUCHES. 489
accompany the naval division, to support the scanty force whicli he
himself could spare to Virginia. It happened, however, that a gale
of wind just then had inflicted severe injury upon Arbuthnot's squad-
ron, three of which had gone to sea from Gardiner's Bay upon a report
that three French ships of the line had left Newport to meet an ex-
pected convoy. One seventy-four, the Bedford, was wholly dismasted ;
another, the Culloden, Captain George Balfour, drove ashore on Long
Island, and was wrecked. The French ships had returned to port the
day before the gale, but the incident indisposed des Touches to risk
his vessels at sea at that time. He sent only a sixty-four, with two
frigates. These left Newport on February 9th, and entered the
Chesapeake, but were unable to reach the British vessels, which, being
smaller, withdrew up the Elizabeth River. Arbuthnot, hearing of this
expedition, sent orders to some frigates off Charleston to go to the
scene. The French division, when leaving the Bay, met one of these,
the Bonudus, 44, Captain George Gay ton, off the Capes, captured her, and
returned to Newport on February 25th. On the 8th of March, Arnold
reported to Clinton that the Chesapeake was clear of French vessels.
On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from
Gardiner's Bay, that the French were evidently preparing to quit
Newport. His utmost diligence had failed as yet to repair entirely
the damage done his squadron by the storm, but on the 9th it was
ready for sea. On the evening of the 8th the French had sailed.
On the 10th Arbuthnot knew it, and, having taken the precaution to
move down to the entrance of the bay, he was able to follow at once.
On the 13th he spoke a vessel which had seen the enemy and gave
him their course. Favoured by a strong north-west wind, and his
ships being coppered, he outstripped the French, only three of which
had copper on them. At 6 a.m. of the 16th the latter were reported
by a frigate to be astern — to the north-east — about a league distant,
a thick haze preventing the British from seeing them even at that dis-
tance (A A).i Cape Henry, the southern point of the entrance to the
Chesapeake, then bore south-west by west, distant forty miles. The
wind as stated by Arbuthnot was west ; by the French, south-west.
The British admiral at once went about, steering in the direction
reported, and the opposing squadrons soon sighted one another.
The British being between them and their port, the French hauled
to the wind, which shifted between 8 and 9 to north by west, putting
them to windward. Some preliminary manoeuvres then followed, both
1 Reference is to Mahan's " Influence of Sea Power Upon History," Plate XII.
490 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783. [1731,
parties seeking the weather-gage. The weather remained thick and
squally, often intercejiting the vieAv; and the wind continued to shift
until towards noon, when it settled at north-east. The better sailing,
or the better seamanship, of the British had enabled them to gain so
far upon their opponents that at 1 v.isL they were laying nearly up in
their wake, on the port tack, overhauling them ; both squadrons in
line of battle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from their
pursuers east by south, — one point on the weather bow (B B).^ The
wind was rising A\ith squalls, so that the ships lay over well to their
canvas, and the sea was getting big.
As the enemy now was threatening his rear, and had the speed to
overtake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to the usual pariy to
such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and passing on the other tack.
This could be done together, reversing the order, or in succession ;
depending much upon the distance of the enemy. Having room
enough, des Touches chose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable,
he decided also to utilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-
gage, and passing to leeward. The advantage of this course was that,
with the existing sea and wind, and the inclination of the ships, the
party that liad the opponent on his weather side could open the lower-
deck ports and use those guns. There was thus a great increase of
batter V power, for the lower guns were the heaviest. Des Touches
accordingly put his helm up, liis line passing in succession to the
southward (c), across the head of the advancing British column, and
then hauling up so as to run parallel to the latter, to leeward, with
the wind four points free.
Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was until
nearly abreast of the French, and at 2 p.m. made the signal to wear.
It does not appear certainly how this was executed; but from the
expression in the official report, "the van of the squadron wore in
the line," and from the fact that the ships which led in the attack
were those which were leading on the port tack, — the tack before
the signal was made, — it seems likely that the movement was made
in succession (a). The whole squadron then stood down, but with
the customary result. The ships in the van and centre were all
engaged by 2.30, so Arbuthnot states ; but the brunt of the action
had already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the first
raking fire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than those
which followed them (C). They therefore not only lost most heavily
^ Reference is to Mahan's " Influence of Sea Power Upon History," Plate XII.
1781.]
ABBUTHXOT AXD DES TOUCHES.
491
in men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippled. The British
Vice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoisting
that for close action, appears to have caused a movement of indecision
in the squadron, — an evidence again of the hold which the line then
still had upon men's minds. Of this des Touches cleverly availed
himself, by ordering his sliips to wear in succession. The French
column filed by the three disabled British vessels (d), gave them their
broadsides one by one, and then hauled off to the eastward, quitting
Arbuxhmot a!--)d Destouches.
/6 ^" Ma/jch. /7a/
0
0^0
^A
b"'
,-o-V C
wind A >»»
wind BCD
D
AIIBUTHNOT AND DES TOUCHED.
the field (D). Arbuthnot made signal to wear in pursuit, Ijut the
Bohust and Prudent^ two of the van ships, were now wholly un-
manageable from the concentration of fire upon them caused by des
Touches's last movement; and the maintopsail yard of i\\Q London^
the only British three-decker, had been shot away. The chase there-
fore was abandoned, and the squadron put into Chesapeake Bay, for
which the wind was fair (D). The French returned to Newport. The
respective losses in men were : British, 30 killed, 73 wounded ; French,
72 killed, 112 wounded.
492
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1781.
Both sides had eight ships, besides smaller craft, in this encounter.
From the table ^ given below it is evident that the advantage in force
was distinctly with the British. For this reason, probably, the action
was considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries, and the
more so because several vessels did not engage closely, — a fault laid to
the Vice-Admiral's failure to make the signal for close action, hauling
down that for the line. Tins criticism is interesting, for it indicates
how men's minds were changing ; and it shows also that Arbuthnot
had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the century. The
French commodore displayed very considerable tactical skill ; his
squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision. With
inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheer intelligence
and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolution to pursue
his advantage. Had he persisted, he doubtless could have controlled
the Chesapeake.
His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, who
on the 10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the
squadron. This officer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical
success, continued thus : —
" As to the advantage which the English obtained, in fulfilling their object,
that is a necessary consequence of their superiority, and, still more, of their purely
defensive attitude. It is a principle in icar that one should risk much to defend one^s
own positions, and very little to attack those of the enemy. M. des Touches, whose
object was pui'ely offensive, could and should, when the enemy opposed to him
^ List of the British and French squadrons in the action of March 16th, 1781.
The British list gives Arhuthnot's line of battle ; the America to lead with the star-
board, and the Robust with the larboard tacks on board. Beatson, vi. 273 (corrected).
— W. L. C.
SHIPS.
73
z
3
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
u
COMMANDERS.
America . .
64
Capt. Samuel Thompson.
*Neptune . . . .
74
( M. des Touches.
I Capt. de Mi5dine.
Bedford . .
74
Capt. Edmund AfHeck.
Adamant. .
50
Capt. Gideon Jolinstone.
*Dttc de Bourgogne .
84
Capt. Baron de Durfort.
London .
98
Rear-Adni. Tlionias Graves (2), (R).
Capt. David Graves.
Conquerant . . .
74
Capt. de la Grandifere.
Provence ....
64
Capt. Lambart.
Royal Oak .
74
( Vice-Adni. Marriot Arbutiniot.
1 Capt. William Swiney.
ArdPHt
64
Capt. de Marigny.
J<isnn
64
Capt. de la Clocheterie.
Prudent . .
64
Capt. Thomas Burnett.
*£veille
64
Capt. de Tilly.
Europe . .
64
Capt. Smith Child.
'fPomidus ....
44
Capt. de ViUebrune.
Robtist . .
74
Capt. Pliillips Cosby.
Frigates : —
Frigates : —
Guadalupe .
28
Capt. Hugh Robinson.
Hermione . . . .
36
Capt. de la Touche.
Pearl . . .
32
Capt. George Montagu.
GentiUe ....
32
in.s . . .
32
Capt. George Dawson.
Fantasque (en flflte)
64
Capt. de VaudorcJ.
Medea . .
28
Capt. Henry Duncan (1).
" Tlii'sc Klnp.s were coppered.
t Late British. Though only a 44-guu ship, she was a two-decker.
1781.] CORN W ALUS AND CLINTON. 493
superior forces, renounce a project wliicli could no longer succeed, unless, contrary
to all probahility, it ended not only in beating, but also in destroying entirely, that
superior squadron."
This exaltation of the defensive above the offensive, this despair-
ing view of probabilities, this aversion from risks, go far to explain
the French want of success in this war. No matter how badly the
enemy was thrashed, unless he were entirely destroyed, he was still a
fleet " in being," a paralysing factor.
The retreat of des Touches and the coming of Arbuthnot restored
to the British the command of Chesapeake Bay. Clinton, as soon as
he knew that the two squadrons had sailed, had sent off a reinforce-
ment of 2,000 troops for Arnold, under General Phillips. These
arrived on March 26th in Lynnhaven Bay, and thence proceeded at
once to Portsmouth, Virginia. It is unnecessary to speak of the
various operations of this land force. On the 9th of May, in conse-
quence of letters received from Cornwallis, it moved to Petersburg.
There on the 13th Phillips died, the command reverting momentarily
to Arnold. On the 20th Cornwallis joined, and Arnold soon after
returned to New York.
Cornwallis now had with him about 7,000 troops, including the
garrison at Portsmouth ; but a serious difference of opinion existed
between him and Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief. The latter had
begun the conquest of South Carolina, and he did not welcome the
conclusion of his lieutenant that the conquest could not be main-
tained, away from the seaboard, unless Virginia also were subdued :
for from the latter, a rich and populous region, men and supplies
supported the American cause in the south. Cornwallis had tested
the asserted strength of the Royalists in the Carolinas, and had found
it wanting. Offensive operations in Virginia were what he wished ;
but Clinton did not approve this project, nor feel that he could spare
troops enough for the purpose. Between October, 1780, and June,
1781, he said, 7,724 effectives had been sent from New York to
the Chesapeake ; and he could not understand the failure to cut off
the greatly inferior force of the enemy in Virginia. This at least did
not indicate probable success for a renewed offensive. The garrison
of New York was now short of 11,000, and could not be diminished
further, as he was threatened with a siege. In short, the British
position in America had become essentially false, by the concurring
effect of insufficient force and ex-centric — double — operations. Sent
to conquer, their numbers now were so divided that they could barely
494 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
maintain the defensive. Cornwuilis therefore was ordered to occupy
a defensive position, which should control an anchorage for ships of
the line, and to strengthen himself in it. After some discussion,
which revealed further disagreement, he placed himself at Yorktown,
on the peninsula formed by the James and York rivers. Portsmouth
was evacuated, the garrison reaching Yorktown on the 22nd of August.
Cornwallis's force was then 7,000 troops ; and there were with him
besides about a thousand seamen, belonging to some half-dozen small
vessels, which had been shut up in the York by the coming of the
French fleet.
On the 2nd of July Arbuthnot sailed for England, leaving the
command at New York to Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves (2). The
latter on the same day wrote to Rodney, by the brig Active^ that inter-
cepted dispatches of the enemy had revealed that a large division
from the West Indies was to arrive on the American coast during
the summer, to co-operate with the force already in Newport. Rodney,
on the other hand, dispatched to New York on the 7th the Swallow
sloop, 16, wath word that, if he sent reinforcements from the West
Indies, they would be ordered to make the Capes of the Chesapeake, and ~
to coast thence to New York. He asked, therefore, that cruisers with
information might be stationed along that route. Two days later,
having then certain news that de Grasse had sailed for Cap Francois,
he sent the intelligence to Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica,
and gave Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood preparatory orders to com-
mand a reinforcement destined for the continent. This, however, was
limited in numbers to fifteen sail of the line, Rodney being misled by
his intelligence, which gave fourteen ships as the size of the French
division having the same destination, and which reported that de Grasse
himself would convoy the trade from Cap Francois to France. On the
24th instructions were issued for Hood to proceed on this duty. He
was first to convoy the Jamaica trade as far as the passage between Cuba
and Haiti, and thence to make the utmost speed to the Chesapeake.
A false report, of French ships reaching Martinique from Europe,
slightly delayed this movement. The convoy was dispatched to
Jamaica w^ith two sliips of the line, which Sir Peter Parker was
directed to send at once to America, and requested to reinforce
with otheis from his own squadron. Hood was detained until the
report could be verified. On the 1st of August Rodney sailed for
England on leave of absence. On the 10th Hood left Antigua
with fourteen ships of the line, direct for the Capes. He had
1781.] DE GRASSE AT CAP FRANQOIS. 495
already received, on the 3rd, Graves's letter by the Active, which
he sent back on the 6th with his answer and with a notification
of his speedy departure.
The Sioallow and the Active should have reached Graves before
Hood; but neither got to him at all. The Swallow, Comman-
der Thomas Wells, arrived safely in New York on the 27th of
July ; but Graves had sailed with all his squadron on the 21st, for
Boston Bay, hoping there to intercept an expected convoy from
France, concerning which a special caution had been sent him by the
Admiralty. The sloop was at once sent on by the senior naval
officer, but was attacked by hostile vessels, forced ashore on
Long Island, and lost. The Active was captured before she reached
New York. Graves, in happy ignorance of the momentous crisis
approaching, continued cruising until the 16th of August, when
he returned to Sandy Hook. There he found the duplicates of
the Swallow^s letters, but they only notified him of the course a
reinforcement would take, not that Hood had started. On August
25th the latter, being then off the Chesapeake, sent duplicates of
the Active's dispatches, but these preceded by little his own arrival
on the 28th. That evening news was received in New York that
de Barras had sailed from Newport on the 25th, with his whole
division. Hood anchored outside the Hook, where Graves, who
was the senior officer, undertook to join him at once. On the 31st
five sail of the line and a fifty-gun ship, all that could be got
ready in time, crossed the bar, and the entire body of nineteen
ships of the line started at once for the Chesapeake, whither it
was now understood that both the French fleet and the united
armies of Washington and Rochambeau were hurrying.
Count de Grasse upon his arrival at Cap FrauQois had found
that many things must be done before he could sail for the con-
tinent. Measures needed to be taken for the security of Haiti:
and a large sum of money, with a considerable reinforcement of
troops, was required to insure the success of the projected operation,
for which but a short time was allowed, as it was now August and
he must be again in the West Indies in October. It was not the
least among the fortunate concurrences for the American cause at
that moment, that de Grasse, whose military capacity was not con-
spicuous, showed then a remarkable energy, politic tact, and breadth
of view. He decided to take with him every ship he could command,
postponing the sailing of the convoys ; and by dexterous arrangement
496 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1781.
with the vSpaniards he contrived to secure botli the funds required
and an efficient corps of 3,300 French troops, without stripping
Haiti too closely. On the 5th of August he left Cap Frangois, Avith
twenty-eight ships of the line, taking the route through the Old
Bahama Channel,^ and anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the
entrance of the Chesapeake, on the 30th, the day before Graves sailed
from New York for the same place. The troops were landed instantly
on the south side of the James River, and soon reached La Fayette,
Avho commanded the forces so far opposed to Cornwallis, which were
thus raised to 8,000 men. At the same time Washington, having
thrown Clinton off his guard, was crossing the Delaware on his way
south, with 6,000 regular troops, 2,000 American and 4,000 French,
to join La Fayette. French cruisers took position in the James River,
to prevent Cornwallis from crossing, and escaping to the southward
into Carolina. Others were sent to close the mouth of the York.
By these detachments the main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail
of the line.
On the 5th of September, at 8 a.:m., the French look-out frigate,
cruising outside Cape Henry, made the signal for a fleet steering for
the Bay. It was hoped at first that this was de Barras's squadron
from Newport, known to be on its way, but it was soon evident from
the numbers that it must be an enemy. The forces now about to be
opposed, nineteen British sail of the line to twenty-four French, were
constituted as follows: British, 2 ninety-eights (three-deckers); 12
seventy-fours, 1 seventy, 4 sixty-fours, besides frigates ; '^ French, 1
jDne hundred and four (three-decker),'^ 3 eighties, 17 seventy- fours,
3 sixty-fours.
The mouth of the Chesapeake is about ten miles wide, from Cape
Charles on the north to Cape Henrj^ on the south. The main chan-
nel is l)etween the latter and a shoal, tlu*ee miles to the northward,
called the Middle Ground. The British fleet, when the French were
first seen from it, was steering south-west for the entrance, under
foresails and topgallant sails, and it so continued, forming line as it
approached. The wind Avas north-north-east. At noon the ebb-tide
made, and the French began to get under way, but many of their
ships had to make several tacks to clear Cape Henry. Their line was
^ Along the north coast of Cuba, between it and the Bahama Banks.
- See note on opposite page.
2 The Ville de Paris, to which Troude attributes 104 guns. She was considered
the biggest and finest ship of her day.
1781.]
GRAVES OFF THE CHESAPEAKE.
497
consequently late in forming, and ^yas by no means regular or closed
as they got outside.
At 1 P.M. Graves made the signal to form on an east and west line,
which would be the closehauled line heading out to sea, on the other
tack from that on which his fleet still was. At 2 p.m. the French van,
three miles distant by estimate, bore south from the London, Graves's
flagship, and was therefore abreast of the centre of the British line.
As the British van came near the Middle Ground, at 2.13 p.m., the
ships wore together. This put them on the same tack as the French,
Hood's division, which had been leading, being now the rear in the
reversed order ; and the fleet brought-to, in order to allow the centre
Note. — British line of battle in the action of Sept. 5, 1781. Mainly from Beatson,
vi. 284 ; corrected by Steel's ' Navy List ' of the period, and from MS. notes by Henry
Wise Harvey in Ed's, edition of Schomberg, iv. 377, 378. The Alfred was to lead
with the starboard, and the Shreusbunj with the larboard tacks on board. — "W. L. C.
SHIPS.
GUNS.
COMMANDERS.
Alfred ......
BelUqueux
Invincible
Barfleur .....
Monarch .....
Centaur
Santa Margarltta, 36
Richmond, 32 . .
America
Besolution
Bedford
London
Royal Oak
3Iontagu
Europe ......
Solehay, 28 . . .
Nymi)he, 36 . . .
Adamant, 50 . .
Terrible
Ajax
Princesa
Alcide
Intrepid
Shrewsbury ....
Salamander (f. s. ) .
Sibyl, 28 ... .
Fortuni':/', 40 .
VOL. III. — 32
71
64
74
98
74
74
64
74
74
98
74
74
64
74
74
70
74
64
74
Capt. William Bayne.
Capt. James Brine.
Capt. Charles Saxton.
Rear- Admiral Sir Samuel Hood (B).
Capt. Alexander Hood.
Capt. Francis Reynolds (later Lord Ducie).
Capt. John Nicholson Inglefield.
Capt. Elliot Salter.
Capt. Charles Hudson.
Capt. Samuel Thompson.
Capt. Lord Robert Manners.
Capt. Thomas Graves (3).
Rear- Admiral Tliomas Graves (2), (R).
Capt. David Graves.
Capt. John Plummer Ardesoif.
Capt. George Bowen (1).
Capt. Smith Child.
Capt. Charles Holmes Everitt (later Calmady).
Capt. John Ford.
Capt. Gideon Johnstone.
Capt. Hon. William Clement Finch.
Capt. Nicholas Charrington.
Rear- Admiral Francis Samuel Drake (B).
Capt. Charles Knatchbull.
Capt. Charles Thompson.
Capt. Anthony James Pye Molloy.
Capt. Mark Robinson (1).
Commander Edward Bowater.
Capt. Lord Charles Fitzgerald (?).
Capt. Hugh Cloberr}' Christian.
498
MAJOR OPFAIATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1781.
of the enemy to come abreast of the centre of the British (a a). The
two lines now were nearly parallel, but the British, being five ships
fewer, naturally did not extend so far as the rear of the French, which
in fact was not yet clear of the Cape. At 2.30 Graves made the
signal for the van ship (the Shrewshury'), to lead more to starboard —
towards the enemy. As each ship in succession would take her course
to follow the leader, the effect of this was to put the British on a line
Gravels and de Crasse:
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GRAVES AND DE GRASSE.
inclined to that of the enemy, the van nearest, and as the signal was
renewed three quarters of an hour later, — at 3.17, — this angle became
still more marked (bb).^ This was the original and enduring cause
of a lamentable failure, by which seven of the rear sliips, in an inferior
force undertaking to attack, never came into battle at all. At 3.34
the van was ordered again to keep still more towards the enemy.
At 3.4G the signal was made for ships to close to one cable, fol-
lowed almost immediately by that to bear down and engage the
1 This reproduced the blunder of Byng, between Avhose action and the one now
under di~;'ti.<ion there is a marked resemblance.
1781.] HOOD'S CRITICISMS. 499
enemy, — tlie signal for the line still flying. Graves's flagship, which
was hove-to, filled and bore down. Under the conditions, the van
ships of course got first under fire, and the action gradually extended
from them to the twelfth in the order, two ships astern of the London.
According to the log of the latter, at 4.11 the signal for the line
ahead was hauled down, that it might not interfere with that for close
action, but at 4.22 it was rehoisted, " the ships not being sufficiently
extended." The meaning of this expression may be inferred from
Beatson's account : —
" The London, by taking the lead, had advanced farther towards the enemy
than some of the ships stationed immediately ahead of her in the line of battle ;
and upon luffing up, to bring her broadside to bear, they having done the same
thing, her second ahead was brought nearly upon her weather beam. The other
ships ahead of her were likewise too much crowded together."
As the ship on the London'' s weather beam could not fire upon the
enemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probably accounts for
the flagship being again hove-to, while firing, as Hood says that she
was. Readers will remember a similar incident occurring with Byng's
flagship. The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4.27, by
the London^ log, that for close action being up, and repeated at 5.20,
when Hood at last bore down with his division, but the French ships
bearing up also, he did not near them. Firing ceased shortly after
sunset. The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded ; that of
the French is given only in round numbers, as about 200 killed and
wounded.
Hood's statement introduces certain important qualifications into
the above account : —
" Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at four, but at a
most improper distance, and our rear, being barely within random shot, did not fire
while the signal for the line was flying. The London had the signal for close action
flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at half a cable was under her topsails,
with the main topsail to the mast,i though the enemy's ships were i^ushing on."
As showing the improper distance at which the London brought-to
to fire, he says : —
" The second ship astern of her (of the London') received but trifling damage,
and the third astern of her received no damage at all, which most clearly proves
[at] how much too great a distance was the centre division engaged."
The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criti-
cisms upon it, which has been published. The gist of this is as
^ I. e., she had stopped.
500 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1781.
follows. As the French stood out, their line was not regular or con-
nected. The van was much separated from the centre and rear, and
it appears also, from the French narratives, that it was to windward
of the rest of the fleet. From these causes it was much exposed to
be attacked unsupported. There was, by Hood's estimate, " a full
hour and a half to have engaged it before any of the rear could have
come uj)." The line of battle on the port tack, with the then wind,
was east and west, and Graves had first ranged his fleet on it, as the
French were doing i but afterwards, owing to liis method of approach,
by the van bearing down and the other ships following in its wake, the
two lines, instead of being parallel, formed an angle, the British
centre and rear being much more distant from the enemy than the
van was. This alone would cause the ships to come into battle suc-
cessively instead of together, a fault of itself ; but the Commander-
in-Chief, according to Hood, committed the further mistake that he
kept the signal for the line of battle flying until 5.30 p.ini., near ta
sunset. The line of battle at any moment ran, of course, from the
van ship through that of the Commander-in-Chief ; those two points
determined it for all in the rear, where Hood was. Hence the latter's
criticism, which is marked by much acerbity towards his superior, but
does not betray any consciousness that he himself needed any justifica-
tion for his division not having taken part.
" Had the centre gone to the support of the van, and the signal for the line
been hauled down, or the Commander-in-Chief had set the example of close action,
even with the signal for the line flying, the van of the enemy must have been cut
to pieces, and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed to
those ships the centre division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging, or
the Rear- Admiral who commanded it ^ would have a great deal to answer for." ^
So much for the tactical failure of that day. Tlie question remained
what next was to be done. Graves contemplated renewing the
action, but early in the night was informed that several of the van
^ Hood himself.
2 Concerning the crucial fact of the signal for the line of battle being kept flying
continuously until 5.30 p.m., upon which there is a direct contradiction between Hood
and the log of the London, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain Thomas
White, who Avas present in the action in one of the rear ships. " If the London's log,
or the log of any other individual ship in the fleet, confirm this statement," (that
Hood was dilatory in obeying the order for close action), " I shall be induced to fancy
that Avhat I that day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what
I believed to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an ignis fatuus con-
jured up to mock me." White and Hood also agree that the signal for tlie line was
rehoisted at G.30. (White : ' Naval Researches,' London, 1830.)
1781.] GRAVES RETURXS TO NEW YORK. 501
ships were too crippled to permit this. He held his ground, how-
ever, in sight of the French, until dark on the 9th, when they were
seen for the last time. They were then under a cloud of sail, and
on the morning of the 10th had disappeared. From their actions
during tliis interval, Hood had inferred that de Grasse meant to get
back into the Chesapeake without further fighting; and he implies
that he advised Graves to anticipate the enemy in so doing. Though
some ships were crippled aloft, the British batteries were practically
intact, nor had men enough been disabled to prevent any gun in
the fleet from being fought. Could but a single working day
be gained in taking up an anchorage, a defensive order could be
assumed, practically impregnable to the enemy, covering Cornwallis,
and not impossibly intercepting the French ships left in the Bay. In
the case of many men such comment might be dismissed as the idle
talk of the captious fault-finder, always to the fore in life ; but in the
case of Hood it must be received ^vith deference, for, but a few
months later, when confronted with greater odds, he himself did the
very thing he here recommended, for an object less vital than the
relief of Cornwallis. Having regard to the character of de Grasse, it
is reasonable to believe that, if he had found the British fleet thus
drawn up at anchor in Chesapeake Bay, as he found Hood at St.
Kitts in the following January, he would have waited off the
entrance for de Barras, and then have gone to sea, leaving Washington
and Rochambeau to look at Cornwallis slipping out of their grasp.
On the 10th of September Graves decided to burn the Terrible^ 74,
which had been kept afloat with difficulty since the action. This
done, the fleet stood towards . the Chesapeake, a frigate going ahead
to reconnoitre. On the 13th, at 6 a.m.. Graves wrote to Hood that
the look-outs reported the French at anchor above the Horse Shoe
(shoal) in the Chesapeake, and desired his opinion what to do with
the fleet. To this Hood sent the comforting reply that it was no
more than what he had expected, as the press of sail the (French)
fleet carried on the 9th, and on the night of the 8th, made it very
clear to him what de Grasse 's intentions were. He "would be very
glad to send an opinion, but he really knows not what to say in the
truly lamentable state [to which] we have brought ourselves."^ On
the 10th de Barras had reached the Bay, where he was joined by de
Gyasse on the 11th, so that there were then present thirty-six French
ships of the line. Graves, therefore, returned to New York, reach-
1 ' Letters of Lord Hood.' N. R. S., p. 35.
502 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
ino- Sandy Hook on the 19tli. On the 14th Washington had arrived
before Yorktown, where he took the chief command ; and the armies
closed in npon Cornwallis by hand as the French fleets had done
already by water. On the 19th of October the British force was
compelled to surrender, 7,217 troops and 810 seamen laying down
their arms. During the siege the latter had served in the works,
the batteries of which were largely composed of ships' guns.
After Graves's return to New York, Rear- Admiral the Hon. Robert
Digby arrived from England on the 21tli of September, to take com-
mand of the station in Arbuthnot's place. He brought with him
three ships of the line ; and the two which Sir Peter Parker had been
ordered by Rodney to send on at once had also reached the port. It
was decided by the land and sea officers concerned to attempt the
relief of Cornwallis, and that it was expedient for Graves to remain
in command until after this expedition. He could not start, how-
ever, until the 18th of October, by which time Cornwallis 's fate was
decided. Graves then departed for Jamaica to supersede Sir Peter
Parker. On the 11th of November Hood sailed from Sandy Hook
with eighteen ships of the line, and on the 5th of December anchored
at Barbados. On the 5th of November de Grasse also quitted the
continent with his whole fleet, and returned to the West Indies.
In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions which
dominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, or
destruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar.
The British Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea
forces of France and Spain in the waters of Europe ; and the Dutch
navy also was now hostile. The French government represented to
its allies that by concentrating, their squadrons near the entrance of
the Channel they would control the situation in every point of view ;
but the Spaniards, intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their
fleet from Cadiz until late in the summer, while the French persisted
in keeping their own at Brest. The Channel Fleet was decisively
superior to the latter, and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers
only.
No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left it in
February, 1780, the question of supplying the fortress became press-
ing. For this purpose, twenty-eight ships of the line, under Vice-
Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen's on the 13th of March,
1781, with a large convoy. Off Cork a number of victuallers joined,
1781.] RELIEF SENT TO GIBRALTAR. 508
and tlie whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompanied by
five ships of the line which were destined for the East Indies, as well
as by the West India and American "trade." These scA'eral attach-
ments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th of April
the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel. No attempt to intercept
it was made by the great Spanish fleet in Cadiz ; and on the 12th of
April, at noon, the convoy anchored in the Bay of Gibraltar. That
night thirteen sail of transports, under the charge of two frigates,
slipped out and made their way to Minorca. The ships of war
remained under way, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar.
As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous can-
nonade, which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the
stores. More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially
built for this siege, the peculiar fighting power of whicli lay in one
26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the bat-
teries of ships of the line. Being moved by oars as well as by sails,
these little vessels could choose their own distance in light airs and
calms, and were used so actively to harass the transports at anchor
that Darby was obliged to cover them with three ships of the line.
These proved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats ; but, while
the latter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not
hinder the unloading nor even greatly delay it. The experience
illustrates again the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by
petty means, or that massed force, force concentrated, can Ije effect-
ually counteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by
the co-operative exertions of many small independent units. " They
were only capable of producing trouble and vexation. So far were
they from preventing the succours from being thrown into the gar-
rison, or from burning the convoy, that the only damage of any
consequence that they did to the shipping was the wounding of the
mizen-mast of the Nonsuch so much that it required to be shifted."^
On the 19th of April — in one week — •the revictualling was com-
pleted, and the expedition started back for England. The fleet
anchored at Spithead on the 22nd of May.
While Darby was returning. La Motte Picquet had gone to sea
from Brest with six ships of the line and some frigates to cruise in
the approaches to the Channel. There, on the 2nd of May, he fell
in with the convoy returning from the West Indies with the spoils of
St. Eustatius. The ships of war for the most part escaped, but La
1 Beatson : ' Military and Naval Memoirs,' v. 347.
504 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
Motte Picquet carried twenty-two out of thirty merchant ships into
Brest before he coukl be intercepted, although a detachment of eight
sail sent by Darby got close upon his heels.
After a long refit, Darby put to sea again, about the 1st of
August, to cover the approach of the large convoys then expected to
arrive. Being greatly delayed by head winds, he had got no further
than the Lizard, Avhen new^s was brought him that the Franco-Spanish
grand fleet, of forty-nine ships of the line, was cruising near the
Scilly Isles. Having himself but thirty of the line, he put into
Torbay on the 24th of August, and moored his squadron across the
entrance to the Bay.
This appearance of the allies was a surprise to the British authori-
ties, who saw thus unexpectedly renewed the invasion of the Channel
made in 1779. Spain, mortified justly by her failure even to molest
the intrusion of succours into Gibraltar, had thought to retrieve her
honour b}' an attack upon Minorca, for Avhich she asked the co-opera-
tion of France. De Guichen was sent in Jul}- witli nineteen ships of
the line ; and the combined fleets, under the chief command of the
Spanish admiral Don Luis de Cordova, convoyed the troops into the
jMediterranean beyond the reach of Gibraltar cruisers. Keturning
thence into the Atlantic, de Cordova directed his course for the
Channel, keeping far out to sea to conceal his movements. But
though thus successful in reaching his ground unheralded, he made
no attempt to profit by the advantage gained. The question of
attacking Darby at his anchors was discussed in a council of war, at
which de Guichen strongly advocated the measure ; but a majority of
votes decided that Great Britain would be less hurt by ruining her
fleet than by intercepting the expected convoys. Even for the lat-
ter purpose, however, de Cordova could not wait. On the 5th of
September he informed de Guichen that he was at liberty to return
to Brest; and he himself went back to Cadiz with thirty-nine ships,
nine of which were French. "This cruise of the combined fleet,"
says Chevalier, "diminished the consideration of France and Spain.
These two powers had made a great display of force, without produc-
ing the slightest result." It may be mentioned here that Minorca,
after a six months' siege, capitulated in February, 1782.
While Darby was beating down Channel in the early days of
August, Vice-Adrairal Hyde Parker (1), lately Rodney's second in
command in the West Indies, was returning from the Baltic to Eng-
land convoying a large merchant fleet. On the 5th of August, at
1781.]
HYDE PARKER AND THE DUTCH FLEET.
505
daylight, a Dutch squadron, also with a convoy, was discovered in
the south-west, near the Doggersbank. Heading as the two enemies
then were, their courses must shortly intersect. Parker, therefore,
ordered his convoy to steer to the westward for England, while he
himself bore down for the enemy. The Dutch Rear- Admiral, Johan
Arnold Zoutman, on the contrary, kept the merchant vessels with
him, under his lee, but drew out the ships of war from among them,
to form his order on the side towards the enemy. Each opponent
put seven sail into the line.^ The British vessels, besides being of
such different rates, were chiefly very old ships, ^ dragged out from
Rotten Row to meet the pressing emergency caused by the greatly
superior forces which were in coalition against Great Britain.
Owing to the decayed condition of some of them, their batteries
1 Fleets engaged in tlie action off the Doggersbank, August 5th, 1781.
BRITISH.
DUTCH.
smps.
i
s
C3
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
COMMANDERS.
In the Line : —
Berwick ....
74
Capt. John Fergusson.
Erfprins ....
54
Capt. A. Braak.
Dolphin ....
U
Capt. William Blair.
Admiraal Generaal
74
Capt. van Kinsbergen.
Buffalo ....
60
Capt. William Truscott.
Argo
40
Capt. A. C. Staering.
71
} V.-Adm. Hyde Parker (1)
Batavier ....
54
Capt. W. J. Bentinck.
Princess Amelia .
80
\ Capt. George Robertson.
Capt. John Macartney.*
Admiraal de Ruijter
G8
( Rear-Adm. Zoutman.
1 Capt. Staringh.
Preston ....
50
Capt. Alexander Graeme.
Admiraal Piet Heijn
54
Capt. W. van Braam.
Bienfaisanl . .
G4
Capt. Richard Brathwaite.
Holland ....
C8
Capt. S. Dedel.
Frigates with the
Fleet : —
Surprise (cutter).
14
Lieut. P. Rivett.
Bellona ....
36
Capt. Haringcarspel Decker.
Cleopatra . . .
32
Capt. George Murray.
Dolphijn ....
24
Capt. Mulder.
Latona ....
.38
Capt. Sir Hyde Parker (2).
Ajax (cutter) . .
20
Capt. Grave van Welderen.
Belle Poule . .
3G
Capt. Philip Patton.
E ensgezindheit . .
36
Capt. Bouritius.
Artois ....
40
Capt. John Macbride.
Zephijr
Amphitrite . . .
36 Capt. Wiertz.
36 Capt. van Woensel.
With the Convoy : —
Jphigenia . . .
32|Cai)t. Charles Hope.
Medemhlik . . .
36 Capt. van Rijneveld.
Tartar ....
28 Capt. Robert Sutton.
Venus
24 Capt. Grave van Regteren.
Cabot ....
14 Com. Henry Cromwell.
Spion ....
10 Com. Stutzer.
Alert
14 1 Com. James Vashou.
Zwaluw ....
10 Com. Buteer.
Leith (armed ship).
20 Com. Peter Rothe.
Busy (cutter) . .
14 Lieut. William Furuivall.
Spriijhtly (cutter)
14 Lieut. J. 15. Swan.
* Killed.
The vessels in the two lines are given above in the respective orders of battle.
The British list is founded on one in Beatson, vi. 315, compared with the 'Navy
Lists' of 1781, the dispatches, etc. The Dutch list is founded on a ]\IS. of Capt.
Count van Bylandt, compared with the dispatches, and with the plan and particulars
in De Jonge, iv. 508-561. The gun-power of each ship is taken from official papers,
British and Dutch. — W. L. C.
2 The Bienfaisant had been captured in 1758, and the Buffalo in 1748; and the
Princess Amelia and Preston were both built in 1757.
506 MAJOR OFERATIOXS. 1762-17S3. [1781.
had been lightened, to the detriment of their fighting power. The
two sevent}'-fours, however, were good and new ships. The Dolphin
also was new. It is probable that tlie Dutch vessels, after a long
peace, were not much better than their antagonists. In fact, each
squadron was a scratch lot, in the worst sense of the phrase. The
conduct of the affair by the two admirals, even to the very intensity
of their pugnaciousness, contributes a tinge of the comic to the
history of a desperately fought action.
The breeze was fresh at north-east, and the sea smooth. The
Dutch, being to leeward, awaited attack, forming line on the port
tack, heading south-east by east, a point off the wind, under topsails
and foresails, a cable's length apart. There is little room to doubt
that an adversary who thus holds his ground means to make a
stand-up fight, but Parker, although the sun of a midsummer day
had scarcely risen, thought advisable to order a general chase. Of
course, no ship spared her canvas to this, while the worse sailers had
to set their studdingsails to keep up; and the handling of the sails
took the men off from the preparations for battle. Parker, who doubt-
less was still sore over Rodney's censure of the year before, and who
moreover had incurred the Admiralty's rebuke, for apparent hesita-
tion to attack the enemy's islands while temporarily in command in
the West Indies, was determined now to show the fight that was in
him. " It is related that, upon being informed of the force of the
Dutch squadron in the morning, he replied (pulling up his breeches),
' It matters little what their force is ; we must fight them if they are
double the number.'" At 6.10 a.m. the signal was made for line
abreast, the ships running down nearly jjefore the wind. This of
course introduced more regularity, the leading ships taking in their
lighter sails to permit the others to reach their, places; but the pace
still was rapid. At 6.45 the order was closed to one cable, and at
7.56 the sisrnal for battle was hoisted. It is said that at that moment
the 80-gun ship was still securing a studdingsail-boom, which indi-
cates how closely action trod on the heels of preparation.
The Dutch admiral was as deliberate as Parker was headlong.
An English witness writes : —
" They appeared to be in gi-eat order; and their hammocks, quarter-cloths, etc.,
were spread in as nice order as if for show in harbour. Their marines also were
well drawn up, and stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity
and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be remembered by every man
in our line ; for, as if certain of what happened, we came down almost end-on upon
their broadsides; yet did not the Dutch admiral fire a gun, or make the signal to
1781.] HYDE PARKER AND THE DUTCH FLEET. bOl
engage, till the red flag was at the Fortitude's masthead, and her shot finding their
way into his ship. This was a manoeuvre which Admiral Zutman should not be
warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses ; as he had it in his i^ower to have
done infinite mischief to our fleet, coming down in that unofficer-like manner.
Having suffered Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly waited
till the signal was hoisted on board the Fortitude, and at the same time we saw the
signal going up on board Admiral Zutman's ship."
The British, thus unmolested, rounded-to just to windward of
the enemy. A pilot who was on board their leading ship was for
some reason told to assist in laying her close to her opponent. " By
close," he asked, "do you mean about a ship's breadth?" "Not a
gun was fired on either side," says the official British report, "until
within the distance of half musket-shot." Parker, whom an on-looker
describes as full of life and spirits, here made a mistake, of a routine
character, which somewhat dislocated his order. It was a matter of
tradition for flagship to seek flagship, just as it was to signal a
general chase, and to bear down together, each ship for its opposite,
well extended with the enemy. Now Parker, as was usual, was in
the centre of his line, the fourth ship ; but Zoutman was for some
reason in the fifth. Parker therefore placed his fourth by the enemy's
fifth. In consequence, the rear British ship overlapped the enemy,
and for a time had no opponent; while the second and third found
themselves engaged with three of the Dutch. At 8 a.m. the signal
for the line was hauled down, and that for close action hoisted, — thus
avoiding a mistake often made.
All the vessels were soon satisfactorily and hotly at work, and the
action continued with varying phases till 11.35 a.m. The leading-
two ships in both orders got well to leeward of the lines, and the
British vessels had to tack to regain their places to windward.
Towards the middle of the engagement the Dutch convoy bore away
for the Texel, as the British had steered for England before it began ;
the difference being that the voyage was abandoned by one, and com-
pleted by the other. At eleven o'clock Parker made sail, and passed
with the flagship between the enemy and the Buffalo, his next ahead
and third in the British order; the three rear ships following close in
his wake, in obedience to the signal for line ahead, which had been
rehoisted at 10.43.^ A heavy cannonade attended this evolution, the
^ Sir John Ross, in his ' Life of Saumarez,' who was a lieutenant in the flagship,
says that the flagship only passed ahead of the Buffalo, and that the rear ships closed
upon the latter. The version in the text rests upon the detailed and circumstantial
statement of another lieutenant of the sc[uadron, in Ekins's ' Naval Battles.' As Ekins
508 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781
Dutch fighting gloriously to the last. When it was completed, the
British fleet wore and the action ceased. " I made an effort to form
the line, in order to renew the action," wrote Parker in his report,
"but found it imp)racticable. The enemy appeared to be in as bad a
condition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each
other, when the Dutch, Avith their convoy, bore away for the Texel.
We were not in a condition to follow them."
This was a most satisfactory exhibition of valour, and a most
unsatisfactor}^ battle; magnificent, but not war. Except as regards
the sailings of the convoys, the status quo remained much as before,
although one of the Dutch ships sank next day; yet the British loss,
104 killed and 339 wounded, was nearly as great as in Keppel's
action, where thirty ships fought on each side, or in Rodney's of
April 17th, 1780, where the British had twenty sail; greater than AA'ith
Graves off the Chesapeake, and, in proportion, full}^ equal to the
sanguinar}^ conflicts between Suffren and Hughes in the East Indies.
The Dutch loss is reported as 142 killed, 403 wounded. Both sides
aimed at the hull, as is shown by the injuries ; for though much harm
was done aloft, few spars were wholly shot away. The Buffalo^ a
small ship, had 39 shot through and through her, and a very great
number pierced between wind and water; in the British van ship as
many as 14, another proof that the Dutch fired low.
With the rudimentary notions of manoeuvring evinced, it is not
surprising that Parker was found an unsatisfactory second by an
enlightened tactician like Rodney. The Vice-Admiral, however,
laid his unsuccess to the indifferent quality of his ships. George III.
visited the squadron after the action, but Parker was not open to
compliments. "I wish your Majesty better ships and younger
officers," he said. "For myself, I am now too old for service." No
rewards were given, and it is asserted that Parker made no secret
that none would be accepted, if offered, at the hands of the then
Admiralty. He voiced the protest of the Navy and the nation against
the mal-administration of the peace days, which had left the country
unprepared for war. The gallant veteran was ordered soon after-
wards to command in the East Indies. He sailed for his station in
the Cato^ and was never heard of again.
Tliough unfruitful in substantial results, Parker's action merits
commemoration, for, after all, even where skill does its utmost,
also was present as a midshipman, this gives, as it were, the contirmatiou of two
witnesses.
1781.] -
KEMPENFELT AND DE GUICHEN.
509
staunchness such as his shows the sound constitution of a military
body.
The year 1781 closed with an incident more decisive in character
than most of the events that occurred in European waters during its
course ; one also which transfers the interest, by natural transition,
again to the West Indies. The French government had felt through-
out the summer the necessity of sending de Grasse reinforcements
both of ships and of supplies, but the transports and material of war
needed could not be collected until December. As the British prob-
ably would attempt to intercept a convoy upon which the next cam-
paign so much depended, Rear-Admiral de Guichen was ordered to
accompany it clear of the Bay of Biscay, with twelve ships of the
line, and then to go to Cadiz. Five ships of the line destined to de
Grasse, and two going to the East Indies, raised to nineteen the total
force with which de Guichen left Brest on the lOtli of December. On
the afternoon of the 12th, the French being then one hundred and
fifty miles to the southward and westward of Ushant, with a south-
east wind, the weather, which had been thick and squallj', suddenly
cleared and showed sails to windward. These were twelve ships of
the line, one 50, and some frigates, ^ under Rear-Admiral Richard
Kempenfelt (B), who had left England on the 2nd of the month, to
cruise in wait for this expedition. The French numbers should have
been amply sufficient to frustrate any attack, but de Guichen, ordi-
narily a careful officer, had allowed his fleet to be to leeward and
ahead of the convoy. The latter scattered in every direction, as the
British swooped down upon it, but all could not escape; and the
French ships of war remained helpless spectators, while the victims
were hauling down their flags right and left. Night coming on,
1 Fleet under Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, December, 1781. From Beat-
son, vi. 317, checked by Steel's 'Navy List' of Dec. 31st, 1781. — W. L. C.
SHIPS.
o
100
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
CO
COMMAXDERS.
Victory .
( Rear-Adm. Richard Kempenfelt (B).
Courageuz .
74
Capt. Hon. Chas. Phipps(Actg.).
\ Capt. Henry CromweU.
Agamemnon .
G4
Capt. Benjamin Caldwell.
Edgar . .
74
( Commod. John Elliot.
( Capt. Thomas Boston.
Medway . .
GO
Capt. Harry Harmood.
Rcnoicn . .
50
Capt. John Henry.
Britannia
100
Capt. James Bradby (1).
Duke . .
98
Capt. Sir Walter Stirling, Kt.
Frigates, etc.
Queen . .
98
Capt. Hon. Fredk. Lewis Maitland.
Arethiisa . .
38
Capt. Sir Richard Pearson, Kt.
Union . .
90
Capt. John Dalrymple.
3Ionsieur . .
36
Capt. Hon. Sejinour Finch.
Ocean . .
90
Capt. George Ourry.
Prudente . .
3G
Capt. Hon. William Waldegrave.
Alexander
74
Com. Thomas Farnham (Actg.).
Tartar . . .
28
Capt. Robert Manners Sutton.
Valiant .
74
Capt. Samuel Granston Goodall.
Tisiphone (f . s.)
8
Com. James Saumarez.
510 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783. [1782.
some prizes could not be secured, but Kempenfelt carried off fifteen,
laden witli military and naval stores of great money value and greater
military importance. A few days later a violent storm dispersed and
shattered the remainder of the French body. Two ships of the line
onl}-, the Triomphant, 84, and Brave, 74, and five transports, could
pursue their way to the West Indies. The rest went back to Brest.
Kempenfelt, before returning to England, sent off express to
Hood in the West Indies the fireship Tisiplione, 8, Commander James
Saumarez,^ — afterwards the distinguished admiral, — with news of the
French approach. Saumarez, having been first to Barbados, joined
Hood on the 31st of January, 1782, in Basse Terre Roads, on the lee
side of St. Kitts. The campaign for the year 1782 had opened
already with an attack upon that inland by the French army and
navy; and the enemy's fleet was even then cruising close at hand to
leeward, between St. Kitts and Nevis.
The original intention of de Grasse and de Bouilld had been to
capture Barbados, the most important of the Eastern Antilles still
remaining to the British ; but the heavj' trade-winds, which in those
days made a winter passage to windward so long and dreary a beat,
twice drove him back to port. "The whole French fleet," wrote
Hood, " appeared off St. Lucia on the 17th of last month, endeavour-
ing to get to windward, and having carried away many topmasts and
yards in struggling against very squally weather, returned to Fort
Royal Bay on the 23rd, and on the 28th came out again with forty
transports, manoeuvring as before." On the 2nd of January it dis-
appeared from St. Lucia, and, after a short stay at Martinique, pro-
ceeded on the 5th to St. Kitts, anchoring in Basse Terre Roads on
the 11th. The British garrison retired to Brimstone Hill, a forti-
fied position at the north-west of the island, while the inhabitants
surrendered the government to the French, pledging themselves to
neutrality. The adjacent island of Nevis capitulated on the same
terms on the 20th.
On the 14th of the month an express sent by General Shirley,
governor of St. Kitts, informed Hood that a great fleet approaching
had been seen from the heights of Nevis on the 10th. The Rear-
^ Jaines Saumarez, Lord de Saumarez, G. C. B. Born, 1757. Commander, 1781.
Captain, 1782. Captain of Russell in Rodney's action, 1782. Knighted for capture
of frigate Reunion, 1793. Captain of Oi-ion in Bridport's action, at St. Vincent, and
at the Nile (when he was second in command). Rear- Admiral and Baronet, 1801.
Defeated French and Spaniards oflf Algeciras, July 12th, 1801. Vice-Admiral, 1805.
Vice-Admiral of England and a peer, 1831. Died, 1836.
1782.] HOOD AND DE GRASSE AT ST. KITTS. 511
Admiral at once put to sea, though short of bread and flour, which
could not be had, and with the material of his ships in wretched
condition. " When the President joins," he wrote the Admiralty, "I
shall be twenty-two strong, with which I beg you will assure their
Lordships I will seek and give battle to the Count de Grasse, be his
numbers as they may." On the 16th a ship reached him with word
that the French fleet had invested St. Kitts. On the 21st Hood
anchored at Antigua for repairs and supplies, indispensable for keep-
ing the sea in the operations which he contemplated, the duration of
which could not be foreseen. About a thousand troops also were
embarked, which, with the Marines that could be spared from the
squadron, would give a landing force of 2,400 men.
St. Kitts being less than fifty miles from Antigua, Hood doubt-
less now got accurate information of the enemy's dispositions, and
could form a definite, well-matured plan. This seems to have been
carefully imparted to all his captains, as was the j)ractice of Nelson,
who was the pupil of Hood, if of any one. "At 9.15 a.m. the Ad-
miral made the signal for all flag-officers," says the log of the
Canada; "and at 4 p.m. the Admirals and Commodore made the sig-
nals for all captains of their divisions." At 5 p.m. of the same day,
January 23rd, the fleet weighed and stood over for Nevis, round the
southern point of which Basse Terre must be approached; for, the
channel between the two islands being impracticable for ships of
the line, they virtually were one, and, their common axis lying
north-west and south-east, the trade-wind is fair only when coming
from the south.
Basse Terre, where de Grasse then was, is about fifteen miles from
the south point of Nevis. The roadstead lies east and west, and the
French fleet, then twenty-four of the line and two fifties, were
anchored without attention to order, three or four deep, the eastern
ships so placed that an enemy coming from the southward could
reach them with the prevailing wind, against which the western ships
could not beat up quickly to their support. This being so, we are
told that Hood, starting shortly before sunset with a fair, and prob-
ably fresh wind, from a point only sixty miles distant, hoped to come
upon the French by surprise at early daybreak, to attack the weather
ships, and from them to pass along the line so far as might seem
expedient. His column, thus passing in its entirety by a certain
exposed fraction of the enemy, the latter would be cut up in detail by
the concentration upon it. The British then, wearing to the south-
512 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
ward, would haul their wind, tack, and again stand up to the assault,
if the enemy continued to await it.
This reasonable expectation, and skilful conception, was thwarted
by a collision, during the night, between a frigate, the Nym'plu., 36,
and the leading ship of the line, the Alfred^ 74. The repairs to the
latter delayed the fleet, the approach of which was discovered by
daylight. De Grasse therefore put to sea. He imagined Hood's
purpose was to throw succours into Brimstone Hill; and moreover
the position of the enemy now was between him and the four ships
of the line momentarily expected from Martinique, one of which
joined him on the same day. The French were all under way by
sunset, standing to the southward under easy sail, towards the British,
who had rounded the south point of Nevis at 1 p.m. Towards dark,
Hood went about and stood also to the southward, seemingly in
retreat.
During the following night the British tacked several times, to
keep their position to windward. At daylight of January 25th, the
two fleets were to the westward of Nevis ; the British near the island,
the French abreast, but several miles to leeward. Foiled in his first
spring by an unexpected accident. Hood had not relinquished his
enterprise, and now proposed to seize the anchorage quitted by the
French, so establishing himself there, — as he had proposed to Graves
to do in the Chesapeake, — that he could not be dislodged. For such
a defensive position St. Kitts offered special advantages. The
anchorage was on a narrow ledge, dropping precipitately to very deep
water; and it was possible so to place the ships that the enemy could
not easily anchor near them.
At 5.30 A.M. of the 25th Hood made the signal to form line of
battle 1 on the starboard tack, at one cable interval.^ It is mentioned
in the log of the Canada^ 74, Captain the Hon. William Cornwallis,
that that ship brought-to in her station, fourth from the rear, at 7
o'clock. By 10 o'clock the line was formed, and the ships hove-to
in it. At 10.45 the signal was made to fill [to go ahead], the van
ships to carry the same sail as the Admiral, — topsails and foresails,
— followed, just before noon, by the order to prepare to anchor, with
springs on the cables. The French, who were steering south, on the
^ See note on opposite page.
2 The times and general movements are put together from Hood's Journal and
the Log of the Canada, published by the Navy Records Society. ' Letters of Lord
Hood,' pp. 6-4, 86.
17«2.]
HOOD AND DE GRASS E AT ST. KITTS.
51S
port tack, while the British were hove-to, went about as soon as the
latter filled, and stood towards them in bow and quarter line.
At noon the British fleet was running along close under the high
land of Nevis ; so close that the Solebcij/, 28, Captain Charles Holmes
Everitt, one of the frigates inshore of the line, grounded and was-
wrecked. No signals were needed, except to correct irregularities in
the order, for the captains knew what they were to do. The French
were approaching steadily, but inevitably dropping astern with refer-
ence to the point of the enemy's line for which they were heading.
At 2 P.M. de Grasse's flagship, the Villc dc Paris, fired several shot
at the British rear, which alone she could reach, while his left wing
was nearing the Ba7'Jleur, Hood's flagship, and tlie vessels astern of
her, which opened their fire at 2.30. Hood, trusting to his captains,
disregarded this threat to the rear half of his force. Signals flew for
the van to crowd sail and take its anchorage, and at 3.30 p.m. the
leading ships began to anchor in line ahead, covered as they did so
by the broadsides of the rear and the rear centre. Upon the latter
the French were now keeping up a smart fire. Between the Canada
and her next astern, the Prudent, 64, — which was a dull sailer, —
there was a considerable interval. Towards it tlie French admiral
pressed, aiming to cut oft' the three rear vessels; but Cornwallis threw
Note. — List of the fleet under Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, Bart., on Jan. 25th,
1782. (Intended line of battle as the fleet stood in. It was slightly modified by
accidental circumstances ; and on the 26th the ships were anchored in the order indi-
cated by the numl)ors ]ircfixed to them, the Bedford being nearest to Basse Terre.)
SHIPS.
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
74
COMMANDERS.
4. St. Albans .
6~1
Capt. Charles Inglis.
22. Alfred . .
Capt. William Bayne.
5. Alcide . . .
74
Capt. Charles Thompson.
Perjasus, 2S
Capt. John Stanhope.
1. Intrepid .
G4
Capt. Anthony Jas. Pye MoUoy.
Forlunee, 40
Capt. Hugh Cloberry Christian.
8. T(ir1)aij . .
74
Capt. Jolin Lewis Gidoin.
Lizard, 28
Capt. Edmund Dod.
r Rear-Admiral Francis Samuel
Champion, 24
Capt. Thomas West.
y. Princesn . .
70
\ Drake (B).
Convert, 32
Capt. Henry Harvey.
VCapt. Charles KnatchbuU.
Triton, 28 .
Capt. John M'Laurin.
10. Prince George
98
Capt. James Williams.
2. Russell . .
74
Capt. Hon. Henry Edwyn Stan-
11. Ajnx . . .
74
Capt. Nicholas Charrington.
hope.
Eiirydice, '2A
Capt. George Wilson.
19. Resolution .
74 Capt. Lord Robert Manners.
12. Prince William
13. Shrewsbury .
64
74
Capt. George Wilkinson.
Capt. John Knight.
1. Bedford . .
-^ ( Commod. Edmund Affleck.
1 Capt. Thomas Graves (3).
14. In vincible
74
Capt. Cliarles Sa.xton.
21. Canada . .
74 Capt. Hon. William Cornwallis.
rRear-Adm. Sir Samuel Hood,
\ Bart. (R).
VCapt. Alexander Hood.
20. Prudent . .
•'"I ("apt. Andrew Barkley.
V>. Barjleur . .
98
3. Blontarpi .
'i^-liCapt. George Bowen (1).
G. America . .
04
Capt. Samuel Thompson.
10. 3fonarch . .
74
Capt. Francis Reynolds.
Sibyl, 28 .
Capt. John Rodney ('?).
18. Bdliquenx .
G4
Capt. Lord Cranstoun.
Solebny, 28
Capt. Charles Holmes Everitt.
17. Centaur . .
74
Capt. John Nicholson Inglefield.
From a list in Schomberg, iv. 396, as corrected in MS. by IKiuy Wise Harvey ;
checked by Steel's 'Navy List' of Dec. 3fst, 1781, and .March 31st, 1782, and com-
pared with dispatches, etc. — W. L. C.
VOL. III. — 33
514
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1782.
everything aback and closed down npon his consort, — a stirring
deed in which he was imitated by the Resolution and Bedford., 74's,
immediately ahead of him. De Grasse was thns foiled, but so nar-
rowly, that an officer, looking from one of the ships which had
anchored, asserted that for a moment he could perceive the Ville de
Faris^s jib inside the British line. As the rear of the latter pushed
on to its place, it cleared the broadsides of the now anchored van and
centre, and these opened upon the enemy, a great part of whom were
T
■"-..
'-%>,
"^v--.
w ((Q)(j)) ^
^3
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Hood and de Crasse
2S^*' U^fw""" /78E.
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Hood axd de grasse.
strung out behind the British colunni, without opponents as yet, but
hastening up to get their share of the action. The Barfieur^ which
anchored at 4.03, opened fire again at 4.40 p.m. Thus, as the
Canada and her few companions, who loore the brunt of the day,
Avere shortening sail and rounding-to, still under a hot camionade,
the batteries of their predecessors were ringing out their welcome,
and at the same time covering their movements by giving the enemy
much else to tliink about. Tlie Canada.,^ fetching up near the tail
of the colunni, and letting go in a hurry, ran out two cables on end,
1782.]
HOOB AND DE GRASSE AT ST. KITTS.
515
and found upon sounding that she had dropped her anchor in a hun-
dred and fifty fathoms of water. The French column stood on, off
soundings, thougli close to, firing as it passed, and then, wearing to
the southward in succession, stood out of action on the port tack, its
ineffectual broadsides adding to the grandeur and excitement of the
scene, and swelling the glory of Hood's successful daring, of which
it is difficult to speak too highly. The captain of the Resolution,
Lord Robert Manners, writing a week later, passed upon this achieve-
-&•« .
''^«-^'-
HoOD AND DE CrASSE
25 "^"^y^^^""^ /P'62.
F. c.ll.
MOOD AND DE GKASSE.
ment a verdict, which posterity will confirm. " The taking posses-
sion of this road was well judged, well conducted, and well executed,
tliough indeed the French had an opportunity — which they missed
— of bringing our rear to a very severe account. The van and centre
divisions brought to an anchor under the fire of the rear, which was
engaged with the enemy's centre (Fig. 1); and then the centre, being
at an anchor and properly placed, covered us while we anchored
(Fig. 2), making, I think, the most masterly manoeuvre I ever saw."
Whether regard be had to the thoughtful preparation, the craft}'
516 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
management of the fleet antecedent to the final push, the calculated
audacity of tlie latter, or the firm and sagacious tactical liandling
from the first moment to the last. Nelson himself never did a more
brilliant deed than this of Hood's.^ All firing ceased at 5.30.
Naturally, aia order taken up under such conditions needed some
rectifying before further battle. As the proper stationing of the fleet
depended in great measure upon the position of the van ship, Hood
had put a local pilot, on board her; but when the action ceased, he
found that she was not as close to the shore as he had intended.
The rear, on the other hand, was naturally in the most disorder, owing
to the circumstances attending its anchorage. Three ships from the
rear were consequently directed to place themselves ahead of the van,
closing the interval, while others shifted their berths, according to
specific directions. The order as finally assumed was as follows.
The van ship was anchored so close to the shore that it was impossible
to pass within her, or, with the prevailing wind, even to reach her,
because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position.
From her the line extended in a west-north-west direction to the
fifteenth ship, — the Barjlcui\ 98, Hood's flagship, — when it turned
to north, the last six ships being on a north and south line. These
six, with their broadsides turned to the westward, prevented a
column passing from south to north, the only way one could pass,
from enfilading the main line with impunity. The latter covered
witli its guns the approach from the south.
At daj'light on the following morning, January 26th, the ships
l)egan changing their places, the French being then seven or eight
miles distant in the south-south-east. At 7 a.m. they were seen to
be approaching in line of battle, under a press of sail, heading for
the British A^an. Tlie Canada, which had begun at 5 a.im. to tackle
her 200-odd fathoms of cable, was obliged to cut, whereby " we lost
the small bower anchor and two cables with one 8-inch and one 9-inch
hawsers, which were bent for springs." The ship had to work to
windward to close with the fleet, and was therefore ordered by the
Rear-Admiral to keep engaging under way, until 10.50, when a mes-
sage was sent lier to anchor iu support of the rear. The action
began between 8.30 and 9 a.m., the leading Fiench ship heading for
the British van, seemingly with the view of passing round and inside
it. Against this attempt Hood's precautions probal)ly were suffi-
^ lUustrations of other phases of this battle can be found in ]\Iahau's 'Influence
of Sea Power upon History,' pp. 470, 472,
1782.]
ROOD'S ORDER OF BATTLE.
517
cient; but as the enemy's vessel approached, the wind headed her, so
that she could only fetch the third ship. The latter, with the vessels
ahead and astern, sprung their batteries upon her. " The crash occa-
sioned by their destructive broadsides was so tremendous on board
her that whole j)ieces of plank were seen flying from her off side,
ere she could escape the cool concentrated fire of her determined
adversaries. "1 She put her helm up, and ran along outside the
British line, receiving the first fire of each successive ship. Her
■
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Hood's Order of Battue,
\^
ivr /t/</cnoff /IT 5^ K 1 TT S
26 ^^ v^/^ " *-- /^ T" />4r. '':/782.
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— 1
noon S OIIDEU OF BATTLE. AT ANCHOR AT ST. KITT.S.
movement was imitated by her followers, some keeping off sooner,
some later; but de Grasse in his flagship not only came close, but
pointed his after yards to the wind,'^ to move the slower. As he
ported his helm when leaving the BarJlevA\ this brought these sails
aback, keeping him a still longer time before the British ships thrown
to the rear. "In this he was supported by those ships which were
astern, or immediately ahead of him. During this short but tre-
1 White : ' Naval Researches.'
, 2 Sharp up by the starboard braces, the wind being on the starboard quarter.
518 MAJOR OFEBJTIOyS. 17G2-17S:3. [1782.
mendous conflict in that part of the fiehl of battle, nothing whatever
could be seen of them for upwards of twenty minutes, save de
Grasse's white flag at the main-topgallant masthead of the Ville de
Paris, gracefully floating above the immense volumes of smoke that
enveloped them, or the pennants of those ships which were occa-
sionally percei)tible, when an increase of breeze would waft away the
smoke." ^
Though most gallantly done, no such routine manoeuvre as this
could shake Hood's solidly assumed position. The attempt -was
repeated in the afternoon, but more feebly, and upon the centre and
rear only. This also was ineffectual; and Hood was left in triumph-
ant possession of the field. The losses in the several affairs of the
two days had been: British, 72 killed, 244 wounded; French, 107
killed, 207 wounded. Thenceforth the French fleet continued cruis-
ing to leeward of the island, approaching almost daily, frequently
threatening attack, and occasionally exchanging distant shots; Init
no serious encounter took place. Interest was centred on Brimstone
Kill, where alone on the island the British flag still flew. De Grasse
awaited its surrender, flattering himself that the British would lie
forced then to put to sea, and that his fleet, increased by successive
arrivals to thirty-two of the line, would then find an opportunity
to crush the man who had outwitted and out-manoeuvred him on
January 25th and 26th. In this hope he was deceived by his own
inaptness and his adversary's readiness. Hood was unable to succour
Brimstone Hill, for want of troops; the French having landed 6,000
men, against which the British 2,400 could effect nothing, either
alone or in co-operation with the garrison, which was but 1,200
strong. The work capitulated on the 13th of February. De Grasse,
who had neglected to keep his ships provisioned, went next day to
Nevis and anchored there to empty the storeships. That evening
Hood called his captains on board, explained his intentions, had them
set their watches by his, and at 11 p.m. the cables were cut one by
one, lights being left on the buoys, and the fleet silently decamped,
passing round the north end of St. Kitts, and so towards Antigua.
When De Grasse opened his eyes next morning, the British were
no longer to be seen. " Nothing could have been more fortunately
executed," Avrote Lord Kobert Manners, "as not one accident hap-
pened from it. Taking tlie whole in one light, though not successful
in the point we aimed at, nevertheless it was well conducted, and
^ White : ' Naval Kesearches.'
1782.] T)E GRASSE'S FLAN OF CONQUEST. 519
has given the enemy a pretty severe check ; and if you give him half
the credit the enemy does, Sir Samuel Hood will stand very high in
the public estimation."
Hood's intention had been to return to Barbados; but on the
25tli of February he was joined, to windward of Antigua, by Admiral
Sir George Rodney, who had arrived from England a week earlier,
bringing with him twelve ships of the line. The new Commander-in-
Chief endeavoured to cut off de Grasse from Martinique, but the
French fleet got in there on the 26th. Rodney consequently went to
St. Lucia, to refit Hood's ships, and to prepare for the coming cam-
paign, in wbich it was understood that the conquest of Jamaica was
to be the first object of the allies. An important condition to their
success was the arrival of a great convoy, known to be on its way
from Brest to repair the losses which Kempenfelt's raid and subse-
quent bad weather had inflicted in December. Hood suggested to
Rodney to halve the fleet, which then numbered thirty-six of the
line, letting one part cruise north of Dominica, between that island
and Deseada, while the other guarded the southern approach, between
Martinique and St. Lucia. Rodney, however, was unwilling to do
this, and adopted a half-measure, — Hood's division being stationed
to windward of the north end of jNIartinique, reaching only as far
north as the latitude of Dominica, while the centre and rear were
abreast of the centre and south of Martinique; all in mutual touch
by intermediate vessels. It would seem — reading between the lines
— that Hood tried to stretch his cruising ground northwards, in
pursuance of his own ideas, but Rodney recalled him. The French
convoy consequently passed north of Deseada, convoyed by two ships
of the line, and on the 20th of March reached Martinique safely.
De Grasse's force was thus raised to thirty-five of the line, including
two fifty-gun ships, as against the British thirty-six. At the end of
the month Rodney returned to St. Lucia, and there remained at
anchor, vigilantly watching the French fleet in Fort Royal b}' means
of a chain of frigates.
The problem now immediately confronting de Grasse — the first
step to the conquest of Jamaica — was extremely difiicult. It was to
convoy to Cap Francois the supply vessels essential to his enterprise,
besides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one
hundred and fifty unarmed ships to be protected by his thirty-five sail
of the line, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being
fair, he purposed to skirt the inner edge of the Caribbean Sea; by
520
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783.
rn82.
which means he woukl keep close to a succession of friendly ports,
wherein the convoy might find refuge in case of need.
"With this plan the French armament put to sea on the 8th of
April, 1782. The fact being reported promptly to Rodney, by noon
his whole fleet ^ was clear of its anchorage and in pursuit. Then was
evident the vital importance of Barrington's conquest of St. Lucia;
for, had the British been at Barbados, the most probable alternative,
the Frencli movement not only would have been longer unknown,
but pursuit would have started from a hundred miles distant, instead
of thirty. If the British had met this disadvantage by cruising before
Martinique, they would have encountered the difficulty of keeping
their ships supplied \\ith water and other necessaries, which St. Lucia
afforded. In truth, without in any degree minimising the faults of
the loser, or the merits of the winner, in the exciting week that fol-
^ British fleet under Adiuinil Sir George Brj'dges Rodney, and line of buttle on
April 12th, 1782. From lists in Beatson, vi. 324, and Schoniberg (revised in MS.
of H. W. Harvey), iv. 399 ; compared with dispatches and with Steel's ' Navy Lists.'
— W. L. C.
SHIPS.
X
z
p
O
74
COMMANDERS.
Capt. Thomas Burnett.
SHIPS.
SO
COMMANDERS.
Royal Oak . . .
Resohition . . .
74 Capt. Lord Robert Manners, t
Alfred ....
'-t
Capt. Williaui B.iyiie.t
Protee ....
04^ Capt. Charles Buckner.
Montagu ....
74
Capt. George Bowen (1).
Hercules ....
74 Capt. Henry Savage.
Yarmouth . . .
64
Capt. Antliony i'aney.
America ....
G4
Capt. Samuel Thompson.
ValMnt ....
74
Capt. Samuel Graiiston Good-
Fortunee,* iO .
Capt.HughCloberry Christian.
all.
Endymion, 44 .
Capt. Edward Tyrrel Smith.
r Rear- Admiral Sir Samuel
- Hood, Bart. (B).
vCapt. John Knight.
Flora, 30 . . .
Capt. Samuel Marshall.
Barfleur ....
98
Convert* 32 . .
Capt. Henry Harvey.
Alarm, 32 . .
Capt. Charles Cotton.
Monarch ....
74
Capt. Franci.s Reynolds.
Andromache, 32
Capt. George Anson Byron.
Warrior ....
74
Capt. Sir James Wallace, Kt.
Sibyl, 28 . . .
Capt. John Rodney.
Belliqueux. . . .
(U
Capt. Andrew Sutherland.
Pegasus,* 28 . .
Capt. John Stanhope.
Centaur ....
74
Capt. John Nicholson Ingle-
field.
Alert, 14 . . .
Salamander*{f. s.),
Com. James Vashon.
Magnificent . . .
74
Capt. Robert Linzee.
8.
Com. Richard Lucas.
Prince Willi'im .
(;4
Capt. George Wilkinson.
Bussell ....
74
Capt. James Sanmarez.
Nymjihe," 3G .
Capt. John Ford.
Pnident* . . .
04
Capt. Andrew Barkley.
Lizard* 'if, . .
Capt. Kdniund Dod.
Fame
74|Capt. Robert Barbor.
Chanijjion, 24 .
Capt. Thomas West.
Anson
04, Capt. William Blair. §
Zebra* IG . .
Com. Jolni Bourehier.
Torbay ....
74 Capt. John Lewis Gidoin.
Bedford ....
74
( Comuiod. Ednuind Affleck.
Prince George . .
98; Capt. James Williams.
1 Capt. Thomas Graves (;>).
rRear-Adm. Francis Samuel
Drake (B).
VCapt. Charles Knatchbull.
AJajr
74
Capt. Nicholas Charrington.
Princesa ....
70
lie pulse ....
(U
Capt. Tliomas Dumaresq.
Canada ....
74
Capt. Hon. Wm. Cornwallis.
Conqueror . . .
74
Capt. George Balfour.
St. Albans . . .
04
Capt. Cli.arles Inglis.
Noyisuch ....
04 Capt. William Truscott.
Namur . . . .
90
Capt. Robert Fanshawe (1).
Alcide
74 Capt. Charles Thompson.
j Adm, Sir George Brydges
Arrogant . . .
74 Capt. Sam. Pitchford Cornish.
Formidable .
98
1 Rodney (W).
Marlborough . .
74 Capt. Taylor Penny.
^L Vr *■ V vl* V*f.'l' V • • •
Capt. Sir Cha.s. Douglas (1st)
Santa Monim,* 30
Capt. John Linzee.
Capt. John Symons ('Jnd).
Triton, 2». . .
Capt. John M'Lanrin.
Duke
98
Capt. Alan Gardner.
Eurydice, 24
Capt. George Wilson.
Agamemnon . .
i;4 <'apt. Benjiiiiiiii CiihlweU.
Germaine,* 10 .
Com. Geo. Augustus Keppel.
///'/.v/ (f. s.),*8 .
[Com. Jolin Aylnier.
* Those vessels were not in the actiou.
t Killed on April 9tli.
t Mortally wounded on Ai)ril 12th
§ Killed on April 12th.
1782.] FRENCH FLEET APPROACHES DOMINICA. 521
lowed, the opening situation may be said to have represented on either
side an accumulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment
of their occurrence may have seemed individually trivial. De Grasse
was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errors of his
predecessors and of himself. That the British had St. Lucia as their
outpost was due not only to Barrington's diligence, but also to
d'Estaing's slackness and professional timidity; and it may be ques-
tioned whether de Grasse himself had shown a proper understanding
of strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour of
Tobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly the
year before. That the convoy was there to embarrass his movements,
may not have been the fault of the French admiral; but it was
greatly and entirely his fault that, of the thirty-six ships pursuing
him, twenty-one represented a force that he could have crushed in
detail a few weeks before, — not to mention the similar failure of
April, 1781.
Large bodies of ships commonly will move less rapidly than small.
By 2.30 P.M. of the day of starting, Rodney's look-outs had sighted
the French fleet; and before sundown it could be seen from the
mastheads of the main body. At 6 next morning, the 9tli, the
enemy, both fleet and convoy, was visible from the deck of the Barjlcur^
the flagship of Hood's division, then in the van. The French bore
north-east, distant four to twelve miles, and extending from abreast
of the centre of Dominica northwards towards Guadeloupe. The
British therefore had gained much during the night, and were now
off Dominica, to leeward of the enemy's rear, which was becalmed
under the land (b). Some fourteen or fifteen of the French van,
having opened out the channel between Dominica and Guadeloupe,
felt afresh trade-wind, against which they were beating; and their
number was gradually increased as individual ships, utilising the
catspaws, stole clear of the high land of Dominica (b). Hood's
division in like manner, first among the British, got the breeze, and,
with eight ships, the commander of the van stood north in order of
battle. To the north-west of him were two French vessels, separated
from their consorts and threatened to be cut o£f(i). These stood
boldly down and crossed the head of Hood's column; one passing so
close to the leading ship, the Alfred, that the latter had to bear up
to let her pass. Rodney had hoisted a signal to engage at 6.38 a.m.,
but had hauled it down almost immediately, and Hood would not fire
without orders. These ships therefore rejoined the main body uu-
522
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1782.
luirmed. At 8.30 the French hoisted their colours, and shortly after-
wards their whole fleet tacked and stood south, opposite to Hood.
De Grasse now had recognised that he could not escape action, if
the convoy kept company. He therefore directed the two fifty-gun
ships. Experiment and Sa(jittaire, to accompau}- it into Guadeloupe,
where it arrived safely that day ; and he decided that the fleet should
ply to windward through the channel between Dominica and
Guadeloupe, nearly midway in which lies a group of small islands
C
.^
IP'C-/L£s S^//vr£j
C A /./) A/TC
^^ rv.
RODNEV AND DE CrASSE.
Position .\ . 9- -^5. AM.
i;hii.\i:y and de grasse.
called The Saintes, — a name at times given to the battle of April
12th. By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away
from the convoy, but also to throw off pursuit through his superior
speed, and so to accomplish his mission unharmed. The French
ships, larger, deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were
naturally better sailers, and it may be inferred that even coppering
had not entirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British.
At the very moment of Ijeginning his new polic}', however, a
subtle temptation assailed de Grasse irresistibly, in the exposed posi-
1782.]
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
523
tion of Hood's column; and lie met it, not by a frank and hearty
acceptance of a great opportunity, but by a half-measure. Hood
thoroughly crushed, the British fleet became hopelessly inferior to
the French ; Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior : pos-
sibly it would be deterred from further pursuit. De Grasse decided
for this second course, and ordered half his fleet to attack. This
operation was carried out under the orders of the Marquis de
Vaudreuil, the second in command. The ships engaged in it bore
BassG Terr-^
A-f /I f} / S.
R0DME.V ANO oc Grasse.
9 '" y^fKii. /732.
Po s I -r I o N 11. /2 A1
liODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
down from the windward, attacked Hood's rear ships, stood along on
the weather side of his column at long range, and, having passed
ahead, tacked in succession and formed again in the rear, whence
they repeated the same manoeuvre (Position I.). Thus a procession
of fifteen ships kept passing by eight, describing a continuous curve
of elliptical form. They were able to do this because Hood was
condemned to a low speed, lest he should draw too far away from the
British centre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica. The
French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunshot, because they
52-1
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3.
[178L
were deficient in carronades, of wiiich the British had many. These
guns, of short range but hirge calibre, were thus rendered useless.
Could they have come into play, the French rigging and sails would
have suffered severely. This first engagement lasted, by Hood's log,
from 0.48 to 10.25 a.m. It was resumed in stronger force at 14
minutes past noon, and continued till 1.45 p.m. (Position IL), Avhen
firing ceased iov that day; Rodney hauling down the signal for battle
MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF KODNEY's VICTOUY, APRIL 12T]I, 1752.
(From an original kindly lent by Capt. II. S. II. Prince Louis of Battenberg, It. y.)
at 2. Between the two affairs, which were identical in general
character. Hood's column was reinforced, and great part of the
British centre also got into action with some of the French main
body, though at long range only. "Except the two rear ships,"
wrote Rodney to Hood that night, " the others fired at such a distance
that I returned none."
The injuries to the British ships engaged were not such as to com-
pel them to leave the fleet. The Royal Ocik lost her main topmast,
and that of the Warrior fell two days later, not improbably from
wounds ; but in these was nothing that the ready hands of seamen
could not repair so as to continue the chase. Rodney therefore con-
tented himself with reversing the order, putting Hood in the rear,
whereby he was able to refit, and yet follow fast enough not to l)e out
of supporting distance. One of the French ships, the Caton^ G4, was
so injured that de Grasse detached her into Guadeloupe. It must be
remembered that a crippled ship in a chased fleet not only endjar-
rasses movement, but may compromise the whole body, if the latter
delay to protect it; whereas the chaser keeps between his lame birds
and the enemy.
Duihig till' night of the 9th the British lay-to for repairs. The
next morning they resumed the pursuit, turning to windward after
1782.] RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. 525
the enemy, but upon the whole losing throughout the 10th and the
11th. At daylight of the 10th the French, by the logs of Hood and
Cornwallis, were "from four to five leagues distant," "just in sight
from the deck." During that night, however, the Zele, 74, had
collided with the Jason, 64; and the latter was injured so far as to
be compelled to follow the Caton into Guadeloupe. At sunset of
that day Rodney signalled a general chase to windward, the effect of
which was to enable each ship to do her best according to her cap-
tain's judgment during the dark hours. Nevertheless, on the morn-
ing of the 11th the French seem again to have gained; for Hood,
who, it will be remembered, was now in the rear, notes that at
10 A.M. twenty-two French sail (not all the fleet) could be counted
from the masthead ; Cornwallis, further to windward, could count
thirty-three. Troude, a French authority, says that at that time
nearly all the French had doubled The Saintes, and it looked as
though de Grasse might succeed in throwing off his pjirsuer. Un-
luckil}^ two ships, the Magnanime, 74, and the Zclc, 74, the latter
of which had lost her main topmast, were several miles to leeward
of the French main body. It was necessary to delay, or to drop
those vessels. Again, trivial circumstances conspired to further a
great disaster, and de Grasse bore down to cover the crippled ships ;
losing so much of his hard-won ground, and entailing a further mis-
fortinie that night. Rodney hung doggedly on, relying on the
chapter of accidents, as one who knows that all things come to him
who endures. To be sure, there was not much else he could do;
yet he deserves credit for unremitting industry and pluck. During
the afternoon, the signals noted in the logs — to call in all cruisers
and for the fleet to close — attest mutely the movement of de Grasse
in bearing down.
During the night, at 2 a.m. of April 12th, the Zele and de
Grasse 's flagship, the Ville de Paris, 110, crossing on opposite tacks,
came into collision. The former lost both foremast and bowsprit. It
has been stated by John Paul Jones, who served on Ijoard the French
fleet a few months later, that this accident was due to the deficiency
of watch-officers in the French navy ; the deck of the Zele being in
charge of a young ensign, instead of an experienced lieutenant. It
was necessaiy to rid the fleet of the ZcU at once, or an action could
not be avoided; so a frigate Avas summoned to tow her, and the two
were left to make their way to Guadeloupe, while the others resumed
the beat to windward. At 5 a.m. she and the frigate were again
526
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1782.
under way, steering for Guadeloupe, to the north-west, and making
from five to six miles an hour (a) ; hut in the interval they had been
nearl}- motionless, and consequently when day broke at 5.30 they
were only two leagues from the Barjleur, which, still flagship of the
British rear, was then standing south on the port tack. The body
of the French was at about the same distance as on the previous
evening, — ten to fifteen miles, — but the Ville dc Paris not more
than eight (A). Just before 6 a.m. Rodney signalled Hood, who was
%
%
V
RODMEY AND DE..GraSSE.
/2 "" /4^/?/z. . /FS2.
. A^CI./^^
r ^ £ />^ c ^
c
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RODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
nearest, to chase the Zele (a) ; and four of the rearmost ships of the
line were detached for that purpose (b). Dc Grasse, seeing this,
signalled his vessels at 6 a.m. to close the flagship, making all sail;
and he himself bore down (c) on the port tack, l)ut running free, to
frighten away Rodney's chasers. The British Admiral kept them
out until 7 o'clock, by which time de Grasse was fairly committed to
his false step. All cruisers were then called in, and the line was
•closed to one cable. Within an hour were heard the opening guns of
1782.J
RODNEY AND DE GEASSE.
527
the great battle, since known by the names of the 12th of April, or
of The Saintes, and, in the French navy, of Dominica.
The British appear to have been standing to the south on the port
tack at daylight; but, soon after sending out the chasers, Rodney
had ordered the line of bearing (from ship to ship) to be north-
north-east to south-south-west, evidently in preparation for a close-
hauled line of battle on the starboard tack, heading northerly, to an
r
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RODMEV AND OE GrASSE:
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RODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
east wind. Somewhat unusually, the Avind that morning held at
south-east for some time, enabling the Britisli to lie up as high as
east-north-east on the starboard tack, on which they were when the
battle joined; and this circumstance doubtless led to the annulling
of the signal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made,
and the substitution for it of the line of liattle ahead at one cable.
It is to be inferred that Rodney's first purpose was to tack together,
thus restoring Hood to the van, his natural station ; but the accident
of the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van — regu-
628
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1782.
laiiv the rear — most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack
in succession, preserving to the full the opportunity which chance had
extended for reaching the enemy. In the engagement, therefore.
Hood connnanded in the rear, and Rear- Admiral Drake in the van.
The wind with the French seems to have been more to the eastward
than with the British, — not an unusual circumstance in the neigh-
bourhood of land.
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RODNEY AXD BE GRASSE.
As Rodney, notwithstanding his haste, had formed line from time
to time during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order,
and his signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed. The
l-'rciich. ou the other hand, were greatly scattered when their com-
iiiaiidei-in-chief, in an impulse of hasty, unbalanced judgment,
al)andoned his previous cautious policy and hurried them into action.
Some of them were over ten miles to windward of the flagship.
Though they crowded sail to rejoin her, there was not time enough
for all to take tlieir stations properly, between daylight and 8 a.m.,
when the firing began. " Our line of battle was formed under the
1782.]
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
529
fire of musketry, "1 wrote the Marquis de Vaudreml,^ the second m
command, who, being in the rear of the fleet on this occasion, and
consequently among the last to be engaged, had excellent opportunity
for observation. At the beginning it was in de Grasse's power to
postpone action, until the order should be formed, by holding his
wind under short canvas ; wliile the mere sight of his vessels hurry-
ing down for action would have compelled Rodney to call in the
ships chasing the Zele, whose rescue was the sole motive of the
fr
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RODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
French manoeuvre. Instead of this, the flagship kept off the wind ;
which precipitated the collision, while at the same time delaying the
preparations needed to sustain it. To this de Grasse added another
fault by forming on the port tack, the contrary to that on which the
British were, and standing towards Dominica. The effect of this
was to bring his ships into the calms and baffling winds which cling
to the shore-line, thus depriving them of their power of manoeuvre.
^ Probably not over one or two hundred yards.
''■ His brother, the Comte de Vaudreuil, was also with the fleet, as chef d'escadre,
in the Sceptre, 74.
VOL. III. —34
530 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
His object probably was to confine the engagement to a mere pass-by
on opposite tacks, by which in all previous instances the French had
thwarted the decisive action that Eodney sought. Nevertheless, the
blunder was evident at once to French eyes. "What evil genius has
inspired the admiral?" exclaimed du Pavilion, Vaudreuil's flag-
eaptain, who was esteemed one of the best tacticians in France, and
who fell in the battle.
As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the one south,
and the other east-north-east, the wind shifted back to the east-
ward, allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and
knocking the British off to north-north-east (B). The head of the
French column thus passed out of gunshot, across the bows of
Rodney's leading vessel, the Marlborough, which came within range
Avhen abreast of the eighth ship. The first shots were fired by the
Brave, 74, ninth in the French line, at 8 a.m. The British captain
then put his helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under
the lee of the French, towards their rear. The rest of the fleet
followed in his wake. The battle thus assumed the form of passing
in opposite directions on parallel lines; except that the French ships,
as they successively cleared the point where the British column
struck their line, would draw out of fire, their course diverging
thenceforth from that of the British approach. The effect of this
would be that the British rear, when it reached that point, would be
fresh, and with that advantage encounter the French rear, which had
received already the fire of the British van and centre. To obviate
this, by bringing his own van into action, de Grasse signalled the
van ships to lead south-south-west, parallel with the British north-
north-east (B, a). The engagement thus became general all along the
lines ; but it is probable that the French van was never well formed.
Its commander, at all events, reached his post after the commander
of the rear did his.^
At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for
close action, followed immediately by another for the leading ships to
head one point to starboard — towards the enemy — which indicates
that he was not satisfied with the distance first taken by the Marl-
borough. The Formidable, his flagship, eighteenth in the column,
l)egan to fire at 8.23;2 but the Barjleur, Hood's flagship, which was
^ The position, in the French order, of the ships taken in the battle, is shown by
the crosses in Figures B, C, D.
' Canada's log, 8.15 ; reduced to Hood's times, which are generally followed.
3782.] RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. 531
thirty-first, not till 9.25. This difference in time is to be accounted
for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrasted with the fresh
trades in the open channel to the northward, which the leading
British vessels felt before their rear. De Grasse now, too late, had
realised the disastrous effect which this would have upon his fleet.
If he escaped all else, his ships, baffled by calms and catspaws while
the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage, and with it
the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chief preoccupation. Twice
he signalled to wear, — first, all together, then in succession, — but,
<although the signals were seen, they could not be obeyed with the
enemy close under the lee. "The French fleet," comments Chevalier
justly, "had freedom of movement no longer. A fleet cannot wear
with an enemy's fleet within musket-range to leeward."
The movement therefore continued as described, the opposing
ships slowly "sliding by" each other until about 9.15, when the
wind suddenly shifted to south-east again. The necessity of keeping
the sails full forced the bows of each French vessel towards the
enemy, destroying the order in column, and throwing the fleet into
■echelon^ or, as the phrase then was, into bow and quarter line(C).
The British, on the contrary, were free either to hold their course or
to head towards the enemy. Rodney's flagship (C, a) luffed, and
led through the French line just astern of the Glorieux^ 74, which
was the nineteenth in their order. She was followed by five ships;
and her next ahead also, the Duke (d), seeing her chief's movement,
imitated it, breaking through the line astern of the twenty-third
French. The Glorieux^ on the starboard hand of Rodney's little
column, received its successive broadsides. Her main and mizzen
masts went overboard at 9.28, when the Canada^ third astern of
the Forraidalle^ had just passed her; and a few moments later her
foremast and bowsprit fell. At 9.33 the Canada was to windward
of the French line. The Formidable was using both broadsides as
she broke through the enemy's order. On her port hand, between
her and the Duke, were four French ships huddled together (c), one
of which had paid off the wrong way ; that is, after the shift of wind
took her aback, her sails had filled on the opposite tack from that of
the rest of her fleet. ^ These four, receiving the repeated broadsides,
at close quarters, of the FormidaUe, DuJce, and Hamur, and having
undergone besides the fire of the British van, were very severely
mauled. While these things were happening, the Bedford, the sixth
^ This mishap occurred to three French vessels.
532 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
astern of the Formidable, perhaps unable to see her next ahead in the
smoke, had luffed indejjendently (b), and was followed by the twelve
rearmost British ships, Avhom she led through the French order astern
of the Cesar, 74, twelfth from the van. This ship and her next
ahead, the Hector, 74, suffered as did the Glorieux. The Barfleur,
which was in the centre of this column of thirteen, opened fire at
9,25. At 10.45 she "ceased firing, having passed the enemy's van
ships;" that is, she was well on the weather side of the French fleet.
Some of the rearmost of Hood's division, however, were still engaged
at noon; but probably all were then to windward of the enemy.
The British ships ahead of the Duke, the van and part of the
centre, in all sixteen sail, had continued to stand to the northward.
At the time Rodney broke the line, several of them must have passed
beyond the French rear, and out of action. One, the America, the
twelfth from the van, wore without signals, to pursue the enemy, and
her example was followed at once by the ship next ahead, the Eussell.
No signal following, the America again wore and followed her leaders,
but the Eiissell continued as she was, now to windward of the French ;
by which she was able to take a conspicuous share in the closing'
scenes. At 11.33 Rodney signalled the van to tack, but the delay of
an hour or more had given the Russell a start towards the enemy
which could not be overcome.
The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer the
weather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French,
and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separated and
disordered (D). In the centre was the flagship Ville cle Paris with
five ships (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant, was the
van, of some dozen vessels (v). The rear was four miles away to
leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again, it
was decided to re-form on the leewardmost ships ; and several signals
to this effect were made by de Grasse. They received but imperfect
execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enough in run-
ning before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exactitude of posi-
tion and of movement was unattainable to ships in various degrees
of disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French were
never again in order after the wind shifted and the line was broken ;
but the movement to leeward left the dismasted Glorieiix, Hector,
and Cesar, motionless between the hostile lines.
It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet also was.
divided into three by the manoeuvre of breaking the line. This is.
178-2.] FRENCH AND BRITISH LOSSES. 533
true; but the advantage remained with it incontestably, in two
respects. By favour of the wind, each of the three groups had been
able to maintain its general formation in line or column, instead of
being thrown entirely out, as the French were ; and passing thus in
€olumn along the Glorieux^ Hector., and Cesar, they wrought upon
these three ships a concentration of injury which had no parallel
among the British vessels. The French in fact had lost three ships,
as well as the wind. To these certain disadvantages is probably to
be added a demoralisation among the French crews, from the much
heavier losses resultant upon the British practice of firing at the hull.
An officer present in the action told Sir John Ross ^ afterwards that
the French fired very high throughout; and he cited in illustration
that the three trucks ^ of the Princesa were shot away. Sir Gilbert
Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permission to
be on deck throughout the action, wrote ten days after it, "I can
aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as we
approach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside." It is
needless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that of
the bravest enemy ; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails,
however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded
that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. As
illustrative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. It was
but 248 killed and 816 wounded ^ in a fleet of thirty-six sail. The
highest in any one ship was that of the Dicke, 73 killed and wounded.
No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French
loss has ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir
(xilbert Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned
that of the Ville de Paris alone to be 300. There being 5,400 troops
■distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties would be
proportionately more numei-ous; but, even allowing for this, there
■can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier's words,
" was certainly much more considerable " than that reported by the
British. Six post-captains * out of thirty were killed, against two ^
British out of thirty-six.
^ Eoss: 'Life of Saumarez.'
'^ Circular pieces of wood which cap the top of the masts.
^ Beatson, vi. 324, 325. Beatson's additions are slightly incorrect.
* Captain de La Clocheterie, of the Hercule; Captain de Saint-Cesaire, of the
Northumberland; Captain de La Vicomte, of the Hector; Captain Bernard de Marigny,
■of the Cesar ; Captain Comte d'Escars, of the Glorieux ; and Captain du Pavilion, of
the Triomphant. Rapport du Marquis de Yaudreuil. — W. L. C.
^ Captain William Blair, of the Anson; and Captain Lord Robert Manners, —
534 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity,
wliicli accident rather than design had given him at noon of April
12th. He did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing
the order for the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted
at 1 P.M., was hauled down a half -hour later. Hood, who realised the
conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences there-
from, wished the order given for a general chase, which would have
api^lied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without sur-
rendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet
movements. He bitterly censured the Admiral's failure to issue this
command. Had it been done, he said : —
" I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the enemy's ships
before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only under his topsails (sometimes his
foresail was set and at otliers his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the
afternoon, though the flying enemy had all the sail set their very shattered state
would allow."
To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of
a junior admiral ; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals to
individual ships of his own division to make more sail, by setting all
he could on the Barflcur, and by getting out his boats to tow her
head round. Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similar
impression of laxity.
" After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of the day was par-
tial and desultory, the enemy never being able to form, and several of the [our]
ships being obliged to lie by and repair theu- damages. As the signal for the line
was now hauled down, every ship annoyed the enemy as their respective comman-
ders judged best."
For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices,
the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated, the order for a general
chase, supplemented by a watchful supervision, which should check
the over-rash and stimulate the over-cautious. If Hood's account of
the sail carried by Rodney be correct, the Commander-in-Chief did
not even set the Ijest example. In this languid pursuit, the three
crippled French ships were overhauled, and of course had to strike ;
and a fourth, the Ardent, 64, was taken, owing to her indifferent
sailing. Towards sunset the flagship Vilh de Paris, 110, ^ the finest
ship of war afloat, having been valiantly defended against a host of
who, though mortally wounded, survived for some days, — of the Eesohition. But
Captahi William Bayne, of the Alfred, had fallen in the action of April 9th.
1 She is thus rated in the British Navy Lists published between the time of her
capture and the receii)t of news of her loss ; but she seems to have carried 120 guns.
1782.] HOOD CRITICISES RODNEl. 535
enemies througliout great part of the afternoon, and having expended
all her ammunition, hauled down her colours. The two British
vessels then immediately engaged with her were the Bussell and the
Barfieur^ Hood's flagship, to the latter of which she formally sur-
rendered; the exact moment, noted in Hood's journal, heing
6.29 P.M.
At 6.45 Rodney made the signal for the fleet to bring-to (form
line and stop) on the port tack, and he remained lying-to during the
night, while the French continued to retreat under the orders of the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, who by de Grasse's capture had become com-
mander-in-chief. For this easy-going deliberation also Hood had
strong words of condemnation.
" Why he should bring tlie fleet to because the F/Ke de Paris "was taken, I can-
not reconcile. He did not pursue under easy sail, so as never to have lost sight of
the enemy in the night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled
him to have taken almost every ship the next day. . . . Had I had the honour of
commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the 12th, I may, without much imputa-
tion of vanity, say the flag of England should now have graced the sterns of
upwards of twenty sail of the enemy's ships of the line."
Such criticisms by those not responsible are to be received gen-
erally with caution ; but Hood was, in thought and in deed, a man
so much above the common that these cannot be dismissed lightly.
His opinion is known to have been shared by Sir Charles Douglas,
Rodney's Captain of the Fleet; ^ and their conclusion is supported by
the inferences to be drawn from Rodney's own assumptions as to the
condition of the French, contrasted with the known facts. The
enemy, he wrote, in assigning his reasons for not pursuing, "went
off in a dose connected lody^" and might have defeated, by rotation,
the ships that had come up with them." "The enemy who went off
in a tody of twenty -six shijjs of the li7ie,^ might, by ordering two or
three of their best sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights at
times, and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet
to have followed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their
lights, might have hauled their wind, and have been far to windward
by daylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and the most crippled
ships of the English;" and he adds that the Windward Islands even
might have been endangered. That such action was in a remote
degree possible to a well-conditioned fleet may be guardedly con-
^ See letter of Sir Howard Douglas, son to Sir Charles ; ' United Service Journal,'
1834, Part II., p. 97.
2 Author's italics ; Mundy : ' Life of Rodney,' ii. 248.
536 MAJOR OPERATIOyS. 1762-1783. [1782.
■ceded ; but it was wildly improbable to a fleet staggering under such
a blow as the day had seen, which had changed its commander just
as dark came on, and Avas widely scattered and disordered up to the
moment when signals by flags became invisible.
The facts, however, were utterly at variance with these ingenious
suppositions. Instead of being connected, as Rodney represents, de
Vaudreuil had with him next morning but ten ships ; and no others
during the whole of the 13th. He made sail for Cap Francois, and
was joined on the way by five more, so that at no time were there
upwards of fifteen^ French ships of the line together, prior to his
arrival at that port on April 25th. He there found four others of
the fleet. The tale of twenty-five survivors, from the thirty engaged
on April 12th, was completed by six which had gone to Curasao, and
which did not rejoin until May. So much for the close connected
body of the French. It is clear, therefore, that Rodney's reasons
illustrate the frame of mind against which Napoleon used to caution
his generals as "making to themselves a picture " of possibilities; and
that his conclusion at best was based upon the ruinous idea, which a
vivid imagination or slothful temper is prone to present to itself, that
war may be made decisive without running risks. That Jamaica even
was saved was not due to this fine, but indecisive action, but to the
hesitation of the allies. When de Vaudreuil reached Cap Francois,
he found there the French convoy safely arrived from Guadeloupe,
and also a body of fifteen Spanish ships of the line. The troops
available for the descent upon Jamaica were from fifteen to twenty
thousand. Well might Hood write: "Had Sir George Rodney's
judgment, after the enemy had been so totally put to flight, borne any
proportion to the high courage, zeal and exertion, so very manifestly
shown by every captain, all difiiculty would now have been at an
•end. We might have done just as we pleased, instead of being at
this hour upon the defensive."
The allies, however, though superior in numbers, did not venture
to assume the offensive. After the battle, Rodney remained near
Guadeloupe until the 17th of April, refitting, and searching the
neighbouring islands, in case the French fleet might have entered
some one of them. For most of this time the British were becalmed,
but Hood remarks that there had been wind enough to get twenty
leagues to the westward ; and there more wind probably would have
* Troude. Chevalier says sixteen, diflfering with Troude as to the whereabouts
of the Brave.
1782.] THE IFAR IN NORTH AMERICA ENDED. 537
been found. On the 17th Hood was detached m pursuit with ten sail
of the line ; and a day or two later Rodney himself started for Jamaica.
Left to his own discretion, Hood pushed for the Mona Passage,
between Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo, carrying studding-sails
below and aloft in his haste. At daybreak of the 19th he sighted the
west end of Puerto Rico ; and soon afterwards a small French squad-
ron was seen. A general chase resulted in the capture of the Jason
and Caton^ sixty-fours, which had parted from their fleet before the
battle and were on their way to Cap Francois. A frigate, the
Aiinabk, 32, and a sloop, the Ceres, 18, also were taken. In report-
ing this affair to Rodney, Hood got a thrust into his superior. "" It
is a very mortifying circumstance to relate to you, Sir, that the
French fleet which you put to flight on the 12th went through the
Mona Channel on the 18th, only the day before I was in it." A
further proof of the utility of pursuit, here hinted at, is to be found
in the fact that Rodney, starting six days later than de Vaudreuil,
reached Jamaica April 28th, only three days after the French got
into Cap Francois. He had therefore gained three days in a fort-
night's run. What might not have been done by an untiring chase !
But a remark recorded by Hood summed up the frame of mind which
dominated Rodney: "I lamented to Sir George on the 13th that . . .
he did not continue to pursue so as to keep sight of the enemy all
night, to which he only answered, ' Come, we have done very hand-
somely as it is.' "
Rodney stayed at Jamaica until the 10th of July, when Admiral
Hugh Pigot arrived from England to supersede him. This change
was consequent upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, in the
previous March, and had been decided before the news of the victory
could reach England. Rodney sailed for home from Port Roj^al on
the 22nd of July; and with his departure the war in the West Indies
and North America may be said to have ended. Pigot started almost
immediately for New York, and remained in North American waters
until the end of October, when he returned to Barbados, first having
detached Hood with thirteen ships of the line from the main fleet, to
cruise off Cap Francois. It is of interest to note that at this time
Hood took with him from New York the frigate Albemarle, 28, then
commanded by Nelson, who had been serving on the North American
station. These various movements were dictated by those of the
enemy, either actually made or supposed to be in contemplation ; for
it was an inevitable part of the ill-effects of Rodney's most imperfect
538 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1783. [1782.
success, that the British fleet was thenceforth on the defensive purely,
with all the perplexities of him who waits upon the initiative of an
opponent. Nothing came of them all, however, for the war now
was but lingering in its death stupor. The defeat of de Grasse,
partial though it was; the abandonment of the enterprise upon
Jamaica; the failure of the attack upon Gibraltar; and the success
of Howe in re-victualling that fortress, — these had taken all heart
out of the French and Spaniards ; while the numerical superiority of
the allies, inefficiently though it had been used heretofore, weighed
heavily upon the imagination of the British Government, which now
had abandoned all hope of subduing its American Colonies. Upon
the conclusion of peace, in 1783, Pigot and Hood returned to Eng-
land, leaving the Leeward Islands' Station under the command of
Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Hughes, Bart., (2)^ an officer remembered
by history only through Nelson's refusing to obey his orders not to
enforce the Navigation Acts, in 1785.
The change in the Ministr}', besides occasioning the recall of
Rodney, drew Lord Howe out of his long retirement, to command the
Channel Fleet. He hoisted his flag on the 20th of April, 1782, on
board the Victory^ 100. Owing to the various directions in which
the eftorts of Great Britain had to be made, either to defend her own
interests or to crush the movements of the many enemies now com-
bined against her, the operations of the fleet were for some months
carried on by detached squadrons, — in the North Sea, in the Bay of
Biscay, and at the entrance of the Channel; Howe having under
him several distinguished subordinates, at the head of whom, in
professional reputation, were Vice-Admiral the Hon. Samuel Bar-
rington and Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt. In the North Sea,
the Dutch were kept in their ports; and a convoy of near 400 mer-
chant ships from the Baltic reached England unmolested. In the
Bay of Biscay, Barrington, having with him twelve of the line, dis-
covered and chased a convoy laden with stores for the fleet in the
East Indies. One of the ships of the line accompanying it, the
Pegase, 74, surrendered, after a night action of three hours with
the Foudroyant^ 80, Captain John Jervis,^ afterwards Earl St,
•
^ Son of Captain Sir Richard Hiifjbes, Bart. (1), who was for many years Com-
missioner at Portsmouth, and who died in 1782. The younger officer died a full
Admiral in 1812.
'^ Who was made a K. B. for this .service.
1782.] HOWE IN THE CHANNEL. 539
Vincent. Of nineteen transports, thirteen, one of which, the Action-
naire^ was a 64-gun ship armed en jilXte, ^ were taken ; a weighty blow
to the great Suffren, whose chief difficult}^ in India was inadequate
material of war, and especially of spars, of which the Actionnaii^e
carried an outfit for four ships of the line. After Barrington's
return, Kempenfelt made a similar but uneventful cruise of a month
in the Bay.
Howe himself went first to the North Sea in the month of May.
Having there held the Dutch in check during a critical moment,
he was directed next to go to the entrance of the Channel, leaving
only a division in the Downs. Information had been received that
an allied fleet of thirty-two ships of the line, five only of which were
French, had sailed from Cadiz earl}- in June, to cruise between
Ushant and Scilly. It was expected that they would be joined there
by a reinforcement from Brest, and b}^ the Dutch squadron in the
Texel, making a total of about fifty of the line, under the command
of the Spanish Admiral, Don Luis de Cordova. The Dutch did not
appear, owing probably to Howe's demonstration before their ports;
but eight ships from Brest raised the allied fleet to forty. To oppose
these Howe sailed on the 2nd of July with twenty-two sail, of which
eight were three-deckers. Before his return, on the 7th of August,
he was joined by eight others ; mostly, however, sixty-fours. With
this inferiority of numbers the British Admiral could expect only to
act on the defensive, unless some specially favourable opportunity
should offer. The matter of most immediate concern was the arrival
of the Jamaica convoy, then daily expected; with which, it may be
mentioned, de Grasse also was returning to England, a prisoner of
war on board the Sandwich.
On its voyage north, the combined fleet captured on June 25tli
eighteen ships of a British convoy bound for Canada. A few days
later it was fixed in the chops of the Channel, covering the ground
from Ushant to Scilly. On the evening of July 7th it was sighted
off Scilly by Howe, who then had with him twenty-five sail. The
allies prepared for action; but the British Admiral, possessing a
thorough knowledge of the neighbouring coasts, either in his own
person or in some of his officers, led the fleet by night through the
passage between Scilly and Land's End. On the following morning
he was no more to be seen, and the enemy, ignorant of the manner
1 That is, with a great part of her guns dismounted, and below as cargo.
540 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3. [1782.
of his evasion, was thrown wholly off his track. ^ A strong gale of
wind afterwards forcing the allies to the southward, both convoy and
fleet slipped by successfully, and again reached England.
Howe was ordered now to prepare to throw reinforcements and
supplies into Gibraltar, which had not received relief since Darby's
visit, in April, 1781. For this uigent and critical service it was
determined to concentrate the whole Channel Fleet at Spithead,
where also the transports and supply-ships were directed to rendez-
vous. It w'as while thus assembling for the relief of Gibraltar that
there occurred the celebrated incident of the Royal George, a 100-gun
ship, while being heeled for under-water repairs, oversetting and
sinking at her anchors, carrying down with her Rear-Admiral
Kempenfelt and about 900 souls, including many women and chil-
dren. This was on the 29th of August, 1782. On the 11th of
September the expedition started, 183 sail in all; thirty-four being
ships of the line, with a dozen smaller cruisers, the rest unarmed
vessels. Of the latter, 31 were destined for Gibraltar, the remainder
being trading ships for different parts of the world. With so exten-
sive a charge, the danger to which had been emphasised by numerous
captures from convoys during the war, Howe's progress was slow.
It is told that shortlj- l)efore reaching Cape Finisterre, but after a
violent gale of wind, the full tally of 183 sail was counted. After
passing Finisterre, the several " trades " probably parted from the
grand fleet.
On the 8th of October, off Cape St. Vincent, a frigate, the
Latona, 38, was sent ahead for information. It was known that a
great combined force of ships of war lay in Algeciras Bay, — opposite
Gibraltar, — and that an attack upon the works was in contempla-
tion; but much might have happened meantime. Much, in fact,
had happened. A violent gale of wind on the lOtli of September
had driven some of the allied fleet from their moorings, one vessel,
the San Miguel, 72, being forced under the batteries of Gibraltar,
where she had to surrender; but there still remained the formidable
numter of 48 ships of the line, anchored only four miles from the point
which the relief ships must reach. This Avas the problem which
Howe had to solve. ^Vlore important still, though of less bearing
^ Chevalier, following La Motte-Picquet's report, ascribes Howe's escape to greater
speed. ('Mar. Fran, en 1778': p. 33.5.) It must be noted that Howe's object was
not merely to escape, np T'liiuiiicl, by better sailing, but to get to the westward, past
the allies, a feat impracticable save by a stratagem such as is mentioned.
1782.] HOWE AT GIBRALTAR. 541
upon his mission, was the cheering news brought by the frigate,
when she rejoined on the 10th, that the long-intended attack had
been made on the 13th of September, and had been repelled gloriously
and decisively. The heavily protected Spanish floating batteries,
from which success had been expected confidently, one and all had
been set on fire and destroyed. If Howe could introduce his suc-
cours, the fortress was saved.
The admiral at once summoned his subordinate officers, gave
them full and particular instructions for the momentous undertaking,
and issued at the same time, to the masters of the supply-sliips,
precise information as to local conditions of wind and currents at
Gibraltar, to enable them more surely to reach their anchorage. On
the 11th of October, being now close to its destination, the fleet
bore up for the Straits, which it entered at noon with a fair westerly
wind. The convoy went first, — sailing before the wind it was thus
to leeward of the fleet, in a position to be defended, — and the ships
of war followed at some distance in three divisions, one of which was
led by Howe himself. At 6 p.m. the supply -ships were off the
mouth of the Bay, with a wind fair for the mole; but, through
neglect of the instructions given, all but four missed the entrance,
and were swept to the eastward of the Rock, whither the fleet of
course had to follow them.
On the 13th the combined fleets came out, being induced to quit
their commanding position at Algeciras by fears for two of their
number, which shortly before had been driven to the eastward.
During the forenoon of the same day the British were off the Spanish
coast, fifty miles east of Gibraltar. At sunset the allies were seen
approaching, and Howe formed his fleet, but sent the supply-ships to
anchor at the Zaffarine Islands, on the coast of Barbary, to await
events. Next morning the enemy was close to land, but visible only
from the mastheads; the British apparently having headed south
during the night. On the 15th the wind came to the eastward, fair
for Gibraltar, towards which all the British began cautiously to
move. By the evening of the 16th, eighteen of the convoy were
safe at the mole ; and on the 18th all had arrived, besides a fireship
with 1,500 barrels of powder, sent in by the Admiral upon the govern-
or's requisition. Throughout this critical time, the combined fleets
seem to have been out of sight. Either intentionally or carelessly,
they had got to the eastward and there remained ; having rallied their
separated ships, but allowed Gibraltar to be replenished for a year.
542 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-17S3. [1782.
On the morning of the 19th they appeared in the north-east, but the
relief was then accomplished and Howe put out to sea. He was
not willing to fight in mid-Straits, embarrassed by currents and the
land ; but when outside he brought-to, to allow the enemy to attack
if they would, they having the weather-gage. On the following day,
the 20th, towards sunset they bore down, and a partial engagement
ensued; but it was wholly indecisive, and next day was not renewed.
The British loss was .68 killed and 208 wounded ; that of the allies
60 killed and 320 wounded. On the 14th of November the fleet
regained Spithead.
The services rendered to his country by Howe on this occasion
were eminently characteristic of the special qualities of that great
officer, in w^hom was illustrated to the highest degree the solid
strength attainable by a man not brilliant, but most able, who gives
himself heart and soul to professional acquirement. In him, pro-
found and extensive ^professional knowledge, which is not inborn
but gained, was joined to great natural staying powers ; and the com-
bination eminently fitted him for the part we have seen him play in
Delaware Bay, at New York, before Rhode Island, in the Channel,
and now at Gibraltar. The utmost of skill, the utmost of patience,
the utmost of persistence, such had Howe ; and having these, he was
particularly apt for the defensive operations, upon the conduct of
which chiefly must rest his well-deserved renown.
A true and noble tribute has been paid by a French officer to this
relief of Gibraltar: ^ —
" The qualities displayed by Loi'd Howe during this short campaign rose to
the full height of the mission which he had to fulfil. This operation, one of the
finest in the War of American Independence, merits a praise equal to that of a
victory. If the English fleet was favom-ed by circumstances, — and it is rare that
in such enterprises one can succeed without the aid of fortune, — it was above ail
the Commander-in-Chief's quickness of perception, the accuracy of his judgment,
and the rapidity of his decisions, that assured success."
I'o this well-weighed, yet lofty praise of the Admiral, the same
writer has added words that the British Navy may remember long
with pride, as sealing the record of this war, of which the relief of
Gibraltar marked the close in European and American waters. After
according credit to the Admiralty for the uniform high speed of the
liritish vessels, and to Howe for his comprehension and use of this
advantage, Captain Chevalier goes on : —
* Chevalier : ' Mar. Fran, dans la Gruerre de 1778,' p. 358.
1778.] PONDICHERRY CAPITULATES. 543
" Finally, if we may judge by the results, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eng-
lish fleet could not but think himself most happy in his captains. There were
neither separations, nor collisions, nor casualties ; and there occurred none of those
events, so frequent in the experiences of a squadron, which often oblige admirals
to take a course wholly contrary to the end they have in view. In contemplation
of this unvexed navigation of Admiral Howe, it is impossible not to recall the
unhappy incidents which from the 9th to the 12th of April befell the squadron of
the Count de Grasse. ... If it is just to admit that Lord Howe displayed the
highest talent, it should be added that he had iu his hands excellent instruments."
To quote another French writer: "Quantity disappeared before
quality."
The operations in India, hoth naval and military, stand by them-
selves, without direct influence upon transactions elsewhere, and
unaffected also by these, except in so far as necessary succours were
intercepted sometimes in European waters. The cause of this isola-
tion was the distance of India from Europe ; from four to six months
being required by a fleet for the voyage.
Certain intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France
reached Calcutta July 7th, 1778. On the same day the Governor-
General ordered immediate preparations to attack Pondicherry, the
principal seaport of the French. The army arrived before the place
on the 8th of August, and on the same day Commodore Sir Edward
Vernon 1 anchored in the roads to blockade by sea. A French
squadron, under Captain Tronjoly, soon after appearing in the offing,
Vernon gave chase, and on the 10th an action ensued. The forces
engaged were about equal, the French, if anything, slightly superior ;
a sixty-gun ship and four smaller vessels being on each side. As
the French then went into Pondicherry, the immediate advantage
may be conceded to them; but, Vernon returning on the 20th,
Tronjoly soon after quitted the roads, and returned to the lie de
France.^ From that day the British squadron blockaded closely, and
on the 17th of October Pondicherry capitulated.
^ British Squadron in the East Indies under Commodore Sir Edward Vernon, Kt.,
in 1778.
n- /!A i Commodore Sir Edward Vernon.
Mipon 60 \
( Capt. Benjamin Marlow.
Asia 54 Capt. George Vandeput.
Coventry 28 Capt. John Alexander Panton.
Scaliorse 24 Commander Alexander M'Coy.
Cormorant .... 18 Commander William Owen.*
* Who, being killed by accident, was succeeded by Commander Charles Morice Pole.
~ W. L. C.
^ Now Mauritius.
5U
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1778.
"TTT
B|o
_6|5_
INDIA
AND CeIYL-ON
too SO o *9<*
tin 1 1 L
3*
f^ dkG>^li
7 5
8o
_0j5_
INDIA AND CEYLON.
1781.] SUFFEEN'S CAMPAIGN IN INDIA. 545
On the Tth of March, 1779, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes,
K. B., sailed for the East Indies with a small squadron.^ The
French also sent out occasional ships; but in 1779 and 1780 these
went no further than the He de France, their naval station in the
Indian Ocean. Hughes's force remained unopposed during those
years. The period was critical, for the British were at war with
Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, and with the Mahrattas; and all
depended upon command of the sea. In January, 1781, when
Hughes was wintering at Bombay, the French squadron under Comte
d'Orves appeared off the Coromandel coast, but, despite Hyder All's
entreaties, it refused to co-operate with him. The different spirit
of the two commanders may be illustrated from contemporary
documents.
" We have advices from Fort St. George of a French squadron which appeared
off that place on January 25, 26, and 27, consisting of 1 seventy-four, 4 sixty-fours,
and 2 fifties. They proceeded south without making any attempt on five Indiamen
then in the roads, witli a number of vessels laden with grain and provisions ; the
destroying of which might have been easily accomplished, and would have been
severely felt."
"On December 8th, off Mangalore,"^ writes Hughes, "I saw two ships, a
large snow, three ketches, and many smaller vessels at anchor in the road with
Hyder's flag flying ; and, standing close, found them vessels of force and all armed
for war. I anchored as close as possible, sent in all armed boats, under cover of
three smaller ships of war, which anchored in four fathoms water, close to the
enemy's ships. In two hours took and burned the two ships, one of 28 and one of
26 guns, and took or destroyed all the others, save one which, by throwing every-
thing overboard, escaped over the bar into the port. Lost 1 lieutenant and 10 men
killed, 2 lieutenants and 51 wounded."
D'Orves returned to the He de France.
When war with Holland began, the British government decided
to attempt the capture of the Cape of Good Hope. For that object a
squadron of 1 seventy-four, 1 sixty-four, and 3 fifties, with numerous
smaller vessels, under Commodore George Johnstone, convoying a
1 Squadron which, under Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. (B), sailed
for India from St. Helens in 1779. — W. L. C.
Q ,1 74 i Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B.
( Capt. Robert Sinionton.
Exeter 64 Capt. Richard King.
Eagle 64 Capt. Ambrose Reddall.
Burford 64 Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Worcester .... 64 Capt. George Talbot.
Belleisle 64 Capt. John Brooks.
Nymph 14 Commander John Blankett.
^ On the Malabar — western — coast.
VOL. III. — 35
546
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1781.
considerable body of troops, sailed from England on the 13th of
March, 1781, in company with the Channel fleet under Vice -Admiral
George Darby, then on its way to relieve Gibraltar. The French
goverfiment, having timely notice of the expedition, undertook to
frustrate it; detailing for that purpose a division of 2 seventy-fours,
and 3 sixty-fours, under the since celebrated Suffren.^ These ships
left Brest on the 22nd of March, with the fleet of de Grasse. They
also carried some battalions of troops.
On April 11th the British squadron reached Porto Praya, Cape
de Verde Islands. This bay is open to the southward, extending
from east to west about a mile and a half, and is within the limits
of the north-east trade-winds. Although aware that a French division
was on his track, and conscious, by the admissions of his report, that
protection could not be expected from the neutrality of the place,
Johnstone permitted his vessels to anchor without reference to
attack. His own flagship, the Romney., 50, was so surrounded by
others that she could fire only with great caution through intervals.
On the 16th of April, at 9.30 a.m., the Isis^ 50, which was the
outermost of the British squadron, signalled eleven sail in the
north-east. Fifteen hundred persons were then ashore engaged in
watering, fishing, embarking cattle, and amusing themselves. The
strangers were Suffren's division. The meeting was not expected by
^ Squadrons under Commodore George Johnstone and M. de Suffren in the
action in Porto Prava, on April 16th, 1781.
BRITISH.
1
FRENCH.
SHIPS
CO
z
B
a
50
COMMANDERS.
Commod. George Johnstone.
Capt. Roddain Home.
SHIPS.
CO
1
COMMANDERS.
Romney . . .
Ilcros ....
74
M. le Bailli de Sufifren.
Annibal . . .
74
Capt. de Tremigon, Senr.J
Hero ....
74
Capt. James Hawker.
Artcsien . . .
64 Capt. de Cardaillac.J
Monmouth . .
64
Capt. James Alms (1).
Svhinx ....
64 Capt. du Chilleau.
Jupiter . . .
50
Capt. Tliomas Pasley.
Vengeur . . .
64 Capt. de Forbin.
Isis
50
Capt. Kvelj'n Sutton.
Diana ....
32
Capt. Sir William Chaloner Burn-
aby, Bart.
Jn.ion ....
32
Capt. James Pigott.
Active ....
32
Capt. Thomas Mackenzie.
Rattlesnake . .
14
Commander Peter Clements.
Porto ....
IG
Commander the Hon. Thomas
Charles Lumley.
* Armed ships. 1
'he Royal Charlotte was hired.
In/rrtuil (f. B.) .
8
Commander Henry d'Esterre Darby.
t Armed transpor
t.
Terror (bomb) .
S
Commander Cliarles Wood.
t Killed.
Tapar/eiir (cutter)
14
Lieut. Philip d'.\uverKne.
Son Cnrlos * . .
2Ct
Commander John Boyle.
Poniliclierry t .
20
Lieut. Thomas Saunders Grove.
Roynl C/inrlotte '
20
Commander Thomas Stanhope Ben-
nett.
and ten Ea.st Indi.ii
nei
1, each of 26 (runs.
W. L. C.
1781.]
SUFFREN AND JOHNSTONE.
54:
the French commander, whose object in entering was simply to
complete the water of the ships ; but he determined at once to attack,
and hauled round the east point of the bay in column, the two
seventy-fours at the head, his own ship, the iZeVos, leading with the
signal for battle (line ab). He luffed to the wind, and anchored five
hundred feet from the starboard beam of the British Hero^ 74 (f),
whence he at once opened fire from both broadsides. His next
astern, the Annibcd (b), brought up immediately ahead of him, but
SuFFRE-N A ts D Johnstone.
Porto Praya .
/tf"^" ^P^,/. : /78/.
SUFFREN AND JOHNSTONE. PORTO PRAYA.
SO close that the Heros had to veer cable and drop astern (a), which
brought her on the beam of the Monmouth., 64.^ The captain of the
Annihal had thought the order for battle merely precautionary, and
had not cleared for action. He was therefore taken unawares, and
his ship did no service proportionate to her force. The third French
vessel (c) reached her station, but her captain was struck dead just
1 I infer, from the accounts, that the Monmouth was well east of the Hero, that
the French had passed her first, and that the Heros was now on her port beam ; but
this point is not certain.
548 MAJOR OPFAIATIONS. 1762-1783. [178h
when about to anchor, and in the confusion the anchor was not let
go. The ship drifted foul of a British East Indiaman, which she
carried out to sea (c' c") The two remaining French (d, e) simply
cannonaded as they passed across the bay's mouth, failing through
mishap or awkwardness to reach an effective position.
The attack thus became a mere rough and tumble, in which the
two seventy-fours alone sustained the French side. After three
quarters of an hour, Suffren, seeing that the attempt had failed,
slipped his cable and put to sea. The Annibal followed, but she had
been so damaged that all her masts went overboard ; fortunately, not
until her head was pointed out of the harbour. Johnstone, thus
luckily escaping the consequences of his neglect, now called his cap-
tains together to learn the condition of their ships, and then ordered
them to cut their cables and pursue. All obeyed except Captain
Sutton of the Isis, who represented that the spars and rigging of his
ship could not bear sail at once. Johnstone then ordered him to
come out anyhow, which he did, and his fore topmast shortly went
overboard. The disability of this ship so weighed upon the Commo-
dore that his pursuit was exceedingly sluggish; and, the Annihal
having got a bit of canvas on a jury foremast, the French kept draw-
ing him away to leeward. Night, therefore, was falling as he came
near them ; the Isis and Monmouth were two or three miles astern ;
the sea was increasing ; if he got much further to leeward, he could
not get back; he had forgotten to appoint a rendezvous where the
convoy might rejoin; a night action, he considered, was not to be
thought of. Yet, if he let the enemy go, they might anticipate him
at the Cape. In short, Johnstone underwent the "anguish" of an
undecided man in a "cruel situation," ^ and of course decided to run
no risks. He returned therefore to Porto Pray a, put the captain of
the Isis under arrest, and remained in port for a fortnight. Suffren
hurried on to the Cape, got there first, landed his troops, and secured
the colony against attack. Johnstone arrived in the neighbourhood
some time later, and, finding himself anticipated, turned aside to
Saldanha Bay, where he captured five Dutch East Indiamen. He
then sent the Hero^ Monmouth^ and Isis, on to India, to reinforce
Hughes, and himself went back to England.
No accusation of misbehaviour lies against any of the British
subordinates in tliis affair of Porto Praya. The captain of the Isis
was brought to a court-martial, and honourably acquitted of all the
1 Expiessidiis ill Johnstone's Keport.
1782.] SUFFREN AND HUGHES. 549
charges. Tlie discredit of the surprise was not redeemed by any
exhibition of intelligence, energy, or professional capacity, on the
part of the officer in charge. It has been said that he never had
commanded a post-ship ^ before he was intrusted with this very
important mission, and it is reasonably sure that his selection for it
was due to attacks made by him upon the professional conduct of
Keppel and Howe, when those admirals were at variance with the
administration. His preposterous mismanagement, therefore, was
probably not wholly bitter to the Navy at large. In the British ships
of war, the entire loss in men, as reported, was only 9 killed, 47
wounded. Several casualties from chance shots occurred on board
the convoy, bringing up the total to 36 killed and 130 wounded. ^
The French admit 105 killed and 20-1 wounded, all but 19 being in
the Heros and Annibal. Although precipitated by Suffc'ren, the affair
clearly was as great a surprise to his squadron as to the British.
Therefore, the latter, being already at anchor and more numerous
as engaged, had a distinct advantage; to which also contributed
musketry fire from the transports. Nevertheless, the result cannot
be deemed creditable to the French captains or gunner}^
Suffren remained in the neighbourhood of the Cape for two
months. Then, having seen the colony secure, independent of his
squadron, he departed for the He de France, arriving there October
25th. On the 17th of December the whole French force, under the
command of d'Orves, sailed for the Coromandel coast. On the way
the British 50-gun ship Hannibal., Captain Alexander Christie, was
taken. On the 9th of February, 1782, Comte d'Orves died, and
Suffren found himself at the head of twelve ships of the line: 3
sevent^^-fours, 7 sixty-fours, and 2 fifties. ^ On the 15th Hughes's
fleet was sighted, under the guns of Madras. It numbered nine of
the line: 2 seventy-fours, 1 sixty-eight, 5 sixty-fours, and 1 fift}-.
Suffren stood south towards Pondicherry, which had passed into the
power of Hyder Ali. After nightfall Hughes got under way, and
1 Charnock, however, says that in 1762, immediately after receiving his post-
•commission, he commanded in succession the Hind, 20, and the Wager, 20. Moreover,
before his appointment to the expedition of 1781, he had been Commodore on the
Lisbon Station. But he had spent comparatively little time at sea as a captain. —
W. L. C.
2 Details are in Schomberg, iv. 385. — W. L. C.
3 One being the captured British Hannibal, 50, which was commissioned by Cap- .
tain Morard de Galles, retaining the English form of the name, Hannibal, to distinguish
her from the Annibal, 74, already in the squadron.
550
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1782
also steered south. He feared for Trincomale, in Ceylon, recently
a Dutch port, which the British had captured on the 5th of Januar}-.
It was a valuable naval station, and as yet most imperfectly defended.
At daylight the British saw the French squadron ^ twelve miles
east (^A, A) and its transports nine miles south-west (c). Hughes
chased the latter and took six. Suffren pursued, but could not over-
take before sunset, and botli fleets steered south-east during the night.
Xext morning there were light north-north-east airs, and the French
were six miles north-east of the British (B, B). The latter formed
line on the port tack (a), heading to seaward ; Hughes hoping that
thus the usual sea-breeze would find him to windward. The breeze,
however, did not make as expected ; and, as the north-east puffs were
bringing the enemy down, he kept off before the wind (b) to gain
time for his ships to close their intervals, which were too great. At
4 P.M. the near approach of the French compelled him to form line
again, on the port tack, heading easterly. The rear ship, £o:cter, 64,
was left separated, out of due support from those ahead (C). fSuffren,
leading one section of his fleet in person, passed to windward of the
1 Britisli and Frencli Squadrons in. the action off Sadras, Feb. 17th, 1782.
BRITISH.
FRENCH.
SHIPS.
rri
Z
a
O
64
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
XT.
o
64
COMMANDERS.
Eagle ....
Capt. Ambrose Reddall.
Severe ....
Capt. de Villeneuve-Cillart.
Monmouth . .
64
Capt. James Alms (1).
Vengeur . . .
G4
Capt. de Forbin.
Worcester . .
64
Capt. George Talbot.
BriUant . . .
04
Capt. de St. Felix.
Burford . . .
64
Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Flamand . . .
50
Capt. de CuverviUe.
( Vice-Admiral Sir Edward
Annibal . . .
74
Capt. du Tromeliu.
Superb. . . .
74
1 Hughes, K. B. (B).
' Capt. William Stevens.
Heros ....
74
( M. de Suffren, Chef d'Ejc.
1 Capt. de Moissac.
Hero ....
74
Capt. Charles Wood.
Orient ....
74
Capt. de Lapalliere.
Isis
50
Capt. the Hon. Thos. Chas.
Artesien . . .
64
Capt. Bide de Maurville.
Lumley.
Sphinx ....
64
Capt. du Chilleau.
Monarca . . .
68
Capt. John Gell.
Ajax ....
61
Capt. Bouvet.
Exeter ....
64
( Commod. Richard King.
1 Capt. Henry Reynolds.
Hannibal . . .
50
Capt. Morard de Galles.
Bizarre . . .
04
Capt. de Lalandelle.
Senhor.te . .
24
Capt. Robert Montagu.
Potirvoyeuse . .
38
Capt. de Beaulieu.
Manilla . .
14
Lieut. William Robinson.
Fine ....
32
Capt. Perrier de Salvert.
Bell one . . ■
.32
Capt. de Ruyter.
Subtile. . . .
22
Capt . de Galif et.
Sylphide . . .
16
Diligent . . .
10
The British list is founded upon that in Beatson, vi. 298, Steel's 'Navy List'
(r782), and dispatches ; the French list, on Trublet : ' Hist, de la Campagne de
rinde' (1801); 'Relation Detaillde,' etc. (1783); Chevalier: 'Hist, de la Mar.
Fran§.* and Cunat : ' Hist, du Bailli de Suffren.' But some of these contradict the
other-s. From some it would appear that the Pourvoyeusc was also in the line. —
\y. L. C.
''yu>rs^^£^^z t.-^-^-si^, ■
C/'
7 r\<?
^/y^' f ^',fer // r/ /r,
L^t>^^. /A^' O'Tt^^a^/,'^^ /^ c/^if^z-aa. iZ/^^ i^di- (.y^'-l^iZ^y' ^ ty2tf^ii:'/a!j.
■ia-ym^^.<;:-n- -^t:fii^
iZ^Zi^ ^c35?ia^a<^^.2^„ Jz^r^ai^-^z^.
1782.]
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
551
British line, from the rear, as far as Hughes's flagship, which was
fifth from the van. Tliere he stopped, and kept at half cannon-shot,
to prevent the four van ships from tacking to relieve their consorts.
It was his intention that the second half of his fleet should attack the
other side of the English (D), but only two of them did so, engag-
ing to leeward the extreme rear(C). The result was, to use
Hughes's own words, that "the enemy brought eight of their best
ships to the attack of five of ours." It will be noted with interest
>
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oqo 0
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B
SuFFREN AND HuCHES
/F "" r^^a "•' /PS 2
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tit
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
that these were exactly the numbers engaged in the first act of the
battle of the Nile. The Exeter (like the Guerrier at the Nile)
received the fresh broadsides of the first five of the enemy, and then
remained in close action on both sides, assailed by two, and at last by
three, opponents, — two fifties, and one sixty-four. When the third
approached, the master of the ship asked Commodore Richard King,
whose broad pennant flew at her masthead, "What is to be done?"
"There is nothing to be done," replied King, "but to fight her till
she sinks." Her loss, 10 killed and 45 wounded, was not creditable
552 MAJOR OPEBATIOXS. 17G2-1783. [1782.
under the circumstances to the French gunnery, which had been
poor also at Porto Praya. At 6 p.m. the wind shifted to south-east,
tlirowing all on the other tack, and enabling the British van to come
into action. Darkness now approaching, Suffren hauled off and
anchored at Pondicherry. Hughes went on to Trincomale to refit.
The British loss liad been 32 killed, among whom were Captain
William Stevens of the flagship, and Captain Henry Reynolds, of the
Exeter^ and 83 wounded. The French had 30 killed ; the number of
their wounded is put by Professor Laughton at 100.
On the 12th of March Hughes returned to Madras, and towards
the end of the month sailed again for Trincomale, carrying reinforce-
ments and supplies. On the 30th he was joined at sea by the Sultan,
74, and the Magnanime, 61, just from England. Suffren had
remained on the coast from reasons of policy, to encourage Hyder
Ali in his leaning to the French; but, after landing a contingent of
troops on the 22nd of March, to assist at the siege of the British port
of Cuddalore, he put to sea on the 23rd, and went south, hoping to
intercept the Sultan and 3Iagnanime off the south end of Ceylon.
On the 9th of April he sighted the British fleet to the south and west
of him. Hughes, attaching the first importance to the strengthening
of Trincomale, had resolved neither to seek nor to shun action. He
therefore continued his course, light northerly airs prevailing, until
the 11th, when, being about fifty miles to the north-east of his port, he
bore away for it. Next morning, April 12th, finding that the enemy
could overtake his rear ships, he formed line on the starboard tack,^
1 Line of battle of tlie squadron under Vice-Aduiiml Sir Edward Hughes, K. B.,
in the action off Providien, on April 12th, 1782.
„ , fii ) Commodore Richard King.
I Capt. Charles Hughes.
Capt. James Hawker.
Capt. the Hon. Thos. Chas. Lumley.
Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Capt. John Gell.
Vice- Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K.B. (B).
Capt. the Hon. Dunbar Maclellan (Actg. ).
Capt. James Alms (1).
Capt. George Talbot.
Capt. Ambrose Reddall.
Capt. James "Watt.
Capt. Charles Wolseley.
Capt. Robert ^lontagii.
Commander Henry Newcome.
The above is taken, the spelling of names being corrected, from Beatson, vi. 298;
but the order of the line was slightly modified at the last moment. — W. L. C.
Hero
74
Isis
50
Burford
64
Monarca
68
Superb
74
Monvioutli
64
Worcester
64
Eagle
64
Sultan
74
Magnanime
64
Smhorsc
24
Combustion (f . s. )
14
i
1782.]
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
553
at two cables' intervals, heading to the westward, towards the coast
of Ceylon, wind north by east, and the French dead to windward
(A, A). Suffren drew up his line on the same tack, parallel to
the British (a), and at 11 a.m. gave the signal to steer west-south-
west all together; his vessels going down in a slanting direction,
each steering for one of the enemy. Having twelve ships to eleven,
the twelfth was ordered to place herself on the off side of the rear
British, which would thus have two antagonists.
/
SuFFRE-N AND H U C H E. S
a
■7'-<3
oo.
b
A
o
c
^'^^
'Ci
^
B
<:3-=3
"C^
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SUFFKEN AND HUGHES.
In such simultaneous approach it commonly occurred that the
attacking line ceased to be parallel with the foe's, its van becoming
nearer and rear more distant. So it was here. Further, the British
opening fire as soon as the leading French were within range, the
latter at once hauled up to reply. Suffren, in the centre, wishing
closest action, signalled them to keep away again, and himself bore
down wrathfully upon Hughes to within pistol-shot; in which he
was supported closely by his next ahead and the two next astern.
The rear of the French, though engaged, remained too far distant
554 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783. [1782.
Their line, therefore, resembled a curve, the middle of which — four
or five ships — was tangent to the British centre (B). At this point
the heat of the attack fell upon Hughes's flagship, the Supcrh, T-i
(C, d), and her next ahead, the Monmouth^ 64 (c). Suffren's ship,
the Heros^ having much of her rigging cut, could not shorten sail,
shot by the Sitperh, and Ijrought up abreast the IlonmoutJi. The
latter, already hotly engaged by one of her own class, and losing her
main and mizzen masts in this unequal new contest, was forced at S
P.M. to bear up out of the line. The place of the Ilcros alongside
the Superb was taken by the Orient, 74, supported by the Brillant,
64 ; and when the Monmouth kept off, the attack of these two ships
was reinforced by the half-dozen stern chasers of the Heros, which
hud drifted into the British line, and now fired into the SicperVs
bows. The conflict between these five ships, two British and three
French, was one of the bloodiest in naval annals; the loss of the
Superh, 59 killed and 96 wounded, and of the Monmouth, 45 killed
and 102 wounded, equalling that of the much larger vessels that
bore the flags of Nelson and Collingwood at Trafalgar. The loss of
the three French was 52 killed and 142 wounded ; but to this should
be added properly that of the Sphinx, 64, the Monmouth'' s first adver-
sary: 22 killed and 74 wounded. At 3.40 p.m., fearing that if he
continued steering west he would get entangled with the shore,
Hughes wore his ships, forming line on the port tack. The French
also wore, and Suffren hoped to secure the Monmouth, which was left
between the two lines; but the quickness of a British captain.
Hawker, of the Hero, ran a tow-rope to her in time, and she was
thus dragged out of danger. At 5.40 Hughes anchored, and Suffren
did the same at 8 p. m. The total British loss in men on this occasion
was 137 killed and 430 wounded; that of the French 137 killed and
357 wounded.
The exhausted enemies remained at anchor in the open sea, two
miles apart, for a week, repairing. On the 19th of April the French
got under way and made a demonstration before the British, inviting
battle, yet not attacking; but the condition of the Monmouth forbade
Hughes from moving. Suffren therefore departed to Batacalo, in
Ceylon, south of Trincomale, where he covered his own convoys from
Europe, and flanked the approach of his adversary's. Hughes, on
the 22nd of April, got into Trincomale, where he remained till June
23rd. He then went to Negapatam, formerly a Dutch possession,
but then held by the British. There he learned that Suffren, who
1782.]
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
555
meanwhile had captured several British transports, was a few miles
north of him, at Cuddalore, which had surrendered to Hj'der Ali on
April 4th. On the 5th of July, at 1 p.m., the French squadron
appeared. At 3 p.m. Hughes put to sea, and stood south during
the night to gain the wind, — the south-west monsoon now blowing.
Next morning, at daylight, the French were seen at anchor,
seven or eight miles to leeward. At 6 a.m. they began to get under
way. One of their sixty-fours, the Ajax^ had lost her main and
'•:■. a
SuFFREM AND HuCHE.S
6 ":" ^i/i. V- /FS2
/ 9 ;
N
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- --\
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SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
mizzen topmasts in a violent squall on the previous afternoon, and
was not in the line. There were therefore eleven ships on each side.
The action, known as that of Negapatam, began shortly before 11,
when both fleets were on the starboard tack, heading south-south-east,
wind south-west. The British being to windward, Hughes ordered
his fleet to bear up together to the attack, exactly as Suffren had
done on the 12th of April. As commonly liappened, the rear got
less close than the van (Position I.). The fourth ship in the French
556 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
order (a), losing her mainmast early, dropped to leeward of the line
(a'), and astern of her place (a"). At half -past noon tlie wind flew
suddenly to south-south-east, — the sea-breeze, — taking the ships a
little on the port bow. INlost of them, on both sides, paid off from
the enemy, the British to starboard, the French to port; but between
the main lines, which were in the momentary confusion consequent
upon such an incident, were left six ships — four British and two
French — that had turned the other way (Position II.). These were
the Burford^ Sultan (s), V/'oreester^ and Eagle^ fourth, fifth, eighth,
and tenth, in the British order ; and the Severe (b), third in the
French, with the dismasted BriUant, towards the rear of the fight (a).
Under these conditions, the Severe, 64, underwent a short but close
action with the Sultan, 74; and with two other British ships, accord-
ing to the report of the Scvere^s captain. The remainder of the
incident shall be given in the latter's own words.
" Seeing the French squadron drawing oif , — for all the ships except the
BriUant had fallen off on the other tack, — Captain de Cillart thought it useless to
prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled down. The ships engaged with him
immediately ceased theu* fire, and the one on the starboard side moved away. At
this moment the Severe fell oif to starboard, and her sails filled. Captain de Cillart
then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones which
remained manned, and he rejoined his squadron " (Position III.).
When the Severe'' s flag came down, Suffren was approaching with
his flagship. The Sultan wore to rejoin her fleet, and was raked by
the Severe in so doing (Position III.). The BriUant, whose main-
mast had been shot away in conflict with either the Sultan or the
Bur ford, both much heavier ships, had at this later phase of the fight
fallen under the guns of the Worcester and the Eagle. Her captain,
de Saint-Felix, was one of the most resolute of Suffren's ofiicers.
She was rescued by the flagship, but she had lost 47 killed and 136
wounded, — an almost incredible slaughter, being over a third of the
usual complement of a sixty-four; and Suffren's ships were under-
manned.
These spirited episodes, and the fact that his four separated ships
were approaching the enemy, and being approached by them, caused
Hughes to give the orders to wear, and for a general chase ; the flag
for the line being hauled down. Two of his fleet, however, made
signals of disability; so he annulled the orders, and at 1.30 formed
on the port tack, recalling the engaged vessels. Both squadrons
now stood in shore, and anchored at about 6 P.M. ; the British near
1782.] SUFFREN AND HUGHES. 557
Negapatam, the French some ten miles north. The loss in the action
had been: British, 77 killed, 233 wounded; French, 178 killed, 601
wonnded. Among the slain was Captain the Hon. Dunbar Maclellan
of Hughes's flagship.
On the following day Suffren sailed for Cuddalore. There he
received word that two ships of the line — the Illustrc, 74, and aSY.
Michel, GO, with a convoy of supplies and 600 troops — were to be
expected shortly at Pointe de Galle, then a Dutcli port, on the south-
west side of Ceylon. It was essential to cover these, and on the 18th
he was ready for sea ; but the necessity of an interview with Hyder
Ali delayed him until the 1st of August, when he started for
Batacalo. On the 9th he arrived there, and on the 21st the reinforce-
ment joined him. Within forty-eight hours the supply-ships were
cleared, and the squadron sailed again with the object of taking
Trincomale. On the 25th he was off the port, and, the operation being
energetically pushed, the place capitulated on the 31st of August.
It is difficult to resist the impression that greater energy on
Hughes's part might have brought him uj) in time to prevent this
mishap. He reached Madras only on July 20th, a fortnight after the
late action; and he did not sail thence until the 20th of August,
notwithstanding that he apprehended an attempt upon Trincomale.
Hence, when he arrived there on the 2nd of September, not only had
it passed into the hands of the enemy, but Suffren had re-embarked
already the men and the guns that had been landed from his fleet.
When Hughes's approach was signalled, all preparations for sea were
hastened, and the following morning, at daybreak, the French came
out. Hughes had been joined since the last action by the Scejitre,
64, Captain Samuel Graves, so that the respective forces in the action
fought off Trincomale on September 3rd were twelve of the line to
fourteen, viz. : British, 3 seventy-fours, 1 seventy, 1 sixty-eight, 6
sixty-fours, 1 fifty; French, 4 seventy -fours, 7 sixty-fours, 1 sixty,
2 fifties. Suffren had also put into the line a 36-gun ship, the
Consolci'iiU.^
While the French were getting under way, the British fleet was
standing towards the entrance, closehauled on the starboard tack, a
fresh south-west monsoon blowing. When Hughes made out the
hostile flags on the works, he kept away four points, ^ and steered
east-south-east, still in column, under short canvas. Suffren pursued,
1 Previously the British. East Indianian, Elizabeth,
2 Forty-five degrees.
558 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
being to -winchvard yet astern, with his fleet on a line of bearing:
that is, the line on which the sliips were ranged was not the same as
the course which they were steering. This formation, wherein the
advance is oblique to the front, is very difficult to maintain. Wish-
ing to make the action, whatever the immediate event, decisive in
results, by drawing the French well to leeward of the port, Hughes,
wlio was a thorough seaman and had good captains, played with his
eager enemy. "He kept avoiding me without taking flight," wrote
Suffren ; '' or rather, he fled in good order, regulating his canvas by
his worst sailers; and, keeping off by degrees, he steered from first
to last ten or twelve different courses." Hughes, on his part, while
perfectly clear as to his own object, was somewhat perplexed by the
seeming indecision of an adversary whose fighting purpose he knew
by experience. "Sometimes they edged down," he wrote; "some-
times they brought-to ; in no regular order, as if undetermined what
to do." These apparent vacillations were due to the difficulty of
maintaining the line of bearing, which was to be the line of battle ;
and this difficulty was the greater, because Hughes was continually
altering his course and Suffren's ships were of unequal speed.
At length, at 2 p.m., being then twenty-five miles south-east of
the port, the French drew near enough to bear down. That this
movement might be carried out with precision, and all the vessels
come into action together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the
A\in(l. on the starboard tack, to rectify the order. This also being
done poorly and slowly, he lost patience; and at 2.30, to spur on
the laggard ships, he gave the signal to attack, specifying pistol-
range (A). Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquents promptly
into line with the flag-ship, the latter fired a gun to enforce obedi-
ence. Her own side being still turned towards the British, as she
waited, the report was taken by the men below to be the signal
for opening fire, and her whole broadside was discharged. This
example was followed by the other ships, so that the engagement,
instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot.
Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his
fleet now in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up. The
French, starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolu-
tion, under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B). Seven ships, round-
ing-to too soon and fore-reaching, formed a confused group, much to
wiiuhvard and somewhat ahead of the enemy's van. Imperfectly
(Irjildvcd. their fire could 7iot bo adequately developed. In the
1782.]
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
o5'J
rear a somewhat similar condition existed. Suffren, expecting the
bulk of his line to fight the British to windward, had directed
the Vcngeur, 64, and the Consolante, 36, to double to leeward on the
extreme rear ; but they, finding that the weather sides of the enemy
were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should be cut
off. They attacked the rear British ship, the Worcester, 64, Captain
Charles Wood, to windward; but the Monmouth, 64, Captain James
Alms (1), dropping down to her support, and the Vencjeur catching
SUFFRE-N AND H U O H El 3 .
CPCP
Qi.5::S^c^'
c:^..-
C::.^
,Ci^
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
fire in the mizzen top, they were compelled to haul off. Only Suffren's
own ship, the Heros, 74 (a), and her next astern, the Illustre, 74,
came at once to close action with the British centre ; but subsequently
the Ajax, 64, succeeding in clearing herself from the snarl in
the rear, took station ahead of the Heros. Upon these three fell the
brunt of the fight. They not only received the broadsides of the
ships immediately opposed to them, but, the wind having now become
light yet free, the British vessels ahead and astern, by luffing or
560 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
keeping off, played also upon them. "The enemy formed a semi-
circle around us," wrote Suffren's chief of staff, "and raked us ahead
and astern, as the ship came up and fell off with the helm to lee-
ward." The two seventy-fours were crushed under this fire. Both
lost their main and mizzen masts in the course of the day, and the
foretopmast of the flagship also fell. The AJax arriving later, and
probably drawing less attention, had only a topmast shot away.
The British total of killed and wounded was very evenly dis-
tributed throughout the fleet. Only the rear ship lost an important
spar, — the main topmast. It was upon her, as already mentioned,
and upon the two leading ships, the Exeter and Isis^ that fell the
heaviest fire, proportionately, of the French. From the position of
the seven van shij)s of the latter, such fire as they could make must
needs be upon the extreme British van, and the Exeter was forced to
leave the line. The loss of the French that day was 82 killed and
255 wounded; of which 64 killed and 178 wounded belonged to the
Heros^ Illustre, and Ajax. The British had 51 killed and 283
wounded; the greatest number of casualties in one ship being 56.
Singularly enough, in such a small list of deaths, three were com-
manding officers: Captains James Watt, of the Sultan, Charles
"Wood of the Worcester^ and the Hon. Thomas Charles Lumley of the
Isis.
At 5.30 P.M. the wind shifted suddenly from south-west to east-
south-east (C). The British wore together, formed on the other tack,
and continued the fight. It was during this final act, and at 6 p.m.,
that the mainmast of the French flagship came down. The van
ships of the French had towed their heads round with boats before
4, in order to come to the support of the centre, in obedience to a
signal from Suffren ; but the light airs and calms had retarded them.
With the shift they approached, and passed in column between their
crippled vessels and the enemy. This manoeuvre, and the failure of
daylight, brought the battle to an end. According to Hughes's
report, several of his fleet " were making much water from shot-holes
so very low down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually
stopped: and the whole had suffered severely in their masts and
rigging." Trincomale being in the enemy's possession, and the east
coast of Ceylon an unsafe anchorage now, at the change of the
monsoon, he felt compelled to return to Madras, where he anchored
on the 9th of the month. Suffren regained Trincomale on the 7th
of September, but the Oric7it, 74, running ashore at the entrance
1783.] SUFFREN AND HUGHES. 561
and being lost, he remained outside until the 17th, saving material
from the wreck.
The break-up of the south-west monsoon, then at hand, is apt to
be accompanied by violent hurricanes, and is succeeded by the north-
east monsoon, during which the east coast, of the peninsula and of
Ceylon, is a lee shore, with heavy surf. Naval operations, there-
fore, were suspended for the winter. During that season Trincomale
is the only secure port. Deprived of it, Hughes determined to
go to Bombay, and for that purpose left Madras on the 17th of
October. Four days later a reinforcement of five ships of the line
arrived from England, under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart.,
who followed the Commander-in-Chief at once to the west coast. In
the course of December the entire British force was united at Bombay.
In Trincomale Suffren had a good anchorage; but the insuffi-
ciency of its resources, wdth other military considerations, decided
him to winter at Acheen, at the west end of Sumatra. He arrived
there on the 2nd of November, having first paid a visit to Cuddalore,
where the Bizarre^ 64, was wrecked by carelessness. On the 20th of
December he left Acheen for the Coromandel coast, having shortened
his stay to the eastward for reasons of policy. On the 8th of
January, 1783, he was off Ganjam, on the Orissa coast, and thence
reached Trincomale again on the 23rd of Februarv. There he was
joined on the 10th of March by three ships of the line from Europe : 2
seventy-fours and 1 sixty^f our. Under their convoy came General de
Bussy, with 2,500 troops, who were at once dispatched to Cuddalore.
On the 10th of April Vice-Admiral Hughes, returning from
Bombay, passed Trincomale on the way to Madras. The various
maritime occurrences since the battle of September 3rd had reversed
the naval odds, and Hughes now had eighteen ships of the line, one
of which was an eighty, opposed to fifteen under Suffren. Another
important event in the affairs of India was the death of Hyder Ali,
on the 7th of December, 1782. Although his policy was continued
by his son, the blow to the French was serious. Under all the con-
ditions, the British authorities were emboldened to attempt the
reduction of Cuddalore. The army destined to this enterprise
marched from Madras, passed round Cuddalore, and encamped south
of it by the shore. The supply-ships and lighter cruisers anchored
near, while the fleet cruised to the southward, Avhere, being to wind-
ward, for the south-west monsoon had then set in, it covered the
operations against disturbance from tlie sea.
VOL III. — 36
562 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1783.
Towards the beginning of June the investment of the place was
complete by land and by water. Intelligence of this state of things
was brought on the 10th of June to Suffren, who by Bussy's direc-
tion was keeping his inferior fleet in Trincomale until its services
should be absolutely indispensable. Immediately upon receiving
the news he left port, and on the 13th sighted the British fleet, then
at anchor off Porto Novo, a little south of Cuddalore. Upon his
approach Hughes moved off, and anchored again five miles from the
besieged place. For the next two days the French were baffled by
the winds; but on the 17th, the south-west monsoon resumed, and
Suffren again drew near. The British Vice-Admiral, not caring to
accept action at anchor, got under way, and from that time till the
20th remained outside, trying to obtain the weather-gage, in which
he was frustrated by the variableness of the winds. Meanwhile
Suffren had anchored near the town, communicated with the general,
and, being- very short of men at the guns, had embarked 1,200 troops
for his expected battle ; for it was evident that the issue of the siege
would turn upon the control of the sea. On the 18th he weighed
again, and the two fleets manoeuvred for the advantage, with light
baffling airs, the British furthest from shore.
On the 20th of June, the wind holding at west with unexpected
constancy, Hughes decided to accept the attack which Suffren evi-
dently intended. The latter, being distinctly inferior in force, — fif-
teen to eighteen, — contemplated probably an action that should be
decisive only as regarded the fate of Cuddalore ; that is, one which,
while not resulting in the capture or destruction of ships, should
compel his opponent to leave the neighbourhood to repair damages.
The British formed line on the port tack, heading to the northward.
Suffren ranged his fleet in the same manner, parallel to the enemy,
and was careful to see the order exact before bearing down. ^ When
the signal to attack was given, the French kept away together, and
l)rouglit-to again on the weather beam of the British, just within
point-blank range. The action lasted from shortly after 4 p.m. to
nearly 7, and was general throughout both lines; but, as always
experienced, the rears were less engaged than the centres and vans.
No ship was taken ; no very important spars seem to have been shot
away. The loss of the British was 99 killed, 434 wounded ; of the
French, 102 killed, 386 wounded.
As the ships' heads were north, the course of the action carried
^ See note on next page.
1783.]
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
bQ^
them in that direction. Suffren anchored next morning twenty-five
miles north of Cuddalore. Tliere lie was sighted on the 22nd by
Hughes, who had remained lying-to the day after the fight. The
British Vice-Admiral reported several ships much disabled, a great
number of his men — 1,121 — down with scurvy, and the water of the
fleet ver}^ short. He therefore thought it necessary to go to Madras,
where he anchored on the 25th. Suffren regained Cuddalore on the
afternoon of the 23rd. His return and Hughes's departure com-
pletely changed the military situation. The supply-ships, upon
which the British scheme of operations depended, had been forced
to take flight when Suffren first approached, and of course could not
come back now. " My mind is on the rack without a moment's rest
since the departure of the fleet," wrote the commanding general on the
25th, " considering the character of M. de Suffren, and the infinite su-
periority on the part of the French now that we are left to ourselves."
The battle of June 20th, 1783, off Cuddalore, was the last of the
maritime war of 1778. It was fought, actuall}', exactly five months
Note. — List of the British and French fleets in the action off Cuddalore, on
June 20th, 1783: —
BRITISH.
FRENCH.
SHIPS.
EC
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
la
COMMANDERS.
o
ii
Cumberland . .
74
Capt. William Allen.
Her OS ....
74
MonmoiUh . .
64
Capt. James Alms (1).
Pendant .
74
Bristol ....
.50
Capt. James Burney.
Annibal .
74
Hero ....
74
( Commod. Richard King.
1 Capt. Theophilus Jones.
Ilhistre .
74
Argonatde
74
Eagle ....
G4
Capt. William Clark.
Vengeur .
64
3fag7ianim>' . .
64
Capt. Thomas Mackenzie.
Sphinx
64
Sceptre . . .
64
Capt. Samuel Graves.
Ariesien .
64
Bur ford . . .
64
Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Ajax . .
64
Monarca . . .
68
Capt. Jolm Gell.
r Vice-Admiral Sir Ed ward Hughes,
- K. B. (B).
I Capt. Henry Newcome.
Severe . .
Brillant .
64
64
Superb ....
74
Hardi . .
64
St. Michel
60
Sultan ....
74
Capt. Andrew Mitchell.
Flamand .
50
Africa ....
64
Capt. Robert M'DouaU.
Hannibal .
50
Worcester . . .
64
Capt. Charles Hughes.
Apollon
40
Exeter ....
64
Capt. John Samuel Smith.
Cleopatre
36
Inflexible . . .
64
Capt. the Hon. John Whitmore
Coventry
28
Chetwynd.
1 Commodore Sir Richard Bicker-
Cribrallar . . .
80
\ ton, Bart.
' Capt. Thomas Hicks.
Isis
50
Capt. Christopher Halliday.
Defence . . .
74
Capt. Thomas Newnham.
Juno . . .
32
Capt. James Montagu.
Medea . .
28
Capt. Erasmus Gower.
Seahorse . .
20
1
W. L. C.
564 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1783.
after the preliminaries of peace had been signed. ^ Although the rela-
tive force of the two fleets remained unchanged, it was a French vic-
tory, both tactically and strategically : tactically, because the inferior
fleet held its ground, and remained in possession of the field : strate-
gically, because it decided the object immediately at stake, the fate
of Cuddalore, and with it, momentarily at least, the issue of the
campaign. It was, however, the triumph of one commander-in-chief
over another; of the. greater man over the lesser. Hughes's reasons
for quitting the field involve the admission of his opponent's greater
skill. " Short of water," — with eighteen ships to fifteen that should
not have happened ; " injury to spars, " — that resulted from the action ;
" 1,121 men short,"' — Suffren had embarked just that number — 1,200
— because Hughes let him communicate with the port without fight-
ing. This is not the place, nor is there room, for enlargement upon
the merits of Suffren ; upon the difticulties he surmounted, and the
genius he showed. He was a great sea-captain, Hughes was not;
and with poorer instruments, both in men and ships, the former over-
came the latter.
On the 29th of June a British frigate, the 3Iedea, bearing a flag of
truce, reached Cuddaloie. She brought well-authenticated intelli-
gence of the conclusion of peace; and hostilities ceased by common
consent.
I January 20, 1783.
,^'
Sttii X--
APPENDIX.
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roLVME in.
Note — British naval officers in the fuUoiving are described as of the rank to which
they attained upon the completion of their active service.
Abekcrombie, General, 172, 185
Aberdeen, 340
Abola, 37
Abraham, Heights of, 209, 357
Acadia : see Nova Scotia
Acapulco, 108, 241, 323
Ache, Admiral Comte d', 164, 174-182,
197-199, 274
Acheen, 132, 561
AchiJle, 119, 120 u., 121, 305, 306, 311, 313
Achilles, 215 n., 216, 234 n., 235, 299, 301,
311, 313
Ackworth, Jacob, 3
Actfeon, 233, 234 ii., 236 and n., 242 n.,
313, 373, 376
Actif, 198 n., 415
Action for Avrongful trial by court-martial,
350
Actions (principal) : battle of Cape Passavo,
33-38 ;■ capture of Puerto Bello, 54-57;
capture of Chagres, 61, 62 ; Lord Aubrey
Beauclerk and M. de Boisgeroult, 64
and n. ; at Cartagena, 70-75 ; at La
Guayra, 85-86; at Puerto Cabello,
87-88; off Toulon, 93-107; Lion and
Elisabeth, 110, 111 ; Peyton and La
Bourdonnais, 120 ; Anson and de La
Jouquiere, 124-126 ; Hawke and de
L'Etenduere, 126-129 ; Knowles at Port
Louis, 133, 134 ; Knowles's off Havana,
135-137; Watson at Geriah, 143, 144;
Byng and de La Galissonniere, 147-155 ;
capture of Calcutta, 161, 162 ; capture of
Chandernagore, 163 ; Forrest and de Ker-
saiut, 165, 166 ; off Cuddalore, 174-176 ;
off Negapatam, 179-181 ; reduction of
Louisbourg, 183, 184; Boscawen and
du Chaflault, 185, 186 ; capture of Goree,
188, 189; Osborn and Duquesne, 189,
190; Pocock and d'Ache (Sept. 10th,
1759), 198, 199 ; capture of Guadeloupe,
202, 203 ; capture of Quebec, 204-210 ;
Boscawen and de La Clue, 211-215;
Hawke and de Conflans, 216-223 ; Cap-
tain Norbury and a French squadron,
225, 226 ; Captain Elliot and M. Thurot,
230 ; capture of l^elle Isle, 234-236 ; cap-
ture of Manilla, 239-242 ; capture of
Martinique, 243 ; iu the River Plate, 251,
252 ; capture of the Northumherland,
274, 275 ; Nottingham and Mars, 281,
282; the Glorioso taken, 285, 286; the
Magnanime taken, 287 ; Buckiwiham
and Florissa?it, 300 ; Vestal and Bellone,
300, 301; the Banae taken, 301; Uni-
corn and Vestale, 304; Minerva and
Warioick, 304, 305 ; Bellona and Coura-
geux, 306, 307 ; Phoenix and Bholu,
352 ; off Valcour Island, 363-368 ; Parker
at Charleston, 373-379 ; Ke}i[iel and
d'Orvilliers, off Ushant, 413-426; Bar-
rington and d'Estaing, 431, 432 ; Byron
and d'Estaing, off Grenada, 434-440 ;
Rodney's action off St. Vincent, 449, 450 ;
Rodney's relief of Gibraltar, 451 ; Rodney
and de Guichen, 453-463 ; Rodne\' and
de Guichen again, 463-466 and 466-468 ;
Cornwallis and La Motte-Picquet, 473,
474 ; Cornwallis and de Ternay, 474-
477 ; capture of St. Eustatia, etc., 480,
481 ; Hood and de Grasse, 482-488 ;
Arbuthnot and des Touches, 489-493 ;
Graves and de Grasse, 495-502 ; battle
of the Doggersbank, 504-509 ; Kempen-
fclt and de Guichen, 509, 510 ; Hood and
de Grasse at St. Kitts, 512-519 ; Rodney
and de Grasse, April 9th, 1782 . . 520-
524 ; April 12th, 1782. .525-535 ; Howe's
relief of Gibraltar, 540-543 ; Yei'ntm and
Tronjoly, 543 ; Johnstone and Suffren,
546-549; Hughes and Suffren, off Sadras,
550-552 ; Hughes and Suffren, off Pro-
vidien, 552-554 ; Hughes and Suffren,
off Negapatam, 555-557 ; Hughes and
Suffren, off" Trincomale, 557-560 ; Hughes
and Suffren, off Cuddalore, 562-564
570
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Actionnaire, 415, 458, 539
Arfire, 212 n., 308, 373, 374, 494, 495,
546 n.
Adamant, 492 n., 497 n.
Adams, George, 3
Adams, H., shipbuilder, 12
Adams, Captaia Sir Thomas, Bart., 232
Adams, Captain "William (1), 131 n., 132
Adams, Captain William (2), 206 n., 208,
226 n., 253
Administration of the Navy, 1, 325
Admiraal De Ruijter, 505 n.
Admiraal Gencraal, 505 n.
Admiraal Piet Heijn, 505 n.
Admirals, 19, 20
Admirals of the Fleet, 19, 39 and u., 237
Admiralty's attempt to inflict punishment
irrespective of the sentence of a court-
martial, 350, 351
Admiralty Board, ], 2, 3, 325
Admiralty Buildings, 2
Admiralty, Court of, 350
Admiralty's politeness to La Perouse, 352
Adventure, 8, 234 n., 293, 311, 337
Advice, 86, 88, 121
^Eolus, 230 and n., 301, 313
^Etna or Etna, 70 n., 212 u., 215, 234 n.,
335
Affleck, Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund, Bart^,
234 u., 395 n., 492 n., 513 n., 520 n., 567
Affleck, Admiral Philip, 212 n., 225, 466 n.,
567
Affleck, Captain William (1), 434, 454 n.
Africa, 71 n., 72, 135 u., 136, 314, 315,
563 n.
Africa Company, The Royal, 260
Agamemrion, 509 n., 520 n.
Aguila, 34, 314
Aguirre, Captain Don Pablo Augustiu de,
268
Aiqh, 314
Aicjrette, 218 n., 300 n., 304
Aiguillon, Due d', 195, 196
Aiken, Captain, (Russian Navy), 341
AimahJe, 537
Aislabie, John, 3
Aix, Isle d', 124, 126, 171, 172, ]90, 191,
236
Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 29, 132, 138 ;
Congress of, 130
Ajaccio, 273, 314
AJax, 254 n., 482 n., 497 n., 505 n., 513 n.,
520 n., 550 n., 555, 559, 560, 563 n.
Alarm, 14, 224 n., 246 n., 247 and n.,
315 (2), 336, 520 n.
Albanv', New York, 300, 370, 389, 391, 393
A/lxuii/, 311, 313, 318
Albemarle, 537
Albemarle, General George, Earl of, 238,
246, 248, 249
Alberoni, Cardinal, 30, 33
Albert, [Marquis d', 96, 287 and n.
Albion, 395 n., 434, 453, 454 n., 459
Alcide, 141, 142, 206 n., 209, 220 n., 226 n.,
242 n., 245 n., 240 u., 250, 289, 312, 313,
482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Alcion, 96, 123 n., 295, 297, 312
Alcidn, 96
Aldborough, 234 n.
Alderete, Captain Don Gabriel, 34
Alderneij, 60, 62 n., 76 n., 103, 223 n.
Alecto, 335
Alert, 415, 505 u., 520 n.
Alexander, 282, 509 n.
Alexander, shipbuilder, 12
Alexandre, 415
Alfred, 482 n., 497 n., 512, 513 u., 520 u.,
521, 534
Algeciras, 292, 448, 540, 541
Algier or Algiers, 288
Alicaut, 51
Allen, Captain Edward, GO, 276, 310
Allen, Ethan, 355
Allen, E., shipbuilder, 12, 335
Allen, J., shipbuilder, 12
Allen, Lieutenant James, 311
Allen, Admiral John Carter, 188, 233 n.,
242 n., 415, 567
Alliance : with Russia, Denmark, and
Holland, 26 ; with France and the
Empire, 29 ; with France, the Empire,
and . Holland, 29 ; with France and
Prussia, 42 ; with Denmark, 43 ; with
S])ain, France, and Holland, 48 ; with
Holland, Austria, Saxon}^ and Sardinia,
89 n. ; of France with Prussia, Hessen,
and the Pfalz, 89 n. ; of France with
Spain, 89, 238 ; with Portugal, 238 ; be-
tween America and the Bourbon king-
doms, 354, 368, 3h8, 394 ; of France and
Spain, 443, 447
Alliances, Disadvantages of, 40
Allin, Josei h, 3
Alms, Captain James (1), 242 n., 246 n.,
247, 546 n., 550 u., 552 n., 559
Alvario, Captain Don C, 96
Alverera, Captain Don Francisco, 34
Ainaranthe, 229 and n., 230 n.
Amazon, 201 n., 283 n., 284, 312
Amblimont, Captain d', 127 n., 415
Ambo}^ New Jersey, 388
Ambrose, Captain John, 96, 104
Ambuscade, 125 n., 212 n., 251, 296
America : see also North America, etc., 310
America, 96, 98, 212 and n., 213, 214, 215,
222 n., 224, 225, 240 n., 247 u., 315, 415,
492 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n., 532
American Colonies, 14, 58, 109, 113-115,
116, 117, 166-169, 243, 262, 331, 354
et seq.
American Lidians, 109, 115, 139, 226, 366
Amvtliyst, 303
Amherst, Admiral John, 148 n., 200 n.,
311, 566
Amherst, Field-Marshal Jeffrey, Lord Am-
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
571
herst, 182, 183, 186, 204, 205, 208, 210,
226, 228
AmpMon, 415
Amphitrite, 335, 505 u.
Anchors, 9
Andrews, Captain Thomas (2), 123 n.,
133 n., 1-41, 148 n., 150
Andro, Port, 235
Andromache, 520 n.
Andromaque, 415
Andromeda, 415, 454 n., 479 n.
Anemone, 313
Angell, Captain Henry, 223 n., 242 n.
Anglesey, 57, 278, 311
Angria, TuLagee, 143, 144
Anguilla, 109
Anna, 310, 320
Annamaboe, 139
Annapolis Eoval, 109, 168
Anne GaUeijJsi, 96, 100, 273, 310
Annibal, 452, 453, 473, 474, 546 n., 547,
548, 549, 550 n., 563 n.
Anson, Admiral of the Fleet, George, Lord,
2, 20, 52, 108, 124, 125 and n., 126,
128 n., 129, 192, 19.% 237, 247, 267, 281,
283, 299, 312, 320-324, 338
Anson, 222 n., 520 n., 533 n.
Antelope, 155, 156, 186, 223 n., 250, 251,
295, 312, 313
Antibes, 123
Anticosti, 358
Antigua, 22, 23, 54 u., 85, 203, 347, 427,
428, 429, 479, 486, 494, 511, 518, 519
Antigua, 201 n., 242 n.
Antilles : see West Indies
Antin, Admiral the Marquis d', 58, 63,
64 n., 68, 272
Antonio, Captain Don J., 247 n.
Antrobus, Captain Charles, 223 n., 234 n.
Anville, Due d', 117
Aplin, Admiral Peter, 406 n.
Apollo, 131 n., 311, 406 n., 407, 408
Apollon, 125 and n., 183, 278, 280, 311,
313, 563 n.
Apprenticing seamen's children, 342
Apraxine, General- Admii-al, 43
Apret, Captain d', 174 n., 176
Aguilon, 96, 224 n., 235 n., 244, 245, 252,
271, 291, 295, 312
Aguilon, 247 n., 315
Arbuthnot, Aduural Marriot (originally
Marriott), 218 n., 246 u., 248, 250, 327,
401 n., 440, 469, 470, 471, 472, 489-
493, 494, 502, 566
Arc en del, 293, 312
Archantel, Captain de 1', 415
Arcot, 224
Arctic, The, 318-320, 389
Ardent, 64 n., 283, 312, 400, 406 n., 444,
492 n., 534
Ardesoif, Captain John Plummer, 497 n.
Arethusa, 397, 412, 415, 509 n.
Arethuse, 302, 313
Argo, 223 n., 239, 241 and n., 303, 505 n.
Argonaut, 335
Argonaute, 563 n.
Argote, Captain Don D., 247 n.
Argyle, 34, 35, 36
Ariadne, 335, 430, 431, 434
Ariga, Gulf of 1', 38
Armed Neutrality, The, 478
Armed ships, 330, 392, 546 n.
Armourers, 342
Arnold, General Benedict, 354-369, 379,
385, 389, 472, 473, 488, 489, 493
Arrisago, Captain Don Antonio, 34
Arrogant, 520 n.
Arrows, Poisoned, 266
Arsic, Fort d', 235, 236
Artesien, 415, 546 n., 550 n., 563 n.
Articles of War, The, 17 and n., 129, 137,
157 and n.
Artois, 505 n.
Asia, 247 n., 315, 543 n.
Assendelft, 91
Assieuto Treaty, The, 262
Assistance, 86, 87, 139, 273, 300
Astroia, 57 n., 70 n., 310, 314
Astronomer Pioyal, The, 338
Asuncion, 249 and n.
Atalanta, 352
Atalante, 96, 227, 290, 300 n., 313
Atkins, Captain Christopher, 373
Atkins, Samuel, 3
Atkins, Captain Samuel, 34
Aubenton, Captain d', 415
Aubigny, Vice- Admiral d', 125 n., 126, 145,
290
Audacieux, 312
Audierne Bay, 295, 299, 3l3
Augusta, 76, 165 and n., 278, 335 (2), 343,
391 392
Auguste, 27 and n., 282, 310, 312
Augustus II., Elector of Saxony and King
of Poland, 49
Aurora, 8, 12, 224 n., 431
Aurore, 8
Austria : (see also Empire, The) ; 123, 124,
190
Auvergne, Prince de Bouillon, Vice- Admiral
Philip d', 546 n.
Avery, Daniel, 15
Avery, the buccaneer, 259
Aylmer, Admiral John (1), 520 n.
Aylmer, Admiral of the Fleet Matthew,
Lord, 112 n.
Azores, The, 285, 443 n.
Badger, 16, 223 n.
Bahama, Old Strait of, 247, 312, 496 and n.
Bahamas, The, 266, 311, 469
Baillie, Captain Thomas (1), 212 n., 293,
311
Baird, Mr. Henry Carey, of Philadelphia
cited, 333 n.
Baird, Captain Patrick, 148 n., 218 n.
572
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
Baird, Captain Sir AVilliam, Bart., 198 n.
Baker, Captain James, 211, 212 n.
Baker, Yice-Admiral John, 258
Balchen, Admiral Sir John, 34, 49, 63, 65,
90 n., 91, 107, 108 and n., 267, 284, 310
Baleine, 224, 313
Balfour, Captain George, 184, 185, 222 n.,
346 and n., 395 n., 489, 520 n.
Ballasore, 163
Baltic, The, 26, 27, 28, 38, 40-43, 47, 256,
257, 310, 478, 504, 538
Baltimore, 113, 206 n., 282
Banca, Strait of, 108
Banks, or Bancks, CajDtain Francis (1),
242 n.; 246 n., 385, 387
Bar, New York, 401 and n.
Baradera, The, 09, 71, 72
Barbados, 201, 233, 242, 245, 338, 427, 428,
429, 466, 468, 478, 479, 487, 48f, 502,
510, 519, 520, 537
Barbados, 242 n., 246 n., 479 n.
Barbarat, Keys of, 88
Barbary, Coast of, 211, 257, 258, 541
Tiarbor, Captain Robert, 520 n.
Barbuda, 311, 408, 470
Barcelona, 32, 66, 67, 155
Barclay, Captain Sir James, Bart., 406 n.
Barfleur, 12, 34, 35, 36, 90, 97, 98 and n.,
171, 172, 335, 343, 482 n., 497 n., 513
and n., 514, 516, 517, 520 n., 521, 526,
530, 532, 534, 535
Barham, Lord: see Middleton, Admiral Sir
Charles
Barker, Eear-Admiral John (1), 212 n.,
245 n., 246 n., 566
Barkiey, Captain Andrew, 513 n., 520 u.
Barlow, the navigator, 318
Barnard, shipbuilder, 12
Baruet, Captain Curtis, 81, 82, 91, 105, 103,
]09, 119, 270, 271
Bamsley, Captain Henry, 169 and u., 311
Barrabas Point, 188
Barradell, Captain Bloomfield, 125 n.
Barrailh, M. de, 90, 91
J3arras, Commodore de, 492, 495, 496, 501
Barre, Isaac, 326
Barre, Major, 228
Barrella, C^aptain Don, 135 n.
Barrida, Captain Don B, de La, 96
Barrington, Major-General Hon. John, 203
Barrington, Admiral Hon. Samuel, 139 n.,
215 ^n., 216, 234 n., 230, 284, 299,301,
427-433, 434, 436, 437, 440, 477, 520,
521, 538, 539, 566
Barrington, William AVildman, Viscount,
3, 326
Barton, Admiral Matthew, 188 and n.,
234 n., 235, 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 248,
311, 566
Basliee Islands, 318, 323
Busilish; 34, 131 n., 132, 215 n., 242 n.,
240 n., 312
Basin of Quebec, 207, 227
Basque Eoad, 126, 191, 223, 236, 239, 252
Basse Terre, St. Kitts, 510, 511, 513 n.
Basse Terre, Guadeloupe, 202, 203
Basset, Captain Christopher, 156, 212 n.
Bastard, ]\LP., Mr., 346, 347
Bastia, 110
Bastimentos, The, 43, 46, 79
Batavia, 131, 201
Batavier, 505 n.
Bateley, William, 3, 326
Bateman, Captain Nathaniel, 226 n., 434,
454 n., 456 n.
Bateman, Captain Hon. William, 3, 4, 326
Batiscan, 207, 209
Batson, M., shi])builder, 12
Batteries v. Ships, Washington's views on,
385
Batticaloa, 197, 554, 557
Bayne, Captain William, 201 n., 242 n.,
482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 u., 534
Baj'ona Islands, 302
Bayonets, 9, 158, 183, 209
Bayonne, 308
Bazely, Admiral John (1), 415, 417, 454 n.
Lieachy Head, Battle of, 439
Beatson quoted, 67, 69, 70, 95, 101, 138,
151 n., 210, 214, 388, 499, 503
Beauclerk, Captain Lord Aubrey, 64, 65, 71,
72
Beauclerk, Admiral Lord Yere, later Lord
A'ere, 4
Beauffremout-Listenois, Commodore the
Prince de, 218 n., 220, 223
Beauffremont, Commodore de, 146, 167
Beaulieu, 12
Beauniier, Captain de, 415
Beaunes, Captain de, 415
Beauport, 200
Beaussier, Commodore de, 145, 182
Beaver s Prize, 479 n.
Beavor, Captain Edmund, 311
Bee de Lievre, Captain, 174 n., 179 n.
Beccart, Captain, 125 n.
Becher, Conunander John, 400 n.
Bedford, John, Duke of, 2, 20
Bedford, , Duke of, 230, 253
Bedford, 83 n., 96, 98, 206 n., 235 n., 281.
305, 310, 313, 395 n., 489, 492 n., 497 n.,
513 n., 514, 520 n., 531
Bedoyere, Captain de La, 127 n.
BeeJcuHet, 91
Bcgon, 229, 230 n.
Belfast, 229, 230
Bell, Governor, 169
Belleisle, Marcchal de, 124
Belleisle, 246 n., 545 n.
Belle Isle, 110, 217, 218, 219, 234-236, 242,
254, 283, 284, 311, 314
Belle Poule, 397, 412, 505 n.
Bellingham, William, 326
Belliqueux, 185, 186, 217, 313, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Bellona, 284, 306, 307, 313, 505 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
573
Bellone, 113, 284, 300, 301, 312, 313, 550 n.
Bencote, (Fort Yictoria), 143
Bengal, 121, 160, 161 n., 162-164, 201, 254
Bengal, Bay of, 109
Bennett, Commander Thomas Stanhope,
546 n.
Bentinck, Captain John Albert, 303
Bentinck, Captain W. J., 505 n.
Bentley, Yice-Adnural Sir John, Kt., 4,
l'^5 n., 127 n., 182, 212 n., 215, 218 n.,
311, 326, 565
Beretti-Landi, Marques de, 36, 38
Bergen, 229
Berkeley, Captain George, 57, 61, 96, 273
Berkeley, Admiral of the Fleet James, Earl
of {earlier Lord Dursley), 2, 39 and n.,
112 n., 261
Berkeley, 313
Bermuda, 426, 429, 474
Bermudez, Captain Don P., 247 n.
Bertie, Captain Lord Thomas, 120 n.
Bertie, Colonel Lord Eobert, 147, 154, 157
Bertin, 305, 313
Berwick, 43 n., 46 n., 92, 96, 98, 100, 101,
169, 189, 201 n., 202, 203, 313, 315, 415,
505 n.
Betagh, William, 316, 318
Bethell, Captain Christopher Codrington,
223 n.
Beverley, Captain Thomas, 34
Bic, Isle, 206
Biche, 183, 313
Bickerton, Eear-Admiral Sir Eichard, Bart.,
212 n., 246 n., 343, 415, 482 n., 561, 567
Biddeford, 262, 302, 311
Bien Acquise, 295, 297, 312
Bien Aime, 83 n., 174 n., 175, 176, 313,
415
Bienfaisuvt, 184, 185, 222 n., 228, 313 (2),
415, 505 n.
Biggs, Vice- Admiral Eobert, 415
Bird, H., shipbuilder, 335
Biscay, Bay of, 129, 147, 232, 233, 283,
295, 297, 310, 313, 481, 509, 538
Bizarre, 218 n., 299, 300, 550 n., 561
" Blackbeard " : see Thatch, Edward
Black Hole of Calcutta, The, 161
Blacksmiths, 342
Blair Captain William, 395 n., 434, 505 n.,
520 n., 533 n.
Blake, Commander Peter, 311
Blake, Governor, 161
Blakeney, General William, 63, 74, 146,
148, 153
Blanche, 479 n.
Blandford, 289, 310, 311 (2)
Blane, Sir Gilbert, 450, 533, 534
Blankett, Eear- Admiral Jolm, 545 n.
Blast, 34, 215 n., 236 and n., 311, 520 n.
Blaze, 161 n.
Blenac, Commodore de, 244, 245, 246, 252
Blenheim, 12
Bligh, Lieutenant-General Thomas, 193-195
Blockade in winter. Difficulties of, 189, 216,
217
Blockade : of Puerto Bello, 44 ; of Chagres,
61 ; of Santiago, 76 ; of Toulon b}'
Mathews, 84, 85, 89 ; of Cartagena, 116,
124 ; of Antibes, 123 ; of Pondicherry,
131 ; of Brest, 145, 146, 170, 171, 195,
196 ; of Louisbourg, 115, 141, 168, 172,
182 ; of French Channel ports, 173 ; of
Cartagena, 189, 190; of Toulon by Bos-
cawen, 211 ; of Cadiz, 215 ; of Brest bj^
Ha.vke, 216, 223; of Dunquerque, 223;
of Le Havre, 224 ; of Pondicherry, 224,
225; of Quiberou Bay, 231, -232; of
Martinique, 242; of Grenada, 244; of
Cape Francois, 246 ; of St. John's, 251 ;
of French ports, 252; of Fort Eoyal,
481
Blockmakers, 342
Blonde, 230 and n., 231, 301, 366
Blue uniform. Origin of the, 20
Board of Longitude, 13, 338
Board of Ordnance, 332
Boatswains, 19, 21
Boca Chica, 69
Boca Nao, Eiver, 248
Boisgeroult, Captain d'Epinai de, 64 n.
Boles, Commander Jolin, 201 n.
Bolt-drawing machine, 337
Bolt Head, 231, 311
Bolton, Duke of: see Powlett, Admiral Lord
Harry
Bombardment : of Cartagena, 60, 61 ; of
Chagres, 62 ; of Bastia, 116 ; of Madras,
121 ; of Chandernagore, 163 ; of St.
Pierre, 202 ; of Le Havre, 216 ; of Palais,
236 ; of Fort Eoyal, 243 ; of Moro Castle,
248
Bombay, 143, 161 n., 164, 181, 197, 200,
232, 545, 561
Bombay, 143
Bombay Castle, 340
Bombs, 12, 30, 33, 34, 40, 42, 46 n., 47, 59,
60, 61, 62, 70 n., 73, 74, 76 n., 84 n., 86,
117, 131 n., 161 and n., 172, 188, 192,
201 n., 200, 206 n., 209, 215 and n., 216,
234 and n., 235, 236 n., 242 n., 245 n.,
261, 276, 281, 314, 330, 335, 428 n.,
546 n.
Bompart, Commodore de, 203, 210, 217
Bond, Captain Eobert, 206 n.
Bonechea, Captain Don D., 247 n.
Bonetta, 76 n., 80, 201 n., 246 n., 248, 276,
310
Bonne Homme Richard, 279, 298
Bonnet, Stede, 260
Booms, 69, 72, 76, 135, 389, 445
Boreas, 185, 215 n., 225, 226, 246 n., 298,
313 (2)
Boree, 96, 271
Bornholm, 27
Boscawen, 206 n., 207, 280
Boscawen, Admiral Eight Hon. Edward*
574
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
51 n., 71, 72 n., 73 n., 113, 125 n., 126,
130-132, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 171,
172, 173, 182-186, 196, 210-215, 217,
222, 223, 224, 231 and n., 266, 267, 274
and n., 289, 291 n., 297, 302, 303, 311,
313, 444 n.
Boscawen, General Hon. George, 193
Boston, 134, 335
Boston, Massachusetts, 113, 185, 370, 371,
387, 409, 410, 428, 488, 495
Boston, Captain 'lliouias, 509 n.
Bot-Deru, Captain de, 415
Boteler, Captain Philip, 246 n., 444
Botterell, Captain Jolm, 242 n.
Bouffonne, 306, 313
Bougainville, Vice- Admiral Louis Antoine
de, 208 and n.
Bouille, Marquis de, 453, 463, 510
Boulogne, 16
Boulogne, 308
Bounties to seamen, 18, 19, 49, 140, 339,
340, 342
Bounty, 339
Bourbon, or Reunion, 197, 231, 232, 234
Bourbon, 120 n.
Bourbon assistance to America, 354
Bourchier, Captain John, 520 n.
Bonrdonnais, M. Mahe de La, 119-122, 124
Bouritius, Captain, 505 n.
Bourke, Commander William Francis, 246 n.
Bouvet (2), Commodore, 130, 132, 174 and
n., 176, 179 n., 198 n.
Bouvet, Captain Comte de, 289
Bouvet, Rear-Admiral Francois Joseph,
Baron, 550 n.
Bow and quarter line, 513, 531
Bowater, Admiral Edward, 497 n.
Bowdler, Captain Jolui, 84 n.
Bowen, Admiral George (1), 497 u. 513 n.,
520 n.
Bowyer, Admiral Sir George, Bart., 395 n.,
434, 454 n., 459, 460
Boyd, Captain John, 233 n., 242 n.
Boyle, Captain John, 546 n.
Boyle, Hon. Robert : see Walsingham, Cap-
tain Hon. Robert Boyle
Bo7/ne, 66, 70 n., 71, 72, 75 n., 76 n., 79 n.,
80, 92, 96, 98, 104, 395, 428, 431, 434,
436, 454 n., 466
Boys, Captain William, 196, 223 and n.,
229
Braak, Captain A., 505 n.
Braam, Cajjtain W. van, 505 n.
Brach, Captain de, 415
Bradby, Cajjtain James (1), 415, 509 n.
Braddock, General, 139, 140, 111
I'raiid, Captain Ellis, 27 n.
Brathwaite, Admiral Richard, 387, 404,
406 n., 428 n., 454 n., 505 n., 568
Brave, 510, 530, 536 n.
Bray, Captain John, 206 n., 347
Braziers, 342
Brazil, 50, 260
Breda, 34, 35, 43 n., 45
Brederode, 91
Brereton, Captain William, 174 n., 177,
179 n., 198 n., 199, 225, 241 and n., 415
Brest, 58, 89, 90, 92, 95, 107, 117, 126, 128,
140, 142, 145, 146, 164, 167, 169, 170,
172, 182, 192, 195, 196, 210, 216, 217,
221, 224, 233, 235, 239, 244, 250, 252,
275, 276, 277 and n., 283, 287, 289, 294,
295, 299, 302, 305, 308, 311, 312, 313,
352, 394, 396; 397, 413, 414, 433, 443,
446, 447, 452, 469, 478, 482, 502, 503,
504, 509, 510, 519, 539, 546
Bretagne, 415, 420
Brett, Captain John, 276, 278
Brett, Admiral Sir Piercy (1), Kt., 110,
125 n., 196, 223, 224 and n., 232, 233,
239,
oxo
308, 324, 565
Brett, Timothy, 3, 326
Brett, Captain William, 234 n.
Brice {later Kingsmill), Robert : see Kings-
mill, Admiral Sir Robert, Bart.
Bricklayers, 342
Bricqueville, Captain de, 415
Bridgeiuater, 140, 143, 161 and n., 162,
174, 258, 311
Bridport, Lord : see Hood, Aduural Alexander
Arthur
Brigs, 330
Brillant, 121, 218 n., 244, 550 n., 554, 556,
563 n.
BriUante, 96
Brill iant, 8, 12, 215, 230 n., 306
Brimstone Hill, St. Kitts, 510, 512, 518
Brine, Admiral James, 482 n., 497 n.
Brisbane, Admiral John, 403, 568
Brisk, 335
Bristol, Earl of: see Hervey, Hon. Augustus
John
Bristol, 259, 335, 340. 563 n.
Bristol, 76, 125 n., 201 and n., 202, 372,
373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 473, 474
Britannia, 509 n.
British officers in the Portuguese service,
238 and n.
Brittany, 113, 118, 119, 196, 302
Broderick (properly Brodrick), Vice-Ad-
miral Thomas, 60 and n., 73, 152 and n.,
155, 156, 170, 171, 190, 210, 211, 212
and n., 214, 215, 298, 311, 565
Brodie, Captain David, 133 n., 135 n., 344
and n.
Bromedge, Ca})tain Hugh, 215 n.
Brooks, Captain John, 545 n.
Brown, Captain Charles, 4, 51 n., 54, 55,
60, 266, 267
Brown, Adn\iral John, 474 n.
Browne, Field-Marshal Maximilian Ulysses,
Count, 123
Brueys, Vice- Admiral Comte de, 400 n.
Brune, 305, 309, 313, 314
Brunswick, Kew Jersey, 388
Brunswick, 335
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
575
Bryne, Captain Henry, 415, 454 n., 479 n.
Buccaneers, 61, 79
Buckingham, 40 u., 63, 96, 148 n., 151 n.,
201 n., 234 n., 236 and n., 300
Buckle, Admiral Matthew (1), 139, 185,
212 n., 215, 218 n., 222, 234, 235 and n.,
286, 305, 566
Bucklershard, 335
Bucknall, J., shipbuilder, 335
Buckner, Admiral Charles, 520 n.
Buenos Ayres, 251, 252
Buffalo, 505 n., 507 and n., 508
Bunker's Hill, 378
Buoys, 338
Burchett, Josiali, 3, 264
Burford, 34, 46 n., 55, 56, 57 n., 59, 62,
70 n., 75 n., 86, 87, 88, 96, 201 n., 202,
218 n., 234 n., 310, 545 n., 550 n., 552
n., 556, 563 n.
Burgojme, Lieutenant-General John, 354,
359, 360, 366, 370, 389, 390, 391, 392.
398
Burke, Edmund, quoted, 379
Burlington, 388
Burnaby, Vice-Admiral Sir William, Bart.,
250, 292, 415, 565
Burnaby, Captain Sir William Chaloner,
Bart.^ 546 n.
Burnett, Captain Thomas, 201 n., 202, 227 n.,
242 n., 246 n., 312, 492 n., 520 n.
Burrish, Captain George, 96, 103
Bursledon, 335
Burslem, Captain Francis, 218 n.
Burton, Richard, 3
Bury, Captain Thomas (1), 310
Busses, 187
Bussy, General de, 561, 562
Busy, 505 n.
Butchart, Captain Johp, 434
Butger, Commander, 505 n.
Button, the navigator, 318
Bylandt, Rear-Admiral Count Lodewijk
van, 351
Byng, Sir George : see Torrington, Admiral
of the Fleet Sir George Byng, Viscounc
Byng, Admiral Hon. John, 105, 106, 113,
123, 124, 130, 137, 142, 146-160, 196 n.,
289, 290 and n., 292, 293, 423, 467, 45S,
498 n., 499
Byng, Hon. Henry Pattee, 3, 33 n.
Byng, Robert, 3, 4
Byron, Captain George Anson, 520 u.
Byron, Vice-Admiral Hon. John, 190 n.,
224, 228, 235 n., 313, 322, 324, 395 and
n., 396, 399, 404, 408, 409, 410, 412, 428,
433, 434-440, 443, 452, 4()0, 473, 566
Cables, 9
Cabot, 505 n.
Cadiz, 31, 38, 39, 47, 62, 65, 66, 67, 107,
116, 212 and n., 215, 280, 285, 306, 308,
448, 449, 450, 452, 468, 469, 477, 478,
502, 503, 504, 509, 539
Cxsar, 335
Caimamera, 76 n.
Calabria, 33
Calais, 112
Calcutta, 201
Calcutta, 160, 161-163, 543
Caldwell, Admiral Benjaiuin, 509 n., 520 n.
California, 317
California, 319, 320
Callis, Rear-Admiral Smith, 86, 211, 212 n.,
273, 285 n., 310
Calmady, Admiral Charles Holmes Everitt
{formerly Charles Holmes Everitt), 497 n.,
513 and n.
Caliiady, Captain Warwick, 115, 311
Calypso, 218 n., 244 n., 299, 313
Cambridge, 96, 101, 201 n., 202, 246 n., 248
Camden, 472
Camilly, Vice-Admiral Blouet de, 91
Cammock, Captain George (Rear-Admiral
in the Spanish Navy), 34, 35 and n., 38
Campbell, Captain Alexander (1), 322
Campbell, Colonel Archibald, 441
Campbell, Captain James (1), 41 n.
Campbell, Captain James (2), 167 n., 206 n.,
242 n., 245 n., 246 u.
Campbell, Vice-Admiral John (1), 218 n.,
222, 324, 341, 413 n., 415, 566
Campbell, William, 326
Campeche, 263
Canada, 511, 512 and n., 513 and n., 514,
516, 520 n., 530, 531
Canada, 117, 118, 139, 140, 164, 196, 197,
204-210, 226-228, 242, 253, 354, 355,
356, 370, 380, 539
Canary Islands, The, 188, 302
Cancale Bay, 192, 193
Candia, 229
Candles in lighthouses, 14, 15
Canoa, Point, 68 n.
Canso, 109, 113, 115
Canterbury, 33, 34, 35, 133 n., 135 n., 136
Canton, 323
Cape Breton, 109, 115, 116, 124, 166-168,
184, 191, 206, 253
Cape Cabron, San Domingo, 294
Cape Charles, 496
Cape Clear, 282, 311
Cape Coast Castle, 169, 287
Cape de Gata, 189
Caj^e de Verde Islands, 546
Cape Digges, 320
Cape Dobbs, 319, 320
Cape Fear, 372
Cape Finisterre, 283, 301, 303, 448, 540
Cape Francois, 123, 165, 225, 245, 246, 314,
468, 469, 470, 473, 474, 488, 492, 495,
496, 519, 536, 537
Cape Henry, 489, 496
Cape Hope, 319
Cape Horn, 267, 317, 321
Cape Lopez, 260
Cape May, 408
576
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Cape Mola, 153
Cape of Good Hope, 130, 197, 232, 350, 545,
548
Cape San Lucas, 317
Cape Spa it el, 503
Cape St. IVIartiii, 281
Cape St. Nicolas, 123, 245, 246
Cape St. Vincent, 285, 477
Cape Tibuion, 308
Capricteiir, 184, 313
Captaiv, 12, 34, 35, 148 n., 151 u., 153,
154, 172, 182, 185, 206 n., 276, 277, 284
Cajitain of the Fleet, 341
Captains, 19, 20, 22, 340
Captures, 138, 310-315, 396 n.
Caracas, 85, 272
Carcass, 84 n., 215 n., 406 n., 428 n.
Cardaillac, Captain de, 546 n.
Cardinals, The, 219, 220
Cardonnie, Captain de La, 415
Carenage, St. Lucia, 429, 430, 431
Caribbee Islands (see also AVest Indies, Lee-
ward Islands, etc.), 201, 238, 244, 519
Carical, 178, 181, 224
Carkett, Benjamin, 265
Carkett, Captain Robert, 190 and n., 223 n.,
312, 434, -^54 n., 4G0, 4G1 and n., 462,
468, 479 n.
Carleton, 361, 365, SC6, 369
Carleton, Sir Guy, K.B., 356, 357, 358, 359,
362, 363, 365, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371,
386, 389
Carlisle Bay, Barbados, 201, 233, 242
Carlos de Bourbon, Don, 48
Carlos III., King of Spain, 34
Carnarvon, 185, 186
Carnatic, 339, 340
Carnegie, Hon. George : see Northesk, Earl of
Carnegie, Lieutenant Patrick, 366
Carolina, 259, 269, 289, 299, 311, 371, 372,
441, 442, 470, 472, 488, 493, 496
Carpenter, Captain Eobert, 206 n.
Carpenters, 19, 205
Carpenters, American lack of, 359, 361
Carrickfergus, 229, 230
Carronades, 330-333, 524
Carron Foimdiy, 330, 331
Cartagena, (S. America), 44, 52 n., 54, 59,
60, 61, 62, 63, 68-75, 78, 272, 274, 279,
314
Cartagena (Spain), 107, 116, 124, 189, 190
Carteret, Lord, 41
Carteret, Captain Philip (1), 120 n., 131 n..
Carteret, Captain Eichard, 14, 246 n.
Cartridge boxes, 9
Casanho)!, 312
Cas de Navires, Bay of, ]\Iartinique, 201,
243, 245
Caskets, The, 108
Cassilis, Earl of: see Kennedy, Captain
Archibald
Cassimbazar, 160
Castafieta, Mce-Admiral Don Antonio, 34, 37
Castejon, Captain Don P., 247 n.
CastiUa, 34
Castillo de Ferro, 54, 55
Castillo Grande, Cartagena, 69, 72, 73
Castor, 127 n., 312, 335
Castro, Captain Don J. B., 96
Catford, Captain Charles, 148 n.
Cathcart, Major- General Lord, 58, 63, 64:
and n., 68
Catherine : see Katherine
Catherine, 263
Cato, 412 n., 508
Caton, 524, 525, 537
Caulfeild, Captain Toby, 387, 473, 474 n.
Cavaigne, Captain, 34
Cavendish, Admiral Philip, 66
Caylus, Captain Chevalier de, 96, 116, 271
Cayo Confite, 249
Celebre, 184, 313
Centaur, 233, 246 n., 250, 303, 306, 415,
482 n., 486, 487, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Cenfuure, 121, 198 n., 199, 212 n., 213, 214,
215, 313
Centurion, 125 n., 139 n., 206 n., 208, 246
n., 247, 288, 315, 320-323, 387, 404
406 n., 408, 428 n., 431, 454 n.
Cerberus, 246 n.
Ceres, 537
Cerf, 293
Cesar, 409, 532, 533 and n.
Ceuta, 35, 211
Ceylon, 197, 550, 552, 553, 554, 557, 560,
5(il
Chacon, Eear-Admiral Don Fernando, 34, 35
Chads, Captain James, 206 u., 234 n.
Chadwick, Captain Eichard, 133 n.
Chagres, 61, 62
Chaise, Captain de La, 174 n., 179 n., 198 n.
Chalay, CajDtain Principe de, 34
Chaleur Bay, 228, 313
Cliamba battery, Cartagena, 69, 70
Chambers, Eear-Admiral William (1) 79,
.130
Chambly, 361
Chambon, Governor of Louisbourg, M. de,
115
Chameleon, 479 n.
Chamj>ion, 513 n., 520 n.
Champlain, Lake, 205, 226, 354-370, 371,
379, 380, 385, 386, 389
Cliandernagore, 163
Channel, The, 39, 66, 89, 107, 113, 129,
147, 196, 215 n., 222, 224, 232, 250, 252,
257, 278, 281, 308, 310, 311, 339, 396,
443, 445, 446, 470, 477, 502, 504, 538,
546
Channel Islands : (see also Jersey, etc.),
291
Chaplains, 19
Chaplen, Commander James, 234 n., 236 n.
Charente Eiver, 191, 218 n., 223, 224, 233,
237, 252
Chariot Boyal, 293, 312
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
577
Charles, 34
Charles II., Act of the 13th of, 82^ 106
Charles VI., The Emperor, 59
Charles VII., The Emperor, 59
Charles XII., King of Sweden, 2G, 27, 41
Charles Edward, Prince : see Pretender, The
Young
Charleston, 372-379, 383, 442, 470, 472,
489
Charleston, 335
Charlotte, Queen, Princess of Mecklenburg-
Strelitz, 237
Charlotte, 137
Charnock quoted, 80, 81-83
Charringtou, Captain Nicholas, 497 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
Chartres, Vice-Admiral the Due de, 145
Charts, 118, 243, 247
Chase, A general, 125, 126, 128, 148, 174,
176, 178, 180, 191, 197, 198, 212, 414,
435, 449, 453, 486, 506, 525, 534, 537,
556
Chateauneuf, Captain de, 96
Chatham, 12, 83 n., 103, 326, 335, 336
Chatham, 215 n., 217, 218 n., 232, 313, 387
Chatham, John, Earl of, 325
Chausey Islands, 291
ChauveUn, 296, 297
Cheap, Captain David, 310, 320-322
Cheap's Bay, 322
Chebucto, 312
Chelsea Hospital, 320
Cherbourg, 193, 194, 304
Chesapeake, The, 359, 370, 390, 392, 405,
442, 472, 488, 489, 491, 492, 493, 494,
495, 496, 501, 508, 512
Chest at Chatham, The, 104
Chester, 76 n., 131 and n., 253, 278, 283 n.,
312
Chester, Pennsylvania, 391
Chesterfield, 148 and n., 153, 154, 249, 287,
288, 312
Chevalier, Captain, quoted, 486, 487, 504,
531, 533, 542, 543
Chevre, 183, 313
Chezine 210
Chichester, 70 n., 75 u., 92, 96, 98, 104,
218 n., 234 n.
Child, Admiral Smith, 492 n., 497 u.
Childers, 335
Children, Provision for seamen's, 342
Chile, 321
Chilleau, Captain du, 546 n., 550 n.
Chiloe, 317, 322
Chimere, 212 n.
Chimene, 125 n.
China, 108, 317, 323
Chinsura, 201
Choque Bay, St. Lucia, 463
Chorera, Pdver, 249
Christian, Commander Brabazon, 406 n.
Christian, Rear- Admiral Sir Hugh Cloberry,
392, 434, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Christie, Captain Alexander, 549
Chronometers, 13, 14
Churchill Eiver, 318, 319
Cillart de Suville, Captain, 415
Cillart, Captain de Villeneuve, 550 n., 556
Ciudadella, 142
Civil law. Supremacy in naval affairs of the,
105, 106
Cizarga, 443
Claigeann Bay, Islay, 229
Clarence, Duke of {later William IV.) : see
William Henry, Duke of Clarence, Prince
Clark, Captain Charles, 352
Clark, Captain Edward (1), 123 n., 135 n.,
201 n.
Clark, Captain John (1), 212 n., 215 n.
Clarke, Captain, (mil.), 171
Clarke, Captain Peter, 246 n.
Clayton, Colonel Jasper, 46
"Cleland, Captain John (1), 183, 206 n., 294,
311
Cleland, Captain William, 80
Clements, Captain Michael, 230 n., 303, 415
Clements, Commander Peter, 546 n.
Cleojmtra, 505 n.
Cleopdtre, 563 n.
Clerks of the Acts, 3, 326
Cleveland, Captain Archibald, 194
Cleveland (or Cleaveland), Captain William,
3,27
Cleverly, Gravesend shipbuilder, 335
Clevland, John, 3, 155, 326
Clinton, 335
Clinton, Admiral of the Fleet the Hon.
George, 42 n., 310
CHnton, General Sir Henry, 372, 379, 383,
387, 390, 392, 393, 398, 441, 442, 443,
471, 472, 473, 488, 489, 493, 496
Clipperton, John, 316-318
Clive, Captain Benjamin, 192, 227 n., 236 n.
Clive, Lord, 132, 139, 143, 144, 161, 162,
163, 164, 201
Clocheterie, Captain de La, 415, 492 n.,
533 n.
Clue, xVdmiral de La, 148 n., 149, 189, 190,
196, 211-214, 217, 302, 303
Clutterbuck, Thomas, 3 -
Coaster's Harbour, IJhode Island, 403
Coats, the navigator, William, 320
Cobham, Viscount, 40, 261
Cockatrice, 335
Cockburn, Lieutenant, (of the Hunter^, 145,
146
Cockburne, Captain Geoige, 3, 326
Cockburne, Captain John (1), 41 n.
Codrington (later Bethell), Christopher : see
Bethell, Captain (Christopher Codrington
Coffin, Admiral Sir Isaac, Bart., 350, 351
Cohorns, 136 and n.
Colby (or Coleby), Captain Charles, 4, 71,
141, 327
Colby, Captain Stephen, 311, 395 u.
Colby, Thomas, 4
578
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Colchester, 46 n., 274, 291, 310
Coleman, Captain Robert, 41 n.
Coles's pump, 337
Collier, Yice-Admiral Sir George, Kt., 346
Collingicood, 317
Collingwood, Yice-Admiral Cuthbert, Lord,
379, 554
CoUingwood, Captain Thomas, 242 n., 245 n.,
246 n., 312, 395 n., 410, 434, 454 n.
Collins, Captain Eichard (1), 206 n., 310
Collins, Captain Eichard (2), 240 n., 241
Colonels of Marines, 223
Colonial vessels, Authority granted to cap-
ture, 371
Colonies, see American Colonies
Colours, Captured, 242
Colville, Eear-Admiral Alexander, Lord, 96,
169, 206 n., 209, 224, 226 and n., 227,
228, 232, 239, 251, 565
Colville, Captain the Hon. James, 174 u.,
179 n., 198 n., 225, 311
Comhiistion, 552 n.
Comet, 86, 88
Comete, 305, 313
Commanders, 20, 330 and n., 336
Commanders-in-Chief, 15, 26, 33 u.. Ill n.,
112 n.
Commissioners of Sick and \Vounded, 1, 2
Commissioners of the Navy, 3, 4, 326, 327
Commissioners of the Rv^gister Office, 2
Commons, Enquiry by the House of, 103 ;
Address to the, 276 and n.
Com]iton, Captain James, 4
Comte de Gramont, 296
Comte de Provence, 174 and u., 179 and n.,
198 n.
Comte de St. Florentine, 301
Conanicut, 402, 403, 405
Conrentration, Tactics of, 176, 455, 456,
458, 511, 551
Concepciim, 279, 315, 317
Conde, 174 n., 175, 179 n., 180
Conde de Chincan, 315
Conde de Toulouse, 34, 314
Conflans, Yice-Admiral the Marquis de, 122,
123, 196, 217-223, 274, 284, 311, 435 n.
Congress, 367
Congress and the outbreak of the war in
America, 356
Conquerant, 415, 492 n.
Conqiieror, 211, 212 n., 215, 311, 395 n.,
434, 452, 453, ■^54 n., 466 and n., 520 n.
Conquistudor, 12, 72 n., 135 n., 136, 247 n.,
314, 315 (2)
Consolant',', 557 and n., 559
Con stun te, 96, 98, 99
Contempt of court by a court martial, 105,
106
Content, 127 and n., 148 n., 151 n., 274, ii75
ContraV>aiid of war, 252, 253
Controllers of the Navy, 3, 4, 326, 343
Controllers of the Storekeei^er's Accounts, 3,
326
Controllers of the Treasurer's Accounts, 3,
326
Controllers of the Yictualling Accounts, 3,
326
Convert, 513 n., 520 n.
Convovs, 65, 75, 78, 91, 119, 122. 123, 124,
125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131,' 135, 136,
137, 139, 140. 144, 165, 166, 188, 190,
196, 203, 210, 225, 250, 252, 280, 283,
284, 286, 291, 292, 294, 298, 299, 300,
301, 302, 303, 351, 390, 391, 395, 396,
433, 434, 435, 438, 445, 448, 451, 452,
469, 470, 473, 474, 477, 478, 479, 480,
482, 486, 489, 495, 503, 504, 509, 519,
521, 536, 538, 539, 540-542, 549, 554,
557
Conway, Henry Seymour, Field-Marshal, 171
Conway, Hon. Hugh Seymour: nfttrwards
Seymour, Yice-Admiral Lord Hugh {q.v.~)
Cook, Captain James, 337, 341 n., 352
Cooks, 19
Cooper, Captain Tliomas, 4, 96, 104, 116
Coote, General Sir Eyre, 225
Copeland Island, 230
Copenhagen, 26 and n., 27, 28, 41, 43, 47,
380, 412 n.
Copper fastenings, 14
Coupering ships, 14, 336, 451, 470, 483,
486, 487, 489, 522
Corbett, Thomas, 3
Corbett, AYilliam, 3
Cordova, Admiral Don Luis de, 446, 450,
504, 539
Cork, 144, 167, 188, 372, 502
Cormorant, 206 n., 543 n.
Cornewall, Captain Thomas, 169
Cornish, Yice-Admiral Sir Samuel, Bart.,
23, 96, 196, 200 and n., 224, 225, 232,
239-242, 565
Cornish {formerly Pitchford), Admiral
Samuel Pitchford, 240 n , 241, 520 n.,
568
Cornwall, 446
Cornivall, 12, 133 n., 134, 135 n., 136, 137,
235 n., 395 n., 404, 400 n., 408, 434, 437,
438, 439, 454 n., 458, 466
Cornwall, Yice-Admiral Charles, 3, 32, 34,
35, 36, 258
Cornwall, Captain James, 52, 96, 100 and n.
Cornwall, Captain Frederick, 99, 148 n.,
289
CornwaUis, 406 n.
Cornwallis, Charles, 1st Marquis, 372, 388,
405, 442, 472, 473, 488, 493, 494, 496,
501, 502
Cornwallis, Admiral the Hon. Sir William,
351, 434, 438, 473-477, 512, 513 and n.,
520 n., 525
Cornwallis, Major- General, 154, 171
Coromandel Coast, The, 119, 124, 130, 164,
174, 197, 225, 545, 549, 561
Corsica, 116, 123, 124, 273, 351
Corvettes, 330
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
579'
Corunna, 39, 303
Cosby, Admiral Phillips, 415, 492 n., 568
Cost of Ships, 10
Cotes, Vice-Admiral Thomas, 71, 118, 127 n.,
165, 182, 204, 224, 313, 565
Cotterell, Captain Charles, 64
Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, Bart., 454 n.,
520 n.
Couchman, the mutineer, Lieutenant Samuel,
287, 288
Coudres, Isle. 206, 207
Councils of War, 67, 68, 74, 78, 79, 87, 118,
123, 151, 154, 172, 177, 194, 202, 270
Courageux, 306, 307, 313, 415, 509 n.
Couronne, 148 n., 151 n., 415, 456, 458
Court, Admiral La Bruyere de, 67, 89, 92,
94 95 101 102
Courts Manial, 17, 88 n., 95 n., 97, 103-106,
106 n., ]23, 128, 129, 135, 137, 156-158,
177, 196 n., 275 and n., 276 and n., 277,
279 and n., 281 and n., 288 and n., 289 n.,
290 and n., 291, 294 and n., 302 n., 339,
350, 423, 425, 426, 435 n., 456 n., 459 n.,
462, 478, 548
Coventrtj, 12, 217, 218 n., 302, 543 n.,
563 n.
Cowardice, 123, 125
Cowell, Captain Henry, 232
Cowling, Captain John, 474 n.
Coximar, Kiver, 248
Cozens, Midshipman of the Wager, 322
Craggs, Mr. Secretary, 30
Craig, Captain Robert, 298
Cranstoun, Captain James, Lord, 513 n.
Craufurd, Major-General John, 235
Craven, Rear- Admiral Thomas, 275, 566
Cresce7it, 12, 242 n., 299, 313
Crespin, Captain Abraham, 454 n.
Criminals in the Navy, 21, 23
Croisic, Le, 220, 221
Cromwell, Henry: see Frankland, Yice-
Admiral Henry
Crookshanks, Captain John, 285 and n.
Crowle, George, 3, 4
Croivn, 206 n., 310
Crown Point, 141, 204, 205, 208, 228, 356,
358, 359, 367, 368, 370, 371, 380
Crozon, 313
Cruiser, 46 n., 310
Cruse, Admiral (Russian Navy), 341 n.
Crutched Friars, 2
Cuba, 67 n., 76, 77, 226, 246-249, 266,
267, 468, 494, 496 n.
Cuddalore : see also, Fort St. David ; 177,
552, 555, 557, 561-564
Cul de Sac Royal : see Fort Royal, Marti-
nique
Culloden, 66 n., 113
Culloden, 148 n., 156, 169, 211, 212 and n.,
213, 215, 245 n., 246 n., 249, 250, 395 n.,
489
Cumberland, 35, 40 n., 60, 62 n., 63, 70 n.,
76 n., 79 n., 140, 161 n., 174 n., 175, 177,
179 and n., 198 n., 199, 303, 304 and n.
311, 415, 563 n.
Cumberland Bay, 32 L
Cumberland Harbour, 76 and n., 77
Cumberland, Duke of: see William Augustus,
Duke of Cumberland, Prince
Cumberland, Duke of: see Henry Frederick,
Duke of Cumberland, Prince
Gumming, Admiral James, 431
Ciunmin^, the Quaker, Mr. Thomas, 186,.
187
Cunningham, Commander James, 253
Curacoa, 85, 86, 536
Curieuse, 415
Curling, Mr. John, master's mate, 366
I urtis. Admiral Sir Roger, Bart., 400, 406 n.
Cusack, Captain .lames, 80
Cust, Captain William, 134 and n.
Cutlasses, 9
Cutters, 330"
Cutting-out Expeditions, 224, 292
Cuverville, Captain de, 550 n.
Cyhele, 291 n.
Cygnet, 246 n., 335
Da ORES,. Vice-Admiral James Richard (1),
361, 365
Dalrymple, Admiral John, 224 n., 509 n.,
567
Dalrymple, Sir John, 332
Damaquart, Captain de, 96
I Damiaten, 91
! Dampier, Captain William, 258, 316, 323
: Banae, 223 n., 250, 301
Danae, 301, 313
Dandridge, Captain William, 63, 68, 269
Daphne, 336
Darby, Vice-Admiral George, 215 n., 226 n.,
242 n., 243, 477, 502, 503, 504, 540, 546,
566
Darby, Admiral Sir Henry d'Esterre, 546 n.
Darien, or Panama, Isthmus of, 52 n., 61, 76
Dartmouth, 125 and n., 286, 311
Daiqihin, 108
Dauphin Royal, 218 n,, 415
Davers, Vice-Admiral Thomas, 71, 76, 91,
109, 115, 122, 123
Davis, Howel, 260
Davis Strait, 318
Dawson, Captain George, 404, 406 n., 409,
492 n.
Deacon, Commander Sabine, 201 n.
Deal, 16
Deal Castle, 131 n., 224 n., 257, 454 n.,
479 n.
Deane, Captain Joseph, 206 n., 208, 227
and n., 228, 235 n., 311
Death penalty, The, 279, 288, 339 (see also-
Byng)
Debt, The National, 254
Decay of ships, 303, 304
Decker, Captain Haringcarspel, 505 n.
Dedel, Captain S., 505 n.
580
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Defence, 563 n.
Defenseur, 244 n.
Defiance, 41 n.. 62, 70 n., 79 n., 80, 125 n.,
126, 127 n., 141, 148 n., 149, 150, 151 n.,
153, 154, 218 n., 219, 246 n., 247 n., 312,
315 (2), 415
Delavall, Vice- Admiral George, 34, 35, 36
Delaware, Bay and Capes of the, 390, 394,
397 402 542
Delaware 'Eive~r, 386, 388, 391, 392, 398,
399, 496
De I'Angle, Captain Merrick, 84 and n., 96
Delfino y Barlande, CaptaiuDon J., 34
Delft, 91
Delgarno, Captain Arthur, 258
Denis, Vice- Admiral Sir Peter, Bart., 125 n.,
218 n., 237, 239, 252, 299, 566
Denison, Captain (Eussian Navy), 341
Denmark, 26 et serf., 41-43
Dennis, Captain Henry, 78
Dent, Captain Digby (2), 3, 4, 55, 71, 123 n.,
124, 133 n., 134, 135
Dent, Captain Sir Digby (3), Kt., 179 n.,
198 n., 225, 311, 434
Dentelle, 110
Depredations by Spain, 50, 51
Deptford, 4, 12, 105, 137
Deptford, 13, 70 n., 76, 108, 131 n., 148 n.,
154, 215 n., 246 n.
Derby, 113
Derlij, 143
Dering, Captain Daniel, 187, 201 n., 203,
224 n.
Derrick, ' Memoirs of the Rise and Progress
of the Royal Navy,' 5
Derwentwater estates. The, 18
Deseada, 519
Desertion, 339, 378
Desirade, La, 203
Desorquart, Caj^tain de, 96
Devert, Daniel, 3
Devonshire, 125 n.. 127, 206 n., 222 n., 226
n., 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 249, 250
Diademe, 244, 294, 303, 415
Diamant, 64 n., 96, 125 n., 126, 312
Diamond, 43 n., 57, 61, 62 and n., 96, 267,
314
Diamond, Ca]De, 208, 227
Diana, 8, 173, 183, 206 n., 227 and n., 253,
546 n.
Diane, 186 n., 281, 298, 313
Dickson, Admiral William, 454 n.
Dictator, 339
Digbv, Admiral Hoc. Robert, 188, 218 n.,
41o, 502, 567
Digges, Captain Dudley, 13, 167 n., 183,
218 n., 246 n.
Dijon, 231 n.
Dilifjence, 192
Dilif/cnt, 550 n.
Diiif/ente, 174 and u., 179 n., 198 n., 244 n.,
449
Dilkes, Captain William, 96, 104 and n.
Dimensions of ships, 9, 12, 190, 335
Discontent on the lower deck, 339
Discovery, 318, 319
Disease: see Sanitation, Mortality, Fever,
Scurvy, etc.
Disguise, Successful, 244
Disobedience to orders justifiable, 161, 460
Distillation of fresh water from salt, 337
Dixon, Master of the Northumberland, Mr.,
275
Doake, Captain James, 206 n., 226 n., 233 n.,
242 n.
Dohhs, 319. 320
Dobbs, Arthur, 319
Dobree, Captain Daniel, 434
Dockyards, 4, 326, 327, 335, 336, 342 and
n., 343
Dod, Admiral Edmund, 513 n., 520 n.
Dodd, Captain Edward, 311
Doddington, George, 3
Doggersbank, The, 314, 343, 505-509
Dolphijn, 505 n., 506
DoJj)Mn, 12, 147, 148 and n., 153, 265,
283 n., 297, 298, 299, 312, 336, 505 n.,
Dominica, 64, 203, 233, 244, 254, 427, 428,
453, 519, 521, 522, 523, 527, 529, 531
Donan Castle, 39
Dorchester, Lord, 350
Dordrecht, 91
Dorsetshire, 12, 34, 96, 101, 103, 218 n.,
219, 299, 313
Douglas, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Douglas, Rear-Admiral Sir Charles, Bart.,
206 n., 207, 235 n., 357 and n., 360, 361,
362 and n., 363, 366 and n., 368, 369,
415, 520 n., 535, 568
Douglas, Sir Howard, 357 n.
Douglas, Admiral Sir James (1), Kt., 115,
206 n., 209, 224, 232, 233, 239, 242 and
n., 243, 244, 245 and n., 246, 247, 565
Douglas, Captain John, 454 n., 459, 460
Douglas, Captain Stair (1), 242 n., 246 n.,
482 n.
Douglas, Captain WiUiam, 60 n.
Dove, Captain Francis, 4
Dover, 16, 335
Dover, 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 284, 312
Do^vns, The, 90, 111 n., 112, 196, 200, 224
and n., 232, 250, 252, 312, 352, 539
Dragon, 43, 72 n., 81 and n., 82, 92, 96, 98,
191, 218 n., 234 n., 235, 242 n., 244, 245
n., 246 n., 248, 249, 270, 284, 302, 314
Dragon, 135 n., 314
Drake, 123 n., 225, 267, 310
Drake, Captain Francis, 34
Drake, Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Samuel,
Bart., 218 n., 227 n., 233 n., 242 n.,
395 n., 482 n., 487, 497 n., 513 u., 520 n.,
528, 567
Drake, Vice-Admiral Francis William,
212 n., 246 n., 248, 311, 566
Dra]X!r, General Sir William, K.B., 239
242
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
581
Dreadnoucjht, 34, 165 and n., 274 and n.,
276, 277, 280, 284, 300, 312
Droits de F Homme, 286
Druid, 234 n.
Drummond, Captain Charles, 96
Drummond, Commander John Anriol, 479 u.
Drunkenness, 273, 274, 317
Dubhn, 230, 342
Dublin, 182, 206, 242 n., 245 n., 246 n.,
250
Dubois de La Motte, Vice-Admiral, 140,
141, 167, 168, 170, 172, 283, 286, 287,
297
Due d'Aiguillon, 293
Dzic d'Aquitaine, 200 n., 225, 295, 311,
312
Due d'Hanovre, 299, 313
Due d' Orleans, 96, 120 n., 121, 174 n., 179
n., 180, 198 n., 312
Due de Bourgogne, 174 n., 175, 176, 179
and n., 198 n., 244 n., 414, 415, 492 n.
Due de Ghartres, 301, 313
Due de Choiseul, 225 n.. 226
Due de Fronsae, 209
Du Chafiault, Admiral Louis Charles, Comte,
127 n., 182, 185, 290, 415
Ducie, Lord : see Moreton, Captain Francis
Reynolds
Dudgeon Shoal, 15
Dudley, Captain O'Brien, 287, 288
Duels, 88 n.
Duff, Eear- Admiral Robert, 193, 216, 217,
218 and n., 242 n., 566
Duft'us, Captain Kenneth, Lord, 43 n.
Duhe, 218 n., 273, 280, 310, 311, 415, 509
n., 520 n., 531, 532, 533
Dumaresq, Admiral Thomas, 520 n.
Dumet, Isle de, 220
Dumont d'Urville, Rear-Admiral T. C,
352 n.
Dunbar, 311
Duncan, Admiral Adam, Viscount, 139 n.,
234 n., 246 n., 568
Duncan, Captain Henry (1), 327, 400 n.,
406 n., 492 n.
Dundas, Henry : see Melville, Viscount
Dundonald, Admiral Thomas Cochrane,
10th Earl of, 301
Dungeness, 90
Dunkirk, 34, 43, 70 n., 76, 96, 101, 141,
188, 218 n., 291, 295, 296, 312
Dunnose, 293
Dunquerque, Dunkerque, or Dunkirk, 89,
90, 112, 196, 223, 229, 230 n., 254, 314
Dupleix, M., 12], 122, 124, 130, 139, 140,
178
Duplessis Perseault, Captain, 4 1 5
Duquesne, Commodore, 189
Durell, Vice-Admiral Philip (I), 88, 115,
127 n., 148 n., 172, 173, 185, 205, 206
and n., 207, 209, 283 n 565
Durell, Captain Thomas (1), 53, 263, 268
Durfort, Captain Baron de, 492 n.
VOL. III.
DursJey Galley, 46 n., 47, 84 n., 96, 261,
263
Dursley, Lord : see Berkele}^ James, Earl of
Dury, Major-General, 195
Dutabil, Captain Don L, 96
Dutch volunteers in British ships, 87
Duvivier, Captain, 109
Eaqle, 127 n., 128, 283 n., 28-1, 295, 312,
380, 400, 406 n., 407, 408, 545 n., 550 n.»
552 n., 556, 563 n.
East India Company, 108, 120, 121 n., 130,
lai, 132, 139, 140, 143, 161, 177. 181,
185, 197, 200, 201, 232, 240, 241, 251,
340, 445, 545, 546 n., 548
East India Company (Dutch), 130, 131,
201, 548
East India Company (French), 119, 121,
124, 125 and n., 126, 139, 160, 164, 174,
197, 294, 295, 301, 305
East Indies, 91, 108, 109, 119-122, 124,
130, 139, 143, 160, 173, 174-182, 196,
197-200, 224, 225, 239-242, 284, 287,,
304, 311, 312, 313, 482, 503, 508, 509,
538, 543-564
East River, New York, 382, 385, 409
Eastwood, Commander Joseph, 192
Echo, 185, 186 n., 206 n., 242 n., 246 n.,,
313
Eeureuil, 314, 415
Edam, 91
Eddvstone, The, 14, 15, 90
Edgar, 212 n., 215, 246 n., 250, 509 n.
Edgcumbe, Admiral Hon. George, P^arl
Mount Edgcumbe, 84 n., 147, 148 and n.,
218 n., 296, 565
Edinburgh, 340
Edinburgh, 127 n., 165 and n., 284
Education of naval officers, 22
Edward Augustus, Duke of York, Admiral
Prince, 193 and n., 216, 239, 252, 343 n.,
565
Edwards, Admiral Edward, 339, 406 n.^
428 n.
Edwards, Admiral Richard (2), 415, 567
Edwards, Captain Richard (a), 35 u.
Edwards, Captain Timothy, 212 n., 395 n.,.
404, 406 n., 434, 454 n.
Eensgezindheit, 505 n.
Effingham, Lord, 154
Egmont, 415, 417
Egmont, John, Earl of, 325
Eleanor, 62 n., 70 n.
Elephant, 278, 312
Elibank, Lord : see Murray, Captain Hon.
George (1)
EUsaheth, 110, 111, 210, 279
Elizabeth, 53, 92, 96, 133 n., 134, 174 n.,
175, 179 and n., 198 and n., 199, 240 n.,
241, 415, 417, 434, 454 n., 557 u.
Elizabeth River, 489
Elliot, Captain Elliot, 108
Elliot, Sir Gilbert, Bart. : see Minto, Lord
38
582
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Elliot, Admiral John, 191, 230 audn., 297,
301, 400 n., 40B n., 509 u., 567
Ellis, the uavigator, Henrv, 320
Ellis, AVelbore, 326
Ellys, Captain Charles, 234 n.
Eljihinstone, Admiral Hon. George Keith :
Viscount Keith, 333
Elphinstone, Captain John (1), 195, 206 n.,
22(J n., 245, 246 n., 304, 311, 341 n., 434,
454 n.
Elphinstone, Captain Samuel Williayas, 341
and n.
Eltham, 86, 87, 88, 115, 272
Elton, Captain Jacob, 278, 279, 311
Embargo on shipping, 45, 16(), 167, 396
I'jmhusrade, 312
Emden, 173, 190
Emi'rakl, 201 n., 297
Eineramle, 125 n., 295, 297, 312
Empire, The Holy Roman, 29 and n., 40,
42, 47, 49, 50, 110
Endeavour, 479 n.
Endymion, 520 n.
England, Edward, 260
English Harbour, Antigua, 23
Enterprise, 39, 24(3 n., 262
Entreprenant, 183, 305, 313
Eole, 96
Epreuve, 311, 313
Erfprins, 505 n.
Erie, Lake, 204, 205
"Error of judgment," 293, 294, 468 (see
also Byng)
Errutia, Captain Don Pi., 90
Erskine, Captain Robert, 285
EscarboucJe, 313
Escars, Captain (.'omte d', 533 n.
Escort, 234 n.
Escudero, Captain Don Antonio, 34
Eskimos, 319
Esperuw^a, 34, 314
Esperance, 96, 289, 312, 335
Essex, 14, 34, 35, 94, 96, 101, 218 n., 221,
234 n., 236, 281, 311, 313
Establishment for guns, 11, 331-334
Establishment of tiag-otHcers, 20
Establishments for ships, 8, 9, 10
Estaing, Vice-Admiral Comte d', 308, 394
and n., 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403
and n., 405 and n., 408-412, 428-432,
433, 435, 438, 440, 442, 443, 471, 478,
521
Estepona, 211
Estournel, Captahi d', 64 n.
Eteuduere, Admiral des Herbiers de 1', 64 n.,
127 and n., 129, i;'>7, 284
Etoile, 283, 286, 312
Eturiago, Captain Don A., 96
Enropa, 247 n., 315
Euro2)a Point, 211
Europe, 492 n., 497 n.
Eurus, 206 n., 226 n., 311
Eurydke, 513 n., 520 n.
Evans, Captain Henry Francis, 395 u.
Evans, Admiral John, 218 n.. 223 n., 395 n.,
566
Evans, Captain Thomas, 185, 235 u.
Eveille, 218 n., 294, 415, 492 n.
Everitt, Charles Holmes ; see Calmady,
Charles Holmes Everitt
Everitt, Captain Michael, 148 n., 156, 206
and n., 233 n., 242 u., 245 n., 246 n.
Ewer, Captain, (Mar.), 191
Exchequer, Captain Sutton";^ action in the
Court of, 350
Execution of Admiral Byng, 158-160. See
Death Penalty
Exeter, 118, 131 and n., 415, 545 u., 550
and n., 551, 552 and n., 560, 563 n.
Exmouth, Lord: see Pellew, Admiral Sir
Edward
Expenditure on the Xavy, 5,*327
Experiment, 522
Experiment, 68, 70 n., 73, 76 n., 78, 79 and
n., 148 n., 156, 188, 276, 296, 373, 374,
376, 387, 406 n., 409
Exploration, Services of, to the Navy, 318,
324
Extra Commissioners of the Navy, 4, 326
Eyesight, Defective, 103
Fairfax, A'ice-Admiral Sir William George,
415
Fairleigh, ]6
Faisan, 313
Fahon, 125 and n., 201 n., 285, 311 (2),
403 n.
Falkingham, Captain Edward (1), 3, 4, 34,
53
Falkingham, Captain Edward (2), 167 and n.
Falkland, 125 n., 218 n., 227 n., 233 n.,
242 n.
Falkland Islands, 208 n., 339
Falmouth, 262, 446
Falmouth, 60 n., 62 and n., 70 u., 75 n.,
200 n., 225, 240, 241, 267
False musters, 350, 351
Fame, 235 n., 311, 314, 395 n., 434, 438,
439, 520 n.
Family Compact, The, 238, 307
Fandino, Juan de Leon, 265, 266, 272
Fanshaw, Captain (Jharles, 269
Fanshawe, Captain Robert (1), 327, 434,
520 n.
Fantasque, 212 n., 439, 492 n.
Farnham, Captain 'J'homas, 509 n.
Faro of Messina, The, 32, 33, 36, 37
Faroe Islands, 229
Farragut, Admiral, cited, 150
Faucun, 229, 230 u.
Faulknor, Admiral Jonathan (1), 188, 215 n.,
415, 567
Faulknor, Captain Robert (2), 306
Faulknor, Captain Sanmel (l), 108 and n.,
284, 310
Faulknor, Captain Samuel (2), 284, 301
INDEK TO VOLUME III.
583
Faulknor, Captain William, 40 n.
favorite, 415
Favourite, 212 n., 298, 306, 308
Fawler, John, 3, 4
Fawler, Captain John, 281
IFeilding, Captain Charles (1), 351
Felicite, 304, 313
JFellowes, shipbuilder, 12
Fenix, 247 and n., 315, 335, 449
Fendatd, 415, 458, o63 n.
Ferguson, Captain James, 253, 428 n., 482 n.
Fergusson, Admiral John, 454 n., 505 n.
Ferme, 96, 281 (2), 312
Ferrers, Earl : fice Shirley, Vice- Admiral
Hon. Washington
Ferret, 167 n., 169, 242 n., 246 n., 311, 335,
406 n.
Ferrol, 62, 65, 66, 267, 285, 451, 452
Tever, 23, 272
Feversham, 84 n., 96, 270, 271
Fidele, 183, 291 and n., 313
Field, Captain Arthur, 34
Fier, 148 u., 151 n., 212 n., 415
Fighting Instructions, The, 82 and n., 94 n.,
103
Ji'inch, Captain Hon. Sej'mour, 509 n.
Finch, Rear-Admiral Hon. William Clement,
497 n.
Fincher, Captain Thomas, 125 n., 131 n.,
132 and n., 311
Fine, 312, 550 n.
Finisterre, Cape, 124, 127
Finland, Gulf of, 43
Fire discipline, 55
Fire, Ships destroyed by, 273, 277 n., 297,
298, 310-315
Firebrand, 70 n.
liredrake, 172, 188, 215 n., 234 n.
Fireships, 28, 30, 33, 34, 41, 42, 43, 46 n.,
59, 70 n., 76 n., 79 n., 96, 100, 101, 117,
125 n., 134, 149, 161 n., 162, 163, 185,
192, 206 n., 207, 212 n., 215, 225, 234
and n., 237, 273, 283 n., 330, 335, 374,
391, 415, 497 n., 509 n., 520 n., 541,
546 n., 552 n.
Firing-tubes for guns. Tin, 334
Firm, 216, 222 n.
First Captain : see Captain of the Fleet
First Lords of the Admiralty, 2, 325
Fishermen in the American army, 384
I^^ishing Industry, The, 115, 186, 253, 254
Fitzgerald, Vice-Admiral Lord Charles :
Lord Lecale, 497 n.
Fitzherbert, Vice-Admiral Thomas, 404,
406 n., 568
Fitzroy, Captain Lord Augustus, 64, 76 n.,
268
Flag, The Honour of the, 196 n., 351, 352
Flag-officers, 20, 343-347
Flamand, 550 n., 563 n.
Flamborough Head, 311
Flamburough, 39, 192, 234 n., 269, 302
J landers, 118, 119, 130
Flecha, 34
Fleet at different periods. Strength of the,
5-7, 328
" Fleet in Being " (see also " Potential "
Fleet), 405
Fleming, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Fleur, 96
Fleur de Ltjs, 225 n., 226, 313
Fkuron, 276, 277 and n., 280, 312
Floating batteries, 75, 207, 391, 392, 541
Flobert, Brigadier-General de, 229 and n.,
230
Flora, 304, 403 n., 520 n.
! F^ore, 271, 312
Florida, 63 n., 250, 254, 269, 270, 371, 441
Florida, Gulf of, 135,311
Florissant, 191, 300
Flushing, 297
" Flute," " En, 539 u.
Fly, 234 n., 236 and n.
Fog, 141, 163, 182, 189, 250, 366, 384, 489,
4y0
Folkestone, 16
Folkestone, 270
Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 89 ; Preliminaries
of peace signed at, 253
Fooks, Rear-Admiral William, 454 n.
Foote, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward James, 352
Forbes, Captain Hugh, 123
Forbes, Admiral of the Fleet Hon. John,
96, 158, 565
Forbin, Captain de, 546 n., 550 n.
Ford, Rear-Admiral John, 497 n., 520 n.
Foreign service, British naval officers in,
340, 341
Formation, Bad, of Byron's deet, 435, 439
Formidabile, 202, 313
Formidable, 218 n., 219, 415, 417, 418 n.,
419, 421, 424, 425, 520 n., 530, 531, 532
Forrest, Captain Arthur, 165 and n., 166,
233, 245, 294, 306
Forrestal, Captain Don, 135 n.
Forrester, Mark, 258
Fort Beau Sejour, 141
Fort Bougee-Bougee, 161
Fort Bourbon, Davis Strait, 318
Fort Charles, Davis Strait, 318
Fort Charlotte, St. Lucia, 430
Fort Churchill, 319
Fort Cumberland, 141, ] (J8
Fort Diego, Florida, 269
Fort Duquesne, 141
Fort Edward, 205
Fort Edward, New York, 389, 390
Fort Lee, 384, 386
Fort Louis, Senegal, 187
Fort Mancinilla, Cartagena, 69, 72
Fort Mifflin, Mud Island, 391, 392
Fort Moosa, 270
Fort Moultrie, 372, 373, 379, 380
Fort Pixnta, Havana, 249
Fort Roval, Guadeloupe, 203
Fort Royal, Martinique, 201, 203, 243, 4j9,
38—2
584
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
308, 311.
431, 432, 433, 452, 453, 463, 466, 468, \
480, 481, 482, 483 n., 484, 488, 510, 519
Fort Salvatore, Messina, 32
Fort San Antonio, San Sebastian, 261
Fort San Felipe, Cartagena, 69, 70
Fort San Jose, Cartagena, 69, 72
Fort San Lazar, Cartagena, 69, 73, 74
Fort San Lorenzo, Chagres, 61, 62
Fort San Luis, Cartagena, 69, 70, 71, 72
Fort Santiago, Cartagena, 69, 70
Fort San Sebastian, Yigo, 262
Fort St. David, (Cuddalore), 119, 122, 131,
132, 160, 174, 177 : see also Cuddalore
Fort St. George, (Madras) : see also Madras,
177, 178, 545
Fort Ste. ^targuerite, 84
Fort Tanna, 161
Fort Wasliington, 384, 385, 386
Fort William, (Calcutta), 162
Fort York, Hayes River, 318
Forte de Nantz (?), 315
Fortescue, Captain William, 188, 218 n.,
234 n., 235 n.
Forth, Firth of, 257
Fortitude, 343, 505 n., 507
Fortune, 148 n., 156, 198 n., 296
Fortunee, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Foudroyant, 148 n., 151 n., 182, 189, 190,
222 n., 242 n., 313, 415, 538
Foufjueux, 127 n., 141, 188, 312
Four Bank, The, 220, 221, 311
Foicey, 206 n., 242 n.. 246 n..
315
Fowke, Captain Thorpe, 80, 206 n., 276
Fowke, General, 147
Fowkes, Commander Henry, 45
Fox, 78 n., 311, 415,425
Fox, Right Hon. Charles James, 347
Fox, Ca]itain Thomas, 126, 127 n., 128,
129, 283 and n.
France, 29 and n.. 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 58,
59, 89, 108, 110, 117-119, 124, 132, 138,
140, 163, 238, 261, 322, 354, 370
France, Isle de (see also Mauritius), 119,
164. 308, 451. 543, 545, 549
Francis, Captain Thomas, 226 n., 242 n.
Frankfurt, Treaty of, 89 u.
Frankland, Vice- Admiral Henry : formerly
Henrj- Cromwell, 505 n., 509 n.
Frankland, Admiral Sir Thomas, Bart., 145,
164. 266 and n., 279, 290, 565
Frederick IV., King of Denmark, 26 n.
Frederick, King of Sweden, 41 u.
Frederikshakl, 41
French aggressions, 138-140
French coasts, Expeditions against the,
171, 172, 173. 190-196, 231, 234-237
French men-of-war fitted out as privateers,
280
French politeness to Captain Cook, 352
Freshwater Cove, Louisbourg, 183
Friedrich of Hessen-Cassel, King of Sweden,
41 n.
Frigates, 7, 8, 330
Friponne, 231 n.
Frogmere, Captain Rowland, 96, 104
Fromentieres, Captain de, 127 n., 128
Frozen Strait, 319, 320
Frye, Lieutenant George, (Mar.), 105
Fuerte, 272. 314
Fulta, 161
Fimdy, Bay of, 168
Funnels of a fireship, 100 n.
Furieux, 96
Furnace, 12, 188, 215 n., 234 n., 236 n., 319-
Furneaux, Captain Tobias, 373
Furnivall, Lieutenant William, 505 n.
Furzer, Captain John, 34, 310
Gabaret, Admiral, 94, 96, 107
Gabarus Bay, 115, 168, 182
Gage, Captain John, 86, 88, 310
Gage, General Thomas, 204
Galapasos Islands, 318
Galatee, 313
Galbraith, Captain James, 171, 246 n.
Galera, 34
OaJ(ja, 135 n.
Galicia, 71 n., 72 and n., 75 and n., 310, 314
Galifet, Captain de, 550 n.
Galissonniere, Admiral de La, 139, 142, 148
n., 149, 150, 151 n., 152
Galle, Yice-Admiral Morard de, 549 n.,
550 n.
Galleons (see aho Treasure ships), 44, 45,
46, 54,61, 241, 246,323
Galleys. 33, 34, 37, 38, 84, 269, 270, 273,
314, 391, 400, 402, 406 n., 442
Galvanic action on coppered ships. Effects
of, 14, 336
Gambler, Yice-Admiral James (1), 201 n.,
202, 218 u., 233, 234 n., 326 (2), 566
Gambler, Admiral of the Fleet James (2)^
Lord, 406 n.
Ganges, 340
Ganges, River, 161, 201
Ganjam, 561
Gardiner's Bay, 471, 489
Gardiner, (Captain Arthur, 148 n., 150, 156,
157, 189
Gardner, Admiral Sir Alan, Lord, 434, 474
n., 520 n.
Garganta, Captain Don F., 247 n.
Garland or Guardland, 27 and n., 34
Garonne, River, 171
Garrecocha, Captain Don, 135 n.
Gascoigne, Captain Edward, 242 n., 245 n.,
246 n.
Gascoigne, of the Carron Foundry, Mr., 332
Gascoigne, Captain John, 96
Gashry, Francis, 3, 4
Gaspoe, 184
Gaspee, 228
Gastrien, boatswain of the Chesterfield, Mr.,.
287, 288
Gata, Cape de, 67
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
585
•Gates, Major (later General U.S.A.), 243,
364, 472
■Gayton, Admiral Clarke, 201 n., 202, 566
•Gayton, Eear- Admiral George, 234 n., 236
n., 489
'Geary, Admiral Sir Francis, Bart., 168, 222
and n., 231, 278, 477, 565
Geddes, Captain Alexander, 4
Gell, Admiral Jolm, 550 n., 552 n.
Generals of Marines, 2L5, 222, 223
•Genoa, 85, 116, 124, 137, 273
Gentille, 492 n.
•George I., King, 25, 27, 30, 47, 48
■George II., King, 20, 48, 50, 51, 66, 103,
105, 231
George III., King, 237, 342, 343, 508
George, Lake, 185, 205, 354, 356, 389
George's Bank, 410
Georgetown, Grenada, 435, 436
Georgia, 372, 441, 442, 472
Geraldine, Captain Don N., 96
Geriah, 143. 144
German mercenaries in America, 359, 366,
383
German troops in British ships, 32.
Germaine, 520 n.
Gibraltar, 4, 32, 42, 46, 48, 59, 66, 89, 91,
104, 107, 116, 147, 148, 151, 153, 154,
155, 157, 160, 169, 190, 210, 211, 215,
270, 281, 292, 327, 394, 395, 447, 448,
449, 451, 469, 477, 502, 503, 504, 540-
543, 546
Gibraltar, 12, 80, 83, 211, 212 n., 215, 217,
335, 449, 482 n., 563 n.
Gideon, Captain Solomon, 84 n.
Gidoin, Eear-Admiral Jolm Lewis, 406 n.,
482 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Gilchrist, Captain James, 148 n., 296, 297,
301
Gillam, the voyager, 318
Glandevez, Commodore de, 148 n., 149
Glasgow, 50
Glasgow, 212 u., 246 n.
^' Glasses," 367
Glenshiel, 40
Gloire, 123 n., 125 n., 308, 312
Gloria Castle, 54, 56, 57
Glor-ieux, 83 n., 218 n., 415, 451, 531, 532,
533 and n.
Glorioso, 6, 285, 303, 311, 315
Olori/, 335
Gloucester, 127 n., 310, 320, 321, 323 ■
Olover, Captain Bonavia, 473, 474
Glover's ballad, ' Admiral Hosier's Ghost,'
45 n.
Goa, 303, 311
■Goat Island, Newport, 402, 403
Goccocea, Captain Don J., 34
Godsalve, Captain Henry, 96
Goes, 91
■Gogland, Battle of, 341 n.
Golston, 42 n.
Gombroon, 200
" Gondolas," 359, 360, 362 and n., 365, 366,
367, 368
Gongee, 163
Gonzales, Captain Don Antonio, 34
Gonzales, Captain the Marques, 247 n.
Goodall, Admiral Samuel Granston, 246 n.,
415, 509 n., 520 n., 568
Goodly, 60, 62 n., 70 n.
Goostrey, Captain William, 206 n., 246 n.,
248
Gorcum, 91
Gordon, Captain Thomas (1) (later Vice-
Admiral in the Russian service), 43 and n.
Gordon, Captain Thomas (2), 311
Gordon, Rear- Admiral William, 206 n.,
222 n., 565
Goree (Goeree), 186-189, 254
Gosport, 196 n., 250
Gothenburg, 229
Gotho, Captain, 174 n.
Gouderak, 91
Gough, Captain William, 156, 227 and n.
Governor's Island, 382, 384
Gowanus Cove, 383
Gower, Rear-Admiral Hon. John Leveson,
212 n., 415, 567
Gracieuse, 148 n., 212 n.
Grgeme, Admiral Alexander, 406 n., 428 n.,
505 n.
Grafton, 33, 34, 35, 76 n., 144, 169, 197,
198 and n., 240 n., 395 n., 434, 437, 438,
439, 454 n., 462
Graham, Captain Mitchell, 234 n.
Gramont, 183, 212 n., 293, 312
Grampus, 274, 310(2), 312
Grand Cul de Sac, St. Lucia, 429, 432
Grand Gideon, 293
(jrand Island, 363
Grande Terre, Guadeloupe, 203
Grandiere, Captain de La, 415, 492 n.
Grant, Captain Charles Cathcart, 240, 241 n.,
304 n.
Grant, General .lames, 430, 432
Granville, 291
Granville, Earl, 41
Grasse, Yice-Admiral Comte de, 369, 385,
405, 443, 482-488, 494, 495-502, 509-
518, 519-535, 538, 539, 543, 546
Grasse-Tilli, Captain de, 415
Grave, Commodore Hendrik, 26
Graves, Captain David, 492 n., 497 n.
Graves, Admiral Samuel (1), 171, 565
Graves, Captain Samuel (2), 557
Graves, Rear- Admiral Thomas (1), 70
Graves, Admiral Thomas (2), Lord, 215 n.,
218 n., 250, 251, 294 n., 471 and n., 492
n., 494, 495-502, 508, 512, 567
Graves, Admiral Sir Thomas (3), 395 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Gravelines, 258
Gravesend, 320, 335
Gravesend Bay, New York, 383
Gravier, Captain de, 96
586
Ih'DEX TO VOLUME III.
Greene, General, U.S.A., 472
Greenhill, Henry, 4
Greenwich, 156, 425, 444 n.
Greenruich, 59, 60, 61, 62, 78 n.. 70 u.,
165 n., 166, 274, 275, 276, 294, 310, 311,
313
Greenwich Hospital, 18, 342
Greenwood, Captain AYilliam, 206 n.
Gregory, Ca^jtain Thomas (1), 86, 88 and n.
Gresjorv, Captain Thomas (2), 310
Grenada, 244, 254, 434, 435 n., 438, 440,
473, 488
Grenades, 9
Grevado, 201 n., 242 n , 245 n., 246 n.
Grenadines, The, 244, 254
Grenville, Rt. Hon. George, 2, 3, 18, 325
Grenville, Captain Thomas, 125 n., 126
Greyhound, 43 n., 113, 226 n., 242 n., -282,
310, 312, 454 n.
Grieg, Admiral Samuel, (Russian Navv),
340,341 andn.
Griffin, Admiral Tliomas (1), 120, 122, 124,
130, 131, 276, 277, 565
Griftin, Commander Thomas (2), 120 n.
Gritn», or Grifon, 34, 201 n., 311, 313
Griffith, Cai)tain Walter (1), 400 n., 406 u.,
428 n., 434, 452, 453
Grimao, Admiral Don F. de, 34
Groix, Isle, 124, 303
Gros Ilet Bay, St. Lucia, 432, 463, 487
Grove, Commander Thomas Saunders, 546 n.
Guadeloupe, 202, 203, 210, 254, 428, 463,
468, 521, 522, 524, 525, 526
Guaddoiipe, or Guadaloupc, 305 n., 492 n.,
536
Guantanamo, Punto, 76 n.
Guarda Costas, 262, 263, 264, 265, 310
Guardian, 143
Guav, Comniodore Comte du, 127 n., 142,
289
Guerin, ^I. Leoji, quoted, 222 n.
Guernsey, 310
Guernsey, 41 n., 96, 169, 170, 212 and n.,
213, .304 n.
Guerrera, Captain Don Francisco, 34
Guerrur, 148 n., 151 n., 212 n., 213, 551
Guevara, Rear-Admiral Don Balthazar de,
34, 36, 37, 38
Guichen, Rear-Admiral Comte de, 415, 443
and n., 453, 456, 458, 461, 463, 464, 465,
466, 468, 469, 470, 478, 480, 488, 504,
509
GuiUaume Tell, 286
Guinea, 169, 259, 260
Guipuscoa, 314
Guipuscoanu, 448 n.
Guirhunh; 193, 308, 313 (2)
Guise, General John, 63, 68 n., 70, 76
Gunboats, on the American lakes, 362, 365 ;
at Gibraltar, 503
Guntleet, The, 43
Gun-locks, 334
Gunners, 19, 111 n., 112 n.
Gunnery exercise, 54, 333
Gunnery, Poorness of French, 549, 552
Guns, Bursting of, 180, 305, 306
Guns, Naval, 11, 12, 330-334
Gvmwharf, Portsmouth, 343
Gwvnn, Captain Richard, 125 n.. 212 n..
296
Gyldenlove, Ulrich Christian, 26^ and n., 27
Haarlem, 91
Haarlem River : see Harlem River
Hackman, Captain James, 311
Haddock, Admiral Nicholas, 34, 49, 50
and n., 65, 66, 67, 80, 270
Haddock, Ca^ttain Richard (2), 3
Haddock, Captain "William, 34
Hadley's Quadrant, 10, 13
Hague, The, 36
Haiti : see San Domingo.
Hakluyt Societv, The,''320
Haldane, Captain Robert, 224, 225
Hale, Captain John, 238, 246 n., 299, 311
Half-pay, 19, 104, 340
Half- pay officers; proposal to subject them
to martial law, 17, 104
Halifax, Nova Scotia, 141, 167, 168, 169,
172, 182, 206, 210, 251, 289, 311, 327,
350, 371, 379, 397, 404
Halifax, 183, 206 n.
Halifax, George, Earl of, 2
Hall, Richard, 3
Hamblin, Robert, 15
Hamilton, Captain Archibald (2), 34
Hamilton, Captain George, 206 n., 208
Hamilton, Captain James (2), 286, 311
Hamilton, Captain Sir John (2), Bart.,
415, 474 n.
Hamilton, Lieutenant , (Mar.), 322
Haraond, Captain Sir Andrew Snape (1),
Bart., 327, 343, 391, 406 n.
Hampden, Richard, 3
Hampshire, 225, 226, 246 n.
Hampton Court, 41 n., 54, 55, 56, 57 n.,
70 n., 71, 72, 75 n., 152 n., 189, 234 n.,
236, 246 u., 250, 266 and n., 267, 276-
278, 283 n., 295
Hancock, 335
Hands, Israel, 260
Hankerson, Captain Thomas, 206 n., 226 n.^
242 n., 245 n., 246 n.
Hannibal, 549 and n., 550 n., 563 n.
Hannover, En ils of the connection with
89
Hannover, Treaty of, 42
Hanwav, Captain Tliomas, 4, 125 n., 127
326 (2)
Happy, 43 n., 45
Happy Iteturn, 317
Hard), 191, 563 n.
Hardships of naval life, 21, 22
Hardy, Vice- Admiral Sir Charles (1), 41 n.,
89, 91, 107, 274, 444 n.
Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles (2), Kt., 167,
07
n..
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
587
168, 169, 172, 182, 184, 186 n., 218 n.,
232, 233, 239, 252, 280, 414, 446, 565
Hardy, Vice- Admiral Sir Thomas, 26
Harland, Admiral Sir Robert (2), Bart.,
127 n., 212 n., 287, 415, 418, 419, 420,
421, 424, 436, 566
Harlem River, 382, 384, 385
Harman, Captain William, 201 n., 202, 203
Harmood, Captain Harry, 434, 454 n., 509 n.
Harmood, Commander James, 246 n.
Harris, Captain Barrows, 34
Harris, Captain Williim, 302, 311
Harris, J., shii^bviilder, 335
Harrison, George, smuggler, 1 7
Harrison, Vice- Admiral Henry, 125 n., 127 n.
Harrison, Cajitain John, 161 n., 174 n.,
179 n., 198 n., 246 n.
Harrison, Captain Thomas (2), 218 n., 252,
302, 308
Harrison, Mr. William, the chronometer
maker, 13, 14, 338
Hartvvell, Captain Brodrick, 206 n., 299
Harvev, Admiral Sir Heury (1), 513 n.,
520 n.
Harwich, 12, 237, 335
Harivicli, 120 n., 131 n., 132, 186, 311
Haswell, Captain Robert, 242 n., 245 n.,
246 n.
Hatchlands, near (ruildford, 231
Hatley, Simon, 316, 317
Haussonville, General Comte d', 250, 251
Havana, 44, 59, 67, 76, 77, 107, 135, )36,
137, 238, 245, 246-249, 250, 254, 265,
266, 267, 272, 279, 312, 314, 315, 468
Haviland, Colonel, 226, 228
Havre, Le, 193, 196, 216, 224, 231, 293,
445, 446
Haivh, 46 n., 269
Haivke, 311, 352
Hawke, Admiral of the Fleet. Sir Edward
Hawke, K.B., Lord, 96, 97, 100, 126-129
130, 137, 138, 142, 145, 152, 155, 156
160, 169, 171, 172, 173, 190, 191, 192
195, 196, 216-223, 224, 230, 231, 232
233, 234, 239, 250, 252, 284, 287, 292
297, 309, 312, 313, 325, 345 n., 435 n.
■444 n., 565
Hawker, Captain James, 242 n., 246 n.,
546 n., 552 n., 554
Hawkins, James : see Whitshed, Admiral
of the Fleet Sir James Hawkins
Hay, Captain William, 253
Hayes, A., shipbuilder, 335
Hazard, 238, 311
Hazardous, 310
Haze, 213 ; see also Fog
Hazeborough Sand, The, 312
Hebe, 335
Hebrides, 110, 113
Hector, 244 n., 269, 283 n., 415, 474 n.,
532, 533 and u.
Hector, Captain, 415
Hell (J ate, 385, 4U9
Hemmington, Captain John (or James),
70, 71
Hemp, 5
Henley, Commander Sir Robert, Bart., 62 n.
Henry the Seventh's Chapel, 193 n.
Henry, Admiral John, 509 n.
Henry Frederick, Duke of Cumberland,
Admiral Prince, 343 n., 566
Henslow, Sir John, Kt., 326
Hepburn, Captain David, (Mar.) 236
Herbert, Captain Edward (1), 272, 310
Herbert, Captain Richard, 54, 55, 62
Hercule, 108, 533 n.
Hercules, 96, 101, 218, 302, 520 n.
Hermione, 34, 224, 295, 297, 306. 308, 312,
313 (2), 314 (3), 492 n.
Hero, 218 n., 234 n., 235 n., 305, 313, 546
n., 547 and n., 548, 550 n., 552 n., 554,
563 n.
Heroine, 335
Heros, 185, 218 n., 220, 221, 313, 546 n.,
547 and n., 549, 550 n., 554, 559, 560,
563 n.
Hervey, Vice-Admiral Hon. Augustus John
(later Earl of Bristol), 148 and n., 153,
189, 216, 234 n., 242 n., 243, 244, 245 n.,
246 and n., 248, 249, 302, 566
Hervey, Captain John Augustus, Lord, 339
Hervey, Captain Hon. William, 63
Hewett, Captain Sir William, Bart., 310
Hewitt, Captain Sir \Villiam, Bart., 200 n.,
225, 311
Hibernian Marine Society, 342
Hill, Captain Benjamin, 428, 434
Hill, Rear-Admiral Christopher, 566
Hill, Mr., carpenter ; his mventions, 337
Hind, 206 n., 258, 310, 549 n.
HippoiMtame, 148 n., 151 n.
Hirondelle, 415
Hispaniola, 59 and n., 64, 68, 78, 133, 273
Hoare {or Hore), Captain Daniel, 61, 62 n.,
75, 80, 310
Hocquart, Captain de, 125 n., 141
Hodgson, General Studholm, 234 and n.
Hodgson, J., shipbuilder, 335
Hodsell {or Hodsoll), Captain James, 81, 96
Hoedic, 119
Holbourne, Captain William, 212 n.
Holburne, Admiral Francis, 140, 141, 145,
146, 156, 167-169, 232, 239, 565
Holland, J., shipbuilder, 12
Holland, 505 n.
Holland, 26, 47, 48, 51, 91, 143, 173, 201,
242, 252, 253, 266, 351, 478. 502, 539,
545
Holloway, Admiral John, 454 d.
Hollwell, Captain John, 215 n., 242 n., 352
Holmes, Rear-Admiral Charles, 135 and n.,
136, 137, 144, 169 and n., 173, 190, 195,
205, 206 and n., 208, 209, 224, 225, 232,
233, 239, 245, 300, 313
Holmes, Captain Lancelot, 246 n.
Holmes, Tempest, 3
588
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Holyhead, 15
Home, Vice- Admiral Sir George, Bart., 454 n.
Home, Eear- Admiral Eoddam, 546 n.
Honduras, Bay of, 80
Honfieur, 216
Hood, Cajjtain Alexander, 497 n., 513 u.
Hood, Admiral Alexander Arthur, K.B.,
Lord Bridport, 218 n., 238, 295, 305,
413 n., 415, 567
Hood, Admiral Sir Samuel (1), Viscount
Hood, 215 n., 283, 300, 326 and n., 346,
369, 479, 481-487, 482 n., 494, 495, 497
and n., 499, 500, 501, 502, 510-519,
520 n., 521-528, 530, 532, 534-538, 567
Hope, Captain Charles (1), 505 n.
Hopewell, 263
Hopson, Major-General, 196, 201, 202, 203
Hopsonn, Vice-Admiral Edward, 42, 43, 45,
46 and n.
Hore, Captain Daniel : see Hoare, Captain
Daniel
Hornet, 14.1, 245, 310, 311
Horse Shoe Shoal, Chesapeake Bay, 501
Hosier, Vice-Admiral Francis, 39 n., 42, 43
and n., 44, 45 and n.
Hospital ships, 31
Hotham, Admiral William (1), Lord Hot-
ham, 234 n., 296, 301, 383, 385, 387,
406 n., 409, 428 and n., 429, 454 n., 469,
567
Houat, 119
Hougue, Cape La, 192
Houlton, Hear- Admiral John, 246 u., 454 n.,
462 n., 482 n., 568
House carpenters, 342
Howe, Admiral of the Fleet, Hon. Sir
Richard, Earl Howe, 141, 171, 173, 192-
195, 216, 218 n., 220, 223, 237, 239, 252,
282, 291, 296, 325, 326, 340, 345, 350,
351, 366, 371, 379, 380, 390, 391, 394,
397, 398, 399, 400 and u., 401-412, 425,
428, 538-543, 549, 566
Howe, General Sir William, K.B., 359, 360,
370, 371, 372, 379, 383-387, 388, 390,
391, 392, 393, 398, 442
Howitzers, 362 and n.
Hudson, Captain Charles, 497 u.
Hudson River, 354, 360, 370, 371, 380, 382,
384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 391, 392
Hudson's Bay, 318-320, 352 n.
Hudson's Bay Comiiauy, The, 318, 319,
320
Hudson's Strait, 319
Huglies, Captain Charlo.-., 552 n.
Hughes, Admiral Sir Edward, K.B., 183,
185, 206 n., 222 n., 439 u., 508, 545
and n., 548, 549-564, 566
Hughes, Cai)tain Richard (1), 4
Hughes, Captain Sir Richard (2), Bart., 4,
84 n., 326, 327, 343, 538 n.
Hughes, Admiral Sir Richard (3), Bart.,
200 n., 538 and n., 567
Hughes, Rear-Aduairal Robert (1), 47
Hughes, Rear- Admiral Robert. (2), 196, 201
and n., 202, 566
Hugli, 162
Hull, 335, 342
Humher, 312
Hunt, Captain Anthony (1), 373
Hunt, Captain Joseph, 215 n., 304
Hunt, Edward, 326
Hunter, 145, 206 n., 208, 252, 253
Hurricanes : see Storms
Hussar, 191, 223 u., 297, 312 (2), 335,
406 n.
Hutchinson, William, quoted, 278, 279
Hvder Ali, 545, 549, 552, 555, 557, 561
Hyeres, 84, 92, 93, 96
Ibbetsox, John, 326
Ice, 357, 358
" Idlers " in men-of-war, 19
Ilfracombe, 186, 313
lllustre, 198 n., 443 n., 557, 559, 560,
563 n.
Impregnahle, 343
Impressment, 18, 23, 140, 396
Impress Service, The, 347
Imprisonment, 275
Improvements, Xaval, 10, 13-15, 330-334,
336-338
Inadequate force, Danger of employing, 370
Indefatigable, 286
India : see East Indies.
Indian auxiliaries in America, 366
Tadien, 415
Industry, 320
Infante, 247, 249, 315
Infernal, 172, 201 n., 234 n., 242 n., 293,
311, 546
Inflammables, Alleged use of, 179
Inflexible, 218 n., 313, 361, o62, 363 and u.,
365-369, 563
Inglefield, Captain Jolm Xicholson, 497 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
Inglis, Rear-Admiral Charles (1), 215 n.,
513 n., 520 n., 568
Innes, Rear-Admiral Alexander, 246 n., 567
Inues, Captain Thomas, 133 n., 135 n.
Inspection of Dockyards, 335
Instructions, Admirals', 15
Instructions, Secret, 66
Instructions, Vernon's, 54
Insurance, Marine, 396
Insulaire, 120 and n.
Intelligence, Admiralty, 126
Intrepid, 126, 148 n., 150, 151 n., 154, 191,
212 and n., 213, 214, 215, 218 n., 246 u.,
299, 312, 454 n., 462, 482 n., 486, 497 n.,
513 n.
Intrepide, 127 n., 128, 165 n., 185, 218 n.,
415, 458
luvasion of England projected or threatened,
39, 89, 90, 142, 145, 196, 210, 216, 261,
445
Invencible, 135 n., 314
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
589
Invincible, 6, 12, 125 n., 182, 288, 296, 297,
311, 312, 395 n., 482 n., 497 n., 513 n.
Inwood, E., shij^builder, 335
IpMgenia, 505 n.
IpJiigenie, 415
Ipswich, 52
Ipswich, 84, 122, 152 u., 273, 280
Ireland, 39, 110, 119, 167, 196, 216, 223,
229, 230, 311
Iris, 292, 335, 492 n.
Irish Viceroy's yacht. The, 330 n.
Isabela, 96, 98 and n.
Ms, 126, 152 n., 215 n., 224 n., 301, 306,
312, 313 (4), 350, 357, 366, 406 n., 409,
410, 428 n., 431, 546 and n., 548, 550 n.,
552 n., 560, 563 n.
Islay Island, 229
Isle Dieu, 301
Isle Bas, 333
Italy, 30, 66, 84, 102, 107, 116
Jacobites, The, 39, 40, 43 n., 279 and n.
Jamaica, 13, 44, 45, 51 n., 54, 58, 59, 60,
61 n., 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 75, 76 and n.,
77, 78 and n., 79, 80, 88, 109, 122, 123,
124, 135, 136, 145, 164-166, 182, 188,
204, 224, 225, 232, 233, 239, 245, 246,
247, 250, 263, 264, 266, 272, 275, 300,
306, 308, 310, 311, 313, 327, 379, 438,
445, 470, 473, 479, 494, 502, 519, 536,
537, 539
Jamaica, 144
James Island, 372
James River, Virginia, 473, 488, 494, 496
James, the historian, William, quoted, 330,
et seq.
James, Mr., (Commodore in H.E.I. Co.'s
Service), 143, 144, 164
Janus, 473, 474
Jason, 108, 125 n., 312, 336, 492 n., 525,
537, 546 n.
Jasper, Sergeant, at Fort Moultrie, 374
Jekyll, Captain Edward, 192, 201 and n.,
202, 235 n., 246 n., 248, 305
Jenkins's ears, Richard, 50, 51, 265 and n.,
266, 272
Jenner, J., shipbuilder, 335
Jennings, Admiral Sir John, 42, 43, 257
Jennings, Captain Thomas, 3
Jennings, Lieutenant-Colonel, 229
Jersey, 291
Jersey, 70 and u., 211, 212 n., 280, 292
Jervis, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir John, K.B.,
Earl St. Vincent, 206 n., 207, 250, 415,
443, 445, 538 and n., 539, 567
Jesuit's bark, 62
Joannis, Captain, 174 n,
Jocelyn, Captain Robert, 200 n , 240 n.
Johnson, Captain Sir Robert, Kt., 27 u.,
261, 310
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 21 n.
Johnson, Colonel Sir William, Bart., 141,
204, 226
Johnston, Lieutenant William, 279 n.
Johnstone, Captain Gideon, 492 n., 497 n.
Johnstone, Captain George, 245, 350, 545-
549
Johnstone, Commander James, 479 n.
Joiners, 342
Jolly (or JoUey), Captain Thomas, 71, 76 n.
Jones, Captain John Paul, U.S N., 298, 525
Jonquiere, Admiral the Marquis de La, 117,
124, 125 and n., 126, 139, 281, 283
Jonquiere de Taffauel, Captain de La, 125 n.
Joy, William, 265
Juan Fernandez, 310, 317, 318, 321
Judges, The, pronounce upon Byng's sen-
tence, 158 ; upon Coffin's case, 351
Jumper, Captain Sir William, Kt., 4
Juno, 12, 34, 35, 37, 186 n., 215 n., 222 n.,
305, 313 (2), 314, 403 n., 563 n.
Junon, 148 n., 314, 415
Jupiter, 143, 546 n.
Juste, 218 n., 313
Karlskroua, 27
Kasteel van MedemhUk, 91
Katherine I., Empress of Russia, 42, 47
Kearny, Commander Michael, 212 n.
Keene, Sir Benjamin, 139, 155
Keith, Captain Sir Basil, Kt., 223 n.
Keith, Viscount: see Elphinstone, Hon.
George Keith
Kempenfelt, Rear- Admiral Richard, 174 n.,
179 n., 181, 182, 198 n., 225, 240 n., 241,
242, 341, 443 n., 509, 510, 519, 538, ■■ 39,
540, 567
Kempthorne, Captain Thomas, 4, 34
Kennebec River, 356
Kennedy, Captain Archibald (later Earl of
Cassilis), 302
Kennington, 167 n., 183
Kent, H.R.H, Prince Edward, Duke of,
184 n.
Kent, 33, 34, 35, 46 and n , 53, 76 n., 78,
79 n., 83 n., 127 n., 128, 129, 140, 161
and n., 162, 163, 267, 268, 283 and n.,
314
Keritish Knock, The, 310
Keppel, Admiral Hon. Augustus : Viscount
Keppel, 139 and n., 171, 188, 189, 218 n.,
220, 223, 231, 232, 234-236, 238, 246 n.,
247, 249, 250, 283, 284, 288, 289, 299,
311, 324, 325, 341, 396, 397, 412-426,
428, 435 n., 436, 440, 443, 508. 549, 565
Keppd, Vice-Admiral George, 400 n., 406 n.
Keppel, Captain George Augustus, 520 n.
Kermadec, Captain Baron de, 415
Kersaint, Commodore Guy Simon de Caet-
uampreu, Comte de, 114 and n., 146, 165,
166, 169, 219 and n., 220 n.
Kersaint, A'ice- Admiral Comte de, 415
Kidd, Captain Dandy, 320
Kidd, the pirate, 258, 259
Killed in action in the Seven Years' War ,
Seamen and Marines, 339
590
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Kilroot Point, 229
King George, 285, 286
Kins, Admiral Sir Richard (1), Bart., 162,
201 u., 239, 241 n., 545 n., 550 n., 551,
552 n., 567
King's College, Cambridge, Chaiiel of, 242
Kingfisher, 140, 143, 161 and n., 162, 201
n., 402 .
Kingsmill {previously Brice), Admiral Sir
Robert, Bart., 242 n., 415
Kingsale, 230, 250, 278
Kingsule, 262
Kingston, 84, 96, 98, 148 n., 218 n., 227 n.,
251, 273
Kinsbergen, Captain van, 505 n.
Kirk, Captain Robert, 198 u., 303, 311
Kirke, Captain James, 212 n., 214, 222 n.
Kittery, 110
Kjoge Bay, 27
Knatchbull, Captain Charles, 482 n., 497 n.,
513 c, 520 n.
Knight, Captain John (1), 224 n., 238
Knight, Admiral Sir John (2), 482 n.,
513 n., 520 u.
Knight, Rear -Admiral Sir Joseph, Kt.,
131 n., 188, 246 n., 343, 566
Knight, Captain Richard, 223 n.
Knight, Captain William, 276, .'510
Knigliton, Captain Francis, 34
Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles, Bart., 23,
57, 61 and n., 62, 64, 68, 72, 73, 85-88,
112, 124, 130, 132-137, 146, 171, 267,
294, 315, 340, 565
Knowles, Commander Edward, 312
Ladrone Islands, 323
Lafoyette, General, 469, 496
Laforey, Admiral Sir John, Bart., 184, 185,
206 n., 242 n., 327 (2), 347 and n., 415,
417, 424 n., 425 n., 567
Lage de Cueilli, Captain, 96
Lage, the privateer, M. de, 280, 281
Lagos, 214, 285, 439 u.
La Guayra, 85, 86, 88
Lake, Captain Thomas, 118, 131 n.
Lakes, Campaign on the American, 353
et se-/.
Lalandelle, Cajjtain de, 550 n.
Lallv, Baron de Tullendal, General Comte de,
164, 174, 176, 177, 181, 199, 200, 394 n.
Lambart, Captain, 492 n.
Lambart, Brigadier-General Hamilton, 235,
236
Lambert, Cajitairi liobert Alexander, 327
Lampraavv, 176, 177, 178
Lancasteri^ 148 n., 151 n., 201 n., 295, 296,
312
Land's End, 249, 250, 338, 539
Langara, Admiral Don Juan de, 449, 451
Langdou, Rear-Admiral William, 165 and n.,
567
Langriil^e, 259
Languedoc, 409, 429
Lapelliere, Captain de, 550 n.
Larl; 276, 285 and n., 310, 403 n.
Larr, Captain, 125 n.
Lascars in the Navy, 177, 225
Latham, Captain Thomas, 161 n., 174 n.,
179 n.
Latona, 505 n., 540
Laughton, Professor J. K., R.X., quoted,
229 n., 296, 297
Launceston, 115, 234 n., 310
Laurel, 479 n.
Law, Naval, 350, 351
Lawrence, Captain Peter, 70, 123 n., 273,
310
Laws, Captain William, 71, 269
Lea, Commander William, 80, 276, 310
Lecale, Lord : see Fitzgerald, Lord Charles
Lecky, Mr. W. E. H., quoted, 51
Le Cras, Ca])tain Edward, 201 and n., 203,
235 n., 326, 327
Lede, Marques de, 32, 37, 38
Lee, Vice- Admiral Hon. Fitzroy Henry, 122
Lee, Captain Thomas (1), 238
Lee, William, 3
Leeutvenhurst, 91
Leeward Islan.'.s, 57, 88, 122, 124, 137, 142,
145, 164, 182, 188, 196, 201-203, 224,
225, 282, 233, 239, 245, 300, 311, 327,
427, 440, 445, 448, 469, 538
Leew^ard, Reasons for engaging from, 214,
408, 420 ; disadvantages of engaging from,
in narrow waters, 363, 364, 369 : engaging
from, 449, 490
Legge, Captain Hon. Edward, 54, 122, 124,
284, 320
Legge, Captain George, 174 n., 177
Legge, Hon. Henry Bilson, 3
Legge, Captain Julian, 206 n., 226 u.,
233 n., 242 n., 245 n., 246 n.
Leghorn, 48, 292, 311
Leith, 505 n.
Lempriere, Cai^tain Thomas, 246 n.
Lendrick, (Japtain John, 246 n.
Lenio, Captain Don Francisco, 34
Lenox, 34, 43 n., 46 n., 53, 81, 123 and n.,
135 and n., 136, 200 n., 240 n., 267, 268,
280, 314
Lenses in lighthouses, 338
Leopard, 43 n., 45
Leopard, 313
Leslie, Captain Lachlin, 86, 201 and n.
Leslie, General, 488
Leso, Admiral Don Bias de, 59, 61, 69, 71 u.
Lestock, Admiral Richard (2), 34, 63, 68,
70, 71, 73, 75, 80-84, 92-107, 118, 119,
257, 283, 423
Letters of Marque (.see also Reprisals), 52
Levant, 242 n.
Leviathan, 399 n.
Levis, M. de, 227
Levis, Point, 207
Lirhfield, 70 n., 76, 80, 188, 311, 312
' Licornc, 165 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
591
Liddell, Dennis, 3
Lieutenant-Generals of Marines, 223
Lieutenants, 19, 20, 22, 103, 330, 341
Lighthouses, 14, 15, 108, 338
Lights, 33 and n., 338
Lightning, 311
Lightning conductors, 338
Lightships, 15
Ligondes, Captain de, 415
Lima, 308, 318
Lindsay, Eear- Admiral Sir John, K.B., 185,
206 n., 207, 246 n., 248, 338, 347 and n.,
415, 567
Line, Breaking the, 531, 532
Line-of-battle, Use and abuse of the, 38, 81-
83, 97, 105, 125, 127, 128, 136, 149, 150,
154, 156, 174, 175, 178, 179, 198, 218,
219, 423, 460-462, 467, 468, 491
Line of bearing, 558
Liugen, Captain Joseph, 96, 122
Linzee, Captain John, 406 n., 520 n.
Linzee, Admiral Eobert, 520 n.
Lion, 64, 66, 70 n., 110, 111, 127 n., 148 n.,
151 n., 201 n., 202, 203, 212 n., 235 n.,
264, 279, 283 n., 308, 314, 434, 437, 438,
439, 473
Lisbon, 31, 50, 54, 62, 63, 91, 107, 245,
295, 301, 302, 322
Lisle, Captain William, 122, 131 and n.,
132, 143, 311
Lissa, 202
Littleton, Yice-Admiral James, 4, 39 n.
Lively, 86, 87, 88, 108, 120 n., 131 n., 225,
226, 272, 313, 415
Liverpool, 335, 338
Liverjiool, 223 n.
Lizard, The, 65, 310, 311, 313, 444, 504,
520 n.
Lizard, 206 n., 226 u., 233 u., 242 n., 246
n., 299, 482 n., 513 n.
Lloyd, Commander , 415
LWd, Captain James, 96, 104
Llovd, Vice-Admiral John (2), 131 n.,
148 n., 566
Lloyd, Captain Thomas (1), 479 n.
Lloyd, William (1), 212 n., 566
Lloyd's List of losses and captures, 1775-83,
396 n.
Lobb, Commander Jacob, 187
Lochaber, 111, 113
Lockhart, John : see Eoss, Sir John Lock-
hart, Bart.
Locmaria, Point de, 235
Loggie, Captain James, 230 n., 306
Loire, Eiyer, 313
Loire, 298, 313
London, 339
London, Eecognition of public services hj
the City of, 58
London, i03, 187, 311, 491, 492 n., 497 and
n., 499, 500 n.
Londonderry, 229
Long, Captain Eobert, 71, 96, 107
Long Island, Charleston, 372
Long Island, Lake Champlain, 363
Long Island, New York, 382, 383, 385, 397,
409, 471, 489, 495
Longcroft, Captain Edward, 365
Longford, Lord : see Pakenham, Ca[)tain
Hon. Edward Michael
Longitude, Discovery of the, 13, 14, 338
Longueville, M. de, 244
Longships' Light, 338
Looe, 34, 310^
Lord Olive, 251, 252
Lorient, 118, 224, 283, 295
Loring, Captain Joshua, 205, 228 and n.
Loss of life in the Seven Years' AYar, 255
Losses of ships, 310-315, 396 n.
Loudoun, General the Earl of, 144, 166,
167, 168, J 72, 204
Louis XY., King of France, 138
Louisbourg, 109, 110, 113-115, 116, 117,
122, 140, 141, 145, 167-169, 170, 172,
182-184, 206, 224, 228, 251, 289, 293,
297, 299, 311, 312, 313
Louisbourg, 311
Louisiana, 253, 254
Loup, 284
Lovett, Captain John, 96
Lowestoft, 206 n., 208, 227 and n., 311
Lowfield, Commander , 246 n., 312
Lowther, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Lowther, the buccaneer, 61, 78
Loyal Oimvert, 361
Lucas, Captain Eichard, 520 n.
Lucas, Major, 87
Ludlo'v Oastle, 12, 201 n., 284
Lumley, Captain Hon. Thomas Charles,
546 n., 550 n., 552 n., 560
Lunars, 338
Lunette, 415
Lurcher, 246 n., 249
Lushington, Captain Franklin, 86, 88
Luttrell, Hon. John : see Olmius, Captain
Hon. John Luttrell.
Lutwidge, Admiral Skeftington, 389
Lutwidge, Lieutenant , 163
Luzon, 241
Ltjme, 211, 212 n., 259, 291, 298, 311 (2)
Lynn, Captain Thoraas,i201 and n., 203, 232
Lyim, Dr. ; his still, 337
Lynn, 340
Lynn, 234 n., 236
Lynnhaven Bay, 493, 496
Lynx, 23 S
Lyons, Mr. Isaac, 338
Lys, 120 n., 121, 141, 142, 289, 312 (2)
Macao, 317, 323
Macartney, ( Captain John, 209, 226 n., 505 n.
Macarty, Captain, 125 n.
Macbride, Admiral John, 333, 346, 413 n.,
*4-l ^ 'SOo w
M'Clevertv, Ca])tain Willia:n, 211, 212 n.,
217, 226 n., 233 n., 242 n.
592
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
M'Coy, Captain Alexander, 543 n.
Macdonald, Flora, 372
Jlachault, 210, 228, 294, 313
Mackenzie, Yice-Admiral George, 193,
201 n., 203, 246 u., 56G
Mackenzie, Commander James, 201 n.,
234 n., 242 n.
]\Iackenzie, Admiral Thomas, 546 n.
]\Iackenzie, Lieutenant-Colonel, (Mar.) 237
Mackie, Commander , 96, 100, 101,
310
M'Laurin, Captain John, 245, 513 n., 520 n.
Maclellan, Captain Hon. Dunbar, 552 n.,
557
Macnamara, master in H.K.I.C.S., 251
"Macnamara, Commodore de, 140
Madagascar, 197
jMadariaga, Captain Don J. Y., 247 n.
]\[adeira, 13, 65, 320, 338
Madras, 109, 119, 121 and n., 124, 130, 132,
160, 174, 177, 181, 182, 186, 199, 200,
232, 239, 394 n., 549, 552, 557, 560, 561,
563
jNladrid, 37, 47, 51, 139, 368, 447
^ludrid, Convention of, 2(J3
Magellan's Strait, 322
Magnanime, 138, 171, 172, 216, 217, 218
and n., 219, 220, 280, 287, 312, 524, 552
and n., 563 n.
Macjnificent, 343, 434, 454 n., 520 n.
Magnifiijne, 218 n., 415
Mahan, Captain A. T., U.S.N. , quoted, 33,
38, 96, 97, 126, 129, 149, 150, 176, 200,
222 n., 254, 255
Mahe, Captain, 174 u.
]\Iahe, 232, 351
Mahrattas, The, 143, 545
Maidstone, 217, 218 and n., 283, 284, 308,
311
Maitland, Cajjtain Hon. Frederick Lewis (1),
225, 415, 417, 454 n., 509 n.
Majorca, 148, 153, 273, 295, 313
^lalabar coast, The, 351, 545 n.
Malacca, 241
Malaga, 32, 39, 51
Malicteuse, 302, 306
Maligne, 312
Malta, 34 n., 38, 298, 313
^lalta Channel, 38
Man, Admiral Robert (2), 201 n., 235 u.,
239, 252, ;'.03 n., 309, 566
Man, Isle of, 230
^langalore, 352, 545
Manhattan Island, 382, 383, 384
Manilla, 550 n.
]\Ianilla, 108, 239-242, 312, 315, 323
Mann, Captain Robert, 308 and n.
Maimers, Captain Lord Robert, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 515, 518, 520 n., 533 n.
^Manning, Captain Thomas, 174, 311
Manning the fleet : (see also Bounties, etc.),
394, 395
Mantel], Captain William, 206 n., 208
Manvers, Earl : see Meadows, Captain
Charles
Maplesden, Captain Jervis, 148 u., 195,
212 n., 218 n., 235 n.
Maps, 118
Mapson, Mr., 338
Marais Bay, 194
Marechal de Belleisle, 230 and n., 296, 297,
298, 299
Mari, Chevalier de, 116
Mari, Rear- Admiral Marques de, 34 and n.,
36 n., 37, 48, 314
Maria, 361, 365, 369
Maria Theresia, the Empress, 89
Marie Galante, 203, 254
Mariel, 247 n.
Marigny, Captain de, 492 n., 533 n.
Marine Society, The, 342
Marine School at Hull, 342
Marines, 'Ihe, 5, 22, 58, 63 n., 87, 131, 140,
147, 158, 159, 183, 187, 189, 191, 207,
208, 215, 222, 223, 224, 236, 240, 241,
243, 248, 281, 2:i7, 322, 327, 338, 506,
511
" Marines " in a privateer, 316, 317
Marischal, Earl of, 39
Marlborough, General the Duke of, 191, 192
Marlborough, 92, 96, 98, 99, 100 and n.,
103, 242 n., 246 n., 248, 249, 250, 312,
520 n., 530
Marlow, Admiral Benjamin, 148 n., 297,
298, 543 n., 567
Marocco, 47 n., 188 and n.
Marooning, 260
Marquis de Marloze, 228, 313
Manilart, Captain de, 96
Mars, 12, 121, 128 n., 218 n., 235 n., 274,
276, 281, 289, 311, 312, 313
Marseillais, 409
Marseilles, 107
Marsh, George, 326 (2)
Marsh, Captain Henry, 173, 186-188
Marsh, Captain William, 96, 311
Marshal of tlie Admiralty, 159
Marshall, Captain, (Russian Navy), 341
Marshall, Captain Samuel (1), 131 n., 238,
242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 311
Marshall, Captain Sir Samuel (2), 397, 415,
520 n.
^larshalsea. The, 275
Marie, 247 n., 315
Martial law. Proposal to subject half-pay
officers to, 17
INIartin, Captain Sir Henry (2), Bart., 223 n.,
250, 326, 327
Martin, Admiral William (1\ 84 and u., 85,
89, 91, 112 n., 113, 273, 312
Martin, Captain William (2), 123, 161 n.,
179 n., 311
Martinique, 59, 63, 88, 116, 138, 145, 201,
202, 242-244, 245, 246, 252, 254, 271,
276, 280, 281, 290, 3U0, 303, 304, 311,
427, 428, 452, 453, 463, 464, 466, 468,
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
593
470, 473, 481, 482, 484, 487, 488, 494,
510, 512, 519, 520
Mary Rose, 258
Maskelyne, Dr. Neville, 338
Masnata, Captain Don Lucas, 34
Mason, Edward, 3, 4, 326
Mason, Major, (Mar.), 187
Massachusetts, 109, 110, 113, 370
Masson, Captain, 125 n.
Master, Captain Streynsham, 34
Masters, 19, 336 and n., 340
Masters-and-Commanders, 330 and n., 336 n.
Masts, 329
Matanzas, Cuba, 267
Mataro, 84
Match-tub, 334
Mathews, Admiral Thomas, 4, 34, 83 and
n., 84, 85, 92-107, 150, 160, 273, 423
Mauritius, 122, 130, 131, 174, 178, 181,
197, 199, 231, 232, 234, 543 n. See also
France, Isle de
Maurville, Captain Bide de, 550 n.
Maynard, Captain Eobert, 259 and n., 260
Mayne, Captain Covill, or Colvill, 41 n.. 53,
267, 268
Mayne, Vice-Admiral Perrv, 54, 55, 105,
-106, 310
Mead, Captain Joseph, 206 n., 242 n., 246 n.,
308
Meadows (properly Medows), Captain
Charles (later Charles Pierrepont, Vis-
count Newark, Earl Manvers), 183 and
n., 212 u.
Meadows, General, 350
Medals, 282
Medea, 492 n., 563 n., 564
MkUe, 274, 280, 312
MedemhUk, 505 n.
Mediator, 311
Medical Stores, 2
Medina, Captain Don F. de, 247 n.
Medine, Captain de, 492 n.
Mediterranean, The, 30 et seq., 43, 46, 47,
50, 65, 80 et seq., 89 et seq., 92 et seq.,
116, 123, 124, 130, 137, 142, 145, 146-
157, 160, 169, 170, 189, 190, 19fi, 210-
■ 215, 224, 228, 229, 232, 233, 239, 252,
258, 273, 280, 286, 288, 292, 304, 306,
309, 310, 313, 448, 469
Medley, Vice-Admiral Henry, 116, 123, 124
Medivay, 120 n., 191, 206 n., 225, 295, 312,
434, 454 n., 509 n.
Medway's Prize, 120 and n., 121
Meer, Jaffier, 164
Melampe, 234 n., 293, 301, 313
Meknnpus, 335
Melville, Henry, Viscount, 326 and n.
Melville, General Robert, 330
Merchant seamen, 19
Merchant seamen and Greenwich Hospital,
18
Merchants in Spanish territory. Difficulties
of, 262
Merci, General Count de, 40
Mercure, 64 n., 281, 312
Mercury, 96, 246 n., 248, 311
Merlin, 13, 14, 133 n., 246 n., 294, 311, 312,
391, 392
Mermaid, 115, 121, 311
Messina, 32, 33, 34, 40, 314
]\Ietelle. Cape della, 36
Mexico, 272, 310, 317
Michell, Captam Matthew, 310, 320
Michie, Captain Colin, 198 n., 199
Micoud, Chevalier de, 432
Middelhunj, 91
Middle Ground, Chesapeake Bay, 496, 497
Middleton, Admiral Sir Charles ; Lord
Barham, 326, 347 and n., 567
Middleton, the navio;ator, Christopher, 319,
320
Midshipmen, 20, 22
Mighells-, Vice-Admiral James, 3, 40, 41,
261, 262
Mignonne, 301, 313
Milan, 30, 32
Milbanke, Admiral Mark, 566
Milbanke, Captain Ralph, 479 n.
Milford, 123 n., 308, 310, 415
Militia embodied, 196
Mi'i.v,- Captain Archibald, 187
MilleiV Captain, (Russian Naw), 341
Miller, Commander George (1)", 209, 210
Milnes, John, 3
Minervcc, 218 n., 238, 305, 313, 330, 335
Minerve, 212 n., 314
Minorca, 4, 42, 48, 65, 92, 105, 107, 142,
146-157, 160, 252, 254, 327, 423, 447,
448, 451, 503, 504
Minotaure, 198 n.
Minto, Gilbert, Lord, 326
Miquelon, Island of, 253
Miramichi, 184
Missing men, 339
Mississippi, River, 253, 278
Mitchell, Captain Cornelius, 63, 78 and n.,
122, 123 and n.
Mithon de Genouilli, Captain, 415
Mobile, Farragut at, 150
Modeste, 125 and n., 212 n., 214, 215, 242
n., 306, 313 (2)
Mohaivk, 226
Mohawk River, 204
Moissac, Cajrtain de, 550 n.
Molloy, Capiain Anthony James Pye, 400 n.,.
406 n., 434, 454 n., 459 and n , 460, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n.
Mona Passage, The, 246, 537
Monaco, 193 n.
Monarca, 449, 550 n., 552 n., 563 n.
Monarch, 156, 158, 190, 313, 415, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Monarque, 127 n., 312
Monck, or Monk, 42 n., 310
Monckton, General Hon. Robert, 141, 207,
233, 243, 245
594
INDEX TO VOLUME IJI.
Monmouth, 12, 125 aud n., 127 u., 189, 190,
216, 234 n., 23ii and ii., 298, 313 (2),
395 n., 410, 434, 438, 439, 546 n., 547
and n., 54», 550 n., 552 n., 554, 559,
563 n.
Monperoux, Captain de, 415
Monsieur, 509 n.
Mont Ozier, 293
Montar/u, 34, 35, 70 n., 76 n., 79 and n.,
liiO, 193, 218 n., 219, 220, 276, 313,
454 n., 459, 460, 462 n., 4b2 n., 497 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
^[ontagu. Admiral Sir Georg«, 492 n.
Montagu (formerly jNIoiiutagu), Admiral
John, 125 n., 190, 235 n., 566
Montagu, Admiral Robert, 550 n., 552 n.
Montagu, Captain Hon. William, 125 n.
^Montcalm, General the Marquis de, 206, 207,
209
Monte Carmelo, 321
Monte Cliristi, 473
!Mouteil, Captain de, 415
Montgomery, General, 356, 357
Montmorency, Falls of, 207
Montreal, 226-228, 354, 356, 358
Montrose, 258, 312, 340
^loor, the navigator, William, 320
Moore, Admiral Sir Joan (1), Bart., 127 n.,
164, 173, 182, 201 aud u., 202-204, 224,
239, 252, 253, 565
Moore, Eear-Admiral Matthew, 234 n., 567
Morals in the Navy, 22, 23
Moras, 174 n., 175, 179 n., 180
Morbihan, The, 216, 217
Mordaunt, General Sir John, 171
Moreton, Captain Francis Reynolds (later
Lord Uucie), 391, 482 n., 497 n., 513 n.,
520 n.
Moreton, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Morgan, Sir Henry, 79, 259
Morgan, the mutineer, Lieutenant, (Mar.),
John, 287, 288
Morue Fortune, St. Lucia, 429, 430
Moro, 247 n.
Moro Castle, Havana, 248, 249
Morphet, Zebulon, smuggler, 17
Morrice, or Morris, Vice-Admiral Salmon,
47
Morris, Captain John, 372, 376
Morristown, 3p8
^lortality on board ship: (see also Disease,
etc.), 45, 46, 320, 339
Mortar, 215 n.
Mortars : (see also Bombs), 57, 184, 187, 261,
374
Mosquito Indians, The, 78
Mostyn, Vice-Admiral Savage, 3, 113, 146,
276-278, 283 n.
Motte, La : see Dubois de La blotto
Molte-Picquet, Admiral La, 415, 443, 452,
473, 474, 503, 504
Mouat, Captain Patrick, 206 u., 312
^loultric. General, 373, 374, 376
Moimtaine ; ' Practical Sea-Gunner's Com-
panion,' 11
Mountford, Commander Edward, 206 n.
Moutray, Captain John, 212 n., 306, 327,
478
Movana, Captain, Don Pedro, 34
Mrul Island, 391, 35^2
Mulder, Captain, 505 n.
Mulgrave, Lord: see Phij^ps, Captain Hon.
Constantine John
Munro, Major Hector, 232
.Murray, Captain, (Mar.), 236
Murrav, Brisadier-General, 209, 226, 227,
228
iluirav, Ca^jtain Hon. George (1), later Lord
Elibank, 320
Murray, Captain James, (mil ), 71 n.
Murray, Vice-Admiral Hon. George (2),
505 n.
Muskets, 9
Mutine, 314
Mutiny, 229, 287, 288, 322, 339, 340
Mysore, 545
Namiir, 48 n., 83, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101
and n., 125 n., 126, 131 n., 132, 185, 211,
212 and n., 213, 214, 215, 218 n., 231,
235 n., 245, 246 n., 241), 311, 312, 351,
520 n., 531
Nantes, 110, 284, 289
Napier, Captain Hon. Chas. (1), 246 n.
Naples, 30, 32, 38, 40. 84
Narbrough, Admiral Sir John, 321
Narcissus, 339
Narragansett Bay, 382, 387, 393, 397, 402,
405, 409, 433, 443, 470, 477
Narrows, The, New York Harbour, 382,
383
A^asscm, 81, 96, 98, 152 n., 187, 188, 203,
236 and n.
Naturalisation of foreign seamen, 18
Nautical Almanac, The, 338
Nautilus, 406
Naval Discipline Act, 15 n.. 17 n., 276, 293,
294
Naval Expenditure, 5
Naval Hosi)itals, 2
Navarro, Admiral Don Jose, 67, 89, 92, 94,
96, 102
Navesink Highlands, 398
Navigating officers, 336 n.
Navigation Acts, The, 538
Navy, Early influence of the American, 354,
359, 360
Navy Office, The, 2, 21, 326, 339
Xavy Pay Office, 2
Navv, State of the, 7
Needles' Light, 338
Negapatam, 119, 179-181, 199, 554-557
Negro Point, ^Slartinicj^ue, 20 L
Negroes, 262
Nelson, Commander Bartholomew ('), 311
Nelson, Vice-Admiral Sir Horatio, Lord
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
595
Nelsou, 165 n., 166, 3^ 379, 380, 383,
) 389, 404 n., 412 n., 43X 451, 456, 462,
t>, 474, 511, 51^, 537, 538, 554
i Xepotism, 350
Neptune, 81, 82, 96, 120 n., 123 n., 124,
127 n., 128, 171, 172, 206, 276, 277,
492 n.
Neptuno, 96, 98 and u., 247, 312, 315
Nesmond, Admiral the Chevalier, 58
Neutralitv, Breaches of, 252, 253, 292, 351,
352, 480, 481, 546
A'evis, 510, 511, 512, 513, 518
Kew England, 109, 110, 113, 117
New Jersey, 371, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388,
390, 391, 393, 397, 399
New Orleans, 253
New York, 23, 167, 168, 210, 354, 355, 359,
371, 379-386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 393,
395, 397-401, 403, 404, 408, 409, 410,
411, 412, 428, 440, 443, 444 n., 469, 471,
472, 478, 488, 493, 494, 495, 496, 501, 537
New Zealand, 337
Newark, 212 n., 213, 215
Newark, Viscount: see Meadows, Captain
Charles
Neiocastle, 174 n., 175, 177, 179 and n., 198
n., 199, 225, 311
Newcastle, Duke of, 72 n., 78, 264
Newcome, Cajitain Henry, 552 n.
Newfoundland, 115, 141, 25(', 251, 253, 254,
260, 309
Newnharn, Caritain Thomas, 454 n., 462 n.
Newport, Khode Island, 387, 402, 409, 410,
428, 470, 471, 488, 489, 491, 492, 494,
495, 496
Newsom, Captain William, 188, 224, 240 n.,
312
Newton, Captain, (mil.), 54, 57
' Newton, Sir Isaac, 13
Niagara, Fort, 141, 204, 205
Nicknames of officers, 196 n., 274 n., 453,
477
Nicholas, Captain Robert Boyle, 479 n.
Nieuil, Captain de, 415
Nujer, 303, 313, 474 aud n.
NiyhtingaJe, 167 aud n., 206 u., 242 n.
Nightingale, Captain Gamaliel, 217, 218 n.,
227 n., 305
Nile, Battle of the, 551
Nivernois, Due de, 253
Noel, Captain, 125 n.
Noel, Captain Thomas, 113, 148 n., 150
Nombre de Dios, 79
Nonsuch, 96, 318, 400, 406 n., 428 u., 431,
434, 503, 520 n.
Norbury, Captain Coningsby (1), 34
Norbury, Captain Coningsby (2), 225
Norbury, Captain Richard, 222 n., 234 n.,
236 n.
Nore, The, 15, 26, 27, 42, 43, 113, 343
Norfolk, 48 n., 70 and n., 75 n., 83 n., 96,
98, 99 and n., 201 n., 202, 225, 240 n.,
242
Normandy, 196
Norris, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John, 26,
27, 39, 40-42, 47, 49, 65 n., 66, 67, 89,
90 and n., 112 n.
Norris, Captain Matthew, 4
Norris, Captain Richard, 96, 104, 273, 320
Norris, Vice-Admiral Harrv, 70, 71, 84,
125 n., 146, 156, 365
North America (see also American Colonies),
113-115, 116, 117, 139, 140, 141, 142,
144, 166-169, 172, 182-186, 189, 190,
196, 204-210, 224, 232, 233, 238, 239,
242, 243, 246 n., 249, 269, 270, 289, 300,
371, 440
North, Captain Abraham, 152 n.
North Hero, 363 n.
North, Lord, 537
North River, 382, 383: .--e^' also Hudson
River
North Sea, 224 n., 301, 311, 538, 539
Northern Powers, Difficulties with the, 25
et seq., 41-43, 478
Northesk (1), Admiral George Carnegie, Earl
of, 108, 120 n., 565
Northumberland, 169, 20(j. 20H, 218 n.,
226 n., 274 and n., 275 and n., 310,
533 n.
North-west Passage, The, 319, 320
Norton, Caj^tain William, 201 n.
Norway, 229, 258
Norwich, 54, 55, 56, 61, 62 and n., 86, 88,
139 n., 215 n., 226 n., 233 n., 242 n.,
312
Norwood, Captain Joseph, 238
Nott, Captain John Neale Plevdell, 242 n.,
246 n., 415, 482 n., 487
Nottiiniham, 43, 125 and n., 127 n., 128,
144,' 238, 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 282, 284,
^ 287, 312 (2)
Nova Colonia, 251
Nova Scotia, 109, 117. 138, 139, 141, 144,
371
Nucella, (-aptain Timothy, 131 n.
Nuesfra Seiiora de Cavadonga, 315, 323
Nuestra Seiiora del liosario, 47, 314
Nueva Espana, 135 n.
Nuits, 231 n.
Nymph, 545 n.
Ni/mjihe, 148 n., 295, 313, 415, 497 n., 512,
520 n.
Nystadt, Treaty of, 42
O'Bkien, Captain Christopher, ;!4
O'Brien, Rear - Admiral Lucius, 218 n.,
242 n., 291, 311, 566
O'Bryen, Rear-Admiral Edwaid (1), 406 u.
Ocean, 212 n., 213, 214, 313
Ocean, 415, 417, 424 and n., 425 n., 509 n.
Ocracoke Inlet, 259
Oflicers, Naval, 19, 21, 22, 340, 341
Ogle, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Chaloner (1),
Kt., 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, ii'S, 70, 79, 80,
85, 91, 103, 105, 109, 260, 261, 275
596
IXDi:X TO VOLUME III.
Ogle, Admiral Sir Chaloner (2), Bart., 224 n.,
235 n., 244, 567
Ogle, Captain Chaloner (3), 242 n., 245 n.,
246 n.
Oglethorpe, General James Edward, 269,
270 and n.
O'Hara, Captain William Henry King, 406 n.
Oiseau, 309, 314, 335
Old Broad Street, 2
Olivares, Captain Don H., 96
Oliuius, Captain Hon. John Luttrell : earlier,
Luttrell ; 234 n.
Onondaga, 226, 228
Onslow, Admiral Sir Kicharel, Bart., 312,
343, 400 n., 406 n., 428 n.
Onslow, Arthur, 3
Ontario, 311
Ontario, Lake, 144, 204, 205, 226
Opah, 244 n., 302, 314
Opinidtre, 165 n., 166, 313
Oporto, 54
Orbetello, 67
Ordinary, Ships in, 335, 336
Urford, 33, 34, 35, 64, 70 n., 76 n., 79 n.,
206 n., 246 n., 250, 267, 268, 274, 289,
310, 314
Orient, 218 n., 415, 550 n., 554, 560
Oriente, 96, 98
Oriflamme, 190, 212 n., 281, 306, 313 (2)
Orion, 510
Orissa, 561
Orleans, Isle d', 206, 207
Ormonde, James Butler, Duke of, 39
Orpliee, 148 n., 151 n., 189, 313
Orpheus, 403 n.
Orrok, Captain James, 187, 188, 215 n.,
234 n., 311
Ortegal, Cape, 53
Orves, Commodore Comte d', 96, 415, 545,
549
Orvilliers, Vice-Adiiiiral Comte d', 413, 414,
415, 417, 420, 422, 443, 444, 445, 446
Osborn, Admiral Henrv, 63, 96, 116, 145,
170, 189, 190, 280, 565
Osborn, Captain Peter, 96
Osborne, Robert, 3, 326
Osnabriick, 48
OsKonville, Captain d', 127 n.
Ostend, 316
Oswald, James, 4
Oswego, 204, 311
Otter, 86, 88, 310
Oud Tijlimien, 91
Ourry, Captain George, 240 n., 241, 400 n.,
406 n., 509 n.
Ourry, Captain Isaac Floriinond, 224, 240 u.
Ourry, Captain Paul Henry, 192, 234 n.,
236 n., 242 n., 327
Outarde, 165 n., 166, 313
Owen, Captain Thomas, 188
Owen, Commander William (2), 543 n.
Oxford, 12, 84 n., 96, 133 n., 135 n., 273,
285 and n., 313
I Pacific, The, or " South Seas," 52, 310,
I 316-318, 320-324
Pakenham, Cairtain Hon. Edward Michael :
Lord Longford, 415
Palais, Belle Isle, 235, 236
Palamos, 84
Palapa, 241
Palermo, 34
Pallas, 8, 194, 230 and n., 303
Palliere, Captain de La, 174 n., 179 n.,
198 n
Palliser (properly Pallisser), Admiral Sir
Hugh, Bart., 206 n., 209, 229, 251, 295,
2i;9, 326, 341, 343, 414, 415, 417, 419,
420, 421, 423-425, 435 n., 566
Palma, 148
Palmer, Colonel, 270
Palmer, William, 326
Palmetto logs, 373
Palmier, 300, 302, 415
Palmyra Point : see Pedara Point
Pamlico Sound, 259
Pamphleteering by naval officers, 112 n.
Panama, 52 n.', 54, 58, 76, 78, 79
Panic in England, 142, 445
Panther, 84 n., 201 n., 202, 203, 225, 240 n.,
241, 257
Panthere, 312
Panton, Captain John Alexander, 543 n.
Papageua, Captain Don Juan, 34
Paragon, 273
Pardaillan, Captain de, 271
Pardon to surrendering pirates, 17
Par fait, 312
Paris, 90, 253, 254
Parker, Alee- Admiral Sir Hyde (1), Bart ,
215 n., 240 n., 241, 324, 343, 395 n., 412
and n., 434, 440, 452, 453, 454 n., 459,
460, 474, 504-509, 566
Parker. Admiral Sir Hvde (2), Kt., 380,
385, 386, 406 n., 412 n., 441 and n., 442,
479 n., 505 n.
Parker, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter (1),
Bart., 201 and n., 234 n., 236 and n.,
372, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 380, 383,
387, 470, 473, 479, 494, 502, 566
Parliament, Recognition of public services
by, 58, 186, 222, 231, 242
Parma, 48
Parrey, Captain Anthony, 395 n., 520 n.
Parry, Admiral William (2), 148 n., 227 n.,
565
Parsons, H., shipbuilder, 335
Pascal, Captain Michael Henr}% 234 n., 238
Pasley, Admiral Sir Thomas, Bart., 546 n.
Passaro, Cape, 32 n., 33-38, 83 n.
Paston, Captain William, 195, 223 n., 235 n.
Patagonia, 322
Patent, The Admiralty, 1
Patereroes, 11 n., 57, 62 and n.
PatersoD, Lieutenant , 406 n.
Patton, Admiral Philip, 505 n.
Pavilion, Captain du, 530, 533 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
597
Pay, Naval (see also Wages), 19, 20, 104,
i23
Payta, 317, 321
Paz, Cajjtaiu de La, 135 n.
Peace: with France and Spain, 253-255, 564
Peadle, Commander M., 96
Pearce, Captain Vincent (1), 269, 270
Pearce, Captain Vincent (2), 200 n.
Pearce, Thomas, 3
Pearl, 54, 257, 259, 320, 321, 406 n., 428 n.,
492 n.
Pearson, Captain Sir Ricliard, Kt., 509 n.
Pedara, or Palmyra, Point, 197
Pegase, 538
Pegasus, 454 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Peighiu, Captain John, 223 n., 241 n.
Pelham, Henry, 18
Pelican, 206 n.
Pellew, Admiral Sir Edward : Lord Esmouth,
286, 365, 366, 379, 389
Pembroke, 125 n., 131 and n., 132, 206 n.,
209, 226 n., 246 n., 311, 312
Penas, Gulf of, 322
Penelope, 286
Penguin, 302, 311
Penkevel, 231 n.
Penmarck, 304
Pennsylvania, 386
Penny, Captain Taylor, 520 n.
Penryn, 52
Pensacola, 371
Pensions for wounds, 301
Pensions to dockyard artificers, 342
Penzance, 227 and n., 233 n., 242 n., 246 n.
Pepperel, Sir William, Bart., 110, 113-115
Perceval, Captain Hon. Philip Tufton, 206 n.
Peregrine, 3l2
Perla, 34, 37
Perle, 415
Perouse, Captain J. F. de G., Comte de La,
352 and n., 415
Perrier, Captain du, 274
Perseverance, 352
Persian Gulf, The, 200
Peru, 317, 321
Peter the Great, The Tsar, 26, 27, 41, 42
Peterhead, 257
Petersburg, Virginia, 473, 493
Petersham, Lord, 358
Petit Terre, 203
Petruche, Captain Don A., 96
Pett, Captain Robert, 96, 104
Pettigrew, Captain William, 125 n.
Peyton, Captain Edward, 119, 120 and n.,
121
Peyton, Admiral Josepli (1), 190, 212 n.,
298, 311, 415, 567
Peyton, Captain Sir Yelverton, Bait., 269,
270 n.
Pliaeton, 70 n., 76 n.
Pheasant, 311
Phenix, 120 n., 121
P/iiladelphia, 406 n.
VOL. III.
Philadel])hia, 370, 387, 390, 391, 392, 393,
397, 403, 404
PliiJibert, 125 n.
Philip v.. King of Spain, 29, 30, 31, 40, 89
Philippine Islands, The, 239-242
Philips, Henry John : see Towry, Henry
John Philips
Philipson, John, 3
Phillips, Lieutenant Baker, 278, 279
Phillips, Captain Erasmus, 310
Phillips, General, 473, 493
Phillips, the privateer, 282
Phillipson, Captain John, 84 n., 108
Phipps, Captain Hon. Charles, 509 n.
Phipps, Captain Hon. Constantine John ;
Lord Mulgrave, 346, 415
Phoenix, 12, 123, 148 and n., 149, 153,
223 n., 257, 269, 313, 314, 352, 386,
406 n., 408, 412 n., 441, 479 n.
Physician of the Fleet, 341, 450, 533
Piacenza, 48
Piece-work, Paying by, 336
Piercy, or Percy, Captain B^-ancis, 41 u.
Pierrepont, Charles : see Meadows, Captain
Charles
Pigeon Island, St. Lucia, 487
Pigot, Admiral Hugh (1), 206 n., 235 n.,
537, 538, 566
Pigot, General Sir Robert, 402, 409
Pigott, Admiral James, 546 n.
Pilotage, Rates for, 15
Pilots, Incompetent, 243
Pines, Isle of, 311
Pintado, Admiral, 65
Piracy, 17, 143, 257, 258-261, 262, 264,
288, 318
Piscataqua, 310
Pisco, 317
Pistols, 9
Pitchford, Samuel : see Cornish, Samuel
Pitchford
Pitch-heaters, 342
Pitt, Rt. Hon. William (1), later Earl of
Chatham, 210, 238, 254
Pitt, Rt. Hon. William (2), 347
Pittsburg, 141 n.
Pizarro, Admiral, 65, 267
Placentia, 251
Plague, 313 : see also Sickness, Sanitation,
etc.
Plassey, Battle of, 164
Plate, River (Rio de la Plata), 251
Playa Grande, 60, 68
Pleiade, 190
Plumbers, 342
Pluto, 283 n., 313, 415
Plymouth, 4, 12, 15, 21, 43, 53 n., 65, 108,
122, 126, 140, 187, 195, 196 n., 282, 296,
316, 327, 335, 336, 343, 347, 397, 425,
445, 446, 448
Plymouth, 12, 123 n., 133 n., 134, 135, 444
Pocahontas, 482 n.
Pocock, Admiral Sir George, K.B., 124, 128,
39
598
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
130, 137, 143, 161 u., 163, 164, 174-182,
197-200, 238, 245-250, 284, 565
Poder, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 315
Podor, 187
Point Judith, 403, 405
Pointe au Fer, 359
Pointe aux Trembles, 356
Pointe de Galle, 557
Poisins, Captain de, 64 u.
Pole-axes, 9
Pole, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles
!Morice, Bart., 543 n.
Politics in the Navy, 424,- 467, 549
Pomona, 474 and u.
Pomone, 227, 313
Pompey, 60, 62 n., 70 n., 76 n..
Pondicherry, 121, 122, 131, 139, 164, 174,
176, 177, 178, 181, 197, 199, 200, 224,
225, 232, 311, 543, 549, 552
Pondicherry, 546 n.
Ponte Yedra, 262
Poole, 46 n., Ill u., 112 n.
Popham, Eear-Admiral Sir Home Risigs,
341 n.
Pore-epic, 34
Porcupine, 206 n., 207, 209, 226 n., 227,
246 n.
Porlier, Captain Uuu J., 247 n.
Porquerolles, 94
Port au Paix, 226
Port au Prince, 300
Port Castries, St. Lucia, 429
Port Louis, France, 118
Port Louis, Guadeloupe, 203
Port Louis, Hispaniola, 61 n., 68, 133, 134,
272
Port Mahon, 32, 34 n., 36, 37 n., 40, 65,
101, 102, 104, 107, 146, 147, 148, 150,
151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 314, 439 n.
Port Mahon, 246 n., 257
Port Royal, 246 u.
Port Royal, Jamaica, 54, 59, 62, 63, 76,
132, 266, 267, 537
Port St. Julian, 320
Porte- Vezins, Captain de La, 415
Porter, Captain Jervis Henry, 302
Porter, Lieutenant , 242
Portland, 194, 296, 314, 338, 343
Portland, 43 n., 46 n., 127 n., 148 n., 151 n.,
169, 212 and n., 213, 214, 215, 218 n.,
282, 283, 287, 312 (3)
Portland's Prize, 283, 312
Porto, 546 n.
Porto Maria, Cuba, 267
Porto Novo, 178, 562
Porto Praya Bay, 350, 439 n., 546-549,
552
Porto Santo, 338
Portsmouth, 4, 12, 13, 14, 23, 46, 53, 90,
117, 128, 156, 158, 182, 232, 278, 288,
326, 335, 336, 337, 342, 396, 426 n.
Portsmouth, 187, 188
Portsmouth, Virginia, 488, 493, 494
Portugal, 50, 214, 238, 239, 251, 254, 274,
282, 302, 448
Postigo, Captain Don J. del, 247 n.
" Potential" fleets, 76, 77, 493
Pouruoyeiise, 550 u.
Powlett, Captain Charles, 135 n.
Powlett, Admiral Lord Harry : Duke of
Bolton, 84 n., 96, 131 n., 56o
Pownall, J., shipbuilder, 12, 335
Pownall, Captain Philemon, 306, 308, 406 n.
Pratten, Captain Edward, 191, 212 n., 214,
299
Prescott, Admiral Isaac, 415
President, 511
Preston, 108, 120 n., 131 n., 223 n., 387,
406 n., 409, 428 n., 431, 452, 466 n.,
505 n.
Preston, Captain William, 131 n.
Pretender, The Young, 16, 28, 66, 90, 110-
113, 257, 258, 279
Prevost, General, 441
Prices, in the West Indies, Effect of the
American war upon, 396 ; at Gibraltar,
448
Prideaux, Brigadier-General, 204
Prince, 212 and n.
Prince Edouard, 313
Prince Edward, 188, 189, 225 n., 226
Prince Edward's Island, 184 n.
Prince Eugene, 316
Prince Frederick, 41 n., 64, 70 n., 71, 72
and n., 125 n., 206 n., 235 n., 280, 286
Prince George, 125 n., 152 n., 190, 280,
297, 298, 311, 415, 449, 513 n., 520 n.
Pr-ince Noir, 218 n.
Prince of Orange, 63, 105, 206 n., 209,
220 n., 226 n., 234 n., 235, 236 n., 276
Prince of Wales, 428, 431, 434, 436
Prince Rupert's Bay, Dominica, 63, 64, 203
Prince William, 265, 335, 448 n., 482 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
Prince's battery, Gibraltar, 46
Princesa (wrongly Friucessa), 12, 66 and n.>
92, 96, 98, 122, 267, 268, 314, 449, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 520 n., 533
Princess Amelia, 12, 70 and n., 71, 75 n.,
171, 206, 235 n., 505 n.
Princess Augusta, 12
Princess Caroline, 70 ii., 71, 75 n., 83 n.,
96, 98 and n., 335
Princess Louisa, 54, 55, 56, 62 and n., 70 n.,
125 n., 127 n., 148 n., 150, 151 n., 153,
156, 169, 170, 212 n., 215, 310
Princess Mary, 121
Princess Eoyal, 72, 76 n., 395 n., 434, 454 n.
Principe de Asturias, 34, 35, 37, 314
Pringle, Vice-Admiral Thomas, 365, 431,
434
Prins Friso, 91
Prisoners of War, 2, 88
Privateers, 18, 26, 113, 115, 134, 137, 186,
228, 231 u., 232, 233, 245, 253, 257, 265,
272, 278, 279, 280, 282, 284, 285, 291,
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
59^
292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 331, 337, 396,
428
Privy Councillorship as a naval reward, 215
Prize-money, 18, 241, 249, 260, 341, 342,
350, 470
Proby, Captain Charles, 191, 206 n., 295,
308, 323 and n., 324, 326 (2)
Proissi, Captain de, 415
Promotion to flag-rank, 20, 343-347
Promotions on the occasion of a review, 343
Proserpine, 415
Protector, 143, 174 n., 225, 311
Protee, 185, 244, 335, 452, 520 n.
Protestant Succession, The, 29
Provence, 492 n.
Providian, Action off, 552-554
Prudent, 184, 290, 313, 491, 492 n., 513
and n., 520 n.
Prudente, 335, 509 n.
Prussia, 42, 192
Puerto Bello, 43, 44, 52 n., 54-57, 58, 59,
61, 78, 79 and n., 80, 274, 314
Puerto Cabello, 85, 87, 88
Puerto Rico, 254, 272, 537
Puerto Seguro, 317
Pulicat, 121
Pulteney, Mr., 67 n., 78 n.
Pumps, Ships', 336, 337
Punta Brava, 87
Pursers, 19
Purvis, Captain Charles Wager, 96
Purvis, Captain George, 3
Vje, Admiral Sir Thomas, Kt., 310, 343,
565
QcjADRAXT, The, 3, 10
Quadruple Alliance (1718), The, 29 and n.,
39,40
Quebec, 116, 117, 140, 141, 182, 196, 204-
210, 222, 226, 227, 281, 313, 354, 356,
357, 361, 366, 368
Queen, 415, 509 n.
Queen Anne's Revenge, 259
Queen Charlotte, 335
Queenborouqli, 174 n., 176, 179 n., 181,
198 n., 200, 225, 311
Queen's (or King's) Regulations and Ad-
miralty Instructions, 15 and n.
Quenel, Governor of Cape Breton, M. de,
109
Quiberon Bay, 118, 217-223, 224, 231, 232,
283, 307, 311, 324, 341 n.
Quibo, 317, 321, 323
Quinta, La, 73
Piucehorse, 206 n., 209, 210, 226 n., 227
Rackam, John, 260
Radeaux, 361, 362 and n., 365
Radstock, Lord : see Waldegrave, Admiral
Hon. Sir William
Painbow, 212 n., 332 (2)
Rainier, Admiral Peter (1), 545 n., 550 n.,
552 n.
Raisonnnhle, 203, 242 n., 243, 299, 311^
313, 339, 404, 406 n.
Ramhorst, 91
RamilUe^, 148 n., 151, 153, 156, 171, 231..
311, 335 (2), 415
Ramsay, 230
Ramsgate, 16
Ranee, River, 194
Randall and Co., shipbuilders, 335
Rating of ships, 7, 328, 330
Rattlesnake, 546 n.
Rawdon, Lord, 344, 346
Rawling, Captain John, 296 and n.
Rayner, Captain John, 406 n., 409, 428 n.,
431
Real, 34, 314
Real Familia, 135 n.
Real Felipe, 96, 97, 98 and n., 100 and n.,
102, 314
Real San Felipe, 34 and n., 35, 37, 38
Real Trasporte, Admiral the ]\Iarques del,
247 n.
Reals, Captain de, 415
Rear-Admirals, 19, 20
Rebecca, 50, 265 n.
Recovery, 317
Red Bank, New Jersey, 391, 392
Reddall, Captain Ambrose, 545 n., 550 n.,.
552 n.
Reddish, Captain Henry, 57
Redoubtable, 148 n., 151 n., 212 n., 214, 313
Reeve, Vice- Admiral Samuel, 391
Re-embarking in face of an enemv, 195
Reflechi, 415, 452
Reflectors in lighthouses, 338
Reggio, 32 n., 37
Reggio, Admiral Don Andrea, 34, 135 n.
Regiments : 15th, 63 n. ; 24;;^, 63 n. ; Dal-
zelVs, 87 and n. ; 40^/*, 109 ; Royal Fusi-
liers, 147 ; Royal Higlilanders, 201 n. ;
Louisbourg Grenadiers, 209 ; 62nd, 229 ;.
79^;/;, 239 ; Royal Artillery, 240
Registration of seamen, 18
Regteren, Captain Grave van, 505 n.
Reid, Captain James, 373
Heina, 247, 315
Relief of Quebec, by Douglas, 357, 358
Remittances by seamen, 18
Rennes, Bishop of, 102
Benommee, 114, 115, 120 n., 219 n., 284,
308, 312
Renown, 193, 201 n., 203, 313, 387, 404,
406 n., 409, 509 n.
Rentone, Captain James, 57 n., 58, 68, 73,
76, 133 n., 134 and n.
Rentorin, Captain Don J., 96
Reprisals, 44, 51
Repulse, 233 n., 242 n., 301, 520 n.
Repulse Bay, 319
Resolu, 352
Resolutio7i, 218 n., 219, 221, 311, 337,
341 n., 482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 514, 515,
520 n., 534
39—2
600
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Restitution, 178
Hestoration, 143
Retez, Don Francisco Martinez de, 57
Eetiremeut: see Superannuation, Pensions,
etc.
Hetiro, 96
Reunion, 510 n.
Eeval 41 42
Revenge, 96, 143, 148 n., 164, 181, 189, 197,
199, 218 n., 219, 273, 289, 313
Eevest, Commodore du, 167, 169
He views, Naval, 343
Eeward for discovery of a North-west
Passage, 319
Rewards for capturing pirates, 17
Reynolds, Francis (later Moreton) : see
Jloreton, Captain Francis Reynolds ;
afterwards Lord Ducie
Reynolds, Captain Henry, 550 n., 552
Revnolds, Admiral John (1), 216, 222 n.,
566
Rhe, Isle de, 191, 282
Rhinoceros, 313
Rhode Island, 387, 402, 403, 404, 407, 409,
410, 411, 443, 471, 542
Rich, Admiral Sir Thomas, Bart., 482 n.
Rich, Captain Edward, 123 n.
Richards, Commander Francis, 206 n.
Richelieu, Marshal the Due de, 142, 146,
149
Richelieu River, 356, 358, 361
Richmond, 206 n., 226 n., 245, 246 n., 304,
313, 406 n., 497 n.
Richmond, Virginia, 488
Ridley, Sir Matthew White, 344
Riedesel, General Baron, 359, 365, 367, 368
Riggers, 342
Rigging of a man-of-war, 329
Rijneveld, Captain van, 505 n.
Rijsbraak, the sculptor, 231 n.
Rio de Janeiro, 251
Rio Grande (S. America), 322
Ripon (or Rippon), 12, 34, 43, 70 n., 71,
76, 201 and n., 202, 235 n., 246 n., 267,
305, 315, 543 n.
Rivadeo, 261
Rivarole, Marchese de, 38, 116
Rivett, Lieutenant P., 505 n.
Roatan Island, 80 and n.
Roberts, Bartholomew, 260 and n., 261
Roberts, Captain John, 310
liobertson, Captain George, 505 n.
liobinson, Captain Hugh, 395 n., 492 n.
Robinson, Captain Mark (1), 201 n., 311,
413 n., 415, 482 n., 497 n.
Ro'.)inson, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
liobiuson. Commander William, 550 u.
Robust, 415, 491, 492 n.
J.'ohusfe, 218 n., 313, 415
Roca Partida, 317
Rochambeau, Admiral de, 107, 274, 282
Rocliambeau, General de, 488, 495, 501
Roche-Allard, Admiral the Marquis de La, 59
Rochechouart, Captain Yicomte de, 415
Rochefort, 89 n., 140, 145, 171-172, 224,
252, 291, 302
Rochelle, La, 293
Rochester, 33, 34, 193, 216, 218 and n.,
227 n., 242 n., 308, 313
Roddam, Admiral Robert, 294, 311, 566
Rodney, 206 n.
Rodney, Admiral Sir George Brvdges : Loid
Rodney, K.B., 127 n., 183, 190 n., 196,
215 and n., 224, 231, 232, 233, 239, 242-
245, 252, 283 n., 387, 393, 408, 425, 432,
440, 443 and n., 448-471, 472, 477-488,
494, 502, 504, 506, 508, 519-538, 565
Rodney, CajDtain Hon. John, 513 n., 520 n.
Roebuck, 80 n., 201 and n., 202, 203, 335,
386, 406 n.
Rogers, Captain Sir Frederick, Bart., 4, 327
Rogers, George, 326
Rogers, Woodes, 316
Roland, 415
RoUo, Colonel Lord, 228, 233
Roman Emperor, 188
Romney, 12, 81, 96, 546 and n.
Romulus, 489, 492 n.
Roofing ships in ordinary, 836
Rooke, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George,
26 n., 112 n.
Roquefeuil, Admiral Comte de, 59 u., 89,
90,92
Rosas Bay, 102
Rosbau, Captain de, 174 n.
Roscoff, 113
Rose, 148 n., 192, 242 n., 246 n., 266, 279,
298, 313, 315, 335
Rosewell, Captain Henry, 120 n.
Rosewell, J., shipbuilder, 12
Ross, Captain Sir John, Kt., C.B., quoted,
533
Ross (j)reviously Lockhart), Yice-Admiral
Sir John Lockhart, Bart., 215 n., 218 n.,
293 and n., 415, 567
Ross-shire, 39
Rostan, 299
Rothe, Commander Peter, 505 n.
Rouge, Cape, 209
Rouret, Captain du, 127 n.
Rous, Captain John, 113-115, 141, 168, 183,
206 n., 208
Routh, Captain Robert, 206 n.
Row-galleys, 359, 360, 363, 365
Rowley, Vice-Admiral Sir Joshua, Bart.,
190, 193, 195, 218 n., 250, 415, 434, 435,
437, 438, 452, 454 n., 460, 567
Rowley, Admiral of the Fleet Sir William,
82 and n., 94-97, 101, 103, 107, 108, 116,
565
Rowzier, Captain John, 131 n.
Rowzier, Captain Richard, 34
Roi/al Aune, 257, 310 (2)
Roycd Caroline, 237
Royal Charlotte, 12, 237,- 546 n.
" Royal Family," 'ihe, 285
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
601
Pioyal Fortune, 260
Pioijal George, 12, 44, 218 n., 231, 449,
540
Eoyal Naval Exliibition of 1891, 338
Jioi/al Oak, 34, 35, 46 n., 47, 81, 92, 96,
iOl, 103, 314 (2), 395 n., 434, 492 n.,
497 □., 520 n., 524
Royal Savage, 365, 366
Eoyal Society, The, 203 n., 352
Boyal Sovereign, 12
Royal United Service Institution, 21
Boyal William, 171, 185, 206, 209, 231,
235 n., 303
Rubis, 125 n., 312
Ruby, 131 n., 395, 474 and n., 475, 476
Rudyard's Eddystone Lighthouse, 14
Rupert, 31, 32, 34, 35, 96, 101, 104
Rushout, Sir John, Bart., 3
Rushworth, Captain John, 224 n.
Russel, Captain John, 96, 101 n.
Russell, 70 and n., 71, 75 n., 96, 101, 286,
315, 395 n., 482 n., 483 n., 486, 510 n.,
513 n., 520 n., 532, 535
Russell, Admiral of the Fleet Edward : Earl
of Orford, 2, 112 n.
Russell, John, 4
Russia, 26 et seq., 41-43, 47, 61 n., 340
Ruyter, Captain de, 550 n.
Rye, 187, 188, 201 n.
Saba, 480
Sada, Captain Don Michael de, 34
Sadras, 176, 550-552
Sage, 148 n., 151 n.
Saqittaire, 522
Sail-cloth, 14
Sailing Instructions, 94 and n.
Sail-makers, 342
Saint-Cesaire, Captain de, 533 n.
St. Allans, 78 n., 79 n., 212 n., 267, 274,
276, 298, 310, 313, 400, 406 n., 428 n.,
431, 513 n , 520 n.
St. Anne's Bav, Martinique, 243
St. Augustine," Florida, 63 n., 269, 270, 314,
441 .
St. Bon, Captain (afterwards Admiral) de,
at Lissa, 202
St. Brieuc, 194
St. Cas, Disaster in the Bay of, 194, 195
St. Catherine's, 314
St. Catherine's Light, 338
St. Charles River, Quebec, 207
St. Christopher: see St. Kitt's
St. Clair, General Hon. James, 118
S't. Croix, Chevalier de, 236
St. Esprit, 96, 280, 415
St. Eustatia, Florida, 269
St. Eustatia, or St. Eustatius, West Indies,
242, 300, 480, 481, 486. 503
St. Felix, Captain de, 550 n., 556
St. Foy, 235
St. Francis de Pupa, Fort, 269
St. George, 156, 201 n., 202, 292
St. George, Chevalier de : see Pretender, The
Yoimg
St. Georges, M. Grou de, 124, 125 n.
St. Helen's, 43, 66, 107, 118, 147, 167, 182,
216, 231, 234, 261, 311, 320, 445, 502,
545 n.
St. James's Square, 2
St. John, Captain Hon. Henry (1), 238,
454 n., 462 n.
St. John, Island of (Prince Edward's Island),
184 and n., 185
St. John's, Lake Champlain, 356, 358, 359,.
360, 361, 362, 366, 368, 370, 371
St. John's, Newfoundland, 210, 250, 251,
253, 312
St. John's River, Florida, 269
St. Kitt's {or St. Christopher), 54 n., 64, 85,
122, 369, 433, 440, 469, 479, 480, 486,
501, 510-519, 521
St. Lawrence, River, 182, 205, 206-210, 226,
227, 228, 311, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358,
361.
St. Loe, Commander Edward (2), 311
St. Loe, Rear- Admiral Edward (1), 45 and
n., 264
St. Lows, 120 n., 174 n., 175, 179 n.,198 n.
St. Lucia, 242 n., 244, 254, 428, 429, 431,.
432, 433, 434, 452, 463, 464, 466, 469,
478, 481, 482, 484, 486, 487, 510, 519,
520
St. Lunaire Bay, 194
St. Malo, 113, 192, 193, 194, 229, 291, 293^
296 445
St. Martin, Rhe', 191, 282
St. Martin, West Indies, 480
St. Michel, 415, 557, 563 n.
St. Nazaire, 110
St. Nicholas Island, 311
St. Philip's Castle, Minorca, 148, 153, 157
St. Pierre, Island of, 253
St. Pierre, Martinique, 202, 245
St. Poissonniere, M. de ; his still, 337
St. Servand, 313
St. Tropez, Gulf of, 84, 273, 310, 314
St. Vincent, 244, 254, 433, 434, 479, 488
St. Vincent, Cape, 438, 449, 540
St. Vincent, Earl : see Jervis, Sir John
Ste. Anne, 306, 313
Ste. Marguerite, 123
Ste. Therese, Isle, 228
Saintes, The, 203, 311, 522, 525, 527
Salamander, 84 n., 212 n., 2 1 5, 497 n., 520 n.
Salavarria, Captain, 318
Saldanha Bay, 350, 548
Salines, Pointe des, Martinique, 482, 483,
484
Saliez, Captain de, 125 n., 126
Salines, The, 244
Salisbury, 41 n., 43 n., 96, 140, 161 and n.,.
163, 174 n., 175, 179 u., 198 n., 311
Sallee, 258
Salou, 211
Salt at the Tortugas, Right to collect, 263
<J02
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Salt, Commander Sampson, 1G7 n.
Saltash, 188, 310, 311
Salter, Captain Elliot, 497 n.
Salvert, Commodore Perrier (1) de, 139
Salvert, Captain Perrier (2) de, 550 n.
Samar, Island of, 241, 3'J3
Sanibala Keys, 59, 310
San Antonio, 247 n., 315
San Bias, Gulf of, 79
San Bruno, 448 n.
San Carloa, 34, 35, 37, 71 n., 72,. 314 (2),
448 n., 546 n.
Sandgate, 335
San Domingo (see also Hispaniola), 145,
284, 286,^294, 308, 453, 468, 469, 470,
473, 494, 495, 496, 537
Sandwich, 222 n., 231, 234 n., 235, 236
and n., 415, 449, 454 n., 456, 458, 459,
486, 539
Sandwich, John, Earl of, 2, 111 n., 325,
345, 366 and n.
Sandy Hook, 379, 390, 398, 399, 400, 404,
408, 441, 470, 495, 502
Ban Eugenia, 449
San Felipe, 71 n., 72, 314 (2)
San Fermin, 448 n.
San Fernando, 34, 37, 96, 314
San Fernando Menor, 34
San Francisco d^Assis, 34
San Genaro, 247 n., 249, 250, 312, 314, 315
>an h>doro, 34, 35, 36 n., 273, 314, 315
Sanitation, 23, 44-46, 337
San Jeronimo, 54, 56, 57
San Joaquin, 314
San Jose, 314
San Juan, 314
San Juan Bautista, 34, 314
San Juan de Puerto Eico, 59
San Juan Menor, 34, 314
San Julian, 449
San Justo, Captain Don de, 135 n.
San Lucar, 449
San Luis, 34, 35
San Miguel, 540
San Pedro, 34, 37, 314
San Bafael, 448 n.
San Sebastian, 261, 308
Santa Cruz (Canaries), 188
Santa Fe, 62
Santa hahela, 34, 36, 37, 314
Santa Marqaritta, 497 n.
Santa Martha, 60, 314
Santa Monica, 520 n.
Saiitander, 47, 65
Santa Bosa, 34, 35, 37, 314
Santa Bosalia, 314
Santa Teresa, 314, 448 n,
Santiago de Cuba, 76, 77, 78, 133, 134, 135,
272
Santisima Trinidad, 241, 315
Santo Domingo, 449
San Vincenie, 448 n.
Sapphire, 218 n.
Sapphire's Prize, Oil
Saratoga, 354, 370, 391
Sardinia, 29, 40, 49, 92 n., 116, 253
Sardoine, 313
Sartine, 335
Saumarez, Admiral Sir James : Lord de
Saumarez, 376, 379, 509 n., 510 and n.,
520 n.
Saumarez, Captain Philip de, 125 n., 127 n.,
128 and n., 282, 321, 323, 324
Saumarez, Captain Thomas, 217
Saunders, Admiral Sir ( harles, K.B., 3,
127 n., 128, 152, 155, 160, 169, 189, 190,
195, 196, 204-209, 210, 222 and n., 223,
224, 228, 232, 239 and n., 252, 310, 324
325, 565
Saunders, Eear-Adnural (Russian service),
43 n.
Saunders, Eear-Admiral Sir George, Kt., 3,
4, 32, 34
Saurins-Murat, Captain de, 96
Suuvage, 165 n.
Sauzon, 235
Savage, Admiral Henry, 520 n.
Savage, 311, 312
Savannah, Eiver and Town, 441, 442, 471,
472
Savoy, 29 et seq., 40, 89
Sawkins, the buccaneer, 258
Sawyer, Admiral Herbert (1), 212 n., 308,
428, 434, 567
Saxe, Marshal, 118, 119
^ Saxton, Captain Sir Charles, Bart., 327,
497 n., 513 n.
Sayer, Vice-Admiral James, 152 n., 187,
188, 566
Scarborough, 72, 76 n., 86, 88, 186 n., 206 n.,
259, 263, 264, 479 n.
Sceptre, 165 n., 557, 563 n.
Schanck, Admiral John, 361
Schenectady, 204
Scheveningen, 304
Schomberg, Captain Sir Alexander, Kt., 14,
183, 206 n., 227 and n., 234 n., 330 n.
Schooners, 330
Schuyler, General, 358
Schuvler's Island, 367
Schuylkill Eiver, 391 n.
Scilly Isles, The, 14, 91, 445, 446, 504, 539
Scipio, 339
Sclater, or Slaughter, Captain George, 96,
104
Scorpion, 12, 206 n., 312
Scott, Captain Alexander (1), 373
Scott, Captain Arthur, 4, 127 n., 283 u.
Scott, Commander James (1), 16, 60
Scott, Captain Sanuiel, 224 n.
Scotland, 110-113, 196, 201 n., 223, 224, 261
Scouting, Inefficient, 67 n.
Scroggs, the navigator, 318, 319
Scrope, Captain Carr, 147, 148 n., 153,
234 n., 311
Scurvy, 117, 319, 321, 323, 563
INDEX TO VOLUME 111.
603
Seaford, 241 and n., 27-t, 310, 337
Seahortie, 70 n., 190, 206 d.,- :08, 231 d.,
240, 241 and n., 297, 304 and n., 543 n.,
550 n., 552 n., 563 n.
8ea Islands, The, 372
Seakonnet Channel, 402
Seamen, Encouragement of, 18, 19, 339, 340
Seamen on the Authorised Establishment,
Number of, 5, 327
Sea-power, Strikinsi; illustrations of the in-
fluence of, 181, l82, 186, 200, 358; In-
fluence of, in the N. American campaign,
353 et seq., 393, 394
Search, Right of, 138, 252, 253, 263, 351, 352
Secrecy at a court-martial. The oath of, 158
Secretaries of the Admiralty, 3, 3"J6
Seething Lane, 2
Seizure of British ships, 26
Senederre, 209
Senegal, 186-189, 254, 311
Seniority, Objections to promotion to flag-
rank b}', 345
Sensible, 415
Sepoys, 131, 161
Serapia, 279
Serieux, 96, 125 n., 126, 312
Serin, 415
Serpent, 335
Servants, Oflicers', 19
Seven Years' War, The, 7, 84, 140, 222 n.,
254, 255, 289 et seq., 295
Severe, 550 n., 556, 563 n.
Severn (called Secerne while in French
^ hands), 122, 127 n., 311, 312, 320, 321
Severndroog, 143
Seville, Treaty of, 48, 50
Seymour, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George
Francis, 317
Shannon, 183, 212 u.
Sham on, The, 445
Sheerness, 54 n., 57, 70 n., 76 n., 112 n.,
212 n., 294, 314
Sheerness, 336, 339, 351
Shell-fire (see also Bombs), 136, 374
Shelvocke Island, 317
Shelvocke, Lieutenant William, 316-318
Shipbuilders, 12, 335
Ships, Advantages of large, 411, 412
Ships captured and lost, 310-315
Ships, Cost of, 10
Ships, Dimensions of, 9, 12, 335
Ships on the strength of the Navy, 7, 328
Ships, Superiority of French, 522
Shipwrights, 342 and n.
Shirley, Captain Thomas, 218 n., 347
Shirley Galley, 113, 115
Shirley, General, 510
Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, 77, 109,
10, 115
Shirley, Vice-Admiral Hon. Washington :
later Earl Ferrers, 218 n., 284, 566
Shoreham, 57 n., 70 n., 71, 73, 76 n., 266,
267, 285
Shot-hole stopping apparatus, 337
Shovell, Admiral Sir Clowdisley, 112 n.,
288 n.
Shreivshury, 34, 70 and n., 75 n., 206, 229,
I 299, 303, 415, 482 n., 486, 497 n., 498,
513 n.
Shuldham, Admiral Molyneux: Lord Shuld-
ham, 201 n., 202, 203, 242 n., 243, 290
and n., 291, 311 (2) 566
; SihTjl, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Sicie, Cape, 95, 211
Sicily, 29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 38, 40, 84
Sick and Wounded Board, The, 1
Sickness (see also Sanitation), 71, 72, 74,
117, 118, 132, 141, 154, 178, 182, 193,
203, 250, 276, 278, 281, 282, 286, 290,
321, 322, 323, 3:^9, 443, 444, 446, 468
Signals, 175, 220, 221, 225, 444
Sillery, 208, 227
I Simonton, Captain Robert, 545 n.
Sincere, 415
Sirene, 225 n., 226, 313
I Sir Thomas Roe's Welcome, 318, 319, 320
Skerries, The, 15
Skynner, Captain Lancelot, 302 and n.
' Skyrm, the pirate, 260
Slade, Sir Thomas, Kt., 3, 8, 326, 335
Slaves released, 144
Sloops, 330
Small-pox (see also Sickness, Sanitation),
[ 358
Smalls Rock Lighthouse, 338
" Smasher," The, 331
Smeaton, John, 14, 15
; Smith, Admiral Edward Tvrrel, 520 n.
! Smith, Admiral Thomas (4), 112, 156, 196
and n.
Smith, Admiral Sir William Sidney, 341
Smith, Captain Edward, 272
Smith, Captain Elliot, 86
Smith, Cai^tain Heniy, 161 n.
Smith, Captain James, 206 n., 208, 304
and n.
Smith, Captain Richard, 206 n.
Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel, 157
Smiths, 342
Smoke in action, 156
Smollett, quoted, 47
Smuggling, 15, 16, 17, 262, 263
Soanes, Captain Joseph, 41 n.
Solerano, 24:7, 315
Sobiero, 96
Soissons, Congress at, 47 and n., 48
Solebay, 47, 224 n., 274, 282, 298, 310, 373,
374, 497 n., 513 and n.
Solebay, or Southwold Bay, 40
Soleil Boyal, 209, 218 n., 220 n., 221, 313
Soledad, 314
SoVde, 96
Solitaire, 218 n., 415
Somers, Captain Thomas, 115
Somerset, 92, 96, 101, 185, 206 n., 222 n.,
400, 406 n.
604
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Somerset, Captain John Stukley, 17i u.,
179 n., 198 n., 199
Sommelsdijck, Vice- Admiral \a.n, 48 n.
Sorel, 358
Sorlings, 310
Sorpresa, 34, 314
Soulances, Captain de, 415
Soimd,"The, 26
South Africa, 197
South Sea Company, The, 44, 58
Southampton, 8, 231 n., 234 n., 296, 297,
301, 312, 313, 343
Southill, 160
Southsea Castle, 224, 241 n., 312
Souverain, 212 n., 213, 302
Spain, 29 et seq., 39, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49-52,
58, 65, 66, 89, 102, 139, 238, 239, 261,
265, 292, 443
Spanish humanity, 322
Spartel, Cape, 32, 271
Spartivento, Cape, 37
Speedwell, 311, 316, 317
Speke, Captain Henry, 161 n., 162, 218 n.,
311
Spence, 269, 270
Sphinx, 191, 218 n., 373, 406 n., 415, 546 n.,
550 n., 554, 563 n.
Spilbergen, the voyager, 317
Spinola, Rear- Admiral, 135 n.
Spion, 505 n,
Spithead, 30, 47, 48 n., 50, 63, 66, 90, 108,
117, 141, 142, 156, 158, 172, 186, 191,
192, 193, 206, 210, 231, 250, 289, 301,
324, 338, 343, 395, 412, 445, 446, 503,
540, 542
Split Rock, 367
Spottiswood, Colonel, 58 and n.
Sprightly, 505 n.
Springs, Use of, 399, 400, 512, 516
Spry, Rear-Admiral Sir Richard, 131 n.,
141, 144, 206 n., 235 n., 239, 244, 252,
343, 566
Spry, Lieutenant , 406 n.
Sptj, 201 n.
Squirrel, 70 n., 183, 206 n., 208, 269, 272,
314, 335
Stag, 223 n., 242 n.
Staering, Captain A. C, 505 n.
Stanhope, Admiral Hon. Sir Henry Edwyn,
513 n.
Stanhope, Rear-Admiral John, 513 n., 520 n.
Stanhope, Captain Sir Thomas, Kt., 189,
190, 212 n., 215, 218 n., 234 u., 235, 236
and n., 237, 283 n.
Stanliope, Colonel, Minister to Spain, 31
Stanhope, Lord, 30
Stanton, Captain Jolin, 174, 311
Stanwix, Brigadier-General, 204, 205
Stapleton, Captain Miles, 54 n., 58
Starhemherg, 316
Staringh, Captain, 505 n.
Starke, Lieutenant , 361, 365
Start, The, 63
Staten Island, 380, 382, 383
Stephens, Captain Nathaniel, 120 n., 131 n.
Stephens, Sir Philip, Bart., 326
Stepnej', Captain George, 96
Stevens, Rear-Admiral Charles, 127 in., 164,.
174, 175, 179 n., 181, 198 and n., 200,
224, 225, 232, 282, 287, 289
Stevens, Captain William, 550 n., 552
Stewart, Captain Henry, 86, 'S'S, 272
Stewart (or Steuart), Admiral of the Fleet
James, 63, 91
Stewart, Yiee-Admiral Hon. Keith (1),<233,
415, 568
Stills fitted in men-of-war, 337
Stillwater, 391
Stirling, Captain Sir Walter, Kt., 188,
234 n., 509 n.
Stirling Castle, 23 and n., 46, 96, 98, 190 n.,
206 and u., 233 n., 242 n., 245 n., 246 n.,
281, 415, 434, 454 n., 456, 479 n.
Stock market. The, 445
Stockholm, 26, 41, 42, 43
Stores, Lack of, 440
Stork, 300, 311
Storms, 27, 39, 58, 59 (2), 63, 90, 108, 121,
122, 132, 166, 169, 172, 186, 190 n., 193,
209, 215, 217, 219-221, 225, 231, 250,
272, 275, 276, 311-315, 321, 397, 404,
408, 449, 478, 479, 489, 540
Storr, Rear-Admiral John, 189, 218 n.,
234 n., 236 n., 567
Stott, Captain John, 183, 206 n.
Strachau, a seaman, 161
Strachan, Capt:iin Sir John, Bart., 218 n.,
296
Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard John, Bart.,
352
Strafford, 54, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62 and n., 70 n.,
76, 123 n., 133 n., 134, 135 n.
Strait of Le Maire, 320, 321
Strange, Captain Edmund (or Edward), 96
Strickland, Mce-Admiral Charles, 34
Stroniboli, or Stromholo, 70 n., 76 n., 190,.
206 n., 406 n.
Stromo, 229
Stuart, General, 154
Stuart, Yice-Admiral Hon. Charles, 257 and
n., 264, 265, 266
Stuarts, Tlie, 42, 89, 257, 258
Stutzer, Commander, 505 n.
Subtile, 283 and n., 284, 312, 550 n.
Success, 34, 61, 62 n., 70 n., 192, 316, 317
Suckling, Captain ]\Taurice, 165 and n., 166,.
236 n., 300, 326
Suffolk, 70 n., 71, 76, 85, 86, 87, 434, 438,
454 n.
Suffren, Yice-Admiral Pierre Andre, Bailli
de, 200, 212 n., 402, 439 and n., 451, 457,
482, 508, 539, 546-564
Sugar, 21
Sidlivan, General, (U.S.A.), 409, 410
Sullivan's Island, 372, 373
Sulphur, 406 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
605
tiidtan, 395 n., 43-i, 436, 437, 474, 552
and n., 556, 560, 563 n.
Sumatra, 200, 561
Sunday observances, 21, 23
Sunderland, 167 and n., 197, 19H n., 199,
^ 206 n., 225, 276, 277, 278, 311, 312
Sunderland, Lord, 30
Superannuated Eear-Admirals, 344, 340
Superannuation of officers, 20, 344
Superb, 115, 250, 545 n.. 550 n.. 552 n.,
554, 563 n.
Superhe, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 43, 45, G."., 88 u.,
90, 218 n., 220, 313
Superstition, 317
Surajah Dowleh, Nawab of Bengal, 160, 163,
164
Surf, 183, 193, 241
Surgeons, 2, 19, 340
Surgidero at Cartagena, The, 72 and n., 73
Surprise, 223 n., 357, 505 n.
Surveillante, 415
Surveyors of the Navy, 3, 326, 335
Surville, Captain de (1), 198 n.
Surville, Cajstain de (2), 174 n., 179 n.,
198 n.
Sutherland, 96, 183, 208, 227 n., 233 n.,
242 n., 245 n., 246 u.
Sutherland, Captain Andrew, 482 n., 483 n.,
484, 520 n.
Sutton, Captain Evelyn, 350, 415, 546 n., 548
Sutton, Captain Eobert Manners, 505 u.,
509 n.
Swallovj, 46 n., 131 and n., 143, 260, 311,
494, 495
Swan, 187, 188 i
Swan, Lieutenant J. B., 505 n. i
Swanton, Bear- Admiral Eobert, 172, 206 n.,
222 n., 224, 227 and n., 232, 242 n., 243,
244, 245, 310, 313, 565
Swanton, Captain Thomas (1), 3, 4
Sweden, 26 et se^i., 40-42, 43, 47, 229, 257,
340, 341
Sweeps, 226, 503
Swift, 335
Sw'iftsure, 189, 190, 212 and n., 213, 215^
218 n., 219, 234 n., 236
Swivels, 11 n.
Swiney, Admiral William, 492 n.
Sylphide, 174 n., 175, 198 n., 550 n.
Symonds, Captain Thomas, 373
Symons, Vice-Admiral John, 482 n., 520 n.
Syracuse, 35, 36, 38
Syren, 373
Taafe, Lieutenant , 278
Tagus, The, 50, 91, 107, 274, 310
Talbot, Captain George, 545 n., 550 n.,
552 n.
Talbot, the privateer, James, 280, 285
Tangier, 47 n.
Tanjore, 132, 178
Tapageur, 546 n.
Tarragona, 211 n.
'I'arrvtown, 380, 385
Tartar, 224 n., 238, 269, 293, 338, 386,
505 n., 509 n.
'Tartar's Prize, 212 n., 293, 311
Tathwell, Commander Joseph, 399 n.
Tavlor, Captain Polycarpus, 133 n., 135 n.
Taylor, Captain Thomas (1), 311
Taylor, Captain Wittewronge, 172, 231, 311
Tchesme, Battle of, 341 n.
Tea, 21
Teach, or Thatch, Edward : see Thatch
Telemaque, 296
Temeraire, 148 n., 151 n., 212 n., 214, 215,
233, 234 n., 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 313
Temple, 218 u., 242 u., 245 n., 246 n., 249,
250, 312, 313
Temple, Eichard, Earl, 2
Temple, Sir Eichard, 4, 326
Teruay, Commodore de, 250, 251, 252, 471,
475-477, 488
Tenerife, 187
Terpmchore, 230 and n., 231, 232
Terrible, 8, 12, 60, 62 n., 70 u., 84 n., 96,
97, 98, 122, 123 and n., 127 n., 206, 312,
415, 454 n , 459, 482 n., 497 n., 501
Terror, 12, 113, 282, 546 n.
Texel, The, 507, 508, 539
Thalia, 335
Thames, 302, 313
Thames, Eiver, 12, 335
Thatch, Edward, known as " Blackbeard,"
259, 260
Thcscc, 218 n., 219, 220, 313
Thetis, 125 and n., 126, 299
Thetis, 212 n., 247 and n., 306, 313, 315,
339
Thiercelin, Captain, 125 n.
Thisbe, 350, 351
Tholen, 91
Thompson, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles (1),
Bart., 482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Thompson, Captain Edward, 19, 21 and n.,
22,23
Thompson, Cai:)tain Samuel, 234 n., 346 and
n., 492 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Three Brothers, 263
Thuuder, 46 n., 161 and n , 242 n., 245 n.,
246 n., 276, 310, 373, 374, 406 n.
Thunderer, 306, 313, 361, 365, 415, 479 n.
Thurot, Commodore Francois, 196, 223,
224, 229-231 and n., 296,'297, 298, 299
Tiburon, Cape, 68, 308
Ticonderoga, 185, 204, 205, 355, 356, 359,
363, 364, 368. 370, 386, 389
Tiddeman, Captain Eichard, 173, 198 n.,
240 and n,, 242
Tierra Bomba, 69, 73
2'iger, 43, 46 n., 47, 76 n., 140, 161 and n.,
162, 163, 174 n., 175, 179 and n., 180,
198 n., 199, 272, 310
Tigre, 34, 96, 247, 314, 315
Tilbury, 62, 70 n., 71, 76 u., 127 n., 135 n.,
169, 273, 310, 311
606
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
Tilly, Captain de, 492 n.
Timber, 5, 335
Timekeepers, 13, 14 and n.
Timewell, Benjamin, 3
" Tin-clads," Precursors of the American,
442
Tindall, Captain George, 224 n.
Tinian, 323
'I'inker, Captain John Bladon, 223 n., 225
Tippoo Sultan, 351
Tisiphone, 509 n., 510
Tobago, 138, 254, 487, 521
Toby, Commander Richard, 161 n.
Toll, Captain Edmond, 133 n., 135 n.
Toms, Captain Peter, 310
Tonnage, Computation of, 9 n.
Tonnant, 127 n., 128, 129, 185, :i8 n,
Tonyn, Captain George Anthonv, 206 n.,
309
Topaze, 148 n.
Torbay, 66, 70 n., 217, 312
Torhay, 4(i u., '(5 n., 96, 141, 171, 188,
218 n., 219, 2:0, £34 n., 299, 312, 482 n.,
504, 513 n., 520 n. j
Torres, Admiral Don Eodrigo de, 34, 58, 59,
62, 63, 65, 76, 77, 107
Torres, Conde de las, 46
Torrington, 267
Torriugton, Adnural of the Fleet Sir George
Byng, Viscount, 3, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33-
38, 38 n., 40, 112 n., 257, 314
Tortuga, 136, 263, 272, 310
Tortuga Banks, The, 135
Touche, Captain de La, 492 n.
Touches, Commodore des, 415, 488, 489-
493
Touchet, Mr. Samuel, 186
Toulon, 59, 66, 84, 85, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96,
107, 124, 142, 146, 160, 169, 189, 190,
210, 211, 215, 229, 274, 280, 310, 394,
397, 411, 442, 469
Toulouse, 96
Tournel, :\1., 117
Tower Hill, 2
Townesend, Captain Sir Isaac, Kt., 4
Townley, Captain Edmund, 161 n.
Townsend, Admiral Isaac (^2), 70, 116, 117,
122, 280, 565
Townsend, Charles, 326
Townshend, Admiral Hon. George, 96, 116,
130, 145, 209, 281, 565
Townshend, General Hon. George, 209
Towry, Captain John, 4, 96
Towry (prcLtously Philips), Captain Henry
John Philips, 215 n., 222 n.
Trade, Eflect of war on : (nee also Convoys,
Privateers, etc.), 130, 138, 231, 232, 245,
_'0.j.
257, 296, 478
Trafalgar,
Tranquebar, 178
Transit of Venus, Expedition to observe the,
304 and n.
Treachery : Dutch, 85 n. ; Bengalese, 163
Treasure ships, Spanish, 44, 53, 65, 135,
136, 238, 241, 271, 279, 280, 308, 315
Treasurers of the Navy, 3, 326
Treatv; of Paris (1763), 254; between
France and the United States, 394, 426
Trefusis, Captain Thomas, 4
Trelawney, Captain Sir William, Bart.,
201 n., 202, 203
Trelawney, Governor of Jamaica, 68 n., 76,
79 and n., 80
Tremigon, Captain de, 415, 546 n.
7VeH^ 185, 206 n., 207, 246 n., 248, 301
Trenton, 388
Tres Moutes, Peninsula of, 322
Trevanion, Captain Sir Nicholas, Kt., 4
Trevenen, Captain, (Russian Navy) 341
and n.
Trevor, Captain John, 62
Trevor, Captain Thomas, 54, 55
Trevor, Captain Tudor, 41 n.
Trial, or Tryal, 253, 310, 320, 321
TriaVs Prize 321
Trident, 96, 'l27 n., 148 n., 150, 156, 206
n., 209, 226 n., 236 and n., 312, 400, 406
n. 434 454 n. 459
Trin'coma'le, 121,' 131, 132, 181, 197, 224,
225, 550, 552, 554, 557-560, 561, 562
Trinite, La, 243
Trinity House, Corporation of, 14 n., 342
'J'riomphant, 458, 510, 533 n.
Triple Alliance (1717), The, 29
Triijoli, 288 n.
Triton, 76 n., 78, 79 and n., 148 n., 151 n.,
161 n., 164, 174, 212 n., 311, 415, 513 n.,
520 n.
Triumph, 57 n., 59, 143, 310, 466 n., 486
Triunfc, 314
Trobriand, Captain de, 415
Trollope, Admiral Sir Henry, 333
Tromelin, Captain du, 550 n.
Tronjolv, Commodore, 543
'J roude,''M., quoted, 129, 486, 525
Truscott, Eear-Admiral "William, 466 n.,
I 505 n., 520 n.
j Tucker, Captain "William, 242 n., 311
Tullibardine, Marquis of, 39
Turin, 92
Turpin, ( aptain de, 415
Tuscanv, 67, 292
1 Tweed,''22Z n., 235 n.
i Tivo Sisters, 263
Tyranny, Naval, 21, 22
Tyrrell, Eear-Admiral Eichard, 86, 152 n.,
201 n., 222 n., 300 and n., 565
i Uliuca Ele.^kora, Queen of Sweden, 41
Unclaimed prize and bounty money, 342
Unicorn, 215 n., 235 n., 296, 299, 304,
313
Uniform, 20, 21, 347-350
Union, 218 n,, 235 n., 509 n.
Uppleby, Captain Samuel, 387, 406 n., 109,
428 n., 479 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
607
Upton, Commander Arthur, 167 n., 169, 311
Urry, Captain Jol.n, 246 n.
Ushant, Cape, 65, 276, 287, 413, 415, 426
n., 443 n., 444, 445, 465, 509, 539
Usher, Captain Arthur, 246 n.
Utrecht, Treaty of, 29, 109
Utting, Captain Ashby, 310
Uvedale, Captain Samuel, 225, 246 n., 347,
454 n.
Vachell, Commander George, 284 an dn.,
311 (2)
Vado Bay, 124
Vaillant, 303
Vainqueur, 296
Valeur, 225 n., 226, 313
Valevale, Captain Don Ignacio, 34
Valcour Island, 361-368, 385
Valiant, 234 n., 235, 246 n., 415, 509 n.,
520 n.
Valparaiso, 322
Vanbrugh, Captain Charles, 34, 310
Vanbrugh, Captain Giles Richard, 96
Vanbrugh, < aptain Philip, 4, 34
Vandeput, Admiral George, 543 n.
Vandeidussen, Colonel, 270 and n.
Vandore, Captain de, 492 n.
Vanguard, 172, 206, 222 n., 227 and n.,
242 n.
Vanicoro Island, 352 n.
Vannes, 196
Var, River, 123, 124
Varlo, Captain Weston, 201 n.
Vashon, Admiral James, 505 n., 520 n.
Vaudreuil, Vice-Admiral the JMarquis de,
96, 127 n., 207, 228, 415, 523, 529, 530,
535, 536, 537
Vaughan, Admiral John, 566
Vaughan, General, 479, 480, 481
Vaughan, the navigator, 318
Vauneulon, Captain, 125 n.
Vaus, Marechal de, 446
Vega Florida, Captain Conde de, 96
Velasco, 248
Velasco, Captain Don Luis de, 247 n., 248
Venezuela, 85
Venganza, 247 n., 315
Vengeance, 217, 218 n., 227 n., 305, 415,
454 n.
Vengeur, 174 n., 179 n., 198 n., 415, 452,
546 n., 550 n., 559, 563 n.
Ventura, 308, 315
Venus, 218 n., 302, 305, 308, 313 (4), 406
n., 428 n., 431, 454 n., 505 n.
Venus, 274
Vera Cruz, 135
Vere, Lord : see Beaucleik, Admiral Lord
Vere
Verger, Commodore St. Andre du, 218 n.,
219
Vernon, Admiral Edward (1), 6 n., 16, 17,
52 and n., 53-65, 67-80, 85, 111 and n.,
112 n., 134, 267, 271, 274, 277 n.
Vernon, Admiral Sir Edward (2), Kt., 212 n.,
291, 311, 343, 543 and n., 567
Versailles, 119
Vestal, 8, 215 n., 300, 301 and n., 313
Vestale, 218 n., 304, 313
Vesuvius, 70 n., 76 n., 206 n., 234 n.
Veth, Rear -Admiral Lucas de, 26
Vice- Admirals, 19
Vicomte', Captain de La, 533 n.
Vidoire, 293
Victor, 479 n.
Victonj, 66, 107, 108, 274 and n., 310, 335,
415, 417, 419, 420, 421, 424, 509 n., 538
Victualling Office, Portsmouth, 343
Victuals, 21
A'ienua, 316
Vienna, Treaty of, 42
Vierge, 313
Vigie, La, St. Lucia, 429, 431
Viyilant, 122, 125 and n., 131 n., 392,
406 n., 415, 434, 454 n.
Vigilante, 115, 312
Vignault, Captain de, 127 n.
Vigo, 40, 261, 262, 306, 311
Vilaine, River, 218 n., 221, 223, 224, 233,
313
Vilena, Captain Don M. de, 96
Villa Franca, 84, 92, 314
Villalobos, the voyager, 317
Villa vicentia. Captain Don Manuel, 34
Ville de Faris, 335, 415, 496 n., 513, 514,
518, 525, 526, 532, 533, 534, 535
Villebrune, Captain de, 492 n.
Vincent, Admiral Nicholas, 174 n., 177,567
Viucente, Captain Don J., 247 n.
Viper, 143, 246 n.
Virgin, 242 n., 311, 313
Virgin Queen, 70 n.
Virginia, 335
Virginia, 139
Virginia, 259, 399, 442, 473, 488, 489, 493
Volage, 96, 281,312
Volante, 34, 35, 37, 314
Volcano, 406 n.
Vriesland, 91
Vulcan, 70 n., 76, 125 n., 415
Vulture, 167 n.
Wachtmeister, Admiral Baron, 41
Wager, 310, 320, 321-323, 549 n.
Wager, Admiral Sir Charles, Kt., 2, 3, 43,
46, 47, 48, 112 n., 319
Wager River, 319, 320
Wages, Payment of, 18
Waldegrave, Admiral Hon. Sir William (1) ;
Lord Radstock, 509 n.
Wales, H.R.H. Frederick, Prince of, 193
Wales, of Greenwich, Mr., 338
Walker, Captain Samuel Hood, 479 n.
Walker, Lieutenant , 246 n., 249
Walker, the privateer, George, 276, 280,
282, 285, 286
Wallabout Bay, 383
608
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Wallace, Admiral Sir .Tames. Kt., 387,
406 n., 409, 520 n.
Wallingfurd House, 2
Wallis, Captain Samuel, 206 n., 226 n.,
284 n., 236 n., 326 (2)
AValpole, Sir Robert, 67, 31Si
Walsh, merchant of Nantes, 110
Walsingham, Capiain Hon. Robert Boyle
(earlier Hon. Robert Bovle), 185, 215 n.,
242 n., 298, 306, 415, 469, 469 n.
AValthenham Bay, 76
Walton, Admiral Sir George, 34, 35, 36
and n., 43, 314
War declared with Spain, 39, 52 ; -with
France, 91, 142 ; Avith Spain, 238 ; begun
"with France, 397 ; by Spain with Britain,
443 ; by Britain against Holland, 478
Ward, Captain Henrv, 148 n.
AVare, M., shipbuilder, 335
NVarrant officers : see Masters, Gunners,
Pursers, Surgeons, Boatswains, Carpen-
ters, etc.
Warrants, 111 n., 112 n.
Warren, Yice-Admiral Sir Peter, K.B., 88 n.,
110, 113-115, 124, 125 n., 126, 129, 130,
J 38, 269, 272, 283, 312
Warrior, 520 n., 524
Warspite, 212 and n., 213, 214, 215, 218 n.,
219, 220
Warwick, 92, 96, 98, 133 n., 135 u., 136,
191, 285, 290, 304, 305, 311, 313, 335
Warwick, Captain Thomas, 161 and n.,
163
WashirKjton, 367
Washington, Captahi, (njil.), 71 n.
Washington, General George, 139 and n.,
371, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388,
390, 393, 398, 401, 402, 405, 469, 470,
471, 472, 488, 495, 496, 501, 502
Water, 23, 337
AVaterbury, Colonel, 364, 366, 367, 369
Waterhouse, Captain Thomas, 54, 55
Watkins, Captain John (2), 96
Watkins, Captain Richard, 86, 88, 96, 289
and u., 311
Wats(m, A'ice-Admiral Charles, 96, 125 n.,
127 n., 140, 142-144, 160-164
Watson, Ca])tain Thomas (1), 55, 71, 72,
274, 275, 310
Watson, Captain Thomas (2), 454 n., 466 n.
Watt, Captain James, 406 n., 552 n., 560
Weather gage, Advantages of the, 484, 486,
531, 532
Wmzel, 128, 133 n., 137, 201 n., 284, 300 n.
Webb, Captain James, 152 n., 223 n.
Webber, Rear- Admiral Charles, 246 n., 567
Welderen, Captain Grave van, 505 n.
Wellard, Captain Robert, 300
AVells and Co., shipbuilders, 335
Wells, Vice-Admiral Thomas (1), 495
Wentworth, General Thoinas, 63, 64 n., 08,
70-80
West, Admiral 'I'humas, 513 u., 520 n.
West Africa, 21 n., 138, 139, 169, 173,.
186-189
West Indiaman, 283
West Indies, 17, 42-46, 48, 50, 52 etc., 58,
62, 67-80, 85-88, 91, 105, 110, 114, 115,
116, 126, 128, 130, 132-137, 142, 146,
167, .173, 189, 196, 203, 204, 217, 225,
226, 233, 238, 239, 242-250, 267, 271,
272, 279, 284, 289, 302, 303, 310, 311,
312, 315, 395, 426 et seq., 447, 448, 451,
471, 478, 480, 509, 510
Westminster Abbej^ 128 n., 209
West Point, 385, 392
West, Vice-Admiral Temple, 96, 104, 125 n.,
142, 146, 148 n., 152, 154, 155, 156, 158,
170
Wetzel, General, 32 n., 37 n.
Weymouth, 343
Weymouth, 64, 68, 70 n., 73, 174 n., 175,
177, 179 n., 198 n., 199, 240 n., 261, 310
Whalelone, 319
Whalebone Point, 319
Wheeler, Captain Edward, 152 u., 215 n.,
224 n., 301, 306
Wheelock, Captain John, 206 n., 226 n.,
246 n., 248, 395 n.
White, Captain Thomas (1), quoted, 500 n.,
517,518
White Point, Louisbourg, 183
White, the navigator, Francis, 320
Whitehall, 2
Whitehaven, 311
Whiteside, Henry, 338
Whitshed, Admiral of the Fleet Sir James
Hawkins (earlier James Hawkins), 479 n.
Whitwell, Captain Matthew, 222 n.
Whorwood, Captain Thomas, 4
Widows and Children, Provision for, 18, 19
Wiertz, Captain, 505 n.
Wight, Isle of, 173, 193, 351, 396, 445, 446
Wilkinson, Captain Andrew, 212 n.
Wilkinson, Captain George, 513 n., 520 u.
Wilkinson, Captain Thomas, 395 n.
Willes, Sir John, Lord Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas, 105, 106
Willett, Captain William Saltren, 218 n.,
234 n.
William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland,
Prince, 66 and n.
William Hemy, Duke of Clarence (later
King William IV.), Admiral of the Fleet
Prince, 343 n., 568
Williams, Captain Edmund, 90, 103, 104
and n.
Williams, Captain James, 513 n., 520 n.
Williams, Sir John, Kt., 326
Williams, Captain William, 373
Williams, William Peere, aftenvards Ad-
miral of the Fleet William Peere Williams
Freeman, 400 n., 431
Willis, Captain Francis, 310
Willis, Captain Thomas, 215 u.
Willis's battery, Gibraltar, 47
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
609
Wilmiugton, 472, 473
"Wilson, Admiral George (1), 513 n., 520 n.
Wilson, Lieutenant Eobert, 131 n.
Winchelsea, 43 n., 94, 96, 168, 201 and n.
283, 299, 311
"Winchelsea, Daniel. Earl of, 2
Winchester, 41 n.,'46 n., 120 n., 203, 238,
261
Windage allowance in guns, 11
Winder, Captain Joseph, 34
WDidsor, 41 n., 57, 61, 62, 70, 75 n., 125 n.,
127 n., 267, 301, 313
"Windsor, Captain Hon. Thomas, 415
Windward Islands (see also West Indies,
Martinique, etc.), 468, 469, 535
Windward Passage, The, 134
AVinter, Ships laid up in, 6, 323
Witchell, Mr., 338
Woensel, Captain van, 505 n.
Wolf, 63, 68, 70 n., 215 n., 269, 270, 284,
310, 311 (2)
Wolfe, Colonel, 70
Wolfe, General James, 183, 184, 196, 204-
209, 357
Wolseley, Admiral Charles, 552 n., 568
AVomen on shipboard, 22, 23, 540
Wood, Captain Charles, 546 n., 550 u., 559,
560
AA^ooldridge, Captain Francis, 479 n.
Woolwich, 4, 12, 335, 336
Woolwich, 122, 201 and n., 203, 224 n.,
242 n.
Worcester, 39, 54, 55, 56, 57 n., 70 n., 76 p.,
79 n., 80, 123 n., 133 n., 272, 314, 415,
545 n., 550 n., 552 n., 556, 559, 560,
563 n.
AVorge, Lieutenant-Colonel, 188, 189
AVorms, Treaty of, 89 u.
Wright, Captain Lawrence, 4
AVright, the privateer, Fortuuatus, 276, 292
Wyborg, Battle of, 341 u.
AVyndham, Captain Charles, 59, 61
Wynyard, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 u.
XlMANI, 69
A'achts, Royal, 237, 330, 335
Awards, 329
Yarmouth, 125 and n., 127 n., 128, 174 n.,
175, 176, 179 n., 180, 198 n., 434, 458,
520 n.
Yarmouth, 224, 310, 454 u.
" Yellow Admirals," 344
York, 46 n., 70, 76, 79 n., 131 n., 200 n.,
232, 434
ATork, Duke of : see Edward Augustus, Duke
of York, Prince
A^ork Factory, 320
A^ork River, 4i)4, 496
Y^orktown, 405, 442, 471, 494, 502
Young, Admiral James (1), 148 n., 218 n.,
223, 239, 252, 565
Y'"oung, Captain AValter, 450, 454 n., 458,
459
Zaffabine Islands, 541
Zavallos, Don .Juan Carlos Gutierrez de,
62
Zehra, 335, 520 u.
ZeU, 525, 526, 529
' Zenobie, 314
Zephijr, 505 n.
I ZepMjr, 96, 244 n., 290, 309, 313
Zephyr, 206 n., 242 n.
Zierikzee, 91
Zodiaque, 174 n., 175, 179 u., 180, 181,
198 and n., 199, 415
Zoutman, Rear- Admiral Johan Arnold, 505-
I 508
' Zwalaiv, 505 u.
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